

LAND & WATER
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AUG. 22 - NOV. 14 1914

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THE BRITISH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF



FIELD-MARSHAL SIR JOHN FRENCH, K.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

Field-Marshal Sir John French was born in 1852, and began his career in the service of his country as a naval cadet and midshipman in the Royal Navy from 1866 to 1870. In 1874 he entered the 8th Hussars, and was transferred to the 19th Hussars, with which regiment he went through the Soudan Campaign of 1884-5, being in the actions of Abu Klea, Gubut, and Metemneh. In 1889 he assumed command of his regiment, and in 1897 was appointed Brigadier in command of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. On the outbreak of the South African war Sir John was appointed Major-General, and given command of the Cavalry Division in Natal. He was in command at the battle of Elandslaagte, and of the cavalry of Sir George White's force at Reirfontein and Lombard's Kop. Promoted Lieutenant-General in 1900, he took part in many important engagements, remaining on actual field service up to the end of the war. Promoted to General in 1907, and appointed Inspector-General of the Forces, which post he held up to 1911. In 1913 he received his Baton, and on the outbreak of the present war was given the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force.

WITH THE BELGIAN ARMY



DOGS EMPLOYED BY THE BELGIAN ARMY

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BELGIAN INFANTRY MARCHING TO THEIR POSITION

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BELGIANS, DUTCH, AND GERMANS



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Tending the wound of a Belgian Officer




Copyright, Newspaper Illustrations **DUTCH AND GERMAN SOLDIERS SIDE BY SIDE**
On the Dutch-Belgian Frontier at Emsden



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GERMAN CAVALRY OF THE 25th REGIMENT ENTERING MOULAND, NEAR VISE



KIN & GEORGE V.

THE NATION'S BULWARKS
H.M.S. King George V., Flagship of the 2nd Battle Squadron

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CURRENT SPORT

THE hunting people in the United Kingdom are responding quickly to the call to do what is possible for their country in this time of trouble. All the horses of the Heythrop Hounds have been placed at the disposal of the War Office by Mr. Albert Brassey, the Master of the Hunt. Mr. F. M. Freake and Mr. C. T. Garland, both prominent hunting men in Warwickshire and well-known polo players, have joined the Suffolk Yeomanry at Portsmouth. Mr. Emmett, of Moreton Paddox, is raising a troop of his own, and Mr. Polehampton, of Walton Wood House, has joined the Army Flying Corps. Mr. Charles Romer Williams and Mr. Nicholson have joined the Intelligence Department as interpreters, and Mrs. Garland and Mrs. Emmett are converting their Warwickshire houses into convalescent homes.

A PRACTICAL suggestion is made by Mr. A. S. Sherwood, secretary to the Walton Heath Golf Club. He points out most golf clubs possess or can readily secure the control of a few acres of vacant land which might be cultivated, thus providing employment for unskilled workers and adding to the nation's food supply. At Walton Heath an experiment is being made with twelve acres of land. There are 2000 golf clubs in the country, and if each devoted two or three acres to cultivation, employment would be provided for many thrown out of work. Another suggestion is to the effect that golf houses should be utilised as hospitals or convalescent homes.

IN the opening match of the challenge round for the Davis Cup A. F. Wilding (Australasia) defeated R. N. Williams (America) in straight sets, 7-5, 6-2, 6-3. M. E. McLoughlin (America) defeated Norman Brookes in the second of the two singles. McLoughlin squared the match at one all by a magnificent straight-set victory. The game was one of the most brilliant ever seen in a Davis Cup contest. The first set, which went to thirty-two games, was the longest ever witnessed in a Davis Cup tie. The strain of the first set exhausted Brookes, and consequently he was unable to show his best form in the other two sets. The first set was a brilliant exhibition of faultless tennis, both men placing with machine-like accuracy. Each won his own service till Brookes began to tire, when his game slowly weakened.

THE following notice appeared in last Thursday's "Racing Calendar":—"The Stewards of the Jockey Club desire to point out how important it is in case of abandonment of race meetings that a decision should be arrived at by the local Stewards and announced sufficiently long before the date of the meeting to avoid any inconvenience or expense to owners dispatching their horses unnecessarily. At the same time the Stewards of the Jockey Club do not wish this to be taken as a discouragement to executives from making every effort

to hold their meetings. In fact they hope that local Stewards will not decide on abandoning unless they are quite satisfied that it is imperative for them to do so, as it must be remembered that any prolonged discontinuance of racing will throw a large number of persons dependent upon it for their livelihood out of employment. On public grounds it is desirable that no reason should be published for the abandonment of a fixture."

LORD CAVAN, Master of the Hertfordshire Hounds, has written a letter to all interested in the Hunt to explain how they stand in the present crisis. He writes: "I have received an appointment which will keep me fully occupied. Seventeen kennel horses have gone to the regular cavalry. At the same time I hope it will be possible for the Hunt servants to get out on young horses or cast horses and to kill a large number of cubs, and I have given such instructions as I can to this effect. May I appeal to covert owners, keepers, rearers of poultry, and farmers, at least to give the hounds the first chance of killing foxes, resting assured that their interests will not be lost sight of even in the turmoil of war."

IRISH RED SETTER FIELD TRIALS

By "OVER AND UNDER"

THE Irish Red Setter Club Field Trials were held on Tuesday, August 4, at the Marquess of Waterford's shooting lodge, Glenbride. There was a large attendance, and Lady Waterford, who kindly entertained the members and visitors to tea, was out on both days.

Owing to the War Office requiring his services, Sir William Austin, Bart., was unable to judge, and Colonel Milner kindly consented to act in his place, together with Mr. Tooney, D.L.

A start was made with Mr. Wood's Fountainstown Meg and the Rev. J. Meehan's Caislean a'Bharraigh. Meg kept too near her handler and Caislean was not very steady on a brace of grouse. Brian of Boyne and Clonterry Flo got several points and dropped to a rabbit, while Brian only scored a back; both might have worked a bit wider in their range. Gruniard Gloria and Fountainstown Meg then came together; Gloria was slow and not much of a ranger. Clonterry Flo was down with Caislean. Flo false-pointed, but then worked one grouse well. She proved a merry worker, with great tail action, and improved as the trials went on; she also got nearly all the points. After a few more trials of Gruniard Gloria, Brian of Boyne, and Caislean a'Bharraigh

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| 33 Sulphur Dun | 55H Willow Fly | 70 Earth Beetle | 90 Green Bug |
| 36 March Brown | 56H Dark Needle | 71 Corixa | 91 Wren Tail |
| 37 Early Olive Dun | 58 Cornflake Sedge | 72 Water Boatman | |
| 3 Evening Crane Fly | 12 Hoverer Fly | 38 Small Red Spinner | 58 Willow Fly |
| 4 Gravel Bed Fly | 13 Small Hoverer Fly | 39 Red Spinner | 56 Dark Needle |
| 5 Small Yellow Crane Fly | 17 Green Bottle | 40 Yellow Tail Spinner | 57 Bustard |
| 6 Olive Gnat | 18 Oak Fly | 44 Olive Spinner | 76 Blue Lacewing |
| 7 Black Gnat | 23 Striped Hoverer | 45 Jenny Spinner | 80 Alder |
| 8 Green Gnat | 24 Wood Fly | 51 February Red | 84 Sand Wasp |
| 9 Ruby Gnat | 25 Speckles | 52 Yellow Sally, Pale | 96 Black Ant |
| 10 Brown Gnat | 34 Brown Spinner | 53 Quill Body | 97 Red Ant |
| 11 Cow Dung Fly | 35 Brown and Yellow Spinner | 54 Early Brown | 101 Green Beetle |
| 1 Large Crane Fly | 31 Yellow Dun | 55 Small Yellow Sally | 102 Small Beetle |
| 2 Orange Crane Fly | 50 Stone Fly | 88 Ruby Wasp | 98 Red & Black Caterpillar |
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the awards were given as follows:—1st, Clonterry Flo; 2nd, Caislean a'Bharraigh; 3rd, Brian of Boyne.

The Grand All-Aged Stake opened with Tony of Boyne v. Clondalee. The latter had a good point on grouse, and was backed, but Tony flushed three grouse later. Glenavon Kitty and Curraghmore Brevity both muddled a grouse. Brevity pointed two grouse well, but was a bit sticky and inclined to false-point. Kitty was faster, but did nothing. Max of Gallawa, an English setter that went fast with good range, was down with Clondalee. Clondalee false-pointed, and was well backed, but later Max poked up some grouse and was not steady. A further trial was then given to Clondalee and Brevity, when Clondalee got a good point. After Tony of Boyne had been tried with Glenavon Kitty, without much result, the awards were given as follows:—1st, Clondalee; 2nd, Curraghmore Brevity; 3rd, Glenavon Kitty.

In the Irish Red Setter All-Aged Stake Tony of Boyne met Cinderella. Tony got a good back, but later would not notice a snipe; he then pointed and worked out some grouse well, and went the faster of the two. Cinderella sprang a grouse and later was weak in her point. Noreen of Boyne then met Glenavon Kitty. Kitty pointed grouse well, but Noreen was not steady to wing, and later got in on grouse and sprung them, and was inclined to false-point. Kitty was whistled at too much and is not a good backer. Caislean a'Bharraigh and Red Flag came together. Caislean pointed and sprang three grouse. Flag would not back, and sprung three grouse. Both sprung grouse later Caislean was afterwards weak in pointing. After Tony and Kitty had been tried the prizes were awarded as follows:—1st, Tony of Boyne; 2nd, Cinderella; 3rd, Glenavon Kitty.

The braces were next down, and Max of Gallawa and Sibyl of Gallawa were the faster pair, the better rangers, and did the better work, and gained first prize. Curraghmore Brevity and Curraghmore Ben, pointers, gained second prize; and Tony of Boyne and Noreen of Boyne, third prize.

About a thousand employees of the Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd., have been called up for active service. During their absence the Company will pay half wages to the families of all the married men, whose places will also be kept open for them.

HORSE SALES

ALDRIDGE'S.

MESSRS. W. & S. FREEMAN.—There was a good attendance at the sale held at St. Martin's Lane on Wednesday, August 12, and there was a brisk trade for a horse of size and quality. A roan mare, quiet in harness, realised the top price of the day, changing owners at 58 gns.

LEICESTER.

MESSRS. WARNER, SHEPPARD & WADE.—This firm are holding their next sale at the above repository on Saturday, September 5. Owing to so many horses having been taken for the Army, there is sure to be a good demand for cobs, ponies, and other horses suitable for trade purposes, and owners of such will find this an excellent opportunity for disposing of them.

THE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have made special inquiries by their own officers into the supply of meat now in cold storage in the principal centres in England and Wales. As regards chilled and frozen meat, the existing stocks are sufficient to meet the ordinary needs at the normal rate of consumption for about six weeks, while there are three to four weeks' supply on passage and due to arrive shortly. As regards home supplies, which represent 60 per cent. of the total consumption, the Board have ascertained from the recently collected agricultural returns that there is a substantial increase in the numbers of live stock as compared with last year.

OWING to the international crisis the British Motor Boat Club has decided to abandon all racing this season.


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BOOKS RECEIVED

THE "Candid Quarterly Review of Public Affairs: Political, Scientific, Social, and Literary." Conducted by Thomas Gibson Bowles. Frederick Henry Garratt. 5s. net.


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


MR. HILAIRE BELLOC

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The Expeditionary Force Disembarking at Boulogne

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FRENCH TROOPS MOVING OUT OF NAMUR



BELGIAN TROOPS (MACHINE GUN SECTION)
Resting after a Heavy Engagement near Louvain

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LAND AND WATER

THE MYSTERY OF THE NORTH SEA



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A DAY WITH THE CUBHUNTERS
Gone to Ground

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AMONG THE CUBS

All-Round Value of the Preliminary Campaign

By "RAMBLER"



IN the grave situation so quickly brought about by the international crisis on the Continent, the vast majority of people have been little inclined to turn their thoughts seriously or for any length of time to the subject of sport. Yet it says much for the self-possession of the British sportsman that although his first and unwavering desire is to do something of solid usefulness for his country, when and where his services are not required, he does not fidget and fume in gloomy idleness, but is up and doing and bracing himself with healthy exercise in the open air.

And so in a relatively minor degree grouse shooting is going on in the north, cricket and golf are being played, and a few Masters of Foxhounds are here and there already giving attention to the cubs in the woodlands and the education of their young hounds.

The hunting outlook may appear to be decidedly obscured at the moment, for it is feared that in the coming winter "money will be very tight," and that there may be many resignations of masterships on that account, while it is certain that there will be scarcely any horses left for hunting purposes; but it is early yet to talk of the probable effects of the great international upheaval upon our sport at home. For the time being, at all events, hunting is not likely to be altogether abandoned, though, as at the time of the South African War, it will be conducted in quite a subdued and modified way as compared with times of peace and prosperity at home and abroad.

In the Farmers' Interests

That cubhunting is an all-important branch of the chase needs no telling, and if there is to be any regular hunting when November comes round, war or no war, the ensuing weeks must be devoted to this educational part of the business by huntsmen and their hounds. For one thing, the conditions are fairly favourable for an early start in the big woodlands this autumn, and by all accounts most countries, where the preliminary campaign is taken seriously, are well stocked with foxes. Farmers' interests have to be studied, and too many foxes in a country are certainly a nuisance. Thorough cubhunting, then, is an advantage to all concerned, and, although countries and their needs vary vastly, and no hard-and-fast rules may be said to govern cubhunting generally, it is a maxim that may be commonly applied that early and genuine work in the big coverts means a steady pack of hounds, straight-necked foxes, and high-class sport when the real thing begins.

There are some countries which are ideal for the making of a pack of hounds. The Grafton is one; the Fitzwilliam another; and many other well-wooded countries might be named in the same category. In big well-foxed woodlands there can be real drilling without unnecessary noise or holloaing, and without holding-up and mobbing. I have long held the opinion that it is neither for the good of the pack nor for the encouragement of bold straight-necked foxes to force tired cubs back into covert when they have been well rattled and hustled. Of course, hounds must have blood, and pretty regularly, but not to the excessive amount which many huntsmen seem to crave for. And where the harvest is over, and the ground is not too hard, no great harm can be done in allowing the hounds from following the cubs into the open occasionally, though I know that this is not a canon in the creed of very many Masters and huntsmen until September is over. I always hold that the sporting custom of the late Mr. Coupland, during his most successful mastership of the Quorn, is the one to adopt. "Let every fox be driven out of covert," was his maxim, "and then clap hounds on the last one to leave and kill him if they can." Even in early September the Quorn used to have some sharp little scurries over the open in those days; and I am sure the subsequent winter sport proved that the efficiency of Tom Firr and his beauties had in no wise been adversely affected.

Riot

There are widely different views regarding even the entering of young hounds to foxhunting. There always have been. When Jack Raven, Mr. Meynell's famous old huntsman, saw Jones, his cork-legged whipper-in, start off in



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AN EXPECTANT FIELD

pursuit of a hound which was running a hare, he pulled him up with the remark: "Let him alone; he'll stop soon enough when he sees what he is after." And so it proved; but there are not many huntsmen at the present day who conduct their early operations on quite such lenient principles. Still, even now there are men who let their puppies start by hunting whatsoever they like so long as they do hunt something, and afterwards by degrees stop them from all kinds of riot.

Opinions vary also as to the size of the pack to take into the large woodlands. A few Masters even now believe to some extent in the doctrine which used to be held by owners of strong kennels in the early days—that of starting cubhunting with very large packs. I believe it was Mr. Meynell, again, who began by taking as many as eighty couple into the field in August. No doubt it was sweet to the ears of a keen hunting man to hear the woodlands echo with the music of such an enormous number of hounds. And how they must have made the startled foxes fly! But Mr. Meynell discovered that better results could be obtained with a far smaller pack, and he soon brought the number down to about thirty couple. Still, there are Masters to-day who believe in making quite a call upon the resources of their kennel, when the early work begins in the extensive woodlands.

The Big Woods First

It has been said—but I have never known an instance myself—that some Masters are disposed to think that by "nursing" the big coverts instead of hunting them, they are more likely to find in them and have good sport from them in winter. It would be a huge mistake, for, as the author of "Notitia Venatica" laid down, so long as there is a chance of finding and killing foxes in the larger woodlands during the first part of cubhunting at all events, hounds should on no account be taken to draw small spinneys. Perhaps there are easy-going short-sighted huntsmen who prefer small coverts to large ones, if they hold enough cubs to provide his young hounds with a lesson and a sufficiency of blood. But I have never met the Master who allowed the big woodlands to be neglected during September when there was a chance to draw them.

And that recalls the fact that in some countries all the big woodlands unfortunately are not open to hounds during cubhunting. There are shooting men who loyally see to it that a few litters of foxes are reared in their woodlands, realising that the loss of game they occasion is not after all serious. Yet they cherish a dislike to hounds drawing their coverts before the shooting parties have been held, and in so acting they largely discount the value of their generous services in preserving foxes. The drawing of the coverts during cubhunting makes all the difference in the world to the sport later in the season, and it is quite a mistake to imagine that shooting prospects suffer thereby in any material degree. A few pheasants may desert the disturbed coverts for the time being, but they are quickly back in their original haunts. This has been proved again and again, and shooting

in October and November certainly cannot suffer at all by visits of the hounds in the latter part of August and the beginning of September.

Education for the Young Follower

If during this preliminary campaign there are far smaller fields than usual—in fact, if those who come out to see the early morning work in the coverts are confined to a few farmers and sporting residents—so much better for the Masters and their huntsmen. The class of sportsmen who get the real enjoyment out of cubhunting are what may be called the scientific sportsmen, the genuine houndmen. These it is who love to see the young entry at work, and to watch the progress of their education day by day. There are pleasures and delights in September woodland hunting which the man who hunts to ride cannot detect or appreciate, and large promiscuous crowds at the covert-side during cubhunting are often an intolerable nuisance. We wish to make no acquaintance with our familiar friends the "tailers" and thrusters until November is here; we do not wish to have recalled yet what it is to put up with the jostling and jamming at the gaps and gates.

Cubhunting no more exists for the Young Rapids of the chase than does the rehearsal at the theatre for the ungodly gods. Yet when September is advanced, and the cubs begin to fly at the first challenge, then may some of the recruits among the field be the better for an occasional morning with the hounds. They will learn more perhaps in an hour than they would in a week in the hunting field in mid-winter; they may learn to appreciate some of the difficulties of hounds and huntsmen; they may be steadied by a few mild ratings and expostulations on the part of those in authority. There is then something to be said for a field during cubhunting, for if the cubs and the puppies that have been put on benefit by gradual initiation into what is expected of them, why not also the young followers of hounds. No one wants to see cubhunting become a fashionable amusement, and I think harm may often come—does come—from the advertising of cubhunting meets in the local newspapers long before the preliminary business has taken on the semblance of the Real Thing, nevertheless, when September has almost run its course, and October darts in the open are being anticipated, surely the young sportsman and sportswoman genuinely anxious to learn the game should not be discouraged. Cubhunting is a fine preparatory school all round, and the character of the coming season will depend very much upon how the lessons are learnt in the next six or eight weeks. Unhappily the war has broken out, and the whole prospect of hunting has been clouded over this autumn. We must look beyond this winter for a return to the normal aspect for our national sport. In the meantime let us congratulate ourselves that such a sport has so long flourished in these islands, providing us with a ready means of securing horses in a time of national emergency and so many brilliant horsemen with the valour and spirit to serve their country in a terrible crisis such as the present.



A BROOD OF PARTRIDGES

From an Old Engraving

PARTRIDGES AND—OTHER THINGS

By GUY C. POLLOCK

WITHIN three days of the partridges! That should be an exhilarating and joyous thought. It is not so. It cannot be so while the shroud of destiny is still wrapped, like a clammy mist of death, over all the world, and while we cannot tell to what new duties, trials, and tests of fortitude and patriotism these days may call us.

Some day, in the mercy of a divine dispensation, we shall have put this, the greatest war of history, behind us. We shall have put behind us the aftermath of conflict, which may well be only less disturbing than the war itself. We shall have returned to a normal England, free, proud, unshaken, with unsullied honour by sea and land. But we shall not be as we were. Neither politics nor parties, things nor men, can ever be what they were. They will be, we may hope, purer and finer, purged of much pettiness, exalted by sacrifice to nobler conceptions. But not the same. Already *tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis*. Yet it is reasonable to believe that in time the partridges of England, our native game bird—neither decimated nor terrified, let us believe, by any successful invasion of armed enemies sweeping with fire and sword over a craven or defeated land—will again occupy our earnest thoughts when warm September days of a peaceful English autumn come near again. War will not drive from us our love of sport. Indeed, our love of sport may have helped us much in war. A foreign military writer, a man of wide experience of war, who has himself commanded in many campaigns levies of ardent volunteers, has already expressed a great surprise in the soldierly efficiency of our Territorials, and has attributed this efficiency to the British love of sport and from athleticism, fit training for the soldier's mind and body. Our games and field sports may yet vindicate themselves on the battlefields of Belgium, on the sacred shores of this our native land.

But I wish—if only I can rid my mind sufficiently of the shadow of war, which impinges on my manuscript as King Charles's head bothered the unhappy Mr. Dick—to consider the partridges in relation to the present crisis. No good sportsman, I think, is keen on partridge shooting now. Too many who have been our comrades in the shooting field—

good fellows, brave and enduring men—are facing shot and shell at the call of patriotism and a righteous cause. I could not even carry a gun over the stubbles and roots of the little shoot without too poignant memories of happier days, when one who now commands a British cruiser in action did such excellent execution in our hottest corner at pheasants, when another who commands a regiment of the expeditionary force shared the varied fortunes of a September partridge day, when yet another, comrade of many days, now recalled to the colours of his heart, walked close with me to make a triumph of the season's very end. I should have, too, to think very nearly of our most faithful and enthusiastic beater, an old soldier, still a reservist, a person, I fear, with an unquenchable thirst, but with a stout and lovable heart, tender to all the brute creation, if not a perfect husband, wearing the ribbon of the medal with four clasps which he had long since pawned, our excellent friend, one of our defenders now. These memories would overpress the day and take from partridge shooting all its joyous friendliness. It may even be that outpost duty and not partridges may claim those of us who, beyond the military age and not so sound as when the doctor vetted us in pre-Territorial days, have offered, obeying a duty which the poorest Englishman could not ignore, to go back to military duty.

Yet, with all this, the game must be shot, if possible. It must be shot because it will be useful, because it may be distributed either to supplement a local food supply or to add to the larders of hospitals delicacies which may have a tragically enhanced value. I hope and believe that neither on big shoots or little shoots will there be any attempt to make a profit by the sale of game in war-time. We do not want our grouse and partridges and pheasants for the dinner tables of the well-to-do. This is no time for many courses and high living. It is a time for simple fare and a communistic spirit. We want the game for the sick, the wounded, and the poor. We must shoot very liberally for the pot. We must shoot, too, because it is important not to withdraw, so far as withdrawal can be avoided, any circulation of money in British districts which have been used to depend for prosperity on such expenditure. Hunting is almost bound

to be stopped. All the hunt horses—or nearly all—are gone. Most of the fields are on active service. And that, too, is true of shooting. But there are many left who can use a shot-gun where they cannot carry a rifle through a campaign, and many more whose best duty it is to carry on our everyday affairs with as serene a heart as man can muster. At the worst there are keepers and farmers who could shoot the game. And the rabbits can be trapped and ferreted.

Very well, then. We must look forward to September and be glad that this has every promise of being an exceptionally good game year. There are tragi-comedies in the situation, and many shoots will be thrown on a market unwilling to receive them. Has not our little syndicate been implored to rent the neighbouring coverts which once we shot over, and which have been Naboth's vineyard to us ever since? The guns that took those coverts from us were Service men. Now they have done with sport and the coverts are empty. But we cannot take them. That is only one of a thousand ironies of Fate.

One change that seems probable in the season's partridge shooting is a return in many cases to the more old-fashioned method of walking up. Organised driving on a large scale

will surely be a difficulty, and it will be well to secure fair bags of partridges as soon as the law permits. That would be no change on the little shoot, where narrow boundaries make driving almost impossible and where nearly all our partridges are got by walking. But I do not think it will be found an unwelcome change on larger manors. Walking up got a bad name chiefly because it was conducted on unimaginative lines. Marching and counter-marching in a solid line across illimitable acres of roots, always shooting at the tails of birds, is a monotonous and uneventful affair. But when you use guile and woodcraft to keep your coveys within your boundaries and to push them in a desired direction, when you use the half-moon formation and necessary variations of it, when you vary the monotony of walking with an occasional impromptu drive, walking up partridges becomes, to my mind, the best of sports—strenuous, eager, giving excellent opportunities for using a knowledge of the ways of game, and offering many difficult sporting shots. It is by no means to be despised, as many who may come to it after a set habit of driven partridges will discover.

But the best of it all is the comradeship of good fellows. And as for that—King Charles's head again. Let me stop.

REPORTS FROM THE MOORS

VERY few sportsmen have yet been on the moors for grouse shooting. The call of war accounted for the absence of many owners, lessees, and others who would have been members of shooting parties but for the present state of affairs. The weather conditions were ideal, and the few reports to hand indicate that if the normal number of sportsmen had been out good bags would have been obtained, since birds are plentiful and free from disease.

ABERDEENSHIRE.

A very fair percentage of moors were shot over. A large box of grouse was sent to his Majesty the King from the Balmoral Moors. The Brackley Moors, adjoining the Royal estate of Birkhall, yielded a large bag, and a parcel of several brace was sent to Mr. S. H. Bridges, at Ewell Court, Sligo. Large parcels of grouse have been sent to the soldiers, and also to hospitals and other charitable institutions. There is to be no shooting on Clashadarroch, which is one of the best moors in the country, since Mr. Holt, the lessee, has offered his services to the Army.

CAITHNESS.

The moors were almost entirely unoccupied; tenants in most cases had not travelled north.

DUMFRIESSHIRE.

The Eskdale and Liddesdale Moors, two of the very best moors in the United Kingdom, were not shot over, but Mr. Berkeley Mathews and his party secured more than 50 brace on the Westerhall Moor.

DUMBARTONSHIRE.

Birds are reported as being remarkably plentiful this season, but so far owners and lessees have not been out. A few of the keepers have been out for a short time and killed a considerable number.

INVERNESS-SHIRE.

Most of the sportsmen in the Badenoch district have decided not to organise shooting parties this season. A large proportion of the sportsmen who usually shoot over the moors are soldiers or are more or less directly interested in other ways in the war. On a few moors a start was made, but even in these cases arrangements were greatly modified.

KINROSS-SHIRE.

The expectations of good sport have not been realised. The weather was excellent, but the birds were never so wild on the opening day. On Ledlanet Moor Mr. J. C. Calder and a friend in a short day had 13 brace. Mr. Balfour Kinnear and Mr. Montgomery shot 12½ brace on Warroch Moor.

MIDLOTHIAN.

In the Stow district only one or two parties have been out. Reports as to game fulfilled the high expectations. Grouse are numerous, particularly on the lower beats, and young birds are strong and healthy. No trace of disease.

MORAYSHIRE.

The majority of the shooting tenants in the Grantown-

on-Spey district have not gone north, while many of those who had arrived have returned south. Grouse are reported good, and far in advance of last year.

PERTSHIRE.

Large numbers of the sportsmen and their friends are engaged in military duties. In the Dunkeld district several of the moors were shot over. In Pitlochry there were no supplies of grouse for sale, and no demand is anticipated on account of the present expenditure in other directions.

ROSS-SHIRE.

Few guns were out on Ross-shire moors, and on some not a shot was fired. In the Ardgay district grouse were plentiful, but there were few sportsmen. For many miles around all shooting quarters were let, except Deanich and Alladale Forests; but owing to the war sportsmen had been called away and numerous lodges are empty. Others are represented by only one gun each.

SUTHERLANDSHIRE.

Only one of four moors in the Rogart district—Robie—was shot over. The sportsmen had not yet gone to the other three—Tressay, Morbich, and Dalreaboch—war having completely disorganised their arrangements. It is reported that the moors as a whole were never better stocked. Young birds are in excellent condition, not a trace of disease, and no cheepers have been seen.

YORKSHIRE MOORS.

There has been practically no shooting over these moors during the first few days, except by keepers. Many beaters have joined the ranks of the Services, but a good number of the men usually employed on the moors have been thrown out of employment. All the principal moors had been let, but the opening day was marked by a total postponement, as, although a few birds were taken on the smaller patches, there was no shooting on the principal moors, and the date of actual opening of shooting is doubtful. In any case, shooting parties will be small, and the excellent prospects of the season will not mature.

On the Lancashire and Yorkshire borders, and in the Clitheroe district, sport has been almost entirely given up, and the Waddington Fell party was the only one out for the opening of the season. This had result in the escape of the birds, strong and vigorous as they were, to neighbouring moors where no shooting was going on, and only moderate sport was had in consequence. Earl Sefton has followed a wise course with regard to the moors near Abbeystead, having given the keepers instructions to shoot there, anticipating being able to supply the needs of some hospitals to a certain extent later on. It is noteworthy that the King should have paid a visit to Earl Sefton's preserves this season, but the visit has been cancelled owing to the war.

In the Whitby district the prospects are excellent, but few of the covers have been broken up to the present. Mr. J. K. Foster, of Egton Lodge, has set the example for this district by announcing that the proceeds of all game sold on his estate will be devoted to the fund for injured soldiers and sailors.

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CURRENT SPORT

WITH reference to hunting in Cambridgeshire, Mr. Douglas Crossman, the Master of the Cambridgeshire Foxhounds has informed us that his present intention is to go out cubhunting when possible and as the horse supply allows, for two reasons:—(1) To kill a certain amount of cubs and reduce the stock of foxes, which would otherwise be too numerous; (2) To enter the young hounds and teach them their business in life, so that another season, when we hope foxhunting will be in full swing again, the young hounds (this season's entry) may know their work. This war has already proved what a tremendous asset the Hunt horses are to the horse supply of the cavalry, and every M.F.H. should endeavour to keep his pack together and prevent the foxes being shot indiscriminately.

IT is untrue that the Oakley Hunt is to be disbanded as was recently rumoured. The single men employed at the Milton kennels were given one week's notice; most of these if not all have volunteered for the front, and one of them has gone with the Master, Mr. Esmé Arkwright. It is improbable that there will be any hunting during the progress of the war, though as to that nothing has been decided yet. The married servants of the Hunt will be retained, and the hounds will be kept as usual at the kennels. The hunt has lost upwards of twenty horses through the requirement of the War Office.

A YOUNG border terrier belonging to "Rokeby," of the Northern Counties Otterhounds recently ran a wild rabbit into a 6 in. drain pipe to the east of Dodmire Schools, Darlington. The terrier also entered the drain and was soon lost, and, darkness coming on, she was left for the night. On Saturday afternoon the owner and two professional drain men dug the drain for over six hours, but failed to locate the terrier before darkness put an end to their exertions. On Sunday morning four willing hands again attacked the drain and dug six separate trenches quite 4 ft. deep in the hard clay. The terrier at times could be distinctly heard, the diggers stuck manfully to their heavy task, and

at 8 p.m. they had the great satisfaction to overhaul the terrier. She proved to be in a very weak condition, covered with sores and clay. She was fifty hours in the drain, and had travelled underground between eighty and ninety yards.

"How to use a Rifle," published by the Temple Press at sixpence, is a handy little manual for the average civilian who wants to know how to handle and care for his gun. It is written in simple language, free from technical terms, and is intended to tell the man who handles a rifle for the first time what to do and how to do it; it will thus be seen that the manual is invaluable to the man just joining the ranks of the Territorials—or of any other force, for that matter. A useful chapter is added on the use of revolvers and automatic pistols, and another chapter forms a guide to military and other map reading; but the manual is mainly intended, as its preface states, "to present in simple language, the elements of shooting for the consideration of the average man."

THE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have received a number of complaints from farmers representing that all their working stock of horses has been requisitioned for military purposes and that they are unable to harvest their crops or are seriously impeded in doing so. His Majesty's Government have clearly stated in Parliament that it is their desire that such interference with harvest operations should be avoided; but where it has unfortunately happened that necessary working stock has been withdrawn, the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries would urge that neighbouring farmers, landowners and land-agents should interest themselves in remedying the misfortune by some measure of co-operation, and that those in a position to do so should arrange to assist or to procure assistance for those whose stock has been removed to supply the needs of the nation.

THE Development Commissioners desire to suggest to landowners in England and Wales that they should at once forward to the Agricultural College for their province particulars of any waste land which they are willing to place at the disposal of suitable authorities for improvement by such means as reclamation or afforestation.

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
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KEEPING A GOOD LINE

BIG GUNS AND SMALL

By GUY C. POLLOCK

IT is impossible, of course, to say or even to think how the various sporting estates and shoots will fare in England through the time of the great war. They must fare better than the sporting districts of France, Belgium, and Germany, than the plains of Hungary, where Servians or Cossacks may do any killing of the swarms of partridges which, in normal years, are so largely imported to this country, both dead for food and alive, or as eggs for stocking purposes. Among the many legends of Wellington, who is now supposed to have omitted to say that the battle of Waterloo—are we to know it as the "first" battle of Waterloo?—was won on the playing fields of Eton, one to be cherished is that he galloped his staff into what was nearly a successful ambush in the enthusiasm of an impromptu run after a chance fox. The soldier on active service, who takes a less tragic view of the business of war than those must take who are left at home to admire or to mourn him, will not neglect any opportunities of sport that may come his way. But modern war may very much restrict such opportunities.

Meanwhile our game birds at home are not in deadly peril. A raid or raids on our coasts may come. Not one of us imagines that the raiders will get very far, or do very deadly damage. But I write under the shadow of an impending clash of colossal armies in Belgium, and the issue cannot be predicted. The battle of Mukden, previously the largest battle in history, raged for weeks, and was not conclusive in the end. Moreover, so many of the soothsayers who prophesied the great war were very much out in their prophecies that a layman must hesitate to adopt their mantle. We have had the story of Anglo-German conflict told very often. Sometimes, as the story went, we have been absurdly triumphant; sometimes we have been utterly smashed; generally we have been vanquished first and victorious in the "happy ending" which was supposed to make the prophecy edible. Very few of the prophets have foretold or even suggested, so far as England and the Empire were concerned, the strange and ennobling spirit in which all the subjects of the British crown are rising to their opportunity of life or death.


It is, then, bad work to prophesy. Yet the mundane business of sport, like those of coal mining and bootmaking,

and the manufacture of linens, lace, or hardware must depend enormously for its course in the near future on the issue of this Titanic struggle in Belgium, which must dictate for a time the course of the campaign. If the event goes well for the Allied arms, it is reasonable to believe that a tremendous impulse will be given towards that resumption of our normal activities which would help so much to keep us all going, and to strengthen the hands of Government and people in waging the greatest of all wars. Luxury and sheer extravagance are, let us hope, destroyed in this country for many years to come. But is it ill for us all to live continually at concert pitch. The strain on nerves must sap the vital energy which the nation now needs more than ever before. When or if we have reason to believe that the tide of war is with us, the manufacturer will seek new outlets for trade, and recreations will be resumed in quiet and reasonable ways. Even the silent grouse paths may again be occupied here and there, and the partridges will be shot.

There are good reasons why one has not been to have that look round the partridge ground which usually makes such an exhilarating excursion at this time of year—(a) one has no heart for such things; (b) there is no train service; (c) one has other and more important duties. But it is impossible not to believe that this will be an excellent year for partridges, and this, I take it, is of good augury, like the abundant crops. But I confess that I should like to know how one may find the fields if it is possible to go down and shoot some partridges in September. Three days before war was declared I watched the reaping machine make short work of the farmer's wheat. But after war was declared? How many horses were left on the farm? How many of the horses I saw are now being trained to military uses? And if many of the horses are gone, how has the harvest progressed? We may indeed feel in September that the stooks are still in the field, and that some crops are still standing uncut. We may be able to lend a hand as amateur farm labourers as a variant to sport. We may, too, find unexpected acres of plough where pasture of doubtful value has been prepared for the aftermath of war.

One change is sure—unless, indeed, this country were then called to meet and destroy alien enemies from overseas.

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

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The military aeroplane will not be seen high up above us. When first these then novel sights were seen upon the little shoot, we used to stop and gaze upward at them, debating what would happen if with shot guns we treated the queer and noisy apparition as a rocketing pheasant. We prophesied gloomily then that the comings and goings of these strange birds would drive all the game from our fields and spinneys. Lately even the beaters have only given an upward glance as the roar of the engine was heard high in the air; and as for the game, no notice whatever has been taken of aeroplanes by birds which would cower and crouch from a hawk hovering

in the sky. Thus war becomes familiar to us all.

For the rest, the semi-military formations of a line of guns and beaters will serve to keep our minds on the subject which must fill them through many difficult and historic months. And I doubt not that we shall concert our plans and issue orders in that martial parlance which is the tongue of the boar. We shall adjure the line to dress by the right, and order "left shoulder up," and wheel by sections, and talk of the enemies' left, and outflank the covey that has been marked into the left-hand corner of the roots close to the boundary hedge. All these things may happen—if—

GOLFING TOPICS

Bogey

By F. KINLOCH

NOT very long ago no Scottish golfer (and by that term I mean a golfer who has drunk in the mother-milk of his golf in the atmosphere of any of the Scottish golfing nursery homes) would have deigned to consider what is known as a "Bogey" competition as worthy of notice. The name was enough. "What's in a name?" A great deal in this particular instance. Truly the godfathers and godmothers who gave this form of playing at the game of golf its most unattractive and absurd name have a good deal to answer for. And yet, in a way, this name is illustrative of the paucity of the English language, or rather of its inability to describe nicely and neatly, in terms not directly calculated to upset any delicate susceptibilities, a new departure in a very ancient game. The French, on the other hand, had no difficulty; they hit the nail right on the head when they called it *La Normale*. Like many other French phrases, *La Normale* cannot be properly translated into bald English. It has in its own tongue a pretty sound, it is romantic feminine, full of possibilities. But fancy going out to play against "the Normal." Here is a cold, hard, nasty thing impossible to cope with. Yet is not what was at first known as "Colonel Bogey" (the Colonel is now dropped) almost worse? The name savours of frivolity, of spooks, of spiritual séances, of childish fables, in fact, of all that a serious-minded golfer would divest from his favourite game.

The game, or whatever you like to call it, was invented not long after the great golf invasion of England, when golf was in a stage of transition; when it was feared that the old traditions were in danger; when there were no dealings with the Jews who played for biscuit boxes and tantalus

spirit cases in the South, and the Samaritans who played for the love of the game, plus a half-crown on the match, in the North. The origin of the name was probably a pantomime song, which was very popular in the early 'nineties.

"Hush, hush, hush, here comes the Bogey Man," a mythical being who was supposed to be the special enemy of children who did not go to bed when they were told. No one had seen him, but there was no doubt of his existence. The bogey man as a golfer was given the rank of colonel, but why, it is not easy to discover. Probably because colonels having reached a staid middle age are presumably steady golfers. This may be true in theory, but it is open to considerable doubt whether actual facts warrant the presumption. Anyhow, behold this new pastime (that seems to be the best name for it) duly baptised, and launched to fight its way all over the many odd places where men play golf. And a very hard fight the ugly-named creature has had; at the same time, it must be confessed, a much more successful one than many of the older school would even now confess. To some sacred spots it has never and will never penetrate.

I do not think "Bogey" as a term or a game is recognised at any of the championship or aristocratic courses; certainly St. Andrews, Prestwick, Muirfield, and North Berwick, in Scotland, and Hoylake, Sandwich, Westward Ho, in England, have never been "Bogeyised." Nevertheless, so insistent is this dumb, shapeless spectre that its followers have forced the Rules of Golf Committee to draft rules for their guidance. Whether these said rules have grasped the true inwardness of what they are meant to direct is rather a doubtful point. After having played seriously (almost



CRAFNANT VALLEY FROM TREFRIW GOLF CLUB



LLANDUDNO GOLF LINKS

with shame let me confess it) in bogey competitions for a year, I am inclined to think that the Rules of Golf Committee were wrong in treating these as if they came within the subtle distinction that separates medal from match play. I am firmly convinced that bogey should be played under match-play rules.

For instance, lost ball should be lost hole; of course the penalty for the loss of a ball is equivalent to the loss of a hole, but there are some obstinate people in this world who are always ready to imagine they can do impossible shots, and who will keep the green back by teeing another ball on the million to one chance that they will hole it or lay it dead. There are a good many other instances which could be cited in favour of legislating for bogey as match play, but into this rather vexed question it is not proposed to enter further.

Speaking, however, as one who, from having been an absolute scoffer, from a fine old Tory point of view, has come to recognise that there is a certain amount of merit in the pastime I should like to draw attention to one or two points. In the first place (we must admit the ugly name), what does the "Bogey" of a course mean? Before bogey was heard of we knew what "the par" of any course implied, viz., the best score per hole that the best player playing his best, but without any flukes, could do. "Par" reduces the score of all courses to its absolute minimum. But that is not what is meant or should be meant by the "Bogey" of a course. Bogey, as I understand it, is the score, per individual hole, which an ordinary scratch player ought to make under ordinary conditions, and it is so interpreted in hard and fast figures in every card that is issued. It is true that in clubs and courses the estimated capacity of the average scratch player varies very considerably. Some have a very high opinion of him as a player, others quite a moderate one; so you will see by the Saturday reports that in one club the bogey prize has been won by a glorious victory of seven down, and in another one reads of a feeble defeat by one up. What is radically wrong about making the bogey score a fixed one is that no attention at all is paid to climatic conditions, and in these islands wind is the most powerful handicapper that we have.

Thus, if I may take a concrete instance from the only course on which I have played this peculiar form of golf, viz., Newcastle, County Down. There are three holes over five hundred yards in length, two of which are played against the prevailing wind, which is southerly and generally a good deal in evidence, and each of these is put down as a bogey five.

In the same way there are several holes of about four hundred yards, for which four is the ghostly score. In calm weather this would be about correct, though it is probable that the ordinary scratch player would have to squeeze a bit to get the figures in comfort; but when, as is often the case, there is half a gale blowing, trying to do these long holes in the stipulated figures becomes a heart-breaking job even for the long powerful hitters, while the short drivers might just as well not try to play the holes at all.

There is indeed nothing more disheartening in golf than to face a hole more than a quarter of a mile long with the foreknowledge that you must do it in five otherwise you will lose it.

There is, it humbly appears to me, a remedy for this, and one that might seriously be considered. It is a simple one, viz., to take the force and direction of the wind into consideration, and vary the inexorable figure for each hole accordingly. At first sight, this may seem so complicated

as to be unworkable, but, seriously speaking, it should not be difficult to work out. Let the club committee, or whoever arranges the bogey score, draw up a sliding scale of figures per hole, varying according to the wind, and let them have a cone hoisted on bogey competition days so as to indicate the allowance to be given for the wind. Of course, only a few of the holes would have moveable figures, and it would require a fairly strong wind for the north or south cone to be hoisted. There need only be the two cones, the north taking in the bottom half of the compass, and the south the top half. It would be left to the discretion of the club professional to decide whether a cone should be hoisted. I think this is a scheme which could be easily worked, and it would add considerably to the pleasure or (a better way of putting it) mitigate against the annoyance of playing against a bogey score in a gale, by giving the ordinary human being a chance.

It is claimed for bogey that it is less irritating than playing an ordinary medal round. In a modified way that is quite true; you may take double figures to several holes and yet not ruin your chances. It is indeed much more satisfactory to go the whole hog when one is about it. The man who just misses a hard half by a putt, which if there were any justice in this world should certainly have been in, is likely to be much more annoyed than the man who has made a hopeless mucker of the hole. Yet both have to mark down that algebraical sign (—).

And in this connection let me give a word of advice to those who like to have a small bet on their respective scores with their opponents. *Don't*. It is bad enough to play a ghostly enemy, but do not give him the help of a material friend. What I mean can best be illustrated by an example of what actually occurred to me the other day. I arranged to play for a bogey competition with a friend, with whom I was in the habit of having the keenest of keen matches, which almost always came to the last hole; and the piece of family plate which passed alternately from one to the other was regarded as of the greatest value. We agreed that the usual stake should depend on our scores against bogey. The first three holes were played against a stiff wind, which made the proper figures difficult to obtain. My opponent lost his ball at the first hole. I just missed a half with bogey "by a hair." At the second he was unplayable off the tee, and I got a hard half. At the third I again had the best of it as regards my human enemy, but the worst as regards the ghostly one. The result of those three holes was that I was two down against bogey, and rather irritated; whereas if I had been playing proper golf I would have been three up against my man, quite happy and pretty sure to win my match. The result of that bogey round, so far as I was concerned, was that I lost my half-crown. Speaking personally, I would infinitely prefer to play a keen blood match with a friend, and win or even lose it at the last hole, than win twenty bogey prizes; but so long as human nature is what it is you will have pot hunters, and if you have to have pot hunting, playing against bogey is, to my mind, preferable to counting one's strokes.

THE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries stated a few days ago that there was in this country sufficient wheat to supply the whole population for about four months. They have now obtained more complete information, including returns of the stocks of wheat and flour held by about 160 of the principal millers in Great Britain. On the basis of the figures now available, it may be said with confidence that there is actually in the United Kingdom at the present time, including the home crop now being harvested, five months supply of bread stuffs. This is additional to the wheat and flour on passage and due to arrive shortly.

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[A NEWSPAPER]

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CAPTAIN FRANCIS GRENFELL

Whose cool courage and daring in action on the Belgian Frontier played a prominent part in the 9th Lancers' brilliant feat of arms. He is a dashing horseman, an all-round sportsman, and a first-class polo player, having assisted his regiment and also the team of Old Etonians to gain many notable successes at the London Clubs.

BOYS OF THE OLD BRIGADE



BRITISH INFANTRY WELL ENTRENCHED
AND HOLDING THEIR OWN AGAINST SUPERIOR NUMBERS
The troops are firing as calmly and critically as though at target practice

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LAND AND WATER
WAR SCENES




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FRENCH INFANTRY IN ACTION



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**BRITISH TROOPS LEAVING A
FRENCH BASE**



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**ZEPPELIN BOMB HAVOC
IN ANTWERP**



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GERMAN CULTURE (?)

German Troops looting and wantonly destroying Buildings at Vise

Bernhardi in his book makes a point of the fact that the refinement and culture of the Germanic races must make itself felt throughout the world. The examples that they provide at present during the war are not, however, such as will appeal to the more civilised races

THE RUSSIAN ARMY



THE FAMOUS CUIRASSIERS OF THE GUARD

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RUSSIAN INFANTRY OF THE LINE
Slow but Sure

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THE COSSACKS ARE COMING



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THE TERRIBLE COSSACKS

Whose fiery reputation and gradual approach are already causing consternation in Berlin



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A FAMOUS RUSSIAN CAVALRY REGIMENT

The progress of the Russian Armies through Austria and East Prussia is being watched with intense interest, and their brilliant victories over the Austrians are a matter of intense satisfaction



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H.M.S. "COLLINGWOOD"
The Warship to which Prince Albert is attached, with her big guns in action

SOCIAL AND SPORTING NOTES

HUNTING is not to be entirely in abeyance this coming winter, but what there is of it will be purely expedient; there will be no more of it than is necessary in order to keep the number of foxes within due limits, to keep hounds in work, to afford employment for huntsmen and whippers-in who are not eligible for service in the Army. Doubtless a few elderly farmers may be found in the field if all their cobs have not been commandeered, and there is no reason why ladies who have mounts for the purpose should not ride to hounds as usual. But countless figures which have been so familiar and so welcome at the covert-side will be missing; quite a number of Masters of Hounds themselves are at the front; and the "Image of War," as Jerrocks called hunting, will be but a very faint image of itself this season. There can be no heart in it. Even as it is an ex-Master of an East Anglian pack has severed his connection with his hunt in order to mark his disapproval of the continuance of the sport in any shape or form, which, to our way of thinking, is quite illogical, though his patriotic fervour is commendable enough.

WHILE hunting has been proving its worth to the nation at such an hour of need in providing for the Army so many gallant horsemen—the best horsemen over a country in the world—and so many thousands of light horses—again the very best Army remounts to be found in the world—is it not despicable on the part of some people to try to stir up strife among poultry-keepers and clamour for a wholesale destruction of foxes by poison and gun? "Hunting men are at the front fighting for us," is really the gist of their argument; "now is our chance, destroy all the foxes, so that when they come back there can be no such thing as hunting for them, which is only the selfish sport of the rich." That is the attitude which is being adopted in some quarters. This agitation against hunting at such a time is surely the meanest and most contemptible action ever perpetrated by so-called well-wishers of the poultry-farming industry. No, let foxes be thinned out by the ordinary and legitimate means, even if it be only in the nature of cubhunting throughout the winter. Let there be no sly attack upon the future interests of a sport which has done so much for England and the British Army, and whose votaries are now serving their country in probably greater proportion than the votaries of any other sport, pastime, or pursuit in the kingdom.

MANY hunts, whose Masters have undertaken active service during the war, are in the management of committees *pro tem*, and everywhere strict economy, of course, will have to be practised. Some private packs have been given up—notably that of Mr. T. Bouch, Joint Master of the Belvoir, who has rejoined his old regiment, the 10th Hussars; Lord Robert Manners, the other Joint Master of this famous pack, has joined the Rifle Brigade, and accordingly Mr. Cyril Greenall has been asked to act as Deputy Master during the season 1914-15. Everywhere the lack of horses will be a handicap to those whose duty it is to carry on hunting in order to keep the thing going, and this will be felt not only this season but perhaps for several seasons yet to come. On the day that the Southdown began cubhunting recently, the hunt servants rode from kennel to covert-side on bicycles, and then hunted hounds on foot. This practice has been followed in several other countries, where practically a clean sweep was made of the hunt horses for national purposes, and it has answered tolerably well, a very fair number of cubs being brought to hand. Lord Harrington, M.F.H., has been more fortunate than some, for he has been able to mount his staff on polo ponies. Hunting may still serve a highly useful and important service, if those who are able to go out with hounds in the ensuing months will carefully break in young horses and get others fit and in hard condition for the front when wanted by the authorities.

LIKE hunting men, followers of other sports and pastimes have not failed the country in time of need, and it was encouraging to find how spontaneously and readily Rugby football players abandoned their season's fixtures when the call to arms came. It was a timely lead to those who play under the Association code, to athletes of every class, and particularly, perhaps, to county cricketers, whose matches dragged on drearily during the very period when anxiety as to the results of Lord Kitchener's appeal for men was rather acute. There will be no representative Oxford University Rugby team this term, Cambridge University will follow suit, and all the crack clubs with one accord have struck out their season's list of engagements, their players having leapt to the call of duty with the fire and enthusiasm

we are accustomed to see at Twickenham, Richmond, the Rectory Field—wherever the game of games is played. And what grander material could our Army wish to recruit from than that of British Rugby Union football, with its splendid spirit and unexampled hardihood? There is no game in the world—unless it is polo—which fosters so surely those high qualities of courage, endurance, judgment swift and sound, and pure unselfishness, which fit a man to discharge the duties of a good soldier. Men long past the glorious Rugby age must have envied players of the present day their opportunity to "form down," when Edgar Mobbs, the old England "internationalist" and former captain of the Northampton Club, undertook, with the approval of the military authorities, to raise in seven days a corps of two hundred and fifty men on the guarantee that they should go in one division. Amateur Association footballers have also answered to the call, and we could have wished that League football had been cancelled this winter, so that the thousands of trained professionals, hard and fit, had been given the opportunity to enlist instead of exhibiting themselves to the sixpenny public as "muddled oafs at the goal."

JUST now reference was made to polo. Alas! a number of brilliant horsemen who have distinguished themselves at Hurlingham, Ranelagh, and Roehampton in times of peace, will never again take part in the galloping game, which has long been recognised as an ideal training for the cavalry officer. In the very first official list of casualties to officers sent from the front appeared the names of well-known polo players among the killed and wounded. The former, we regret to say, included Mr. Harold Martin Soames, the youngest son of Mr. W. A. Soames, of Moor Park, Farnham, and a popular officer in the 20th Hussars, a noted polo regiment. He was rated in the handicap at seven points, and for his regiment he proved a sound and reliable back. Major F. Swetenham, of the 2nd Dragoons, was also a well-known polo player, though lower in the handicap, and every one will deplore the death in action of Major V. R. Brooke, of the 9th Lancers. This was not reported officially when the first list of casualties was made out, but from a private source. Major Brooke, though not in the 9th Lancers' first polo team, was a keen and enthusiastic player.

THAT 9th Lancers' sweep down on the concealed guns of the Germans in an encounter close to the Belgian frontier reads like a second edition of Balaclava. The regiment charged through "a hail of melinite or lyddite" (according to the *Evening News*), cut down all the German gunners, and put the guns out of action. In spite of being hit in both legs and having two fingers shot off (according to the reports) another fine deed is recorded of Captain Francis Grenfell, of the same regiment, in recovering a couple of British guns, whose servers had been put out of action. Our readers do not require to be told that Captain Grenfell (like his twin brother, Mr. "Rivy" Grenfell) has been one of the best and most dashing polo players in London polo in recent seasons, though he has had more than his share of bad luck in the shape of accidents. There is no doubt that to the game in which he has played such a conspicuous part must be given some credit for having developed in him those soldierly qualities of dash and cool resource he has now displayed upon the battlefield. According to another account, when Captain Grenfell was wounded he was carried into safety under heavy fire and at great personal risk by the Duke of Westminster. It may seem a small matter at a time like this, but it should be pointed out that the Duke of Westminster is another keen votary of that game which calls for so much reckless courage, such physical fitness, perfection of eye and wrist, and most finished horsemanship on the part of the rider. This war is going to prove to us once more that the Britisher's love of sport and games at their fit time and in their proper places is his salvation and not his undoing, as croakers and detractors are so fond of telling us.

IN consequence of the war Surrey cancelled their last two matches, and the season's first class county cricket came to an end last week. But there was little interest in it. Who cared what county stood at the top of the table, or how So and So finished up in the averages. At this time of the year we are accustomed to a bewildering array of figures every morning showing how the counties and their players have fared during the past four months. But even if they have appeared, no one has had the time or the inclination to study them. It is sufficient to summarise the thing into the statement that Surrey finishes at the head of the table, with Middlesex second, and Kent third, while those unfortunate West of

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The purity and age of this Whisky ("Sandy Macdonald" is guaranteed 10 years old) have rendered it famous in all quarters of the globe, and wherever Britishers foregather a "wee deoch-an'-doris" drunk in "Sandy Macdonald" is the most probable finale to the meeting



England counties, Somerset and Gloucestershire, are hopelessly at the bottom of the list. Hobbs, the Surrey crack, had the remarkable average of 62.47 and the record of ten three-figure innings for his county, but in the general batting averages he played second fiddle to J. W. Hearne, of Middlesex, while C. P. Mead is a creditable third. But for all-round performances the figures of F. E. Woolley and Tarrant are the features of the averages. The former made considerably over 2000 runs and took 124 wickets for 18.91 apiece. Tarrant's total was nearly 2000 with an average of something over 45 per innings, while in bowling he had 138 victims at a cost of 18.84 runs each. In many respects it was a wonderful season, and but for the war the inquest on it would have furnished some most interesting reflections.

A MEETING of the committee of the Culmstock Otterhounds was held at the Castle Hotel, Taunton, on August 22, to consider whether hunting, which had temporarily been suspended, should be resumed. Mr. A. Venables Kyrke was in the chair. Among those present were the Master, Mr. H. Welch-Thornton, Mr. C. W. Nelder, and Mr. H. Gillham. After the minutes were read and signed the chairman placed before the committee his views on the matter, and it was eventually decided that hunting should be resumed in such districts as might be considered advisable, provided that it were not against the wishes of the riparian owners. It was also decided that at each meet the "cap" should be devoted to the Prince of Wales's Relief Fund. This was signed by A. Venables Kyrke, chairman. The Culmstock Otterhounds will meet at the Carnarvon Arms, Dulverton, at nine o'clock on September 14, and at East Dulleigh at ten o'clock, September 16, to wind up the season.

WHATEVER the holiday-makers by the side of the sea may have to say about the weather, the angler certainly has no cause for complaint, for the dull cloudy days and the constant rainfall have kept fish on the move. Very few fishermen have visited Blagdon recently, but some good baskets were obtained by those who were out, Mr. C. R. Batey having seven on the 22nd, three on the 24th, and two on the 25th, a splendid brown trout of 5 lb. 4 oz., which graced his basket on the last day, being a record for the week. Some good sport has also been had on the Elan Reservoirs, where the trout run rather smaller but make up in gameness what they lack in size. On the Tavy, Devonshire, the peal are running well, General Eagles having nine, Captain Roe four, and Colonel Trotman two, while some nice catches of brown trout are reported. Wroxham Broad and the rivers in the vicinity are in first-class fettle and some huge catches of bream, roach, and rudd have been taken during the last week. The fishing is all that could be desired in Ireland, and excellent sport has been had recently on the Great Southern Hotel lakes at Waterville, Co. Kerry, and from Murphy's Hotel, Oughterard. We hear that the "Daddy" is putting in an appearance on Lough Corrib, where some splendid trout have recently been caught.

PARTRIDGE shooting in Scotland opened under delightful circumstances as regards weather, but very few sportsmen were out during the first few days. Even those that did take a turn in the meadows remained only to secure a few birds, and did not indulge in anything like systematic shooting. Despite some discouraging predictions, the birds are said to be very numerous, strong and well-developed. In fact, there is good reason to believe that they are more plentiful than they have been for the last five years. Shooting, which will not be general until the beginning of October, must this year be conducted with special care and caution. The reason of this is that for some time to come it will be impossible to replenish the stocks by the introduction of live birds from Hungary or Belgium. Grouse are everywhere abundant and in the pink of condition, but the moors have not yet been much disturbed except by keepers. The largest bag hitherto reported was secured in Gaick on the opening day, and consisted of 115 brace. Stags everywhere make a superb show, but stalking is not conducted with anything like the usual energy. Seven fine animals were shot in Struy and Braulen forests by Lord Stanley and his guests, the best head obtained falling to Mr. Oliver. Among those who secured heavy stags are Sir Arthur Bignold, of Lochrosque, and party, Captain Combe, of Strathconon, and party, and Mr. Wills, Killilan, and party.

THE weather, on the whole, has been favourable to angling during the last few days. More wind would certainly be welcome, but the waters have been in a fairly satisfactory state, and nice baskets have been obtained. Recent catches on Ballindalloch stretches of the Spey included a salmon of 10½ lb. by Mr. A. Robertson; a salmon of 9½ lb. and a grilse

of 5 lb. by Mr. A. Murdoch; two salmon weighing each 11 lb. by Mr. A. Shiach; and a grilse of 5 lb. by Mr. J. MacGilchrist. On Loch Assopol, Island of Mull, Mr. French had six sea trout; while on Loch Eye, Mr. Wilson, Edinburgh, had eighteen trout weighing 13 lb. On River Cononish, Tyndrum, Mr. R. Stewart landed a salmon of 15 lb.; on River Garry, Mrs. Hands got a salmon of 9½ lb.; and on River Avon, Tomintoul, Mr. Frank Reid, Edinburgh, had a fine salmon of 6 lb. Loch Leven is giving some fine sport, and its habitués have every reason to be satisfied with the season. Last month the total catch with the rod was 9,726 trout, weighing 6,794½ lb. In August last year the catch was 3,021 trout, weighing 2,532½ lb. We are informed that Mr. Gilbert Tweedie, W.S., Annan, honorary secretary of the Annan Angling Association, has received a communication from the Fishery Board for Scotland, to the effect that Mr. W. L. Calderwood, Inspector of Salmon Fisheries, will hold a public inquiry at Annan with respect to the petition of the District Board craving for an alteration of the rod-fishing close time within the district.

IN the competition for the prize presented to the Routenburn Club, Largs, by the vice-president, Mr. MacAndrew, of Knock, the best cards returned against bogey were J. A. Malcolm (scratch), four down, and A. H. Orr (2), five down. In the Tillicoultry Club Championship competition, Thomas S. Millar beat W. M. Bett by one hole, and W. Caldwell beat William MacLauchlan by one hole. In the final William Caldwell beat Thomas S. Millar by 2 up and 1 to play. The winner in the ladies' competition was Mrs. Caldwell (14), 70 (14 holes). Troon Ladies' Club played for Captain Dickie's prizes, for second division and club medals. The winner of both prizes was Miss Graham (25), 71. Miss Sinclair (17) made a score of 72; Miss W. A. Robertson (10), a score of 72; Mrs. Collins (1), a score of 74; Miss L. Neilson (20), a score of 76, and Miss G. Wilson (14), a score of 76. Under the auspices of Balmore Club the ladies' monthly medal was won by Miss Nan Reid (22), 91. At a meeting of Glasgow Corporation Sub-Committee on Recreation—Bailie Robert Mitchell, convener, in the chair—there was taken into consideration the question of proceeding with or postponing the golf competitions which were fixed to take place on two consecutive Saturdays in the course of this month. After some discussion it was finally agreed to recommend that, in view of the present national crisis, the competitions be postponed *sine die*.

IT is officially announced that it has been decided, on account of the war, to abandon the Western Race Meeting which was to have taken place at Ayr on September 16, 17, and 18. A disappointing afternoon's sport was the outcome of the £15 one mile open trotting match promoted by Mr. S. Ferguson at Hawkhill enclosure, Edinburgh. Only six horses turned out, and it was found necessary to run off the handicap on the best average, Mr. Campbell's Owl winning two out of the three finals. The entries were: Mr. Campbell's Owl (60); Mr. Ovens's Dr. Crippen (200); Mr. Cranston's Erin's Queen (scratch); Mr. Haxton's Miss T. (250); Mr. Beattie's Carpets (250), and Mr. Nicol's Mistake, Dyart (180). An unsuccessful attempt to break her own record was made by Mr. Cranston's Erin's Queen. There have been sold in Messrs. Lyon and Turnbull's Rooms, Edinburgh, a number of sections of the Traill estates of Castlehill and East Murkle, Caithness. They included a mansion house, home farm, quarries, harbour and parks. In each case the upset price was obtained. Most of the important athletic fixtures have been abandoned, including the Braemar gathering, the Northern meetings (Inverness), and the Argyllshire gathering (Oban).

To those who are interested in the present struggle now going on just across the Channel, and are unable from any reason whatever to take part in that struggle, I can commend them to do nothing better than go to the Scala Theatre and see the pictures that are there given in their natural colours of the whole fighting units now engaged. The series is entitled: "The Fighting Forces of Europe," and in addition there are some wonderful pictures straight from the fighting lines, showing the awful ravages of war, and the penalty inflicted on Belgium for not standing out of the Kaiser's way and allowing him to pass on. There is also a very fine picture which shows our splendid young men of to-day, who are giving up their lives, their home comforts, in fact everything they can, to help to keep the British flag flying. The picture in question is Lord Roberts inspecting the recruits who have just joined Lord Kitchener's Army. Here, in truth, is a patriotic exhibition which no Britisher should miss. He will also have the satisfaction of knowing that a part of the money he pays for admission is being sent weekly to swell the Prince of Wales's Fund. The number of well-known people who have already visited the exhibition are too numerous to mention, but here a few may be given: H.R.H. The Prince of Wales, Lord Titchfield, Admiral Fisher, Lady Hansell, Prince Bariatsky, Sir Alexander Asanchyev, the Servian and Roumanian Ambassadors, and quite large numbers of the staff of the War Office.

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
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A NEWSPAPER]

PRICE SIX PENCE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY



Photograph by Swaine, 106 New Bond Street, W.

THE MAHARAJA OF BIKANIR

Who is on his way over to lead his troops in the defence of the British Empire. Not the least gratifying result of the war has been the spontaneous action of all classes and creeds in India to place their services and their wealth at the disposal of the British Government.

SOLDIER-SPORTSMEN



Left to right, top
VISCOUNT CASTLEROSSE, 2nd LIEUTENANT IN THE IRISH GUARDS
Who is reported wounded and missing. He is an all-round sportsman and particularly fond of golf.

Left to right, bottom
LIEUTENANT LORD R. E. INNES-KER OF THE IRISH GUARDS
Reported wounded and missing. Like his brothers the Duke of Roxburghe and Lord Alistair Innes-Ker, he is particularly fond of polo.

Copyright, Sport and General
CAPTAIN LORD H. C. C. SEYMOUR OF THE GRENADIER GUARDS
Who has been wounded in the course of the actions carried out by the British Expeditionary Force. Lord Seymour is a fine horseman and has steered many winners past the post in regimental racing.

CAPTAIN GEORGE BELLVILLE OF THE 16th LANCERS
Who has been wounded. Captain Bellville is captain of his regimental polo team and has played in many important tournaments for the Old Cantabs, in fact, he is one of the best No. 1's who has ever played in Mr. Buckmaster's famous side.



THE FORWARD MOVE IN BELGIUM
Belgian Troops in Action near Louvain

Copyright, Sport and General

WATER MEADOWS AND STUBBLE FIELDS

By GUY C. POLLOCK

IT is surely reasonable to hope that before these lines appear in print all doubt or hesitation as to recruits for the new army will have been ended. As things now are, with the story of our little army's heroic stand against desperate odds hot in the memory, it is difficult to conceive the mind of the man who does not genuinely thirst for such training as may fit him for battle against an insolent and savage enemy.

They say that the country needs enlightenment, especially in the great towns and industrial districts. That may be so. Yet it seems odd we have been taught to believe that here dwelt the sections of our people most intelligent and most alert. The rural districts were supposed to enjoy a monopoly of slow-witted lethargy. Yet the rural districts perfectly understand the war, the German menace, and the duty of a Briton.

Two days ago I found myself, for the first time since war, on a chalk stream with a rod in my hand. It was not a very gay experience. A mist of tears and rage came between an angler and what used to be his passionate sport. But that is a mere digression. I had not been fishing long before I was hailed by the excellent fellow who, with another, older than himself, cuts our weeds for us and looks after our hatches. The second weed-trimming had been undertaken just before the declaration of war.

His first words were: "Well, sir, I never expected to see you again. I said to Carter, I says, you may be sure we shan't see none of the gentlemen here again. Gone to the war you may depend on it, I says."

With an almost apologetic regret I explained the non-military character of our occupations and, in self defence, the reluctance of authority to accept such material aid as one had been able to offer. My friend joined me in these regrets. He, too, had offered himself. But they wouldn't have him. Forty-one are his years, and a fine upstanding man he is. "But, sir," he went on, "they may take us yet. Let us get at them—devils. That is what I want. That's what I tells the missus and the kids."

He had said nothing about the payment due to Carter and himself for the weed cutting. No doubt they had counted that out as a personal sacrifice on the altar of patriotism. But he was glad as well as surprised to receive it. He went on to talk about the war and recruiting. He told me of a neighbouring farmer who had gone to his young men and told them that the country wanted them. "Fourteen of them there was, as fine a set of fellows as you might find anywhere. And all of them went, and all of them was accepted barring one. Too short he was—but eager, right eager." He told me the same tale of all the neighbouring villages. He told me of ten of them talking in a bar when a recruiting sergeant happened along, and how all but one stood up at once in response to an appeal. And what he told me was confirmed from other sources. The villages of Hampshire—I heard of one, to take exception, where only two men could be got, and I heard of one man brave enough to confess that he "hadn't the heart for the job" (a man, this, who might make a better soldier than some who enlist with unthinking valiance)—have poured in men to the new army. And I went back to my indifferent siege of a great trout, engaged in the meal time of one of the most baffling evening rises by which I have ever been worsted,

wondering where the brains and heart of England really rested—in the rural or in the industrial districts.

Angling with a dry fly in a chalk stream is not—*experts crede*—a really exhilarating business while one's country is at grips with Fate, while one's friends and fellows are being killed to defend one's own liberties. I do not think angling is any more a matter for shame—so long as a man has offered what he can of personal service—than any other reasonable occupation or recreation. But it seems so. And all the ancient zest has gone for it. You cannot catch wary trout without a great concentration of will and skill. You cannot concentrate any thought on anything except the country's need, the army's heroism, the navy's splendour, and the duty of a man. My creel was light at the day's end, and I found only part of that recreation of spirit which I sought by the water meadows.

So it will be with shooting. We have the purpose now to go to the little shoot—which might so easily become the big shoot in these days when shoots are going so tragically cheap—for some days and to kill some partridges, hares, and rabbits for the general food, while still leisure and opportunity may be found. That again is, I think, a reasonable and even necessary excursion. Nothing will be gained by complete cessation of shooting. Much will be lost and jeopardised. A source of food supply would be stopped, and the evils of unemployment would be spread widely. Already the game food manufacturers, the game farmers, the keepers, the gun makers, the powder factories, the beaters, face the prospect of evil fortunes. It will not help the fortunes and the resisting powers of this country to make these fortunes worse than they must be. But I cannot suppose that any of us will enjoy very keenly the sport of shooting partridges in these desperate and bloody days. The thought of killing, for one thing, has become not less but more horrible in itself. And there are other



A LIKELY SPOT

Copyright, Alan R. Haig Brown

fields for killing than the stubbles of this, as yet, peaceful and inviolate countryside.

But these rural sports have one sound effect. They reinforce that actual love for England which drives men to any sacrifice not less surely than the hottest conceptions of an ethically righteous cause. [One looks along the chalk stream, at the woods and water meadows, the broody peace of a sunlit evening in England; one's eye follows the undulations of stubble and roots and plough, of coppices and hedgerows, of farm and villages; one says to oneself: "Here is the England that is mine, the fields I know, the beauty that I love." And, so seeing, no man could fail to give his unimportant life to save this England if England shall have need of it.

IN spite of being inundated with orders for military kit, in which, since the South African war, Burberrys have specialised with such splendid results, this enterprising firm has without interruption continued its seasonable innovations in ladies' out-door dress, which, as usual, will be the universal standard of autumn and winter fashion. Burberrys believe with confidence that their many distinguished clients will recognise the desirability at this national crisis of supporting a typically British house in its endeavour, not only to do justice to its reputation, but to maintain undiminished its entire staff and the families of such married members as are now serving our country. Burberry weatherproofs, owing to their wonderful wearing properties, are economical as well as efficient, and the new Burberry cloths eclipse in beauty of colouring and artistic originality of design those hitherto introduced. A post card to Haymarket will elicit illustrated catalogue and patterns.



SOCIAL AND SPORTING NOTES

Polo and the Roll of Honour

QUITE a long list is already formed of well-known polo players who have been killed or wounded during the war, some of the best polo regiments having been in the very thick of it. It is very sad, but losses are inevitable, and we can only console ourselves with the knowledge that in each and every instance the dash and brilliancy of these officers' play on the polo ground have been truly reflected by their grand courage and spirit in action. The death of Lieutenant-Colonel G. K. Ansell is a great loss to the British Army; it is also a loss to British polo. For many years he had been a prominent player, and his interest in the game this season, when he took part in the Inter-Regimental with his team of the 5th Dragoon Guards, was just as keen as it was in the hey-day of the prosperity of his former regiment, the Inniskilling Dragoons, when he and his colleagues, Colonel (then Mr.) F. A. B. Fryer, Major (then Mr.) Neil W. Haig, and General (then Major) M. F. Rimington were one of the strongest military teams of the day. They won the Inter-Regimental Cup in 1897 and (with Mr. C. H. Higgin No. 1 instead of Mr. Fryer) again in 1898, beating that rare combination, the 13th Hussars, by one goal to none after a memorable final. Their other Army championship victory at Hurlingham was in 1905, when, with Captains Gibson and Ewing Paterson in the side, they triumphed over the 20th Hussars by four goals to three; and, although they were a team of veterans, they were still to be reckoned with as a hard-hitting combination, up to every move on the board, until five or six years ago. Colonel Ansell was a very good forward, with a remarkably quick eye and exceptional wrist stroke. He had not the extraordinary physique of Major Neil Haig, whose tremendous strokes frequently called forth the wonder and admiration of onlookers, but with his wrist-power his hitting was always crisp and clean, and he got a great length on the ball. He was a member of the Army Polo Committee, and always worked hard in the interests of the game, the value of which he fully recognised as a training in horsemanship for the cavalry officer.

Memorable Finals Recalled

ANOTHER well-known player who has figured in a victorious Inter-Regimental side on more than one occasion, and whose brilliant career as a soldier has ended in the present war, was Captain J. S. Cawley, of the 20th Hussars. It seems only the other day, though in reality it is ten years ago, since the 20th Hussars sprang a surprise on us all as the "dark horse" of the tournament, having only returned from foreign service a few months ago, yet running the best regimental sides very closely; indeed, as shown in the preceding paragraph, they were only beaten by the Inniskillings by the odd goal in seven in the final of 1905. The 20th Hussars as it then stood was Mr. J. S. Cawley, Mr. C. McG. Dunbar, Captain H. C. Hessey, and Captain H. R. Lee. Quick on the ball, tricky in tactics, dogged triers all, and finely balanced as a team, they were doughty opponents indeed, and they triumphed in 1906 and 1907, beating the 11th Hussars in the final on each occasion. I well recollect the sensation Captain Cawley then made with his dashing play at No. 1. One of his ponies was an Arab stallion named The Turk, and this pony was so handy that he could pull up, turn, and jump into his quickest stride almost as quick as thought. On The Turk Mr. Cawley, as he then was, proved a source of constant trouble to the opposing back, and his dashes down the field when he had slipped the field (as he often did even in those days of "offside") drew the spectators on to their feet breathless in excitement. "Officers wounded" have also included a number of polo players, prominent among whom is Captain J. G. Porter: the No. 3 of the crack 9th Lancers' side. The gallantry of his fellow officer and colleague in the regimental polo team, Captain Francis

Grenfell, was referred to last week. The 9th Lancers have lost Major V. Brooke, a four-goal man; and among the wounded officers whose names were recorded in last week's lists were such well-known players as Captain George Bellville, of the 16th Lancers (the famous No. 1 of the Old Cantabs); Major E. A. W. Harman and Major G. H. A. Ing, of the 2nd Dragoon Guards; Captain W. G. F. Renton, of the 1st Dragoon Guards; Lieutenant-Colonel I. G. Hogg, D.S.O., of the 4th Hussars; Captain E. G. Christie-Miller and Mr. E. D. H. Tollemache, of the Coldstream Guards; and Lord R. E. Innes-Ker, of the Irish Guards, who was also reported as missing.

The National Game of India

INDIA'S magnificent devotion to the cause of the Empire in this war has had due recognition in the columns of the daily Press. In this country, however, people do not sufficiently realise the great part which polo has played in training the cavalry officers in the Indian Army and the military forces of the states. Take those chiefs who were selected to accompany the Expeditionary Force to France for example—they are all polo players and promoters of the game. The Maharaja Sir Pertab Singh has played on several occasions at the London grounds; the present Maharaja of Patiala, like his predecessor, is an enthusiastic sportsman and lover of polo and pigsticking. For many years the Patiala team proved invincible against the best English regimental teams. Then the Maharaja of Bikanir keeps the game going in his state, and the Maharaja of Jodhpur is a famous enthusiast and exponent, as are two others who are with the Expeditionary Force—the Maharajas of Kishengarh and Rutlain. The last named is a fine, safe, clever back—a nine-goal player—the former a quick and resolute No. 2; and with Captain F. W. Barrett (England's international captain) between at "3," and K. Ratan Singh at "1," they won the Calcutta Coronation Cup Tournament in great style a season or two ago. And so the list of famous Indian players who have gone gladly and gallantly to the front with their splendidly-trained troops on behalf of the Empire might be greatly extended. Suffice it to say that finer and fitter horsemen and soldiers more dashing and daring are not to be found in the world. To a larger extent than many of the uninitiated here can realise they owe their brilliance and fitness to their true soldier's game of polo; and no matter to what task these Indian chiefs and their soldiers may be put in the war we may rest fully assured that they will do honour to themselves and their Empire.

Should Racing Continue?

THE question as to whether it is the public wish that racing should continue was answered in no uncertain fashion at the Doncaster meeting last week. The Corporation had prepared itself to encounter an appreciable loss as the result of their policy of holding the meeting in the face of the war difficulties, but the attendances were so good that by the end of the third day there was actually the prospect of a small balance on the right side. Apart from this, there is no doubt but that the townspeople of Doncaster would have suffered heavily if the meeting had been abandoned. They look to the race-week as an important source of revenue and, trade being already bad in consequence of the war, it would have been a double hardship upon them to have a blank St. Leger week. The fact that the King allowed his colours to be carried in the St. Leger was a sign that His Majesty does not view with any disfavour the continuance of racing. This branch of sport has grown into a real industry, and the question is whether more mischief would not be caused by its total suspension than by the present policy of bringing off fixtures wherever practicable.



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
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H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES

The Prince's Regiment, the 2nd Grenadier Guards, has now moved out of London for a destination at present unknown. His Royal Highness, who has been transferred to the 1st Grenadier Guards, expressed great regret that he was not permitted to go to the front, and has since approached Lord Kitchener on the subject, but it is understood that at present his wish cannot be complied with.



THE KING REVIEWING THE HONOURABLE ARTILLERY COMPANY
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Leo Britannicus

THE British Lion is the sort
Of thing to spend the day with,
At any kind of friendly sport
The animal to play with ;
But do not anger him, because
He has the most tremendous claws.

A wholly tranquil creature he,
Who likes to spend his leisure
In making lots of £ s. d.
Wherewith to purchase pleasure ;
But irritate him and a roar
Of mighty volume is in store.

He's not at all the kind of beast
To get into a flurry,
Nor does he trouble in the least
If folks his leisure worry ;
But harm his friend and you'll not fail
To see a lashing of his tail.

The German Eagle is a bird
That causes small annoyance ;
No sound from it is ever heard
Which dissipates his joyance ;
But batter Belgium and you'll trace
Black looks upon the Lion's face.

The Eagle lately gave a prance,
And 'mid much loud concussion
Went first to meet the Man of France
And secondly the Russian ;
The Lion, too, she chanced to meet,
And now she beats a bad retreat.

The Teuton Eagle has a fleet
On which she's spent much money,
And which the Lion wants to meet ;
But this seems truly funny—
It gives no sign of any sort
Of ever coming out of port.

And so the war goes grimly on
To its predestined finish ;
The Eagle, grave and woebegone,
Sees hope on hope diminish ;
The Lion, with a sigh most deep,
Still pining to resume his sleep.

MOSTYN T. PIGOTT.



THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE



FRENCH INFANTRY CHARGING

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FRENCH DRAGOONS

In pursuit of flying German Uhlans passing through a village on the Marne

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


FRENCH INFANTRY

In action against Germans, who are fighting a rear-guard action

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THE HAVOC OF WAR



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THE BEAUTIFUL TOWN OF DINANT, NOW A SAD RUIN



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VIEW OF TERMONDE

A scene which brings home to us the horrors of bombardment



SOCIAL AND SPORTING NOTES

WE welcome the appeal that has been made by an eminent soldier to Masters of Hounds not to stop hunting during the war. It was time such an appeal was made, for many prominent people—and among them at least one ex-M.F.H.—have from the purest, though in our view the most mistaken, of motives urged the contrary. In their opinion a continuance of the sport while the great struggle between the powers is proceeding and so many thousands of our countrymen are fighting nobly in the cause of liberty for the nations is uncalled for—unseemly. Unseemly it would be if the hunting it is proposed to carry on were of the “merrily we’ll whoop and we’ll holloa” nature; but it is nothing of the sort. The Masters of Foxhounds Association, who considered the subject a month ago, came to the wise decision that it would be most prejudicial to the country in general if it were allowed to lapse altogether, though they fully recognised that “regular hunting,” as it is known in normal times, would this season be impossible. They suggested that it should be carried on as a matter of expediency and not as a sport. Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, the last man in the world to advocate anything contrary to the interests of the Army or contrary to taste, so thoroughly agrees with this attitude adopted by the Masters of Foxhounds Association that he has made a direct appeal not to stop hunting. “It is a very important training for our officers,” he remarks, “the very dash of our cavalry being attributable to hunting at home”; and he knows the value of the hunting field even at the present time as a means of supply to the cavalry of the best possible horses for the purpose. By all means keep hunting going, he and many others agree; but let there be no panoply or heedless merriment about it this winter, for such would certainly be out of taste.

GENERAL FRENCH, who has shown all his old mastery and wonderful military science in his command of the British Expeditionary Force during the past six weeks, gained undying fame in South Africa by his brilliant work in command of the cavalry. And General French has always acknowledged his indebtedness to the hunting field for the experience which proved of such service to him in his career as a cavalry leader. He has been a hunting man all his life, like Sir Evelyn Wood, who hopes to be out with hounds pretty often this winter on the only horse the Government has left him—a cast-off Army one. Earl Roberts is a firm believer in the value of hunting and polo, so long as they do not interfere with a soldier's duties. The great Duke of Wellington, who kept a pack of hounds going during the Peninsular campaign, always declared that “England will rue the day when her field sports are abandoned.” Major-General Sir William Knox expressed the strongest views on the necessity of looking upon hunting as the last hope of our riding-horse supply in the absence of the expensive one of breeding establishments, and declared: “There is no better school of training for Army officers of all arms than the hunting field.” Major-General E. A. H. Alderson, himself a Master of Hounds, thought so highly of the value of hunting that he wrote a book, “Pink and Scarlet,” showing the inseparable connection between soldiering and the sport; and there are other Masters of Hounds serving the country at this critical time who have left strict injunctions for their staffs to keep hunting going in a practical and businesslike way until their return. A better lead and example than that no one can wish for.

FURTHER well-known names of polo players have appeared in recent casualty lists, and further stories come from the front of the particular dash and gallantry of well-known polo regiments, which seem to have played their part nobly in the work of the cavalry. One list of wounded officers contained the names of two members of the Inter-

regimental Cup winning team this year—Captain T. R. Badger and Mr. B. G. Nicholas, the 12th Lancers' No. 2 and No. 3. It is to be hoped that their injuries are not serious, but slight. The 12th Lancers, it will be remembered, showed extraordinary combination in their play this year. Individually, the officers named were the strongest members of the side, though Mr. E. H. Leatham was a capable “1,” and Mr. R. W. R. Wyndham-Quin a reliable and steadily-improving back. But it was their remarkable team-work which carried them through all the rounds into the final, in which they beat the 1st Life Guards. Their record for the tournament speaks for itself—38 goals for: 16 against. And they capped it all subsequently by beating the Champion Cup winners, the full team of Old Cantabs, and then the Cavalry Club in securing the King's Coronation Cup. It was the first time since the institution of the latter tournament that the “championship of champions” had been won by a regimental side, and both Captain Badger and Mr. Nicholas had a big share in this success. In the same list of wounded appeared the names of Mr. L. H. Jefferson (the 11th Hussars' No. 1) and Major W. J. Lockett, of the same regiment; and previously it was announced that Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G. H. Morris, of the Irish Guards, a keen and well-known polo player, was not only among the wounded officers, but also among those missing.

The War and the Turf

LAST week's discussion by the members of the Jockey Club as to propriety of continuing to hold race meetings during the war bids fair to become historic in the annals of the Turf. The meeting had been preceded by panic rumours in the sporting columns of at least one important newspaper to the effect that the Jockey Club had in contemplation the abandonment of the three autumn Newmarket meetings. Had this been true it would have meant the summary end of the flat-racing season. If the authorities of the Turf had abandoned the meetings for which they are primarily responsible, it can be taken for granted that race-course companies in general would have followed their lead. But we now know that the members of the Jockey Club were never desirous of putting into practice the drastic measure falsely attributed to them. On the contrary, the Stewards went very carefully into the facts and the figures, and at the meeting at Derby House they were able to present a strong case for the continuance of racing during the war. Thus it was resolved, without a dissentient voice among the Jockey Club members, that the racing fixtures at Newmarket and elsewhere should be carried out where the local conditions permit and where the feeling in the locality is not averse to the meeting being held.

Autumn Handicap

NOW that racing at Newmarket next month is practically assured there will be rapidly growing public interest in the prospects of the Cesarewitch and the Cambridgeshire, which are perhaps the most attractive of all the racing season's handicaps. Some good judges declared that the winner of the Cesarewitch was seen at Doncaster in John Amendall, who won the Rufford Abbey Handicap on the Town Moor in most convincing style. That horse, unfortunately, died last week as the result of a severe kick. Princess Dorrie is sure also to be well backed. The Oaks winner stays well, and is by no means harshly treated in view of her smart achievements this season. One will await with interest the further performances of those good three-year-old colts Willbrook and Dairy Bridge, who filled the leading places in the Doncaster Cup. It is certain that both of them are well endowed with stamina, that quality which, above all others, is indispensable in a Cesarewitch winner.

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
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The Shooting of Game

THE idea of giving official encouragement to co-operation in game-shooting originated with Lord Leith, of Fyvie. At his suggestion the County Clerk of Aberdeenshire approached the administrative authorities, and the response to his appeal was prompt and satisfactory. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue have intimated that they will make no additional claim for licence duty in respect of duly licensed keepers who, for the purposes of the Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund, shoot on the lands of and by permission of others than their employers. This means that a keeper with a £2 licence may help in shooting game on neighbouring estates without having to provide himself with a £3 game licence. The concession is highly appreciated by preservers, and we are informed that it has already borne excellent fruit. In all parts of the country keepers belonging to different estates are carrying out joint shoots. They fully realised that it is only by clubbing together that they can possibly accomplish the thinning out that is indispensably necessary in the different preserves. There is little danger that the military and naval hospitals will suffer for lack of game or venison during the shooting season.

River and Loch

THE angling season is now tapering to a point, and on some leading waters the rod has been definitely laid aside. In the majority of Scottish districts the sport has been rather indifferent, the protracted drought preventing salmon and sea-trout from ascending the rivers with the requisite ease and freedom. Trout were impeded more, perhaps, than the lordly fish. The former often frequent small streams which are liable to dry up, whereas the latter are invariably found in large rivers which are never without a moderate flow of water, even in the longest and brightest summer. Within the last few days the weather has been marked with heavy and frequent showers, and in many places good baskets have been obtained. On Loch Shiel Mr. Wilson secured thirteen sea-trout in four days and Mr. Chalmers had ten sea-trout, and five brown trout in one day. Mr. MacQueen creelred seven sea-trout in two days and also landed a salmon weighing 15 lb. In Kyle of Sutherland, Mr. John MacLennan brought to gaff in a single day four fine sea-trout, the heaviest scaling 6 lb. 13 oz. On the Esk and Liddle herling continue to give fine sport. In one of the Netherby reaches a single rod accounted for fifty in less than a week, and another rod had a score in one day. The Spey, the Garry, the Shiel,

and other rivers have recently yielded some capital salmon fishing.

On the Links

THE camping and drilling of troops on many of the best-known Scottish links has interfered to some extent with golf playing, but in very few places has it been found necessary to put a complete veto on the ancient game. The men in khaki have everywhere evinced a laudable desire to interfere as little as possible with the wielders of the clubs; but of course it is impossible that practice should go on "just as usual." Half a loaf, however, is better than no bread. The autumn medal competed for by the Montrose Mercantile Club was won by J. C. Jessop with a score of 73. Other scores were:—W. S. Pairman (1), 75; A. P. Mitchell (4), D. Patterson (2), and J. Fyfe, jun. (plus 1), 78; A. Harley (1) and G. M. Smith (2), 79; C. Lamb (scratch) and D. Thomson (plus 3), 80; and R. Middleton (1) and A. Patterson (3), 81. The hole competition of the Hawick Club was keenly played, and the following is the result:—J. S. Reid beat W. Boyd by 3 and 2; C. S. Rennie beat A. Elder by 3 and 1; W. Burnett beat H. L. Purdon by 6 and 5; H. M. Duncan beat R. H. Lindsay Watson by 3 and 1. In the semi-final W. Burnett beat H. M. Duncan by 2 and 1; J. S. Reid a bye. The final resulted in W. Burnett beating J. S. Reid by 3 and 2.

Polo in Ireland

LIKE most other Irish pastimes, polo has been severely handicapped by the war, and the game may be said to have been brought to an abrupt close with the departure for the front of most if not all the principal players in Ireland. All the important fixtures have been abandoned, and while regret is widespread there is hope of a speedy resumption of the play. The military, who have popularised polo in Ireland, hope to render a good account of themselves in the more real opportunity afforded them for the display of coolness and courage. That they have done so is already a matter of history, and next year when the Open Cup Tournament, now in its thirty-sixth year, is played, it is anticipated the contest will arouse a degree of enthusiasm never previously experienced. One or two famous players of the 5th Royal Irish Lancers and several "strong men" of the 16th Lancers have rendered a good account of themselves under fire, and that they do not forget the game is evidenced by references to it in their home correspondence.



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
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GENERAL SIR H. SMITH-DORRIEN

Who is so ably commanding one of the Army Corps at the Front


HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF



THE HUNS A.D. 451

An old French Engraving, showing the hordes of barbarians who were defeated at Chalons
The Kaiser's legions have copied their methods as far as acts of barbarity, cruelty, and vandalism are concerned

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THE LAST VOYAGE
H.M.S. Hogue and her sister ships as they steamed to sea for the last time



CAPTAIN WILMOT S. NICHOLSON OF H.M.S. HOGUE

Copyright, West & Son, Southsea

Who is to be congratulated on his rescue in the North Sea after the foundering of his ship. The following quotation is from one of the men who were aboard the Hogue: "A few minutes later we were struck twice. Captain Nicholson, who was on the bridge, was as cool as a cucumber. He gave us the word to tip over everything that would float, to take off our clothes, and to look after ourselves. It was done ship-shape. The Navy rule is 'keep your mouth shut and do your job well.' We did it. It went off, as you might say, just like evolutions. The ship turned over and we saw the Captain with nothing on sliding down the keel into the water."



PHEASANT SHOOTING IN THE FLINT-LOCK PERIOD
One of a set of four fine old shooting prints from paintings and engravings by T. Sutherland

ABOUT PHEASANTS

By GUY C. POLLOCK

IT would be rash indeed to suppose that one will do much pheasant shooting this year—though certainly a good many people must and should shoot a good many pheasants. But the time when it is legal, if not expedient, to shoot pheasants can hardly come and go, even in these days, leaving one quite unresponsive to its memories and delights.

A suggestion has been made that all pheasants, or as many as possible, should be killed this year in the earliest days of October as a generally prudent contribution to the communistic good which is now the general goal. But the suggestion seems to me neither very wise nor very feasible. A great glut of pheasants will do no one any good. Birds killed in early October are by no means so good to eat, whether for the healthy or for the sick and wounded, as birds killed in November and December. It may be doubted, moreover, whether it would be found possible to trap or net a great number of pheasants—certainly of wild pheasants—at this time. It would certainly be foolish to try to shoot very large numbers in early October.

Most of us have at one time or another taken part in days of covert shooting attempted prematurely. Lack-lustre days they generally are: days of low and reluctant birds, of small bags, of much cry and little feather. One such day holds pride—if that be the word—of place in my memory and in my game book. That was in a year when we had added to the little shoot adjoining coverts most desirable in many ways. The keeper then persuaded us to try a premature day in these coverts. His intentions were excellent. They were frustrated no less by a paralysis of marksmanship that overcame even the efforts of ordinarily decent guns than by the extreme difficulty of showing anything but foxes in the circumstances of the case. That year the leaves clung to the trees with an unusual obstinacy. The day was a redoubtable disappointment.

It began with one of those tragi-comedies that add variety to all sorts of sport. We were, first of all, to attempt a drive of as many coveys as might be pushed successfully over a line of guns, despite the difficulties of narrow boundaries. The coveys were there, they were remarkably tractable, and the keeper's plans worked well. We should, no doubt, have put together quite a respectable bag of partridges out of one drive if—if we had not solemnly lined the wrong hedge. The situation, indeed, would have been, for a dispassionate onlooker, deliciously humorous. Five guns took their post behind what they believed to be the selected hedge bordering a stubble field. They were agreeably excited by a distant cry of "Mark!" They gripped their guns nervously, as guns do at a partridge drive, kept eager eyes on the hedge in front, and made up their minds to secure at least one bird in front. But nothing happened. After an abominable silence more cries came, louder and more insistent—cries of "Mark!" "Mark over!" "Coming to the right." And still nothing happened. For myself, I began to deem the world bewitched when I saw the end gun on the right run hurriedly towards the other hedge, passing at right angles to the one we lined. As he ran and as, quite amazed, I watched him, I saw a large covey break over that hedge and stream away. It was the last of seven coveys which had passed behind our backs while we patiently lined the wrong hedge.

That was a fitting prelude to a day on which impenetrable coverts, a multitude of foxes, and very poor shooting made a very poor bag, when quite a good one would have rewarded us if we had deferred pheasant shooting for two or three weeks and if we had not put ourselves in an evil mood by the tragicomic error about the selected hedge.

But against this I have to set very many memories of quite delicious days and half-days spent in the outwitting of outlying pheasants in early October. These have been great days of variety and charm. They have commonly begun and ended with an impromptu partridge drive, while the major part of the day has been spent outside the boundary spinneys or along the hedgerows with a spaniel. Some of these October days have been spent in the great wood, after a morning had been occupied in driving the partridges in the adjoining fields. The sum of their memories is of sunshine to make perfect a day of crisp English autumn, with all the gorgeous hues of beech woods at the turn of their tide to satisfy the eye and to charge the spirit with an abounding sense of beauty, of good, honest, free and easy sport, of the comradeship of good fellows. It is a happy memory and it is a sad one, for some of these good fellows have fired their last shot on the battlefields of France, and the memory of their companionship makes the sport of shooting seem in some sort profane.

Other memories crowd on me of very happy days spent in breaking a few pheasants out of the hedgerows and spinneys of the little shoot. One may not find in these hedgerow pheasants the thrill of rockets coming in a steady stream over one's stand and demanding a top-notch speed and accuracy if one is to look the keeper squarely in the eye when the best is finished. But one finds in these little days of few birds, no rockets, but great endeavour—a very honest and enjoyable sort of sport. October days are very gracious and their spoil is not to be despised.

AVON TYRES

THE Avon Tyre Co., second largest firm of solid and pneumatic tyre manufacturers in Britain, have lost 20 per cent. of their employees since the declaration of war. The firm have made arrangements for the support of the dependents of these men for the duration of the war and have guaranteed to each man that his post shall be kept open. As a rule the company employ only British labour. This has been slightly departed from at present by the finding of temporary posts for Ally refugees.

The work done with a set of square-ribbed motor tyres of Avon make that has come to our notice is of interest as showing the quality of work and material turned out by the firm. Out of a total of 5,000 miles that the car has run since being fitted with these tyres only one puncture has been experienced, and there is a large amount of life left in all four tyres. The work that this particular set has accomplished is a good testimonial to the quality of Avon manufactures.

For every dozen golf balls manufactured and sold by the Avon Tyre Co. the company are contributing 2s. to the Prince of Wales's Fund.

Messrs. Williamson & Cole, Ltd., who publish an excellent book on artistic furnishing entitled the "Home Beautiful," have recently added to their premises a spacious carpet floor, and on view here they have every variety of carpets, including the newest and choicest productions from the British loom. The adjoining premises are under constructional alteration, and when completed will be opened as high-class furniture galleries.

the windows of the wards can be seen a fair prospect of smiling country. The inhabitants of the narrow iron beds, so trim and clean and comfortable, will have everything to win them back to health in this beautiful spot. Broad white notices, headed by the sign of the Red Cross, are displayed in many of the shops of the little town, signed by the commandant of the local Voluntary Aid Detachment and setting forth a list of needs that still remain unsupplied. We are asked to send soap, candles, soda, rice, flour, and that expensive commodity, sugar. A demand for jars to accommodate fifty pounds of jam is made, together with a few hints as to bacon, eggs, and such like aids to convalescence. It is probable that all will be provided, judging by the number of people who study the poster and make a few notes for future reference, and presumably active attention.

NOTHING daunted by her previous experiences, Mrs. St. Clair Stobart has gone once again to the front. She is in charge of the hospital sent out by the Women's National Service League to help the Belgian Red Cross Society. The hospital has its headquarters at Antwerp, and is served by six women doctors and surgeons, twelve fully trained nurses, cooks, orderlies, and electricians in charge of the X-ray apparatus so kindly given by Lady Cowdray. Mrs. Stobart had a tale to unfold, without doubt, of her recent vicissitudes as a prisoner in the hands of the Germans, but she has been too busy getting ready for her new departure to waste much time in talking, and the story will have to wait till a more leisured moment. In the meantime the Women's National Service League is working hard in the interests of the Belgian Red Cross, which is having its resources fully taxed and can ill afford any fresh demand upon its funds. So it is hoped by the League that the expenses of the hospital will be subscribed for in this country, and Lady Muir MacKenzie makes a special appeal to this effect from the headquarters

of the Women's National Service League at 39 St. James's Street, London, S.W.

WHETHER we feel inclined to think of clothes or whether we do not the fact remains that with the approach of autumn we must more or less replenish our wardrobes. The first snap of cold weather has already distinctly asserted itself, and nearly every post brings an appeal from one of the large shops, or a private dressmaker or milliner, asking for support as usual, so that workrooms may be maintained and the dread plague of unemployment not spread. Prices all round have certainly decreased—of that there is no shadow of doubt—so that the shops are doing their best to conform to the heavy claims on every purse. Perhaps one of the strongest proofs of this was included in the contents of this morning's mail, when some sketches of the hats of a famous London milliner arrived. They one and all bore prices of amazing moderation, and it is safe to prophesy that in ordinary times their cost would have been far higher. No one is inclined to wear vivid colours these days, and in not one single instance did the six small sketches offend. It is easy to see that black velvet will have it all its own charming way this cold-weather season, and few of us will grudge it its pride of place. Black velvet hats are universally becoming, and, moreover, they serve exceedingly well with the furs which will soon fall to our daily lot. There is a certain type of hard winter hat which quarrels ceaselessly with our fur wraps, and quite undoes any softening effect they are able to impart. Velvet, on the contrary, never annoys in this way, and we can welcome the velvet hat in all its various shapes and guises.

Besides the general subduing of colour the war influence shows itself in yet another way. Exaggerations of shape or trimming have almost completely vanished, judging by the same modistic guide; and not many of us will regret the passing of their day.

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Copyright, Sport and General

FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS

The Grand Old Man of the Army, who has recently celebrated his eighty-second birthday



A RECRUITING SONG

"To arms!" is the cry
 That comes echoing by
 Through the length of the day and the night;
 "To arms!" calls the King,
 With a soldierlike ring
 That tells that his summons is right.
 To the order come forth
 From the South and the North,
 From the limits of East and of West;
 Come forth and don't lag,
 Come and fight for the flag,
 Obeying the nation's behest.
 Old England is ready
 For freedom to fight;
 Her purpose is steady,
 Her standpoint is right.
 Though never denying
 That peace has its charms,
 Her colours high flying,
 To foemen replying,
 You'll still have her crying,
 "To arms!"

"To arms!" cries the Russ,
 Who is warring with us,
 And the same cry the children of France;
 "To arms!" Belgium calls
 As her tottering walls
 Are opposing the German advance.
 Our Colonies call,
 And the Hindoos are all
 Most eager their duty to do;
 So come out and fight,
 For the Black and the White
 Are maintaining the Red, White, and Blue.
 Old England is steady,
 Not longing for strife,
 But eagerly ready
 To fight for her life,
 Her summons is winging
 To townships and farms;
 Her Britishers bringing,
 With cheers loud and ringing,
 She's lustily singing,
 "To arms!"

MOSTYN T. PIGOTT.





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THE SENTINEL

IN THE TRAIL OF WAR



ON THE ROAD TO RHEIMS
All that is left of a small village near Soisy-le-Bois

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MODERN SIEGE ARTILLERY



Copyright, International Illustrations

GERMANS VIEWING THE DAMAGED FORTS AFTER THE FALL OF NAMUR



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THE EFFECT OF THE GERMAN GUNS AT NAMUR
All that remains of one of the Great Forts



SHOOTING OVER DOGS

From an Old Print

WALKING UP

By GUY C. POLLOCK

THIS is indeed, by the irony of fate, a wonderful year for partridges, and I have lately had some actual and extremely heating proof of this. Three of us have been spending three days in walking up the birds on the Little Shoot, and, since all three have undertaken such duties as the State can find for us, and these three days represent the whole holiday of busy men, I am not in a mood to apologise too much for carrying on peaceful sport while the country is at war. If excuse were needed it might be found in the local lamentations of the village over the abandonment to a very great extent of shooting and hunting, and in the frantic persuasions made in vain to us to fill the gaps caused in the local shooting world by the war. It does the village harm and not good that shooting should be abandoned, while the ramified interests of various trades and their dependents are also injured.

These, however, are brave words, and I am bound to say that one goes about this business of shooting partridges in war time with an uneasy mind, and that every Territorial sentry with his rifle seems to shame the man with a shot-gun on his shoulder, however clear he may have his patriotic conscience. Troops pass along the roads by day, and one's night's rest, filled with its inevitable dreams of war, is broken by the hoarse sounds of challenges upon the bridges. You cannot get away from the war by walking after partridges in a home county. You cannot really feel that the duty of "carrying on," laudable and harmless as it may be for those who are not permitted to render military aid, is satisfactory or ennobling.

These thoughts were too keenly present with us all to allow the shooting to be good. They weighed especially with the ex-officer who, still hoping for active re-employment, found his usually accurate aim greatly diverted by the thrusts of a disquieted spirit. Besides, we came down three pale, wan, overworked wretches on whom a day's walking under a blazing September sun over stubbles and grass fields baked to a desert dryness and roots languishing with tired leaves had an uncommonly exhausting effect. Thus it befell that for the first two days, when the coveys were young and foolish, we shot extremely badly. And I do not think that the ineradicable loquacity of the chief beater, partly induced by the fact that he had a brother at the front and had been himself rejected for the Army on account of faulty eyesight, really helped us much. Even the black dog, the indefatigable, seemed to feel the influence of these days—so much so that, brought to one supposed runner in the turnips, she just lay down and said very plainly: "I don't believe there's no such person." When the man of affairs had found the bird for her she could hardly be persuaded to make a full and frank apology.

For my own part, I had during the first two days an excellent excuse for poor marksmanship. Accident had deprived me of the use of my cherished weapon, and I was reduced to a spare gun which never did suit me well, and with which I have become thoroughly unfamiliar. I did not hesitate to impress upon the others and upon the chief beater, when he bemoaned the poverty of my aim, the fact of this misfortune. But I will confess that when the right gun turned up the discomforting thought came that, unless

the aim were very sensibly improved, the excuses made for failure would make me look unusually foolish. Fortune, however, was kind enough to put me, on the last day, in a mood to shoot as well as I can. It was, for me, one of those days on which one goes out not caring particularly whether one hits or misses. Either the intense heat or the war, or both, brought an indifference of spirit, and such indifference, quelling the tumult of over-eager "nerves," is just what one wants for shooting. Anyhow, the last day and the new gun were tolerably successful.

On the last day, moreover, by a freak of nature, the coveys sat extremely tight. On the first day, when the noise and the effect of guns were presumably strange to them, the birds rose in a surprising hurry, and showed how strong and forward they were by going off like rockets. On the second day they were obviously perturbed. On the third—a day of rest having intervened—they lay and waited for us to kick them up. And they waited on one occasion in cabbages—an unusual incident, accounted for, no doubt, by the excessive drought and by the fact that such moisture as remained from an early morning mist was there to be found.

The man of affairs bemoaned the impatience which took several coveys up at some distance, and expressed a preference for the shower of birds which suddenly bursts all round one's progress across the drills of a root field. But that seems to me a mistaken preference. Whenever a covey of partridges gets up in the course of a day's walking it is almost bound to surprise the gun. But when the sudden whirr fills all the air with accountable birds I am myself reduced to a deplorable indecision. The first bird is easily picked, though one is apt to fire at too close a range. The second, being found, is too often abandoned for what may seem a more suitable chance at a bird rising after the first lot are well on the wing. And this second bird is apt to prove a less hardy and well-grown specimen than one would select in a perfectly calm moment.

The perversity of coveys, of course, adds to the very real enjoyment of walking up on a limited acreage, where half the sport is the effort to push the birds in the right direction and to keep them within the boundaries. One such covey defeated us very handsomely. We pursued it with admirable craft and guile over four fields, and imagined that we had it fixed, with all its twelve well-grown members, in a convenient strip of swedes and turnips. To make doubly sure we took a wide and hurried sweep over an adjacent stubble towards the roots. Inevitably, therefore, we disturbed our covey on the stubble, to which it must have run out of the roots, and then it finally defeated all our efforts by flying right out of our ground. As I watched it go I said to the chief beater: "We shall never get one of that lot," and he answered: "No, sir, I don't believe we ever shall."

These are, however, the misfortunes which lend charm and variety to sport. I expect, if we are still able to pursue our partridges before all the cover is gone, that we shall have great fun trying to outflank that covey. If all else fails, those twelve crafty birds will play games with us and keep us walking and manœuvring if out shooting. It would be a pity to shoot them. Their loss would spoil much genuine sport. They are better out of the bag, at all events, it is better for us to regard them in that light, for they will remain out of it.



SOCIAL, SPORTING AND WAR NOTES

Pink and Scarlet

THERE are now serving with the colours, it is stated, forty-four Masters of Hounds—really a very good percentage, especially when the fact is taken into consideration that the ambition to take a mastership is not often realised by sportsmen until they are getting on in years, so that many Masters, who doubtless would otherwise be serving their country at the present moment are precluded from so doing by age. The percentage of regular followers of hounds who are eligible for Service, and have joined some branch of the Service or other, must be nearly as satisfactory, for there is practically no one left in the hunting field who need have any qualms of conscience at being there, and huntsmen say that they never recollect such a "lonely" cubhunting season as this has been so far. Mr. T. Bouch, Joint Master of the Belvoir, who has been in training on Salisbury Plain, is reported to have left Tidworth with his regiment for the front, where he will have the opportunity possibly of meeting several fellow M.F.H.'s who but for the war would be busily engaged in superintending the preparations for the hunting season. Captain J. E. N. Heseltine, of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, recently reported wounded, is a brother of Captain Godfrey Heseltine, Master of the Essex Union Foxhounds, of which he himself was a keen follower; and the late Captain R. B. Parker, of the Northamptonshire Regiment, who was among the officers killed, used to be a brilliant rider to hounds in the shires. Only a season or two ago he had the great distinction of alone seeing the finish of a tremendous thing with Mr. Fernie's hounds, in the course of which event that brilliant horseman Arthur Thacker, the huntsman, got thrown out. Then Captain C. W. Banbury, of the Coldstream Guards, whose death is generally deplored, was a first-class man to hounds, a useful polo player, and a brilliant steeplechase jockey. He won many races at regimental and other meetings, notably the Grand Military Gold Cup at Sandown Park, which he twice secured on Sprinkle Me, the property of his brother officer, Captain E. G. Christie-Millar.

In Abeyance

IT is not every pack that will hunt at all this season. Mr. Curwen's foxhounds are among those establishments in abeyance, and the reason is one of which Cumberland sportsmen may be proud. Practically every member of the staff is on active service. The Master himself, Mr. F. A. Iredale, and his amateur huntsman, Captain A. F. Broadley-Smith, have rejoined their regiments, which are under orders to proceed abroad. The honorary secretary, Mr. W. T. Highet, is with the colours, and so is Captain H. R. S. Massy, adjutant of the 4th East Lancashire Howitzer Brigade. More than a few of the followers of this Cumbrian pack have likewise given their services to the King in this critical hour of the nation's history; and it furnishes a notable instance of what hunting is doing as a sport generally to strengthen the forces of the Crown. Mr. Curwen's hounds were started eight seasons ago to fill the void caused by the abandonment some years previously of the Whitehaven Harriers, which for many years hunted both fox and hare in the country. It is not a pretentious establishment, but a very sporting one; and it is to be hoped that all the good men and true who have helped to make it such a success will come back from Service, when Germany has been fairly "run to earth," to enjoy many a great chase behind the stout greyhound foxes of West Cumberland.

Cricket in 1915?

IS it realised that next summer there may be no first-class cricket, and that it is possible that we may have to wait until 1916 before things are in shape and swing again at Lord's, the Oval, and other county grounds? Nothing, of course, is settled yet; in fact, it is impossible to see how the authorities could come to a decision in the matter for some time to come, because no one can foresee or foretell the

probable duration of the war, or its effect upon games seven or eight months hence. Still, at the special meeting of the Worcestershire County Cricket Club the other day "the probability of first-class cricket being suspended next year" was taken into consideration as well as the provision of the small sum of £350 to meet expenses assuming that no cricket takes place. Arrangements will be in the hands of the committee during the suspensory period, if suspensory period there is, and the professionals have consented to accept winter pay for six months, when the club's liability will cease. All this shows plainly enough how problematical first-class cricket in 1915 really is. It is almost as doubtful, in fact, as is the holding of the Olympic Games at ruined and impoverished Berlin in 1916.

A Light of Other Days


REGARDING cricket, the most notable item of news recently—though in these critical days it has passed comparatively unheeded—was the report of the death of Mr. Bransby Beauchamp Cooper at Geelong, Australia. Perhaps the present generation of cricketers can be said to know very little of Bransby Cooper; as a matter of fact, it is nearly fifty years ago since he gave up participation in English first-class cricket, and his career for Middlesex and Kent, though brilliant, was of short duration. Yet he was a remarkably sound bat, and that in days when wickets were not nearly so good as they are now. Many of the important county matches in which he figured were played on a ground at Islington. But his best performance was at the Oval in 1869, when he and Dr. W. G. Grace scored 283 runs for the first wicket in 200 minutes. They were playing for the Gentlemen v. Players of the South, and Bransby Cooper's contribution was 101—as faultless as and only a little less masterly than the Doctor's 180. Nor was that the only occasion upon which he helped to put on over 200 runs for the first wicket; in partnership with Mr. "Jimmy" Slight (another fine hitter of former days) at Melbourne in the 'seventies, he scored 117 against the best bowling of the time in Australia, while Slight rattled up 124. A few seasons later, by the way, the last named (279) and J. Rossen (192) made 395 for the first wicket, playing for South Melbourne against Kilda.

The Australian Tattersall

FROM Sydney also has come news of the death of Mr. J. T. Inglis, whose eldest son, Mr. Gordon Inglis, on the staff of Sir George Reid, High Commissioner for Australia, is well known in London sporting and social circles. Head of the famous Australian bloodstock firm of William Inglis & Son, Mr. J. T. Inglis was often spoken of as the "Tattersall of Australia," and at "Newmarket," a place celebrated in Australian sporting annals, he used to preside over sales of bloodstock second only in importance and scale to the dispersals conducted by Mr. Somerville Tattersall at Doncaster and Newmarket at home. The Australian Newmarket, by the way, is a wonderfully well-adapted property to serve the dual purpose of training establishment and centre of sale activity. No one was regarded as a higher authority on horse-breeding in Australia than the late Mr. Inglis, who was a fine type of sportsman, and in his younger days an athlete and Rugby football player much above the average. Mr. Gordon Inglis has distinguished himself in lawn tennis among other pastimes, and his younger brothers, Dr. Keith Inglis and Mr. Clive Inglis, were rowing Blues at Sydney University. The death of their father will be greatly regretted, not only in Australia, but in this country, for he was known and highly respected by bloodstock breeders the whole world over.

Hunting in Ireland

MAY be said to have properly begun with the advent of Michaelmas, when the weather, changing for the better, gave the necessary stimulus to cross-country sport. There was a welcome fall in the temperature, and with improved



JOHNNIE WALKER: "How goes the recruiting?"

SERGEANT: "Like yourself, Sir; still going strong."

JOHN WALKER & SONS, LTD., SCOTCH WHISKY DISTILLERS, KILMARNOCK.

scent the members of the Meath Hunt made a capital start at Gibstown, where Major Collins's woodlands were drawn and several foxes scattered effectively by the hounds, which were followed in a capital run from Arch Hall, heading back towards Balsaw and into the Decoy, where the quarry was killed. The Donaghpatrick Moat also held a leash, and one was marked to ground. The Ballinter Woodlands were visited, a fine show of cubs being successfully hunted to the neighbourhood of the kennels, where hounds caught their fox. The Clewd Wood and surrounding plantation afforded scope for a brisk run. Colonel Stuart's Pond Wood, at Dowdstown, was hunted through to Brady's Wood, several local sportsmen being well in at the death.

Rod and Gun

ANGLING and rifle shooting have played an important part amongst Irish sportsmen for some time past, and although the former may be said to be on the decline, owing to the passing of the year and the absence of many devoted fishermen, interest in the latter recreation continues unabated, local clubs holding their periodic meetings with success. The bright and sultry weather and general calmness of the waters tend at present to retard fly fishing and to reduce the importance of captures generally. The chief resorts at Waterville, Castleconnell, and adjoining lakes are growing less frequented, and sport is mostly backward. Sea trout take well at Lough Currane, one of the best baskets being that of Mr. Thompson, who captured several beauties one day last week. On the Inny, Mr. Verschoyle landed a fine salmon, and on the Cumberagh the former gaffed a salmon weighing 6 lb. and a few nice sea trout. The salmon and peal running on Waterville river is at a standstill, but sea angling is affording a pleasant alternative. The need of the hour is being promptly recognised by the various rifle clubs throughout the country, and a gratifying instance of unswerving loyalty is afforded in the offer to the military authorities by the Ulster clubmen to form a corps of expert Service shots. The Ulster Rifle Association numbers amongst its members some of the foremost marksmen in the kingdom, and the addition it affords to the ranks is a welcome one.

Irish Turf Topics

THE third meeting of the season at Kells brought a strong contingent of sportsmen to the popular Meath event, where, with favourable weather and excellent fields, there was no lack of enjoyment. The hurdle racing and steeplechases were well contested, Mr. J. Rogers riding two winners. The Tipperary fixture was a powerful attraction, and, despite the fact that there are few families in the county who have not relatives at the war—for the district has always given of its best to the Army—there was a large and fashionable attendance at Powerstown Park. Gloriously fine weather—more suggestive of mid-summer than advanced autumn—made for unalloyed pleasure. The Greenmount stable was in capital form at Iramore, where a well-raced programme formed the attraction for the Waterford people and visitors from all parts. Large fields ruled and good going was general.

Angling

FISHING on the River Forth, Mr. Alan Hannah, president of Bonnybridge Angling Club, was successful in landing a salmon weighing 19 lb. The fish, which was a beautiful, clean-run specimen, measured 38 in. in length and 20 in. in girth. In the opinion of Alexander Greenhill, keeper of the Forth fishings, the salmon was the finest specimen taken from the river for fully ten years. Mr. Hannah hooked the splendid creature with the fly known as "a small turkey." In the Esk and Liddle an increased number of salmon are now in evidence, especially in the lower waters. Herling and sea trout have afforded good sport with the fly during the past few days. In the stretch below Longtown, Mr. Makant secured, with a minnow, a salmon weighing 14 lb., and Mr. Keith Makant, fishing with dun turkey winged fly, had three fish of the same species, weighing respectively 10½ lb., 12½ lb., and 12 lb. Mr. Keith had also a splendid basket of thirty herling. The River Tay continues low and clear, but despite this fact a few fish are showing, and some nice sport has recently been obtained. In one day's fishing Mr. J. Cattanaich landed three salmon, 10 lb., 11 lb., and 12 lb.; Mr. J. Jack, a fish of 15 lb.; and Mr. W. R. Stuart, two salmon, 6 lb. and 11 lb.

Trotting and Steeplechasing

IN dull but dry weather the open trotting handicap was decided on Victoria Race-course, Glasgow, in three heats and a final. There was a large attendance of spectators, and the sport provided was of an excellent character. The starters in the preliminary heats were well up to the average in point of numbers. For the final, George IV. was in most request at even money, and next in favour came the two

ponies Wee Pod and Cinderella. At three-quarters distance it seemed as if the ponies could not be overhauled, but on coming into the straight the champion put in some capital work and ultimately won a well-contested race by half a length. George IV. is the property of Miss Trail, Wee Pod is owned by Mr. MacCusker, and Cinderella belongs to Mr. Clark. There also ran in the final, Walter W. (Mr. Alexander), Dun Jack (Mr. Lindsay), His Worshipful (Mr. Johnstone), and Directese (Mr. Binnie). The effects of the war in taking away owners and producing a scarcity of steeplechase horses in training induced the committee of the United Border Hunts to apply to the National Hunts stewards for permission to abandon the October fixture at Kelso. Leave has been granted, and the meeting has been removed from the calendar.

Retriever Trials

THE annual field trials for retrievers, promoted by the Gamekeepers' National Association, was held on the Duchess of Norfolk's estate of Caerlaverock, near Dumfries, and extended over two days. The weather was simply perfect and the meeting was largely attended. The opening day was devoted to the competitions in the Castlemilk Stakes for ten dogs or bitches, the property of ordinary members. The challenge cup was taken by Ian Earsman, Hoddam, with Jubilee Drake; T. Parmley, Bradfield Kennels, came second with Pallinsburn Nell; and R. Reay, Wooperton, third with Ilderton Ben. The prize for the best handler was awarded to Ian Earsman, and that for the best-looking Labrador to R. Reay for his Ilderton Ben. On the second day the National Stakes for dogs owned by honorary members of the association was decided, and the entries numbered sixteen. The winner was Snipe, belonging to the Hon. Mrs. Lionel Walrond, Bradfield; the second prize went to Mr. T. W. Twyford, Whitmore Hall, for Peter of Whitmore; and the third to Mr. R. A. Ogilvie, London, for Caulcleuch. The judges were Mr. Ernest E. Turner, Gloucester; Captain G. Hutchison, of Kenbank, New Galloway; and Mr. Wilson Davidson, jun., Beechgrove, Annan. The work of the dogs, taken as a whole, was decidedly good.

Golf

AT the business meeting of the Royal and Ancient Golf Club, St. Andrews, it was reported that on account of the war the captaincy of Major Bethune had been deferred till next September. Mr. H. W. Forster, M.P., is to continue to discharge the duties of the office for the next eleven months. Referring to steel-shafted clubs, the chairman of the rules committee stated that clubs of this make had been carefully tested for a number of years and the results had from time to time been placed before the committee. It had always been decided that such clubs were not a permissible departure from the traditional instrument and that their adoption ought not to be encouraged. In the final round for the hole-and-hole tournament, under the auspices of the Musselburgh Royal Club, Mr. Richard Niven (receiving 6 holes) beat the club honorary secretary, Mr. Herbert Millar (owing 1½ holes) by 10 to 9, and won the Menzies Cup. Mr. Harry Hope, M.P., has presented the Bute Club with a handsome cup, and the final in connection therewith was played on Saturday. The result was a victory for William T. Esplin (scratch), who beat Malcolm Bell (2) by 5 up and 3 to play. In the hole tournament for prizes presented to Cochrane Castle Club (ladies' section) by Mrs. H. W. MacGregor, the winners were: 1st, Miss Jessie Jackson; 2nd, Mrs. James MacNab.

Items of Interest

DURING the past few days some very good stags were accounted for in the forests of Ross-shire and Inverness-shire. A considerable number of excellent heads are reported from Gaick, Killilan, Cozac, Monar, Strathconan, and Lochrosque. Colonel Clarke, Fasnakyle, brought down two magnificent stags, each of which scaled 19 st. 4 lb. clean. One carried a grand head of 11 points and the other had a fine, rough head of 16 tines. The latter is regarded as the outstanding trophy of the season.—Owing to the war the executive of the Border Coursing Club have cancelled the Spotsmain and Redden meetings fixed for October 13 and November 5 respectively. It is announced by the Mid-Annandale Club that unless there is a satisfactory entry the proposed meetings on the 13th and 14th current will not be held.—The principal subject discussed at the annual meeting of the Scottish Ice Rink Club was the effect that the war is likely to have on curling during the coming winter. While it was recognised that the game, in common with other forms of sport, must suffer in some measure, there was a unanimous expression of opinion that as the majority of players are out of the sphere of active service no useful object could be attained by giving up curling, even temporarily. It was agreed to open the Crossmyloof Rink on the 19th current.

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CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

THE choosing of kit for campaigning purposes is of more importance than would appear at first sight, and the path of the new recipient of a commission in His Majesty's Army is beset, as he soon finds to his great mental inconvenience, with many doubts, queries, and difficulties when it comes to selecting the paraphernalia comprised in the average land kit.

That the possession of a good kit is half the battle is generally conceded so far as experienced officers are concerned; the man who has undergone the rigours of active service understands the real value of good boots, good glasses, perfectly fitting and thoroughly suitable clothing, and really portable accessories to personal comfort. These things, and an intelligent choice of them, go far to make up the difference between the successful man and the failure, for although a bad workman is said to quarrel with his tools a good workman cannot do good work with bad tools; and in the peculiarly exacting conditions which active service entails, kit and equipment must be of the very best, and the choice of what to take and what not to take must be as nearly perfect as is humanly possible if a man is to give his very best to his work.

It is fairly safe to say that the most important item of kit is boots; smart footwear is useless for campaigning. It lies with the wearer to decide what size and fitting suits him best, but he should bear in mind that he ought to take only boots that he can "sleep in." Not literally, of course, but the boots ought to fit so loosely and easily that they can be worn for at least forty-eight hours without causing discomfort to the wearer. At the same time they must not be loose enough to chafe the feet; a pair of heavy walking boots, well broken in before departure on Service, and roomy enough to be as comfortable at the end of a long walk as at the beginning, is the ideal to be striven for. Further, the owner of the boots should take care to obtain and take with him a small tin of ordinary motor grease, or of vaseline, in order to keep the feet in condition, together with a supply of boracic powder, with which to dress chafed skin when necessary. For the carriage of these latter articles an airtight tin is necessary, and this should be rounded in form, for corners are to be avoided in all articles of equipment, since they mean trouble either in the haversack or wherever else they may be carried.

It is to be borne in mind in the selection of a kit—apart from the things that must be taken as a matter of course—that lightness and compactness are the first considerations, while another important point is the ease with which any article can be washed or cleaned. In the matter of drinking vessels, for instance, one should carry an aluminium collapsible drinking cup for field use; it is the lightest form obtainable, it is easily kept clean, and it gives the greatest capacity in the smallest form. Again, in the matter of underclothing the lightest and smallest-folding articles should be taken, and a sufficiency only carried, not a superabundance. In choosing from among these the probable climatic conditions must be taken into account, and with these kept in view the necessary minimum should be chosen, while if choice arises between two articles the one which packs more easily and in the less space must be chosen.

A rainproof—and a real rainproof at that—is a necessity. The cape form of coat is not advisable, for the time may come when one needs all the freedom for the arms that can be had, and then the man with a sleeved coat has the advantage over the man with a mere cape. In the fitting of this coat particular care should be taken to see that full play is allowed to the arms, and if the garment can be worn for a time before actually setting out for that vague region known as "the front" so much the better. It is a good rule, so far as clothing is in question, to take nothing new in the kit, but to take only articles which have been tested by actual wear. This is especially applicable to boots and riding breeches, both of which articles require to be "broken in" before they will give the maximum of comfort to the wearer. As to riding breeches, much chafing will be avoided if the thinnest of pants are worn under them; half the discomfort of this kind that is experienced comes from the rucking and doubling of thick underwear at the points where riding breeches crease about the inside of the knee and higher up the leg. Thin underwear does not necessarily presuppose absence of the warmth required for winter campaigning, nor, conversely, does the wearing of thick underwear mean always greater warmth.

(To be continued next week.)



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THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN

Feminine Facts and Fancies

WOMEN to-day are occupied with a score of things, and to those who are watching and waiting for news from the front these claims upon their attention must be a veritable relief. Many women, for example, are taking more than a passive interest in the Belgian refugees who have come over in such numbers to our country, and whose condition beggars sympathy. Alexandra Palace is now being used for the housing of a considerable number of Belgians. Men, women, and little children are here, and this large, somewhat unwieldy building has certainly never been put to a better use. The rooms have been turned into dormitories, and are bright and cheerful, besides being scrupulously clean. The main hall is the children's playground, and here large swings have been fixed, which are rarely idle, as can easily be imagined. Here also are the inquiry bureaux. The various organisers have their own particular tables, dealing quickly and sympathetically with the different questions that arise. Alexandra Palace is, in fact, the clearing house of the refugees. The offers of hospitality arriving from all parts of the country are sent here, and receive careful consideration. The great difficulty is to please both parties—the entertainers and the entertained—and to see that all are satisfied as far as possible. Not an easy task by any manner of means, but it is being more or less accomplished, nevertheless. The refugees do not stay long at Alexandra Palace, for new homes are quickly provided for them, and they then leave to make room for new arrivals. Visitors are not allowed inside the gates without passes, but there are many who receive the necessary authorisation, and several well-known Belgians in London have been down to welcome their compatriots, amongst them the Duchesse de Vendôme. Several people have arrived at the gates with presents of clothing and food, and the gate-keeper has his time fully occupied answering questions and receiving various offerings.

The Women's Emergency Corps

Many societies and organisations have sprung into being since the commencement of the war, some of which bear tribute to little but misplaced energy, overlapping as they do societies already in working order. No such criticism, however, can be levelled at the Women's Emergency Corps. In the first days of the war the headquarters of the Corps were at the Little Theatre, John Street, Adelphi, but its activities grew so rapidly that larger premises had to be found in York Place, Baker Street; and here great things are being done. The main object of the Women's Emergency Corps is to find employment for those who through no fault of their own have been thrown out of work. It is a work of women for women, and many clever people are bringing their best wits to bear upon the matter. One of the latest things that the Women's Emergency Corps is doing is to train a selected number of girls to become toymakers. The collapse of the German monopoly of the toy trade gives too good a chance to be lost, and of this full advantage is being taken. Sixty girls are busy making toys in the top rooms of the Corps' premises in York Place, and a very interesting sight it is. They have already made considerable progress in the art, and, judging from appearances, it will not be long before they are experts. Christmas and the toy season is not so very far away now, and war was declared just at the time when large stocks of toys would in the ordinary course of events have been arriving in this country from Nuremberg and the country round. The children, however, are not going to be disappointed of their Yuletide gifts if the Women's Emergency Corps can help it. The Duchess of Marlborough is amongst the many taking an active interest in the Corps and its objects, and her example has been followed by many of the Americans who have been "held up" here. The boats now, of course, are running much more frequently, and a great many of our trans-Atlantic visitors have left for home. A considerable number, however, still remain, and more than one American woman has found her way to York

Place during the last week or so. One pretty woman, who has joined the Corps till her departure for Washington, at the middle of this month, was ordering quite a large consignment of toys for her small boy and girl, and their tribe of little cousins in the United States of America. Many other orders, also, are arriving daily, and this latest industry should flourish. Nor is this the only work that the Women's Emergency Corps is providing. They have equipped the Queen's Canadian Military Hospital, at Shorncliffe, Folkestone, with sheets, pillow cases, draw sheets, and surgeon's overalls, and have offered to take on orders from any Government contractors who are finding it difficult to complete their orders within the promised time.

The Latest Entertainment

The newest form of entertainment seems to be the knitting dinner. The moment dinner is over, and the ladies have left their lords and masters to discuss politics, wars, and rumours of wars in the dining-room, knitting needles are produced and fingers grow busy. It is quite a usual thing for an informal dinner invitation to convey the warning, "Bring your knitting," and by this permission no time is wasted. Many people, indeed, are so occupied in making and dispatching knitted goods to sources all over the country, as well as abroad, that they grudge a leisurely evening in which needles and wool play no part. Lately it has fallen to my lot to go to three of these knitting dinners, and very amusing have they all been, each in its own particular way. Every woman has her own individual style of knitting. Some knit quickly, others are slow. Some are exceedingly practical at their task, finishing each row with decision and decreasing and increasing with the air of a commanding general, whilst others knit in an apologetic way, fully conscious that at any moment they may drop a stitch, let it unravel, and occupy some more capable person's time in repairing the damage. At the last dinner of the trio there was an exceedingly attractive culprit of this sort, who dropped stitches more readily than she knitted them, but was so pleasant to behold that we cheerfully forgave her her shortcomings in this particular way. She wore one of the new very short dresses of flounced net, with jet chains in lieu of sleeves, and a general impudence of design. The matron of the party wore a stately gown of velvet with a modest quantity of the family diamonds, and the war, as usual, was the sole topic for discussion from the moment we met till the moment we parted.

The Fashions That Are

As a matter of fact, for those who feel inclined to think about clothes, there are such things as the new winter models. All the models were ready and waiting in the Paris *ateliers* when war broke out, the only difficulty being their dispatch to London. This, as can easily be imagined, was a formidable one, but it has been solved in a certain number of cases. The manager of one of the best-known London houses brought home a collection of models in his own personal luggage, and secured them for the benefit of his customers that way. We were present at their display an afternoon or so ago, and duly noted the one or two points which differentiate the models of the autumn from those of the summer. One thing that is noticeable is the exceeding shortness of the skirts. They are almost absurdly short, and it is quite difficult for the eye to become accustomed to this curtailment. It is not with the walking suits alone that this can be noted; afternoon gowns of taffeta or charmeuse are equally brief; nor do the evening frocks escape. One of the most effective evening frocks we saw was entirely composed of moonlight-blue sequins, caught up on the shoulder and at the knee with a single red rosebud. Its wearer admitted its excessive weight; but this in no way discouraged its subsequent purchaser, whose rapid decision, no less than her accent, proclaimed her from New York. It is Americans, in fact, who up to the present have kept the shops at work; but trade shows signs of reviving now, and everybody is getting busier.—ERICA.

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
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
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SOME DISTINGUISHED PEOPLE RELATE THEIR EXPERIENCE.

"I HAVE given Sanatogen a fair trial. My experience confirms the medical opinion—there is no longer that feeling of fatigue which one previously experienced, but there follows from its use a distinct restorative effect."

Lucretia Mott

"MY experience has been that as a tonic nerve food, Sanatogen has on more than one occasion done me good."

Hall Caine

"SANATOGEN has done everything for me which it is said to be able to do for cases of nervous debility and exhaustion. I began to take it after nearly four years' enforced idleness from extreme debility, and now (after only four months) I find myself able to enjoy both work and play again."

Sanatogen

"I HAVE for two months been suffering from a rather severe attack of Congestion of the Lungs. I am now recovering and rapidly regaining strength, which I attribute in a great measure to my having taken Sanatogen twice daily for some weeks."

B. W. Leader

"SANATOGEN seems to me a very valuable food and nerve tonic. I have several times taken a course of it when I have been run down, and always with good results."

Henry Arthur Jones

"I FIND Sanatogen an excellent tonic."

E. Mansur



Sir John Benn.

"SIR JOHN BENN is deriving much benefit from Sanatogen."

"I HAVE been taking Sanatogen, and think that it has decidedly helped me to get through the extremely arduous work that I have had to do during the past few months."

Landen Ronald

"SIR FREDERICK MILNER was much run down from overwork when he took Sanatogen, and it certainly did good. He has more than once sent supplies to poor people, run down from illness or overwork, and it has invariably proved successful. It seems both to nourish and give strength."


F. Milner

"SANATOGEN promises, when you are run down, to pick you up. It does so."



Rev. Father Bernard Vaughan.

Bernard Vaughan



Sanatogen will give you back Health, Strength and Nerve-power—not visionary, but real.

That the regular daily use of Sanatogen does actually produce a remarkable improvement in many conditions of ill-health is a fact which has been vouched for by no fewer than twenty thousand physicians, as well as by many celebrated people who have used it.

A True Tonic Food—Start a course to-day!

Anæmia, Dyspepsia, Lassitude, and other symptoms of nervous disorders—all disappear rapidly after a course of Sanatogen. It restores and invigorates the system after Influenza, Operations, and illness generally. Sanatogen

is, therefore, specially prescribed for nursing mothers and weakly children of all ages, for in no case can it do harm, while its bland composition renders it easily and rapidly digestible.

Sanatogen is sold by all Chemists from 1s. 9d. per tin.

SANATOGEN—a Scientific Health Food with True Tonic Properties.

BURBERRY WAR KIT

The Burberry Weatherproof

Infantry or Cavalry Patterns, lined wool, or with detachable fleece lining, supplied to every regiment in H.M.'s Army, has been indispensable to Officers ever since the beginning of the South African War.

General KITCHENER referring to THE BURBERRY described it as "a most valuable addition to his campaigning kit."

Burberry Coats are labelled "Burberrys." Be sure that yours is genuine, otherwise the most need the imitation may fail you.

Burberry Khaki Uniforms

Designed by Burberrys for the War Office, and proofed by their process, are supplied with the greatest expedition.

Pea Jackets

Made in Burberry-proofed Regulation coating, lined fleece or fur.

Burberrys' War Kit

includes, besides full Service Dress, Haversacks, Slings, Puttees, Shirts, S. B. Belts, Water Bottles.

Gabardine Ground Sheets and Sleeping Bags

GABARDINE DAWAC—a Bivouac weighing only 3½ lbs. inclusive of pegs.

PEACE PRICES

Regiments in any part of the United Kingdom waited upon by appointment.

Illustrated Military Brochure Post Free.



Burberry Service Dress

OFFICERS IN FRANCE can obtain all War Kit from Burberrys' Paris House.

BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON

& 10 Boul Malesherbes PARIS; Basingstoke and Provincial Agents.

FURS

At Special Prices

With the object of finding work for our staff of skilled Furriers we have, during the last few weeks, designed and made about 100 Fur Coats in four different shapes, of which the garment sketched is an example. These coats are made from sound and reliable skins. They follow the lines of the latest Paris Models, and the shape and finish are excellent.

Seal Musquash Coat (as sketch), made from reliable skins, lined new striped chiffon taffeta silk.

Price **13½** Gns.

Actual Value, 19½ Gns.

KHAKI ARMY RUGS

Very warm and durable. Size 60 x 90 in. Each **10/6**

Debenham & Freebody

Wigmore Street. (Cavendish Square) London.W



IMPORTANT PRIVATE SALE OF HIGH-CLASS SECOND-HAND AND ANTIQUE FURNITURE, CARPETS, PLATE, LINEN, PICTURES, PIANOS

TO THE VALUE OF OVER £500,000. MUST BE SOLD ENTIRELY WITHOUT RESERVE.

ENTIRE CONTENTS OF A LARGE WEST-END CLUB Removed from St. James's St., S.W., for convenience of Sale.

ANY ARTICLE MAY BE HAD SEPARATELY, and, if desired, CAN REMAIN Stored Free, and payment made when delivery required, or will be PACKED FREE AND DELIVERED OR SHIPPED TO ANY PART OF THE WORLD.

98 COMPLETE BEDROOMS.

Comprising 16 well-made solid oak bedroom suites complete £3 17s. 6d.; solid oak bedsteads to match, complete 16s. 6d.; handsome china toilet services, from 3s. 6d.; large bedroom and other carpets, from 7s. 6d.; 14 well-made solid walnut bedroom suites complete at 5s.; massive black and brass-mounted bedsteads, full size, complete with spring mattresses, at 25s.; three very handsome design white enamel bedroom suites of Louis XIV. style at £5 15s.; four well-made large solid oak bedroom suites at £3 17s. 6d.; four very artistic Sheraton design inlaid mahogany bedroom suites at £7 15s.; three artistic large solid walnut bedroom suites at £9 17s. 6d.; several fine Old English gent's wardrobes, fitted sliding trays and drawers, from £3 15s.; several fine bow-front and other chests of drawers, from 37s. 6d.; old Queen Anne and other tallboy chests, from 6s.; six very choice inlaid mahogany bedroom suites, 13s.; elaborate all-brass Sheraton style bedsteads with superior spring mattresses complete, 45s.; choice Chippendale design bedroom suites, 12s.; Chippendale design bedsteads to match; Queen Anne design solid mahogany bedroom suites, £14 14s.; all-brass square tube full-size bedsteads with superior spring mattresses, at £5 17s. 6d.; costly Chippendale design mahogany bedroom suite, 16s.; costly inlaid satinwood bedroom suites £45; panelled satinwood bedstead to match, 9s.

DINING-ROOMS, SMOKING-ROOMS AND LIBRARIES

Several fine quality real Turkey carpets about 9 ft. by 12 ft. from £4 17s. 6d.; real Turkey rugs at 17s. 6d.; massive carved oak sideboard, £5 15s.; overmantel to match, £2 10s.; extending dining table to match, £2 17s. 6d.; two elegantly-carved armchairs and six small ditto to match, £6 15s.; elegant Queen Anne design sideboard, fitted drawers, cupboards, etc., £7 15s.; set of eight Queen Anne

design dining room chairs, comprising two large carved chairs and six smaller ditto £7 15s.; oval extending Queen Anne design dining table £4 10s.; Queen Anne design mantel mirror to match, 42s.; 18 luxurious Chesterfield settees, £2 15s.; luxurious lounge easy chairs to match at £1 10s.; magnificently carved grandfather clocks; fine tone upright piano, £7 15s.; a magnificent instrument by George Brinsmead, 12s.; and an exceptionally fine small grand piano, £25, equal to new. Several sets of complete Old English table glass from £4 15s.; set of four oak American roll-top desks at £3 15s.; and many other items too numerous to mention here.

DRAWING-ROOMS AND ANTE-ROOMS.

Nineteen elegant design large Axminster bordered carpets from 3s.; elegant design suite, comprising luxuriously sprung settee, with two lounge easy chairs and four occasional chairs, covered rich Paris silk tapestry, £9 15s.; very elegant Louis XIV. design china cabinet to match, £8 15s.; choice centre table, 21s.; and Louis XIV. design overmantel, 35s.; elaborately carved and gilt Louis Seize design suite of seven pieces, including settee, 12s. complete; white enamelled French cabinets; Vernis Marten painted tables, escritoirs, etc.; the satinwood decorated china cabinet, 4 ft. 6 in. wide, £14 14s.; satinwood decorated centre table, £2 10s.; satinwood decorated overmantel, £3 10s.; costly satinwood decorated suite, covered choice brocade gobelin blue silk, £18 18s.

Also BED and TABLE LINEN, Carpets, Curtains, Draperies, &c.

SILVER and SHEFFIELD PLATE, &c., &c. Five full-sized billiard tables from 30s. complete with all accessories. Billiard dining table, three iron safes, and thousands of other items impossible to mention here, including two nearly new motor cars.

Write for Complete Catalogue ("Land and Water"), Illustrated by Photographs. Now Ready. Sent anywhere Post Free.

THE FURNITURE & FINE ART DEPOSITORIES, Ltd.

48 to 50 PARK STREET, UPPER STREET, ISLINGTON, LONDON, N.

Grand Prix, Diploma of Honour, and



Gold Medals, Paris Exhibition, 1912.

The following Number Motor Buses pass Park Street, Islington: Nos. 4, 19, 43, 43a, and 30.


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ESTABLISHED OVER HALF-A-CENTURY.

By Royal Appointment



to H.M. the King of Spain.

IMPORTANT NOTICE.—We have NO WEST END BRANCHES, neither are we connected with ANY OTHER DEPOSITORIES. Our ONLY ADDRESS is as above. Having NO WEST END EXPENSES TO MAINTAIN enables us to offer GENUINE advantages in really Fine Antique and High-class Goods.

L. LEWIS, Manager

Grand Prix and Gold Medals.



International Exhibition, Rome, 1912.

THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN

Some Leaves from a Feminine Note Book

TAKE us on the whole, we are not an imaginative race. It is very difficult for us to picture the horrors of invasion when such a thing has never happened in our experience nor in that of our forefathers. Owing to what has been neatly described as a geographical accident, the people of this country are in very different case from those on the Continent, and this has its natural result on life in general. It is probably for these reasons that the charge of apathy has been made against us. Fugitives from abroad, escaping from scenes of horror and desolation, marvelled and were perhaps somewhat shocked at seeing us proceeding on our way much the same as usual. They asked whether the English really knew they were at war. We may perhaps have been slow in fully realising it, but every day now drives the fact harder home. To those living in London one of the first visible signs of being in a state of war has been the darkening of the streets at night. This most certainly helps to stimulate the imagination. Gone are the sky-signs, the illuminated lettering, and all the eye-catching devices of electric advertisement. No longer are there the brightly-lighted shop windows that in times of peace remained brilliant and shining far into the night. The street lamps are carefully graded, those which are not absolutely necessary for the safety of traffic being unlit. Added to this, folk who are awake at night can sometimes hear a patrolling airship with engines throbbing distinctly as she passes overhead. It is the first unusual demonstration we have had, though it probably will not be the last. Many people lately have made a pilgrimage to the Embankment after it is dark to see the effect of the search-lights that pivot from the top of Charing Cross against the sky. This also is new to our experience, and makes its own peculiar claim upon the imagination.

The Families Left Behind

The Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association has been very busy since the outbreak of war and has relieved several cases of distress that almost instantaneously arose. It will be remembered that Queen Alexandra made an appeal on behalf of the Association, but this was withdrawn shortly after to allow freer scope for the Prince of Wales's Fund. Those in authority felt that the two appeals running simultaneously might interfere one with the other and lead to confusion. Lady Londonderry, as President of the Durham County Branch of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, has just made a statement regarding the administration of relief in that county, which makes very interesting reading. The Association here has had no fewer than 11,151 cases on its books, and the numbers have increased week by week. The organisation is relying for funds upon the balance of the money collected in Durham for Durham families at the time of the Boer War, upon contributions and subscriptions which have been given now, and a contribution from the Prince of Wales's Fund. This last has been sufficiently large to enable Lady Londonderry to hope that there may be no need to make any further appeal on behalf of the Association. A detailed return is shortly to be published giving an account of the way in which the relief has been distributed amongst the dependents of our troops at the front.

All those who have been interested in the Association in the past are anxiously waiting to see how the new scheme of the Government, which came into operation on the 12th of this month, will work. The Government has undertaken to make the payments direct, and it is now a matter of State control. Whether this means the resulting decrease of personal interest remains to be seen. That, as we all know, is the danger of the State machine. The county branches of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association have counted many helpers amongst their ranks, who watch over the various cases and pay frequent visits to the different homes. The personal note, therefore, has not been lacking in the past, and in many instances has proved of great value in the good work accomplished.

Patriotic Shopping

Women have many duties at present, and not least amongst them is patriotic shopping. We can all do a very formidable best to encourage home industries. It has been shown quite recently that though we are at war with Germany German commercial agents still overrun our markets. The German trader, naturally enough, is sufficiently astute to know that he must disguise his nationality; but this presents no difficulty. To this end German businesses are making an effort to be turned into English limited liability companies and traders in neutral countries are being used as middlemen by German concerns. By these subterfuges German trade with this country is by no manner of means as completely closed as it should be. The remedy for this lies in the hands of the English shopping public. If everybody made a point of examining the articles they buy and inquiring as to their origin the British trader and British trade would have a very decided stimulus. There has never been such a chance as the present for promoting English manufactures and strangling German competition. If every mistress of a house makes up her mind that nothing of German manufacture shall enter her doors she will help her native land in the most practical of all practical ways. Nor need this be an uninteresting task to perform. If we once set our minds to cope with the question we should learn more about the clothes we wear and the food we eat than we probably have ever known before, and the study cannot fail to be a fascinating one.

Lace and the Belgians

Belgian lace is being given a foremost place in the catalogue of many a great shop's wares, and the examples now being displayed amply merit attention. Apart from all sentimental value attaching to work done by our brave Ally, lace made by the Belgians has always ranked high in excellence and been a foremost industry of the country. The specimens shown in London are particularly beautiful, and it is no wonder that many people have taken the opportunity to add to their lace collection. There are various signs that lace is to be much used on evening frocks and tea gowns. This is a time when the tea gown has undoubtedly come into its own. Women who have been out all day, serving on various charity organisations, attending first-aid lectures, and working in many other ways, are well inclined towards the rest frock when they reach their own home again. And the rest gown at its best is as becoming a garment as the heart of woman can desire. Planned upon up-to-date lines, it partakes much of the nature of an evening dress, but is infinitely easier to don. A pretty gown of Neapolitan violet charmeuse, intended for the trousseau of a war-wedding bride, had wide scarf sleeves of delicately-meshed lace, with a tiny edging of hand-embroidered violets, outlined by a background of leaves in very natural colourings. The lace was toned to the shade of old parchment, of the colour to which the inferior *dentelles* never aspire. That the cheaper kinds of lace, however, rarely justify their existence is too well established a fact for pressing at this or any other time.

A Good Response

Many gifts have reached Devonshire House in response to the Queen's appeal for knitted belts and socks for the troops at the front. No fewer than six thousand pairs of socks have been forwarded by the women of Dundee through Colonel Hill, chairman of the Dundee Territorial Association, and from Lady French's Fund comes a regular supply every week. Lady Salisbury has sent five hundred pairs, Mrs. Ronald Greville seven hundred pairs, and Lady Phillips has sent over a thousand pairs of socks and three hundred belts. It has been requested that the givers of socks will see that each pair is sewn together, so that one sock may not escape from its fellow. This small detail, however, is forgotten by numerous people, and the result is that a staff of a dozen sewing women is kept constantly employed at Devonshire House sewing the socks together in pairs.

ERICA.

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 27)

VERY many firms who cater for the soldier in the field, both with regard to items which fall under the head of "kit" and those which must be designated "equipment," are making their appeal by way of cheapness. But when campaigning is in question the old proverb which states that the best is the cheapest is more than ever true, for the man who cuts cost also cuts comfort; and it cannot be too often repeated that comfort is half the secret of endurance and fitness.

For the Mounted Man

Especially is this true of riding breeches. The tailor who advertises a cheap line in riding breeches will make you a pair of breeches out of very good quality material, and usually they look well. They are all right for the man who does four or five hours riding a day and then changes into just what kind of clothing suits him best for his hours out of the saddle; but it must be remembered that on actual service the man who is wearing riding breeches may have to wear them for a week without a chance of changing his clothes, and may have to sleep in them every night as well as wear them during the day. For this sort of work only the very best and most carefully cut breeches will give even comparative comfort; a slight ruck inside the knee or alongside the thigh, which for ordinary riding use would pass unnoticed, develops into a rasp which involves a patch of raw flesh and consequent torture in the saddle. This is where the high-priced breeches come in, for if the wearer makes his tailor alter and alter until the fit is perfect, and then breaks in the breeches by a few days of hard wear before actual service begins, he can be sure of all the comfort that campaigning will allow him when the hardest stress has to be put on him and clothes alike. And with the cheap tailor there is no chance of making the tailor alter and fit till absolute satisfaction is obtained. "Your money back if we fail to satisfy you," says the cheap tailor, and he means it, for that sort of statement when properly carried out is a good advertisement for his business; it is cheaper for him than altering clothing to give full satisfaction. But the man who is preparing for active service has no use for "money back."

Paying for the Name

Half a dozen or more of the West End houses are specialising in fitness without regard to cost, both in clothing and equipment. It must be said against them that in most cases one has to help to pay their rent in purchasing their goods; and that rent is higher than the expenses of establishments in some other localities. But, admitting this, it must also be said that the West End houses carry only the best stock. They bought to sell at high prices, and they bought perfect goods; to put it differently, they bought the best, knowing that they would sell to buyers who would not consider cost so long as they could be certain of reliability. It is often said in a disparaging way, with regard to West End houses, that "one pays for the name," but the speaker usually forgets that the name has to be maintained by

(Continued on page 39)

CASTLE & CO.,
MILITARY TAILORS.

(Established 1889.)

FIELD SERVICE KITS
IN 8 HOURS.

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT.

STORE PRICES.

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.
(FACING ST. JAMES'S CHURCH).

'Phone Regent 5624.



KHAKI SHIRTS

Regulation Pattern for Officers from
7/11 to 12/6 each.

Khaki Handkerchiefs

A nice soft Handkerchief 3/3 per dozen.
A cheaper quality 1/11½ per dozen.

KHAKI COLLARS

1/- each.

WE also have Flannel Shirts, Cholera Belts, Mufflers, Sleeping Helmets, Woollen Gloves, and Mittens, at moderate prices. Suitable for the men

WRITE FOR PRICE LIST.

Robinson & Cleaver

156 Regent St., LONDON - AND - BELFAST



SERVICE KITS

—IN 48 HOURS.—

Every detail guaranteed correct, in accordance with War Office regulations.

Patterns and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service Jackets always on hand, which can be completed in eight hours.

WEST & SON, Ltd.

Military and Sporting Tailors,

151 NEW BOND STREET, W.

(Opposite Conduit Street.) 'Phone - Gerrard 8161.

Everything for
active service

You can get practically everything you will require to wear—from sword to puttees, from cap to great-coat—at the old-established Bond Street House of Rimell & Allsop.

The cut and finish and practical usefulness of your uniform will be of the character which has given Bond Street tailoring its reputation.

The following are standard prices:—

	£	s.	d.
Khaki Service Jacket	4	0	0
Knicker Breeches	1	12	6
Short Breeches for Infantry	2	2	0
Do. for Cavalry	2	10	0
Knees strapped Buckskin	extra	12	6
Do. same material	extra	7	6
Thin Continuations	extra	5	6
Khaki Serge Trousers	1	7	6
Khaki Flannel Shirts	12	6	
Do. Collars	each	1	6
Khaki Ties (wide end)	each	3	6
Do. (narrow end)	each	2	0
Great Coat for Infantry	5	10	0
Do. for Cavalry	6	0	0
British Warm	4	4	0
Cap	17	6	

Rimell & Allsop,

Sporting and Military Tailors,

54, New Bond Street, W.

Terms: Cash on or before Delivery.



By appointment to the King of the Belgians

Manufacturers to H.M. King George V.

War Service

corroborates the wonderful wear-resisting qualities of Dunlop motor-cycle tyres.

"Albany Road Hospital, Cardiff.
September 23rd, 1914.

"I SHOULD like to say how much I appreciated Dunlop tyres out in Belgium and France. I am a motor-cycle despatch rider, and was one of the first to go to the front. I covered well over 2,000 miles in three weeks, and only had one puncture. The roads in Belgium were some of the most fiendish imaginable, and I frequently rode across fields of stubble and tracks of all descriptions. This shows that Dunlop tyres are the best and wear the longest, for active service is a sure test of endurance and fitness. I was invalided home, and am now convalescing here.

(Signed) "Corporal J. K. STEVENS, R.E."

The capacity for hard wear of Dunlop motor-cycle tyres is unique, and is the result of an important development in tyre construction.

DUNLOP

The Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd., Founders throughout the world of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry

Aston Cross, Birmingham. 14, Regent Street, London, S.W.
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DUNLOP SOLID TYRES FOR HEAVY COMMERCIAL VEHICLES



Trade mark.

War-Time ECONOMY THREE CUPS A PENNY

A wonderful new food-beverage which gives more nourishment at a lower cost than almost any other beverage you can buy.

PLASMON OAT-COCOA

is a combination of the celebrated PLASMON OAT-FOOD and PURE COCOA, and in flavour equals that of the finest drinking chocolate.

Procurable through all chemists, grocers or stores. If not, send P.O. or stamps, and it will be forwarded post free. Manufactured solely by PLASMON, LTD. (Dept. 25), Farringdon Street, London, E.C.

**NO INCREASE IN PRICE
OF PLASMON FOODS.
ALL BRITISH.**

PLASMON CHOCOLATE is supplied as an emergency ration to the BRITISH TROOPS.



4 1/2
PER LB.
TIN
1s. 4d. PER LB.
3 cups 1d.

THE SCHULTZE COMPANY, LTD.


SOLE MAKERS OF

"SCHULTZE" AND "LIGHTNING" GUNPOWDER.

THE Company desires to inform the Sporting Public that the constitution of the Company is entirely British. There are no alien Shareholders, and all the Directors and Employees are British. The Schultze Powders were the first smokeless sporting powders made, and have been manufactured since 1865 at the Company's Works in Hampshire. Sportsmen may therefore continue to use the Schultze Co.'s Gunpowders with the knowledge that by so doing they are supporting a purely British industry.

For THE SCHULTZE COMPANY, LIMITED
O. G. WILL, Secretary.


Smokeless Cartridges



Loaded with "Neonite" (30 gr.) Powder in Gastight Quality Case.



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Loaded with "Stowmarket Smokeless" (33 gr.) or "N.E." (36 gr.) Smokeless.



Loaded with "Stowmarket Smokeless" or "N.E." Smokeless.

The Trade only supplied.

SOLE MANUFACTURERS

The New Explosives Co. Ltd.
62 LONDON WALL, LONDON, E.C.

CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 37)

providing only goods of a quality that will maintain the name. Certainly one pays for the name, but that name ensures to the purchaser expert choice and a quality consistent with the name; and in buying for Service the name is worth paying for. The old campaigner knows this, and pays cheerfully.

Waterproofs v. Rainproofs

Now about waterproofs. The thing known as "rain-proof" may be passed over as practically useless, for though it is relatively proof against showers—a good many of them—it admits some part of a steady, soaking rain to contact with the skin of the wearer. Further, it is a clammy, soggy thing after a day's rain; not at all the kind of garment that one can use as an overcovering in a wet bivouac. The waterproof coat must be so in fact as well as in name, and this is just as important in the case of the coat as in that of the ground sheet and sleeping valise. One should go to a firm which is prepared to guarantee every garment as absolutely waterproof—not merely "rainproof"—and should be content with no less than the absolute guarantee. Further, the waterproofing should be *in* the material, not *on* it. Many makers dress their waterproof cloths on the surface, and at first these clothes will keep out any amount of rain. But the perfect waterproofed fabric is dressed in as well as on the cloth, and it is consequently impossible to force water through the garments. The former kind lose their waterproofing after a certain amount of wear, but the latter will keep out water as long as they are fit for wear—as long as a rag remains, to use a common phrase. One noteworthy point with regard to waterproofs is that constant tight folding is bad for them, for the strain involved on the material helps to destroy the dressing, and the folds will leak after a time. If it is necessary to roll a waterproof tightly it should be folded for rolling in a different way each time so far as is possible. Persistent creasing in the same place makes for leakage. In the matter of quality and price one may go a long way to look for a better garment than the officially sealed regulation waterproof and not find it.

False Economies

I make no attempt in these notes to help the intending campaigner to save money over his purchases, for experience has proved to me that economy in outfit is false economy. The work of the soldier subjects every item of his outfit to special strain, and in regard to the quality of every item that must be taken the *best* is none too good. Further, I do not believe in the "complete outfit." Every house concerned in the supply of military equipment specialises in some thing or things, and from that house the things in question should be procured. If any one house sets out to provide a complete outfit the range of its supply is so wide that some items, perforce, must either be obtained from the houses which specialise in them or else be selected without that peculiar knowledge which makes for perfection. In the first case, one pays two profits on the one article, and in the second case one is not absolutely certain of quality. Not only should expense be disregarded as far as possible, but no trouble should be spared in getting a kit together. One should be prepared to go to half a dozen places in order to get things exactly right, for approximately right is not good enough for active service.

(To be continued next week.)

SERVICE BOOTS

MARSHALL'S Handsewn Boots

For the FIELD or for SERVICE.

WELL - SEASONED AND
READY FOR WEAR.

Quagga Hide or Brown
Grain Hide.

Price - 36/6

Genuine Porpoise,
45/-

W. MARSHALL, LIMITED (ESTABLISHED
1854)
10 FENCHURCH STREET, LONDON, E.C.



Junior Army & Navy Stores

LIMITED

YORK HOUSE,
15 REGENT STREET, LONDON, S.W.

SPECIALISTS IN CAMP EQUIPMENT MILITARY TAILORING

Etc.

Young Officers may safely rely upon the 35 years' experience of the Junior Army and Navy Stores. Every detail of Uniform and Equipment correct.

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Army and Navy Equipment.

WATERPROOFS

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SLEEPING VALISES.
GROUND SHEETS.
CAMP BUCKETS.
BATHS and BASINS.

OUR PRICES ARE THE SAME NOW AS BEFORE THE WAR.

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Makers of the Army and Navy Regulation Waterproofs,

37 QUEEN VICTORIA STREET, E.C. LONDON.
58-59 CHARING CROSS, S.W.

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Civil & Military Tailors

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THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN

Plans, and those Who plan them

THE National Relief Fund continues to accumulate like the proverbial snowball, each day witnessing a further growth in the already large total. The arm-chair critic has never been more carping than during the course of the last ten weeks, and, needless to say, the National Relief Fund has not escaped his attentions. There is no more difficult proceeding than the just administration of a charitable fund, and it must surely be allowed that the executive committee of the one in question has made every effort to solve the problem. The ideal state of things is a central fund and its local distribution, and this has been recognised. Mr. Wedgwood Benn, as chairman of the committee, has issued a statement making this abundantly plain. In each district a central register of information has been formed and agencies already in existence asked to contribute to this end. Foremost amongst them are the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, the Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation, and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society. Then there is the Government Committee on the Prevention and Relief of Distress, which has been collecting information for some time past and is now ready with its report. Through these channels the fund is already being distributed and much needed relief being given. It is, however, very certain that some very deserving cases have not come to the notice of those in authority. The truth is that those administering the fund are face to face with the problem confronting all social workers. The shiftless poor are only too ready to claim all the relief they can secure, whilst others, brought to misfortune often through no fault of their own, are too proud to beg. A much-criticised letter has recently appeared in the Press eulogising the social conditions in Berlin. Only one of the points it made was worthy of attention, and that dealt with the house-to-house visitation carried out in the German capital. This is done through the medium of a corps of German girls of good family, who make it their business to investigate every genuine case of distress. Germany has learnt and copied so much from us that we in our turn need not hesitate over the adoption of a useful hint from her. Some such organisation started over here, and worked tactfully and well, could not fail to be helpful in directing attention to cases that might otherwise be unavoidably overlooked.

Women and the Fund

Many reports have been circulated as to the practical working of this fund, some of which have been accurate and others very wide of the truth. Until quite recently many people believed that women were not eligible for help and that men alone were to benefit. This has been proved to be wrong upon the authority of Mr. Balfour, who makes a very sympathetic reference to the working woman and war conditions. It must regretfully be allowed that the war has caused hundreds of women to lose their employment, and the difficulties of obtaining fresh work are very great. The demands of the new army for numbers of men is lessening the male ranks of the unemployed, but women have no such claim upon their services. Mr. Balfour says that in his opinion the women thrown out of work by the war have the strongest claim to sympathy, and so, he believes, think the other members of the executive committee. Few will quarrel with this opinion. The working woman, indeed, would be in evil case at present if strenuous efforts were not being made on her behalf. It is calculated that already thirty-five thousand women are out of work in London alone. The Queen's Work for Women Fund is striking at the root of the matter, and has successfully provided some much needed employment. Many private individuals also are providing all the work they can, realising that the truest form of charity is that which receives as well as gives. The briefest survey of recent years shows that women come more prominently into the labour market with every day that passes. Times change, and we with them, but amongst the many points of difference between this present conflagration and the last which set Europe in a blaze is the position of women. Woman,

as a class, is affected by the present war in a way which would not have been possible a hundred, fifty, or even fifteen years ago. She feels the rise and fall of trade prosperity directly instead of indirectly as heretofore, because in many instances she is personally concerned. Every intelligent scheme, therefore, to cope with women's employment deserves very warm approval. The National Union of Women Workers is fixing its attention upon the need for social work amongst the women and girls living in the neighbourhood of the many large camps now rapidly being formed. They suggest that a band of voluntary workers should be formed under the control of paid organisers. These organisers will have to be carefully selected, as the work will be difficult and responsible, and adequate salaries must be forthcoming. The object is so excellent, however, that these will probably be ensured and this important work maintained.

A Belgian School in London

One of the most practical schemes for helping the Belgian refugees may be found at 4 Challoner Street, West Kensington. Here Miss Ruth Holland has started a school for the Belgian children now in this country. Some of these children have already attended various county council schools, but owing to their speaking a foreign tongue this has not been altogether successful. Miss Holland's school will be conducted precisely as if it were in Belgium. One of the teachers speaks Flemish, but practically all the lessons will be given in French. Lessons in English are to be given as a foreign language subject, but otherwise English will be rarely spoken. One hundred children will be sent as boarders to this school by the Belgian Legation, and it will be opened on the first of November, when all arrangements are to be in working order. The conduct of the school has been carefully planned, and it should prove a very happy venture.

ERICA.

LOOKING WESTWARD

THE subject of investments and profitable re-investment is one that is occupying the attention of a good many people at the present time, for, in the state in which all Europe is now, securities that have long been regarded as thoroughly safe and capable of paying a good rate of interest are no longer to be considered worth holding even; some other field for enterprise must be sought, and the prospective re-investor naturally turns to a country where the war and its effects are not so likely to be felt as in the older European states. It is probable that European stocks will fall still more before they rise, and since investors are already looking westward for fresh enterprises it is also probable that the available stock of the western countries will rise steadily in value. Interest is naturally centred to a large extent on Canada, where agricultural and commercial prosperity is assured, capital earns a high rate of interest, and the effects of the war are less likely to be felt than in most countries, since geographical position, combined with the absolute loyalty of the Dominion, render it more than probable that European disorganisation and cessation of industry will prove Canada's opportunity.

But one requires the assistance of those thoroughly familiar with the country and its ways in selecting investments in Canada just as much as elsewhere. The Alberta Co-operative Development Agency, with headquarters at Craven House, Kingsway, has been established with a view to dealing with Canadian stock of all kinds. Mr. C. Copley Singleton, the managing director of the company, is a firm believer in personal acquaintance between investor and agent, and is willing to place his experience of things Canadian at the disposal of clients. It is not to be supposed that the agency is not established to work at a profit, but the method of business is such that the investor reaps benefit from consulting the agency, just as the agency also reaps a reward for its enterprise. The business has been established for the purpose of dealing in Canadian stocks, enabling members to secure investments without incurring heavy brokers' commissions. The managing director is a man of extensive commercial and general business experience, and may be ranked among experts on the subject of Canada and its possibilities. The organisation of the agency provides for the thorough investigation of any commercial, industrial, or agricultural undertaking. An interesting feature is that no investment is recommended unless it is approved by the agency's Canadian representatives; this provides investors with the assurance that it has the support of local men living on the spot and knowing conditions. The prospective investor or re-investor is thus fully safeguarded, and it may be added that the safeguard is afforded by a sound business organisation in which clients and members can have full confidence. Any particulars in connection with the business will be gladly afforded on application at the address given above.

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 39)

Underclothing

LAST week I started to talk about underclothing and then my allotted space ran out. This matter of cheapness is just as important with regard to underclothing as riding breeches. To each man his own idea with regard to the kind and quality of underclothing taken, but my own experience in this matter is that the lightest possible is the best. Weight does not always mean warmth; the best blankets are of very light weight in comparison with cheap ones, and so, with regard to quality, weight is no criterion in underclothing. Here again the point to be observed is fit, for one may turn out with perfectly fitting riding breeches, and yet if the pants under them fit so loosely as to make folds, chafes and discomfort will result. Underclothing needs just as much care in fitting as outer wear, and ready-made stuff should be avoided if possible, especially by the mounted man. Pure wool, and as thin in texture as possible, according to the temperament and needs of the wearer, are safe guides in choosing the stamp of material to be used, and this should be made up to fit in just the way that outer clothing is made up.

Cost and Quality

These may seem like counsels of perfection, but they are worth heeding when active service is contemplated. Extra expense will be involved, of course, but it must always be borne in mind that life itself may depend on the fit and comfort of clothing. On the big retreat to the position of the Marne more than one man was left behind and taken prisoner, or perhaps killed, just because of a blister on the heel caused by a badly fitting boot. There is a world of warning in this simple fact, which applies not only to footwear but to the whole outfit. When life itself is in question no expense is too great, and the man turning out to risk his life should spare no expense in fitting himself for all the tasks that may be his to accomplish. The great merit of the German system of preparation for this campaign is that it includes not only preparation for what will happen but for what may possibly happen—this with regard to the German army as a whole, and for our part we should see that every man of the Army that goes out is fitted in like fashion—prepared for possibilities as well as probabilities. If expense is a thing to be considered the consideration should be ignored when clothing has to be obtained, though it may be given a look in when equipment is under consideration. Yet here again the man who buys the best is at an advantage over the man who skimps his purchases.

Waterproof Warmth

Among items worthy of consideration for inclusion among the winter kit is a sleeved vest made of waterproof oiled silk, with fleecy lining. The garment weighs just 20 oz. and fits under the military tunic, being long enough to afford protection as low as the tunic falls. The idea of this garment is admirable, for it affords both warmth and protection from wet; no amount of rain can penetrate through. A disadvantage, however, lies in the short life such a garment must necessarily have under active service conditions. Personally, I should think it will wear well for three months, and then a new one will be required. On the other hand, so light and small-folding is the thing that it can almost be put in the pocket, and thus replacement is not such a great difficulty. Ventilation is secured by slits under the arms and eyelet holes at the waist—the latter if desired—and altogether the oiled silk vest is an admirable addition to field kit, fulfilling as it does all requirements of lightness and warmth.

Leather Wear

For those who require something stouter and likely to wear as long as required a chrome leather vest is to be recommended. Since leather is not so absolutely non-conducting as rubber the problem of ventilation does not enter into a consideration of this style of garment, which is admirable as regards warmth. The chief drawback is that, in case of persistent rains, leather is never absolutely waterproof, and a vest fitting under the tunic will hold a good deal of water and will get heavy without actually wetting the wearer. It has a damp and uncomfortable feel at these times, and on the whole I prefer the oiled silk idea.

The Drawback of Oiled Silk

Yet another item displayed is the oiled silk ground sheet, but this seems to sacrifice absolute efficiency to

(Continued on page 49)



KHAKI SHIRTS

Regulation Pattern for Officers from
7/11 to 12/6 each.

Khaki Handkerchiefs

A nice soft Handkerchief 3/3 per dozen.
A cheaper quality 1/11½ per dozen.

KHAKI COLLARS

1/- each.

WE also have Flannel Shirts, Cholera Belts, Mufflers, Sleeping Helmets, Woollen Gloves, and Mittens, at moderate prices. Suitable for the men.

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for Officers' wear.




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Weight 20 oz. Price **27/6**

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New Model Fur Coat (as sketch), in Seal Musquash. An exact copy of an exclusive French model, lined with rich French Brocade, with handsome Skunk Collar.

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Actual Value, 45 Gns.

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CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 47)

lightness. Certainly it is very light and portable, and folds into half the space occupied by the ordinary waterproof fabric ground sheet. But it must be said that if the ground sheet is to be used for ordinary campaigning purposes and laid down on all sorts of ground it will very soon show an array of holes and tears. It is not to be trusted for hard wear, and if a ground sheet is to be used, then the ordinary fabric, thoroughly waterproofed, should be used.

Sleeping Bags

But the ground sheet is not in it with the sleeping bag. A thoroughly waterproofed sleeping bag takes up very little more room than a ground sheet, and the weight is no more than a ground sheet and blanket put together, while the actual use is far more than twice as much. Warmth and thorough protection from wet are afforded in a normal way, and there is also the bag for use as a kit bag when folded. Quality is a great consideration here; the sleeping bag must be of the very best material, and is one of the items of kit on which no expense may be spared.

Nurses' Kit

Reverting to leather goods, there has recently been designed a very light leather coat to fit under a nurse's cloak. The ordinary regulation cloak worn by nurses is not an extremely serviceable garment; it is a relic, rather, of other times—a "regulation" affair—that needs supplementing for full warmth and protection. For the warmth, and to a certain extent for the rain-resisting qualities desired, the light leather cloak, three-quarter length is to be recommended. It is made in three lengths—either as short jacket, as full-length cloak, or in three-quarter length; and of these I recommend the three-quarter length, which weighs about 2 lb. and affords full protection against all kinds of weather. It is windproof and rainproof, though not absolutely waterproof against days of rain; but then nurses under any conditions are not likely to undergo more than five or six hours in the rain at a stretch, and the three-quarter length cloak will keep this out and leave the wearer comfortable. Several of these cloaks have been made and supplied to order, and they have given every satisfaction in field use.

Waterproofing

The waterproofing question is a vexed one. Oiled silk does not stand hard wear very well; leather can never be considered absolutely waterproof, for it absorbs a certain amount of rain and gets heavy and damp-feeling, even if it does not let the rain through. Rubber-proofed materials bring in the trouble of ventilation and cause stuffiness, while another drawback is that when a waterproofed fabric is folded several times in the same way the folds lose their waterproof quality. The ideal fabric for keeping out continuous rain has yet to be devised, and up to the present the rubber-proofed material is about the best.

The Ways of Officers' Servants

The maintenance of rubber-treated fabric, so far as the officer is concerned, consists very largely in the possession of a good servant, and in the training of the man to the care of clothes as well as to his other duties. The training of the man is largely a matter for the officer himself, and when waterproofs are in question the man should be taught that he must not fold a coat always the same way. It takes very little time and trouble to teach a man the reason for this, to point out to him that if he persists in folding a rubber-proofed article always in the same creases these creases will lose their waterproof quality, whereas if he will fold the thing in a different way each time—either for the saddle or for any other form of carriage—he will increase the life of the garment and add to his master's comfort. The average man on service who takes up the duties of "officer's servant" is a born valet, but he needs instruction in the little points which will make him careful of his master's pocket as well as of his personal comfort. And the time taken up in teaching a man how to fold a waterproof, how to make boots comfortable by the application of grease outside or French chalk and boracic powder inside—all the little tricks that make for increase of comfort—is well repaid by increased efficiency. It is repaid also in the decrease of expense as regards upkeep of kit; your average officers' servant looks on his master as a man with plenty of money to spend, one to whom the saving of a shilling is a matter of no consequence. It is an idea of which men should be disabused as soon as possible, especially on active service, where economy of kit often pays in other ways than that of mere money.

(To be continued next week)

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Slip Overcoats	..	"	3½	"
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820 x 135 mm. to fit 120 mm. rim	7 7 9	6 13 0	5 8 6	1 12 3
880 x 135 mm. to fit 120 mm. rim	8 6 0	7 13 9	6 5 6	1 16 6
895 x 150 mm. to fit 135 mm. rim	10 0 0	9 8 3	7 7 0	1 18 3

Oversize tyres are distinct from the interchangeable sizes, which continue to be manufactured by the Dunlop Company as heretofore.

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FOR NEAT CATTLE & SHEEP.

In cases of Hove or Blown, Hide Bound, Loss of Appetite, Staring Coat, Distemper, Epidemic or Influenza.

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The entire profits of this song will be devoted to the National Relief Fund and the Variety Artists' Benevolent Fund and Institution, the former receiving 75 per cent., the latter 25 per cent.

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Band parts are published at the nominal charge of 2/- net by the Publishers of the song, Enoch & Sons, 14 and 14a Great Marlborough Street, London, W.

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CANADA'S splendid identification of herself with the Mother Country in the present crisis, and her magnificent war gifts, make the publication of "CANADA TO-DAY, 1914," just now specially opportune.

This fine publication which is just out is the finest shillingworth ever produced. It tells all about the greatest of our Oversea Dominions—how wheat, corn, and fruit are grown; about its commerce and industries; finance and investments; mining and lumbering; education; emigration; transportation; sport and travel—how Canada does everything in which you may be interested.

The numerous illustrations (over 200) from recent photographs give an exceptionally fine idea of every phase of life and activity in all parts of Canada. The complete gazetteer of cities and towns, their population, officials, business facilities, etc., is another most useful feature.

IF YOU would know more about this great and growing country, get a copy of "CANADA TO-DAY, 1914," from the nearest newsagent or bookstall now. A large demand has already attended the publication of this popular work, and although the supply is large it is limited, and a reprint is quite impossible.

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"Buckingham Palace.

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The County Gentleman
AND
LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV.

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
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JOHNNIE WALKER: "Friend."

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We cannot all go out to fight, but we can all do something to help our soldiers who are fighting our battles and defending the honour of our native land, and in this way contribute to their well-being and efficiency

SEND HIM A FLASK OF HORLICK'S MALTED MILK TABLETS



Invaluable to a soldier in the field and most efficient in relieving hunger and thirst and preventing fatigue.

We will send post free to any address a flask of these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat vest pocket case on receipt of 1/6. If the man is at the front, be particular to give his name, regimental number, regiment, brigade and division.

Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket flasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-

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LEAST COST

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Procurable through all chemists, grocers or stores. If not, send P.O. or stamps, and it will be forwarded post free. Manufactured solely by PLASMON, LTD. (Dept. 25), Farringdon Street, London, E.C.

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We have just made up about 250 Smart Winter Tailor-mades in four designs, of which the garment sketched is an example. These Suits are made from high-grade Novelty Tweeds, Vicunas, Boucle Cloths and Striped Velours, which sell in the ordinary way at from 7/6 to 10/6 per yard. As the quantity is limited the garments cannot be sent on approval, or made specially to order.

Smart Street Suit (as sketch),
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Vicunas, Boucle Cloths. **£4**
All dark shades.

Actual value 5½ to 6½ gns.

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Khaki Army Rugs
Very warm and durable.
Size 60 in. by 90 in.
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THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN

Some Everyday Impressions

LONDON streets are infinitely interesting these days. There is always something to hold the attention of the passer-by, and much that marks this present time as being different from all others. For one thing, we have never been so cosmopolitan as we are now. Nearly every other person to be seen bears unmistakable traces of French or Belgian nationality, and there are not a few Russians in our midst. We have grown accustomed to the sight of little groups of people struggling to make themselves understood in a strange country. We have also grown accustomed to the good Samaritan who almost invariably arrives to act as interpreter and earns a genuine gratitude. One of the most cheering signs of the times, indeed, is the anxiety shown by the English people to help in all possible ways. And this spirit of camaraderie grows and continues to flourish. It should mean the breaking of that national reserve and aloofness upon which, though low be it spoken, we have undoubtedly prided ourselves. Circumstances have proved too strong, and even such a long-established tradition as this vanishes before the bonds uniting the Allies. Another point worthy of note is the vast variety of uniforms to be seen. Here a Belgian officer passes swiftly on foot, receiving and returning the salute of an officer of the English army, wearing the badges of major's rank and a line of war ribbons. Further along are two Belgian privates, one of whom is limping rather badly, while both look sorely in need of care and rest. Naval officers in undress uniform wend their way along, either coming from or going to the Admiralty. Men from India, still wearing their sun-helmets and burnt brown after a sojourn in the tropics, jostle the elbow of some pale-faced Londoner wearing a medallion to show he has joined some particular branch of the New Army and awaits Service dress. Close to the headquarters of their regiment are some men wearing the well-known uniform of the London Scottish, with its unobtrusive kilt. Then there are the dispatch riders on motor cycles, with the blue and white band of their calling round their arm, and proceeding in recognised disdain of speed limits and their requirements.

The Army in Making

We are not at all ashamed of the impulse which makes us stand still to watch the passing by of a battalion of Kitchener's Army as it marches along, singing a snatch of some well-known song. All sorts and conditions of men are numbered in the ranks, from the stable lad to the boy who looks as if he had not left public school days very far behind. All sorts and conditions of hats and suits are worn also, for the recruit and his uniform are long parted. Now and again some enthusiast creates a diversion by waving his hat at these citizens who have answered their country's call; but, apart from this, it must be admitted that it is our trans-Atlantic cousins who make most demonstration as the steady tramp goes by. One attractive Washingtonian, waving a minute handkerchief vigorously, was forcible in her disapproval of English methods. "You watch your New Army," she said, indignantly, "but why don't you give them a cheer. Now, if it were us——!" And no amount of excuse of the true Britisher and his truly British habits would satisfy her. As a matter of fact, it is quite likely that the Englishman, being such as he is, would be the first to deprecate any undue notice as he makes his way through the streets on route-marching bent. He has made soldiering his business, like he makes most other things his business that he takes it into his mind to do. To form part of a spectacular show will certainly rasp his sense of fitness, and even if attention be not meant in this way he will probably get it into his head that it is. As a nation we have certainly brought disguise of our feelings to a fine art, and this characteristic is dear to the heart of the race. The dread of anything approaching emotion, or what we are pleased to term bad form, is the strongest of motives, accounting for much that is quite incomprehensible to people of other nationalities. The laconic Englishman has been a butt for much good-natured and some spiteful ridicule, but this very

quality makes him "the first-rate fighting man" of whom we are so justly proud to-day. The keynote of the country's attitude towards this crisis of its fate was struck by the manner in which the campaign both on land and sea opened. Fleet and Army arrived at their allotted posts in silence, and nothing could have been more impressive than the grim quiet with which they handled their appointed tasks from that time forward.

Every Little Helps

Such is the motto of the entirely fascinating toyshop which has been started at 21 Old Bond Street by Mrs. Duveen. It is known as "The Toy Shop," and is thus a toy shop both by name and by nature. Its object is no less excellent than the helping of the Belgian Relief Fund in Belgium. All the profits are going to be devoted to the succour of the unfortunate people left behind in the devastated districts of this country. With such an aim in view it is no wonder that "The Toy Shop" has the support of Comte de Lalaing, the Belgian Minister in England, and that he opened it at a very attractive little ceremony of inauguration. It is charming to see this toy shop, both inside and out. A carefully limited number of toys are arranged by a clever hand on a dark background in either window. Inside, also, it is easy to realise that here may be found toys to please even the most sophisticated of children. Some of these toys are instructive without being boring, and by their means many a child will be coaxed to improve his little mind as well as amuse it. We all know how many children resent instruction presented to them in play-time guise. It is the old story of the powder and the jam—an unfair combination, as all must agree, grown-up people as well as the nursery folk. This charge, however, cannot be made against a spelling game played with carved letters, which can be made to stand upright in a grooved wooden stand. "The Toy Shop" is busy now, but it will certainly grow busier still as Christmas looms nearer and nearer and toy-making as an English industry progresses. To this end and in connection with this particular venture a toy manufactory has just been started at Reading, and from this a great number of the supplies will come. Every good idea is welcomed in the region of toyland, where the magic word "novelty" spells "Open Sesame," when it is such as will appeal to the rising generation and its critical standards.

Gardens Trim

Lady Catherine Milnes Gaskell is one of the many who are doing all they can to help our soldiers and sailors. She has been selling rock and herbaceous plants for the benefit of the sick and wounded, and a few days ago had made £84 by this means. Lady Catherine's gardens at Wenlock Abbey, in Shropshire, are justly famous, and of late years she has made a special study of rock gardens and their suitable planting. A rock garden, indeed, can afford many hours of pleasure to any reasonable individual. The collection and rearing of suitable rock garden plants is a hobby in itself, and when two rock gardeners meet they have, as a general rule, but one topic of conversation. A rock garden, indeed, is apt to become so absorbing that it grows into a considerable extravagance. But when we can combine our own besetting hobby with the most deserving of charities our state is indeed gracious.

ERICA.

THE French Government has officially recognised the Blue Cross, and Captain Claremont has been deputed by the French Minister of War to immediately instal eight base hospitals for wounded horses at the front. Donations immediately required. Arthur J. Coke, Secretary, Our Dumb Friends' League, 58 Victoria Street, London, S.W.

HORSE SALE AT LEICESTER.—Messrs. Warner, Sheppard and Wade held a sale of horses at the Repository on Saturday, October 17. Good prices were realised, the following being some of the principal:—

	Gns.		Gns.
Grey mare.....	66	Defender.....	72
Topper.....	55	Fortuna.....	61
Polly.....	40	Badger (cob).....	44
Chestnut mare (cob).....	49	Brown Peter.....	44

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 49)

UNDER the heading of camp equipment comes such a varied list of articles that it is impossible to treat of them separately and fully in a single article on the subject of kit. Camp bedsteads occur to one's mind inevitably; but, except for the staff officer well away down on the lines of communication, camp bedsteads are not to be thought of on active service, coming under the head of sybaritic luxuries for the man who is moving on every day from position to position as the line goes forward or sometimes back. The sleeping bag or valise is the best that can be done in this direction, and that, as pointed out last week, should be of substantial and thoroughly waterproofed material, for it is a mistake to try for too much lightness in choosing it. The campaigner should bear in mind that as regards sleeping accommodation one sleeping bag fulfils the purpose of two ground sheets, while it is also of use as a kit valise.

Water Bottle Shapes

A water bottle seems a small thing to talk about, but a word on it is worth while. A day or two ago I saw exposed for sale in a shop window a water bottle covered with felting in the usual way, and with what used to be the usual square edges at the bottom, though the thing was curved to fit on the body of the wearer, just as a metal cigarette case is curved. It struck me at the time that the makers of that pattern of water bottle must be remarkably short-sighted folks; they had allowed the curve for the body, and yet had squared the bottom of the water bottle, so that there was evidently a right angle between the bottom of the bottle and the sides. The drawback of this becomes obvious after the bottle has been in use for a little time, for in order to clean out the angle formed by the bottom and the sides it is necessary to use sand or something and go in for about ten minutes of hard shaking if any fluid other than pure water has been placed in the bottle. It is just as easy and just as little expense in purchasing a water bottle to get one of oval pattern, which holds just as much as the one with squared edges, and is far easier to keep clean. The ideal water bottle is oval in form, made of aluminium, and sufficiently solid in build to stand lots of hard wear. Care should be taken to see that the felt with which it is covered is of good quality, for with the swing of the arms in marching or the swaying of the bottle in riding there is a good deal of wear on this felt, which acts as a non-conductor of heat and preserves the drink in the bottle fresh and good.

Gloves

For winter work gloves are a necessity for campaigning. Some kit furnishers recommend mitts, but these are a snare and a delusion, since all the freedom of the fingers that can be obtained is required when wearing the gloves. For ordinary work good stout leather gloves, unlined, are to be preferred. Lined gloves are thoroughly warm and comfortable, but they make all the difference when handling a weapon, either a fire-arm or any other kind, while unlined gloves, after the hands have grown accustomed to them, give practically as much freedom to the fingers as is obtained with the bare hands; and the warmth of lined gloves, unless the weather is perfectly arctic in quality, is very little greater than that of unlined articles after the first ten minutes of wear. A very good glove for motoring and for aeroplane work was

(Continued on page 59)

CASTLE & CO., MILITARY TAILORS.

(Established 1889.)

FIELD SERVICE KITS IN 8 HOURS.

ABSOLUTELY CORRECT

STORE PRICES.

37 PICCADILLY, LONDON, W.

(FACING ST. JAMES'S CHURCH).

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AS Winter approaches the necessity for really warm coverings in the trenches is obvious.

We are now producing Blankets on the lines of our famous Ulster Fleece Rugs (the eiderdown of cloth), made from pure high-grade wool, which gives more bodily warmth than two or more of many of the so-called Army Blankets.

The size is ample, 60 by 90 inches, and the colours are grey, khaki, natural and dark natural.

PRICE 18/6

On receipt of 19/6 we will forward one of them securely packed to any Officer of the Expeditionary Force.

Our new Linen Hall in Regent Street, London, will be opened on 2nd November with a great Sale of Specialities.

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156-170 Regent St., LONDON, And BELFAST



SERVICE KITS

—IN 48 HOURS.—

Every detail guaranteed correct, in accordance with War Office regulations.

Patterns and Estimate post free.

A large number of half-finished Service Jackets always on hand, which can be completed in eight hours.

INFANTRY SWORD £4 14 6

WEST & SON, Ltd.

Military and Sporting Tailors,

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(Opposite Conduit Street.)

'Phone—Gerrard 8161.

HARRODS' GIFT BOXES

FOR

TROOPS AT THE FRONT

Specially selected and appropriate "Comforts" have been arranged in Parcels, details of which are given below. These are securely packed and will be dispatched immediately to anyone serving in the Expeditionary Force, upon receipt of instructions.

No fuss or bother with packing.

You simply send your order by letter, 'phone or wire to Harrods, specifying **Box No. 1** or **Box No. 2** (or both), and the following goods to the value of one Sovereign are dispatched without delay straight to the Firing Line:—

BOX No. 1

ONE SOVEREIGN.

- 1 lb. Chocolate (Harrods).
- 3 Tins Oxo Cubes.
- 2 Potted Meats.
- 1 Ivelcon.
- 1 Brand's Ess. Chicken.
- 1 Brand's Ess. Beef.
- 100 Cigarettes, Best, Flat Box.
- 1 lb. Tobacco (compressed).
- 1 Packet Boracic Powder.
- 1 Tube Vaseline.
- 1 Tin Coffee and Milk, or Cocoa and Milk.
- 1 Plum Cake.
- 1 Tin Danish Butter.
- 1 Pipe.
- Bromo Toilet Paper.

BOX No. 2.

ONE SOVEREIGN.

- 1 Pair Gloves.
- 1 Pair Socks.
- 1 Undervest.
- 1 Pair Pants.
- 3 Handkerchiefs.
- 1 Pair Braces.
- 1 Woollen Scarf.
- 1 Balacava Cap.

The Sovereign covers cost of packing and postage.

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Solid and pneumatic tyres are being offered in such a way as to mislead the British public as to their country of origin.

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DELICIOUS FOR BREAKFAST & AFTER DINNER

In making, use LESS QUANTITY, it being much stronger than ORDINARY COFFEE.

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THE RELIABLE MEDICINE.

The Best Remedy known for

COUGHS, COLDS, ASTHMA, BRONCHITIS.

A true palliative in NEURALGIA, TOOTHACHE, RHEUMATISM, GOUT.

Cuts short attacks of SPASMS, PALPITATION, HYSTERIA.

Acts like a Charm in DIARRHŒA and other bowel complaints.

Convincing Medical Testimony with each bottle.

Always ask for a "Dr. COLLIS BROWNE." Of all Chemists, 1/12, 2/9, 4/6.

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TO THE VALUE OF OVER £500,000. MUST BE SOLD ENTIRELY WITHOUT RESERVE.

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98 COMPLETE BEDROOMS.

Comprising 16 well-made solid oak bedroom suites complete £3 17s. 6d.; solid oak bedsteads to match, complete 16s. 6d.; handsome china toilet services, from 3s. 6d.; large bedroom and other carpets, from 7s. 6d.; 14 well-made solid walnut bedroom suites complete at 5s.; massive black and brass-mounted bedsteads, full size, complete with spring mattresses, at 25s.; three very handsome design white enamel bedroom suites of Louis XIV. style at £5 15s.; four well-made large solid oak bedroom suites at £3 17s. 6d.; four very artistic Sheraton design inlaid mahogany bedroom suites at £7 15s.; three artistic large solid walnut bedroom suites at £3 17s. 6d.; several fine Old English gent's wardrobes, fitted sliding trays and drawers, from £3 15s.; several fine bow-front and other chests of drawers, from 37s. 6d.; old Queen Anne and other tallboy chests, from 6s.; six very choice inlaid mahogany bedroom suites, 15s.; elaborate all-brass Sheraton style bedsteads with superior spring mattresses complete, 45s.; choice Chippendale design bedroom suites, 12s.; Chippendale design bedsteads to match; Queen Anne design solid mahogany bedroom suites, £14 14s.; all-brass square tube full-size bedsteads with superior spring mattresses, at £3 17s. 6d.; costly Chippendale design mahogany bedroom suite, 16s.; costly inlaid satinwood bedroom suites £24s.; panelled satinwood bedstead to match, 9s.

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Several fine quality real Turkey carpets about 9 ft. by 12 ft. from £4 17s. 6d.; real Turkey rugs at 17s. 6d.; massive carved oak sideboard, £5 15s.; overmantel to match, £2 10s.; extending dining table to match, £2 17s. 6d.; two elegantly-carved armchairs and six small ditto to match, £6 15s.; elegant Queen Anne design sideboard, fitted drawers, cupboards, etc., £7 15s.; set of eight Queen Anne

design dining room chairs, comprising two large carved chairs and six smaller ditto £7 15s.; oval extending Queen Anne design dining table £4 10s.; Queen Anne design mantel mirror to match, 42s.; 18 luxurious Chesterfield settees, £2 15s.; luxurious lounge easy chairs to match at £1 10s.; magnificently carved grandfather clocks; fine tone upright piano, £7 15s.; a magnificent instrument by George Brinsmead, 12s.; and an exceptionally fine small grand piano, £25, equal to new. Several sets of complete Old English table glass from £4 15s.; set of four oak American roll-top desks at £3 15s.; and many other items too numerous to mention here.

DRAWING-ROOMS AND ANTE-ROOMS.

Nineteen elegant design large Axminster bordered carpets from 3s.; elegant design suite, comprising luxuriously sprung settee, with two lounge easy chairs and four occasional chairs, covered rich Paris silk tapestry, £3 15s.; very elegant Louis XIV. design china cabinet to match, £3 15s.; choice centre table, 21s.; and Louis XIV. design overmantel, 35s.; elaborately carved and gilt Louis Seize design suite of seven pieces, including settee, 12s.; complete; white enamelled French cabinets; Vernis Marten painted tables, escurtoires, etc.; the satinwood decorated china cabinet, 4 ft. 6 in. wide, £14 14s.; satinwood decorated centre table, £2 10s.; satinwood decorated overmantel, £3 10s.; costly satinwood decorated suite, covered choice brocade gobelin blue silk, £16 16s.

Also BED and TABLE LINEN, Carpets, Curtains, Draperies, &c.

SILVER and SHEFFIELD PLATE, &c., &c.

Five full-sized billiard tables from 50s. complete with all accessories. Billiard dining table, three iron safes, and thousands of other items impossible to mention here, including two nearly new motor cars.

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Gold Medals, Paris Exhibition, 1912.

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Business Hours: Open every day, 9 till 9, except Saturdays, when we close at 7.

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L. LEWIS, Manager

Grand Prix and Gold Medals,



International Exhibition, Rome, 1912.

CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 57)

shown me the other day—a gauntlet cuff of rubber, lined with fleece, completely covered in the coat cuff, and this rubber was continued up the back of the glove to the finger tips. The palm and the insides of the fingers, where the hard wear would come, were of very soft and flexible kid, and the glove was fleece-lined throughout. For ordinary field service such a glove as this would not stand a week's wear, but for motoring—if kept solely for that purpose—it is ideal, for the rubber of the glove where all the wind pressure comes is sufficiently non-conducting of heat to afford perfect warmth, while the kid of the palm and inside the fingers assures flexibility; and the lining affords sufficient warmth even for motor cycling. It struck me as just the very thing for dispatch riders and airmen.

Headgear

Yet another item, scarcely coming under the head of camp equipment, was a tightly-fitting cap of oiled silk, lined with thin yet warm material, with fur covering for the ears and the back of the neck, designed to fit under a peaked field-service cap. This again looked just the thing for the use of airmen and motorists, while at the same time it would be of good service for mounted men, and for infantry as well in the winter months. The field-service cap affords practically no protection from rain in its normal state, but gets soggy and heavy after very little wet weather, while, even when a waterproof cover is fitted, it leaves the rain to trickle down the back of the neck in most uncomfortable fashion. This under-cap of oiled silk does away with all the difficulties, affording both warmth and thorough protection from wet, while it will also come in as a sleeping cap for winter use. For such as have either no opportunity or not sufficient inclination to wear such a thing there is a waterproof cover to fit the field-service cap, made of oiled silk, and so light and small that it can be crumpled up in a wisp and placed in a vest pocket without damage either to pocket or cover, when the latter is not in use.

Sleeping in the Open

With regard to sleeping out in a sleeping bag, without the comfort of a camp bedstead, I have heard amateur campaigners declare they could never get a comfortable sleep on the ground. Personally, I have found the reverse to be the case, and have never slept better than when directly under the stars—or the rain clouds—with something waterproof over and under me, and a hole to fit my hip-bone. It is always possible to find that hole, with a little trouble, for a very small depression in the ground suffices for comfort; and after a night or two, to grow accustomed to the change from spring mattresses and similar luxuries, sleep in the open is far healthier and sounder than sleep in a bedroom, no matter how well ventilated the latter may be. One awakens more fresh and fit, and is more ready to face the day after a night's sleep in the open.

Air Pillows

An air pillow, though a luxury, is one worth having. It can be inflated without apparatus—simply by blowing into it, and is very little trouble to deflate. It can be deflated in a second or two and thrown inside the sleeping bag in the morning, when it takes up practically no space and weighs only ounces. It may seem almost as sybaritic an article of equipment as a camp bedstead, but it is not so, since a pillow of some sort is a necessity, and if the folded coat is used on a wet night and the user is a restless sleeper—likely to turn and twist during the night—the result is often a wet coat to wear at the start of the day. Not that an air pillow should be taken when it is necessary to keep kit and equipment within the strictest limits, but in many cases it is a very useful accessory to field kit, and most men have sufficient judgment to know when it is not admissible.

Canvas v. Rubber

It may be stated definitely that the canvas washing bowl is better than anything that can be done in the way of rubber proofing. The chief drawback to the canvas article is that it must nearly always be folded and put away wet, and this is a difficulty that cannot be overcome, apparently. But then there is a drawback to practically every article of camp equipment; all things used in campaigning have either to serve double purposes or else must be collapsible; the users must get accustomed to the fact that they cannot have the amount of comfort that the Ritz or Carlton can provide; they are out to rough it, and rough it they must, though it rests with themselves to a very great degree how much of comparative comfort they get out of their campaigning; and the more comfort they get the more efficient they will be.

(To be continued next week)



Tinder Lighters

FOR
Active Service, Motoring, &c.

No. V. 791.—Vickery's New Tinder Lighter. Excellent for Campaigning, etc. Will not blow out in strongest wind.

Plain Gold	-	£2 10 0
Engine-Turned Gold,		£2 15 0
Plain Silver	-	£0 7 6
Engine-Turned Silver,		£0 10 6

No Petrol required

No. V. 2156.—Vickery's New Thinnest Possible Flask, in solid Sterling Silver. Extremely flat for the pocket. In five sizes.

£1 6s. 6d.,	£1 15s.,	£2 5s.,
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Ditto without cap:

£1 1s.,	£1 8s. 6d.,	£1 15s.,
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*Their Majesties Jeweller?
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The New SILK-SKIN WAISTCOAT

Impervious to wet or searching winds. The special slip finish allows the service tunic to be worn comfortably over the waistcoat. Weight 20 oz.

Price **27/6**


Special Articles:
Waterproof Sleeping Bags, Fur-lined Warmers, Leather Waistcoats, Oil-silk Cap Covers, "Wolsey" Valises "Sam Browne" Belts (finest quality 37/6).



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
Smokeless Cartridges



Loaded with "Neonite" (30 gr.) Powder in Gastight Quality Case.



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Loaded with "Stowmarket Smokeless" (33 gr.) or "N.E." (36 gr.) Smokeless.



Loaded with "Stowmarket Smokeless" or "N.E." Smokeless.

The Trade only supplied.

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The New Explosives Co. Ltd.

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"SCHULTZE" AND "LIGHTNING" GUNPOWDER.

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For THE SCHULTZE COMPANY, LIMITED

O. G. WILL, Secretary.

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"PALAKONA" (REGD.)

Split Bamboo are the highest quality

Fishing Rods

They are of most perfect balance—are the lightest and have everlasting wear.

A "Hardy" rod is a rod with a character and a reputation—a rod which is a valuable investment.

These rods are made under the supervision of the Hardy experts. There are no rods "just as good as Hardy's."

Buyers only pay cost price—no middleman's profit comes between them and the actual manufacturers.

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Choice Crocus Species, Colchicums, Hardy Cyclamen, Nerines, Roman Hyacinths, etc., for present planting.

LIST ON APPLICATION.

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IMPORTANT TO SPORTSMEN AND MASTERS OF HOUNDS



THURLOW'S Scotch Oatmeal

WARRANTED GENUINE
As supplied to numerous Kennels in all parts of the Country


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A DISCOUNT of 10/- PER TON for Cash within two months of delivery of goods.

For present prices and samples apply to—
J. THURLOW & SON, High Wycombe.

CREOSOTE, full strength. 5 galls. for 4s., 10 galls. for 7s. 6d., 40 gall. barrel 26s. 8d. Renders woodwork rot-proof, stains russet brown, preserves, disinfects, destroys insects.—ALDRIDGE, Islington Green, London, N. Established 100 years

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FOR HORSES.

For Grease, Swelled Legs, Cracked Heels, Coughs, Colds, etc., and keeping High-fed Horses in Health.

FOR NEAT CATTLE & SHEEP.

In cases of Hove or Blown, Hide Bound, Loss of Appetite, Staring Coat, Distemper, Epidemic or Influenza.

For Scouring in Calves they are almost infallible.

"Showle Court, Ledbury.

"Dear Sirs,—I enclose cheque value £1 13s. for Constitution Balls. I do not like to be without them; my father and myself have used them for cattle and horses for about 50 years with satisfaction.—Yours truly, HENRY W. TAYLOR."

Prepared upwards of 50 years by FRANCIS CUISS, M.R.C.V.S., Diss.

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The County Gentleman
AND
LAND & WATER

Vol. LXIV. No. 2739

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1914.

[PUBLISHED AS]
[A NEWSPAPER.]

PRICE SIXPENCE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY



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THE LATE PRINCE MAURICE OF BATTENBERG

It is with great regret that we record the death of the Prince as the result of wounds received near Ypres. Educated at Wellington and the R.M.C. (Sandhurst), he was appointed in 1911 to the King's Royal Rifle Corps. He was recently mentioned in despatches. He was an ardent sportsman and motorist and greatly interested in Aviation, making frequent flights as a passenger at Hendon.



Usher's
"GREEN STRIPE & O.V.G."
Scotch Whiskies.

"Safe in all Waters"

H.M.S. IRON DUKE. Super Dreadnought:—Displacement, 25,000 tons; length, 580 ft.; horse power, 30,000; built at Portsmouth; launched 1912; cost £2,080,918; guns, 10 of 13·5 in., 12 of 6 in., and smaller; four torpedo tubes; speed 22 knots; crew about 900.
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A CALL TO ARMS
The Russian Artist, Retin's, conception of the conscript moujik's departure for his Regiment

LEATHER VESTS FOR OFFICERS at the Front



Heavy Chamois,
extra length 50/-
Heavy Chamois,
ordinary vest
length 42/-
Best Chrome
Leather, lined
flannel 30/-

SPECIAL ARTICLES: Waterproof Sleeping Bags, Fur-lined Warmers, Leather Waistcoats, Oil-silk Cap Covers, "Wolsey" Valises, "Sam Browne" Belts (finest quality 37/6)

*The Finest Stock of Leather
Waistcoats in London at*

Dunhills

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Jewellers and Silversmiths to H.M. The King

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
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QUALITY

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Completely fitted with serviceable Toilet Requisites.
Rolled up they occupy a minimum space. At a
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EXCELLENCE in tyre construction depends very largely on attaining perfection in a thousand details. More accumulated knowledge of how to do this goes to the making of the Dunlop tyre than to any other.

HENCE the superiority of the Dunlop, the proof of which is before you in the countless instances of splendid service that have made the word

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DUNLOP SOLID TYRES FOR HEAVY COMMERCIAL VEHICLES



Trade mark.

CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 59)

The Ubiquitous Cigarette

STRICTLY speaking, the business of sending out things to men of our Army in France is not in any way connected with the choice of kit, but, since several of our readers have already made inquiries on the subject, it is as well to accord it at least a passing mention. Many who have friends or relatives at that mysterious region known as "the front," as well as the charitably inclined, are dubious as to what to send out. It is always perfectly safe, of course, to send cigarettes, for even if the recipient is a pipe-smoker he can make currency of the gift and trade off his cigarettes for practically anything he likes. I remember how in the South African War the value of a cigarette would go up as the distance from a town increased, until one could trade off one cigarette for a tin of jam, and on an exceptionally long trek for far more than that. Both cigarettes and tobacco are very safe things to send out, the only point being to ascertain that the articles sent really get to the men for whom they are intended.

Sending—and Receiving

In this connection it is worthy of note that several large firms are making up hampers for sending out to the troops, and one benefit in connection with the dispatch of these hampers by relatives or friends is that the goods get there; they are practically certain to reach their destination without trouble, and, in addition to this, they are packed by men who have experience in the needs and tastes of men at "the front." It is worthy of remark that to the average civilian mind there is no such thing as line of communication or base in the composition of the field army; but everybody is at "the front," even though he may be fixed up at a wireless station a hundred miles or so behind the guns, or stuck away on the lines of communication with plenty of hard work and no excitement. His relatives always speak of him as "at the front," wherever he is.

Hamper Contents

In selecting the contents of a hamper one should be certain that it contains a tin of vaseline, which is the thing most appreciated by the troops for preserving the feet in condition. Most firms in the composition of their gift hampers include a number of compressed foods, which are thoroughly popular with the men.

Clothing Parcels

If one desires to send out articles of clothing let there be a Balaclava cap in the outfit, for with the winter coming on some warm covering for the head at night makes all the difference to the sleeping outfit, and the man who is actually "at the front" without a woolly nightcap has no chance of getting one other than by means of the kindness of his friends. Socks, of course, are always welcome, and it should be definitely specified in the packing of a parcel of clothing that boot-laces are included—two or three pairs of really strong laces, preferably leather ones. Undervests are almost as welcome as socks, too.

Matches and Substitutes

Almost as welcome as the man with a cigarette is the man who can supply a light for the cigarette or pipe smoker. After a week or so away from supplies matches begin to grow scarce, and the various automatic lighters on the market come to their own. I have no faith in the thing which presses open with a spring, lights itself, and is dependent for its usefulness on a supply of benzine—that is, I have no faith in it unless it is particularly well made and a supply of either petrol or benzine is available for the owner's use. Otherwise, the thing runs dry at the time it is most needed and one sighs for a box of vestas. There is also the disadvantage of wind, which this class of lighter will not stand. One presses the spring and the thing flies open, lights itself, and promptly goes out, leaving the owner swearing. There is, however, a tinder lighter, made by various firms, which needs no constant supplies of benzine or petrol to render it efficient, and its greatest advantage is that the worse the wind the better it works. The idea is an adaptation of the old-fashioned flint, steel, and tinder dodge of our forefathers, and the new lighter is worked by a string of tinder stuff contained in a metal tube, which, when rubbed sharply against a prepared surface in the way a match is rubbed on

(Continued on page 60)

BLANKETS FOR ACTIVE SERVICE

AS Winter approaches the necessity for really warm coverings in the trenches is obvious. We are now producing Blankets on the lines of our famous **ULSTER FLEECE RUGS (THE EIDERDOWN OF CLOTH)**, made from pure high-grade wool, which gives more bodily warmth than two or more of many of the so-called Army Blankets.

The size is ample, 60 by 90 inches, and the colours are grey, khaki, natural and dark natural.

PRICE 18/6

On receipt of 19/6 we will forward one of them securely packed to any Officer of the Expeditionary Force.

Our new Linen Hall in Regent Street, London, will be opened on 2nd November with a great Opening Sale of Linens, etc.

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SERVICE KITS

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Of the finest quality KHAKI,
Correct in every detail,

Supplied at shortest notice at the following reasonable prices:

Service Tunic (heavy whipcord), from	£3 3 0
" " " Baratheia " "	£4 4 0
Bedford Cord Breeches, strapped	
buckskin " " "	£2 10 0
British Warm (lined fleece) " "	£3 10 0
Service Great Coat " "	£4 4 0

OVERCOATS

My new Season's Models are now ready, and can be seen at the above address, together with new Winter Suitings.

Slip Overcoats " " "	from 3 guineas
Town Overcoats " " "	3½ "
Suits " " "	3½ "
Dress Suits " " "	6 "

ALL GARMENTS PERSONALLY FITTED.

During the present crisis I am charging the lowest possible prices in order to keep my staff of workpeople fully employed.

TELEPHONE " " MAYFAIR 145.

SAMPLES AND ESTIMATES POST FREE.

How to help Tommy Atkins

We cannot all go out to fight, but we can all do something to help our soldiers who are fighting our battles and defending the honour of our native land, and in this way contribute to their well-being and efficiency

SEND HIM A FLASK OF HORLICK'S MALTED MILK TABLETS

Invaluable to a soldier in the field and most efficient in relieving hunger and thirst and preventing fatigue.

We will send post free to any address a flask of these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat vest pocket case on receipt of 1/6. If the man is at the front, be particular to give his name, regimental number, regiment, brigade and division.

Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket flasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-

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Rest Gown (as sketch), in rich brocaded velvet, with belt of roses in gold or silver, and finished at neck and sleeves with a little lace. Exceptionally good in black; also in heavy rich brocaded crêpe de chine.

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Note.—The velvets from which these gowns are made are usually sold at from 10/6 to 12/6 per yard.

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Very warm and durable.

Size 60 in. by 90 in.

10/6 each

100 Rugs for £50

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For Home Rifle Practice

Every one may learn how to shoot accurately in an easy and inexpensive manner by using the remarkable

B.S.A. AIR RIFLE

A serious arm, solidly built and easy to manipulate. "Cocked" by the patent lever arrangement beneath the barrel.

Price from 40/-

B.S.A. Pellets 1/6 per 1000.
(55 Shots for One Penny!)

This is the only weapon with which regular serious and accurate practice may be obtained in the house or garden. A complete home outfit, with which practice may be started at once and conducted indefinitely, consists of a Light pattern B.S.A. Air Rifle with straight hand stock, a steel-faced wall target with paint and brush, and 1,000 pellets, and costs but 50s. It may be regarded as a patriotic investment in these troublous times, when every one should be able to shoot a rifle in case of necessity.

For fully illustrated
Rifle Booklets post
free write to

**The Birmingham Small Arms
Co., Ltd.,
BIRMINGHAM.**

Makers of Rifles for H.M. War. Dept.



CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 67)

the side of the box, ignites the string of tinder, which a wind fans to greater fire instead of putting out. As the tinder burns away it can be pushed up into the tube, and one string of it will last an enormously long time, while extra supplies can be carried, if necessary, with no trouble. The idea is distinctly good, and seems to solve the problem of the ideal lighter, so far as this can be done.

The Importance of the Match

Substitutes for matches seem very small things to talk about in connection with the selection of field kit, but they are in reality most important items. We who sit within reach of a match-stand half our time, and the other half have only to go round the corner, put down a copper, and get a box of vestas, do not realise all that the absence of matches would mean to us. We have utterly lost the old-time habit of using flint and steel, and must have some mechanical substitute; we have grown so used to that substitute that it seems a very small thing to us, while in reality it is responsible for half our comfort. Let every man bound for "the front" see that he is well provided in this respect, or he will regret his carelessness before many days are over.

Flasks

Another thing is the flask. This must be covered in altogether; the one that exposes half the glass is useless. Glass for cleanliness, and a metal cover for protection, or a thick leather cover for the same purpose, makes the ideal flask. Personally, I prefer the metal cover, but would not have a solid metal flask without the glass lining. The flask should be taken filled and kept filled with the best brandy that can be obtained. Its contents should be looked on as an emergency ration—only to be used in dire necessity, unless it is possible to refill at once with the same quality of spirit. Far too many men regard the flask as a mere camp-dinner accessory, to provide a peg at any odd time; but this is a bad misconception of the reason for carrying a flask. One can always get pegs for a camp dinner when pegs are available for other men, and if they are not then it is no time for using up the reserve supply that the flask carries, for that supply may save some poor devil's life in the course of the next few hours, and using it as a drink in the ordinary way is sheer wanton waste. A good flask, kept full, is a very necessary adjunct to the camp outfit. The lower part of the metal casing, of course, forms a cup. Having a stopper which also forms a tiny cup is also an advantage, though this is largely a matter of taste, and the stoppers that are hinged and secure with a half-twist have an advantage in that they do not get lost and leave the flask useless until a stray cork, with a doubtful sanitary history, can be found for replacement.

Wool and Comfort

One very necessary item of clothing for the coming winter months is a cardigan jacket, woollen jersey, or something of the kind. Mention has already been made of an oiled-silk sleeved vest to fit under the tunic, and this forms an ideal warm garment, except on the score of hard wear; it is an item that needs renewing fairly often, as these things go, but at the same time it is well worth while renewing such an article as this. If, however, it be desired to get a woollen garment only, and sacrifice the waterproof quality of the oiled-silk article, then care should be taken to ascertain that the sweater or cardigan jacket chosen is all wool, for the half-cotton half-wool things are unsatisfactory both on the score of warmth and that of wear. There used to be obtainable a brown wool sweater, something like an Army blanket in colour, fitted with sleeves, and so expandable—to coin a word—that any size would fit any man, practically. Its elasticity arose out of the fact that it was all wool; and a thoroughly comfortable thing for cold mornings it was, too. I have one of these articles yet in my possession, and value it highly when out cycling, although it cannot be less than twelve years old, and has several darns in it. Sweaters of this kind can be obtained at most outfitters, and make most acceptable gifts to troops at the front when included in parcels of clothing.

A Personal Opinion

Personally, I would rather have one of these sweaters to slip on than a lot of warm underclothing. The reason for the preference is that in the actual work of a campaign a man very seldom has a chance to remove his underclothing for the night, and thus does not feel the benefit of it to such an extent during the day, while the man with a sweater can slip it off as easily as his tunic, almost, and put it on again to get the full warmth from it.

(To be continued next week)

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MILITARY TAILORS.

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"Active Service" Watch.

FINE QUALITY
LEVER
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TIMEKEEPER.Superior quality in Silver
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AN ESSENTIAL PART OF AN OFFICER'S EQUIPMENT.

Luminous Dial and Hands so that the time may be readily seen at night.

Illustrated List post free.

Largest Stock in London of Luminous Dial Wristlet Watches.

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No fuss or bother with packing.

You simply send your order by letter, 'phone or wire to Harrods, specifying Box No. 1 or Box No. 2 (or both), and the following goods to the value of one Sovereign are dispatched without delay straight to the Firing Line:—

BOX No. 1

ONE SOVEREIGN.

- 1 lb. Chocolate (Harrods).
- 3 Tins Oxo Cubes.
- 2 Potted Meats.
- 1 Ivelcon.
- 1 Brand's Ess. Chicken.
- 1 Brand's Ess. Beef.
- 100 Cigarettes, Best, Flat Box.
- 1 lb. Tobacco (compressed).
- 1 Packet Boracic Powder.
- 1 Tube Vaseline.
- 1 Tin Coffee and Milk, or Cocoa and Milk.
- 1 Plum Cake.
- 1 Tin Danish Butter.
- 1 Pipe.
- Bromo Toilet Paper.

BOX No. 2.

ONE SOVEREIGN.

- 1 Pair Gloves.
- 1 Pair Socks.
- 1 Undervest.
- 1 Pair Pants.
- 3 Handkerchiefs.
- 1 Pair Braces.
- 1 Woollen Scarf.
- 1 Balaclava Cap.

The Sovereign
covers
cost of packing
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HARRODS Ltd. (Richard Burbidge, Managing Director), London, S.W.

THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN

Notes by a Feminine Pencil

WITH the afternoon came a visitor, and with the visitor much indignation. She had just heard from the lips of her austere respectable maid a long tale of the delinquencies of two soldiers' wives who apparently had done little save drink since their husbands left for the front. And, what was worse, they showed no tendency to change, but every intention of continuing to waste their substance in the same manner. Both these women were in receipt of allowances, making them far better off than they had ever been in all their lives before. Both, moreover, had married immediately after the outbreak of war, and had never started a home, but were living in lodgings with no work to do. It can hardly be wondered at if time hangs heavily on their hands and the temptations of the drinking bar are powerful. So it comes to pass that day after day we see the statement that drinking amongst women is on the increase, with many incontrovertible facts added in support of the charge.

It is really hardly fair on the women themselves that they should have this weight of unoccupied days in addition to their other burdens. Every one whose man is on active service knows how the agony of suspense is relieved only by steady occupation. Then the mind is forced, often in spite of itself, to concern itself with other things, and it takes a healthier point of view involuntarily. It is very certain that many soldiers' and sailors' wives cannot find sane distraction when thrown completely upon their own resources. It is equally certain that other resources can be forthcoming. Clubs started for these women in each of our big towns would go far towards solving the problem. They could be worked upon the most attractive lines, so that the members would find it a pleasure to belong and count hours spent there as happy ones. Plenty of occupation could be given. Working parties could be formed to sew for some of the many schemes to provide our soldiers and sailors with creature comforts. The women forming these work parties would feel of some use in the general disposition of things, and it would provide interests for them—those most important possessions. Games could also be played, such as draughts, chess, and halma, and the winter days would lose half their dreariness to many women such as those described by the Afternoon Visitor with such virtuous wrath and disapproval.

The Blue Cross

Several little leaflets decorated in the corner by a broad blue cross have found their way into the letter box, together with sundry other missives. They show that Our Dumb Friends League has not forgotten our dumb friends on the battlefields abroad, and will be eagerly scanned by many an animal lover. The Blue Cross Fund has been formed by this League to help horses in war time, and it has been officially recognised by the French Government. Captain Claremont has been working ceaselessly on its behalf, and it is mainly owing to him that this has come about. All goes very well now, however, for he has been deputed by the French Minister of War to form base hospitals for the wounded horses; and here the life of many a valuable animal will be saved. It is good to think that such an idea has been started and is being energetically carried out. The Blue Cross Fund makes its appeal above Mr. Arthur J. Coke's well-known signature from 58 Victoria Street, Westminster. It asks for wither pads, embrocations, and bandages, amongst many other things of veterinary requirements. Already the fund has supplied several ambulances for the use of horses at the different Army camps in this country. When the base hospitals are in working order abroad Captain Claremont will have, it is hoped, many ambulances over there, too, so that the wounded horse, like his master, can be transported with all possible speed from the battlefield. Needless to say, such activities will need help from the Chancellor of the Exchequer's Silver Bullet. The sufferings of dumb animals, however, make a powerful lever for unlocking the pocket, and several people have a personal interest in horses at the front. Recently there was a meeting at Claridge's Hotel at which Lady Smith-Dorrien presided, and the aims of

the fund were explained to a very sympathetic audience. The badge of the fund is a blue and white enamel cross, and it is so pretty that it is well worth buying for itself alone.

A Mission to Serbia

The last accounts from Serbia show that she is in desperate plight. There has been an almost complete lack of medical stores, and doctors and nurses working there have done so under terrible disadvantages. A warning was actually issued by the Servian Government urging the strictest economy with all medical stores, and the sick and wounded have had extra but unavoidable suffering in consequence. Lady Paget has been working at the Servian Legation for the last few weeks collecting medicine and surgical stores, and her hospital unit has just left for Serbia. Accompanying it were eight surgeons, twenty nurses, and a staff of ward maids and orderlies. Lady Paget hopes to form a hospital of two hundred and fifty beds, and she and her helpers at the Legation have spent a busy time sending off the equipment to Southampton, from whence it was shipped. Though the mission has already set off upon its work of mercy, contributions towards its upkeep will no doubt still be welcome. Sir Edward Boyle is the honorary treasurer to the Servian Relief Fund, and his address is 22 Berners Street. To know Serbia and the Servians is to sympathise with them. They are a brave people, very industrious and hardworking, and have suffered so cruelly during the past months that to describe Serbia as the Belgium of the East is no exaggeration. In addition to medical stores, Lady Paget took with her also a store of clothing for the Servian refugees from Bosnia and neighbouring provinces. And, as a passing thought, why do we not show the Servian flag in common with those of the Allies? A quintette of flags is displayed in many instances; and where space can be found for five there is surely room for a sixth. It is quite amusing to note how the flag-carrying brigade flourish. People who a short while ago would have considered such ornaments as the worst form of Jingoism now fall victims to the wily tradesman and his neat series of small silk flags for motor car or bicycle. Take them from every point of view, the flags of the Allies are a well-assorted lot, and those of us who have no possessions to beflag, and would not beflag them if we had, none the less feel their significance in our hearts each time we see them.

The Personal Column

It has been quoted as typical of the Englishman that he still looks at the announcement page of his morning paper before opening it and reading the news of the day. As a matter of fact, however, there is no page showing forth more clearly the conditions under which we are living at present. Almost the whole history of the war can be gleaned, for example, from the announcements appearing day by day in the personal columns. They make interesting if sometimes very sad reading. Many of them are in Flemish or French, asking for news of some Belgian relatives or friends, who it is believed have arrived in England, but about whom there is no certainty. Then there are some, which are far more cheerfully worded, conveying thanks to people who have supplied the eagerly desired information. Further down the column a well-known author advertises for officers' diaries of the war, or asks for a personal interview with men who have returned from the front. Evidently another book of thrilling adventure is on the high road to preparation. Offers of hospitality are given to wounded soldiers or refugees in distress. Numerous officers' wives appeal for clothing, tobacco, and several small luxuries for the men in their husbands' regiments. An application is made for a revolver and sword by a subaltern who has just joined the New Army and is evidently not overburdened with this world's goods. An adventurous soul asks for a motor ambulance, which he is prepared to drive for the Red Cross abroad. A wonderful study is the personal column, and sufficiently engrossing to warrant attention.

ERICA.

The County Gentleman
AND
LAND & WATER

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No. 2740

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1914

[PUBLISHED AS
A NEWSPAPER.]

PRICE SIXPENCE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY



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Commander-in-Chief of the French Army

Alexander & Macdonald

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ALSO 15 AND 20 YEARS OLD

SANDY MACDONALD

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The purity and age of this Whisky ("Sandy Macdonald" is guaranteed 10 years old) have rendered it famous in all quarters of the globe, and wherever Britishers foregather a "wee deoch-an'-doris" drunk in "Sandy Macdonald" is the most probable finale to the meeting



CHOOSING KIT

Practical Hints

(Continued from page 69)

Saddle Blankets

A MATTER of nearly fourteen years ago I was detailed, with the rest of the men of a troop, for flank guard to a cavalry column, and, in common with the rest of the men that morning, I folded my two blankets and placed them under the saddle when saddling up. My horse had a habit of "blowing" at the time he was girthed, and, as a rule, I tightened the girths again about five minutes after saddling; but that morning everything had to be done in a hurry, and I overlooked the second tightening of the girths. We went out on the extreme flank, and ran into such a hot corner that it took a good half-hour's gallop to get us out of it, and I came out minus two blankets, for, with the loose girths, they had slipped away from under the saddle and been left on the veldt. There was no chance of retrieving them, and only a combination of luck and judgment saved me from slipping round with the saddle and getting a nasty fall. I slept that night with the one blanket that travelled on the transport wagons; and it was a cold night.

A Blanket Clip

This, I repeat, is a matter of nearly fourteen years ago. With the regulation saddle one blanket is still carried folded on the back of the horse, and there is as yet no officially-adopted device to prevent that blanket from slipping just where it likes. At a prominent firm of saddlers I have just been shown a small clip, made scissor pattern, so that the harder it is pulled the tighter it grips, which is intended to grip the front of the blanket in the middle and buckle on to the peak of the regulation saddle. This is an excellent idea, but it has the drawback of allowing the blanket to slip diagonally, so that at the back of the saddle the blanket may fall a long way over to one side or the other, as in the course of a day's march that blanket is almost certain to alter from its original position.

Ventilation

There is another point to be considered, too. A blanket flat down on a horse's back, or even raised at the front with a clip of this description so as to expose the withers to the air, is going to affect the horse rather adversely before the day is over, for in a long march all that makes for warmth and consequent perspiration is a decided drawback. My own plan, after losing two blankets in the way already described, was to get a strong, narrow, leather strap, which fastened on the ring at the back of the saddle, passed between the folded blankets and the back of the horse, and was pulled up as tightly as possible and buckled to the peak of the saddle, so as to pull the blankets quite up off the back of the horse and leave a space through which a current of air could penetrate from back to front. This kept the blankets quite firmly in position, and also gave the horse a good deal more ease than could be obtained by leaving the blankets flat on his back, or even by merely lifting them by means of a clip in front, which affords no ventilation near the point at which the rider sits, or in rear of that point. Many little tricks have been tried in order to fix the saddle blanket and allow of such ventilation as was obtainable with the old-fashioned numnah, but I believe this of the strap through under the saddle is the best. One must exercise extreme care, however, in folding the blankets and pulling up the strap, so that the blankets are pulled well up into the body of the saddle, and also so that no folds or rucks are made which might cause soreness to the horse.

Bitting

Another point in connection with saddlery that appeared worthy of attention was the regulation-pattern headstall for use with the "reversible" pattern bit. The regulation pattern allows for the use of a bridoon with a strap fastening to the D's of the head-collar, and a reversible bit attached to a separate headstall. The use of this in its complete form is a matter of taste; personally, I should scrap the bridoon and use its reins on the reversible bit as a second pair, for I have never yet come across the horse that needed both bridoon and reversible bit in his mouth, and to carry the two is only a needless burden on the horse. The bit with four reins is enough for all circumstances, and on Service every extra ounce that is imposed on a horse counts very heavily in a strenuous march. As to whether the separate headstall is a necessity for carrying the bit, this also must be left to individual judgment. If the headstall is retained, adjustment of the bit is certainly easier.

(Continued on page 81)



Handkerchiefs are a necessity, but when buying see that they are Linen Handkerchiefs from Robinson & Cleaver as we have been noted since 1870 for uniform excellence.

No. 27. Men's Handkerchiefs, in Linen Cambric, hemstitched. Sizes 20½, 19½, and 18 ins. square with 1½, 1½, and 1½ in. hems, respectively. Per doz. 10 11. Largest size per doz. 13 9

No. 41. Men's Handkerchiefs in fine Linen, hand-embroidered with 1 in. monogram (any two-letter combination). About 10½ ins. square with 1½ in. hem. Per doz. 13 11

No. 28. Men's Handkerchiefs in Linen Cambric with tape or corded borders. Usual size 21 ins. square. Per doz. 10 6. Largest size per doz. 12 6

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
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ALL GARMENTS PERSONALLY FITTED.

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SAMPLES AND ESTIMATES POST FREE.

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SADDLERY**

BRIDLES, WALLETS & SADDLE BAGS
for immediate delivery.



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and in getting them in good condition."

JOHNNIE WALKER : " You are quite right—that's been *our*
policy since 1820."

JOHN WALKER & SONS, LTD., SCOTCH WHISKY DISTILLERS, KILMARNOCK.

CHOOSING KIT

(Continued from page 79)

Head-collars

But I do not like the regulation head-collar. It is a nice-looking affair, but the "throat-lash" is not solid or wide enough to stand hard wear. The same saddlers who showed me the blanket clip exhibited a special pattern head-collar with extra strength in the throat fastening, and this looks a far more serviceable article for hard wear. It must be remembered that on actual service a groom often has no chance to change the head-collar used for riding for another one in the lines, and thus the parade article has to be used for fastening the horse at night as well as for riding purposes. If a horse jerked his head up suddenly from any cause he would snap the throat fastening of the regulation head-collar—not when it is new, but after a month or two of wet weather and hard wear. It is strong enough at the beginning of things, but saddlery must be so built as to stand wet weather without cleaning and all the hardships that its user has to stand on campaigning work. And it is not possible to get breakages repaired or replaced on Service as it is in peace time; as a rule, one cannot carry duplicates of articles in use, and thus everything should be patterned and constructed to stand the maximum of strain, which the regulation pattern head-collar will not do.

Wallets and Saddlebags

A point on which all saddlers concur is that no leather can be made absolutely waterproof; pigskin, and the other leathers from which saddlebags and most wallets are constructed, are even worse than heavier leathers in their wet-resisting qualities, and thus it is imperative that both wallets and saddlebags should be properly lined with absolutely waterproof material. Further, the exteriors of these articles should be dressed as often as possible with some waterproofing composition; but, at the same time, they must not be soaked in grease, or the rubbered lining will speedily lose its power to resist water, for nothing is so damaging to rubber and rubber-proofed fabrics as grease. The regulation wallets are the best, and as for the pattern of the saddlebag, it should be perfectly plain—compartments and fittings are nuisances in actual work.

The Safety Bar

Many nervous riders seem to have a hankering after a safety bar to release the stirrup leather in case of a fall; but, after seeing trials of several of these devices, I have come to the conclusion that, for Service work, the ordinary bar fitted to the regulation saddle is as "safety" as anything else. The patent devices for releasing the stirrup leather usually fail to act in case of a downward and backward pull, and the man who cannot trust himself and his horse with the ordinary fitting ought not to go campaigning—his nerves are not fit for it. There is, certainly, a safety device which releases the stirrup leather instantly if the stirrup is thrown over to the other side of the saddle in case of a fall, but this happens so seldom that the thing is not worth fitting for campaigning, whatever may be its merits in the hunting field. Safety bars may be counted out for practical purposes in a military sense.

Wire-Cutters

Most of the German barbed-wire entanglements—at least, those used for the defence of prepared positions—contain at least one strand of barbed wire charged with a very powerful electric current. The average man advancing on these entanglements with ordinary wire-cutters, should he get a chance to cut any of the strands, will sooner or later get electrocuted—when he comes to the electrically-charged strands. In order to overcome this difficulty it is now possible to get wire-cutters with vulcanite or rubber-covered handles, both in the ordinary and the "Ironsides" pattern. The latter are by far the better pattern. There is enough power in these "Ironsides" cutters to sever half a dozen strands of ordinary barbed wire at once with ease. But the rubber-covered handles should be insisted on, as they may mean the saving of a life—and, in fact, of many lives.

(To be continued next week)

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"What IS War? Half the people who talk of war know not what it is." *John Bright—House of Commons Speech*

What IS Military Tailoring? a difficult and complicated business requiring knowledge, brains and skill to produce any and every Officer's Uniform.

It is a Scandal that vast numbers of Officers, especially **newly-appointed Lieutenants**, have gone to the front in abominable rubbish.

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You simply send your order by letter, 'phone or wire to Harrods, specifying **Box No. 1** or **Box No. 2** (or both), and the following goods to the value of one Sovereign are dispatched without delay straight to the Firing Line:—

BOX No. 1 ONE SOVEREIGN.

- 1 lb. Chocolate (Harrods).
- 3 Tins Oxo Cubes.
- 2 Potted Meats.
- 1 Ivelcon.
- 1 Brand's Ess. Chicken.
- 1 Brand's Ess. Beef.
- 100 Cigarettes, Best, Flat Box.
- ½ lb. Tobacco (compressed).
- 1 Packet Boracic Powder.
- 1 Tube Vaseline.
- 1 Tin Coffee and Milk, or
Cocoa and Milk.
- 1 Plum Cake.
- ½ Tin Danish Butter.
- 1 Pipe.
- Bromo Toilet Paper.

BOX No. 2. ONE SOVEREIGN.

- 1 Pair Gloves.
- 1 Pair Socks.
- 1 Undervest.
- 1 Pair Pants.
- 3 Handkerchiefs.
- 1 Pair Braces.
- 1 Woollen Scarf.
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
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THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN

Comfort and Discomfort

A BRIEF retrospect of the hundred days since war began shows what wonderful things can be achieved when the heart of the nation is touched. If we remember the few committee meetings and sewing parties that inaugurated the women's work for the nation, and see the vast machinery that has developed so rapidly, we can say, without fear of contradiction, that women, as well as men, have borne willingly some of the burden imposed by war. When the new and great Army came into being in a night its simplest requirements made an instant appeal to our mothering instincts. Nobody cavilled, or criticised, or spoke in a detached way of the duty of Government and so on; instead of that, a great resolution seemed to be made quite spontaneously that the Executive of the Empire should have immediate and disinterested support in its almost superhuman task. From small beginnings have come the great undertakings in London and the provinces; the men in the services, the unemployed workers, the professional classes, who, perhaps more than all others, are affected by the dislocation of civil life, are all being cared for by some agency. England, always "rich in human sympathies," aided by the generous help of the Greater Empire, seems to have received a deep impulse towards an idealism of brotherhood, which will surely last into the future—long after the last sound of war has died away.

Just a few days ago a small paragraph appeared in a daily paper appealing for warm clothing for recruits at a certain depot. Within a week the whole requirements had been sent in; socks, shirts, belts and underwear, books,

'baccy and pipes, all the hundred and one little odds and ends that humanise and help, had reached their destination, and soldiers knew that somebody had taken a little trouble about their well-being. The aim and object of us all must be to co-ordinate our efforts so that we do not make "meal of one and malt of the other," to use a homely simile, and as the weeks go by it is comforting to notice how well the various committees are endeavouring to define the scope and locality of their individual schemes and to co-operate with each other.

The Field Force Fund

With Lady French and the Duchess of Portland's names to head the list of the executive, the Field Force Fund has come into action again. Many of us remember its fine services in the South African War, when it secured the delivery of parcels to the troops at the front. During one year nearly two hundred and thirty-seven thousand parcels went out to the men. It was a fine effort to relieve the powers that be in a gigantic task, and to this end it is working again. There is no desire to interfere with or limit the various activities now at work; it is merely an endeavour to bring all agencies into one line, to make sure that provision is made for every unit in the field and that wastage is avoided. Mrs. William Sclater, who organised the work for South Africa, has consented to become honorary secretary, and anybody who is anxious to know of the requirements of the Field Force Fund will receive full information from her at 53 Grosvenor Street, London, W., care of Lady Henry Bentinck.

Cleanliness is the God-like essential of health. We

How to help Tommy Atkins

We cannot all go out to fight, but we can all do something to help our soldiers who are fighting our battles and defending the honour of our native land, and in this way contribute to their well-being and efficiency

SEND HIM A FLASK OF
HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS

Invaluable to a soldier in the field and most efficient in relieving hunger and thirst and preventing fatigue.

We will send post free to any address a flask of these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat vest pocket case on receipt of 1/6. If the man is at the front, be particular to give his name, regimental number, regiment, brigade and division.

Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket flasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1 6, 2 6 and 11/-

Liberal Sample sent post free for 3d. in stamps.

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After Exercise.

A hot bath after marching or any form of vigorous exercise is the best preventive against either cold or stiffness.

The Gas Water-Heater supplies the bath with plentiful hot water at the shortest notice; there is no risk of getting chilled through having to wait.

A Gas Fire is a further safeguard; it needs no preparation and makes no work.

Write for Booklet W-2 to The British Commercial Gas Association, 4, Victoria Street, Westminster, S.W.

D.194

know that the men have toiled night and day for our protection, and that they can only keep fit and well if they are clean and warm. The kind of parcel each man received in South Africa must have been welcome. It contained a shirt, a sweater, a cardigan or a jersey, a pair of socks and mittens, a towel and soap, handkerchiefs, muffler, bootlaces, a tooth brush, toilet paper, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of chocolate, stationery and an indelible pencil, a pipe, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of tobacco, cigarettes, and safety-matches. Thousands of parcels have gone out already; some have reached their owners and some have not. Under the Field Force scheme no parcel should go astray.

Comforts for the Fleet

A huge Union Jack floats outside No. 47 Grosvenor Square, and, though a house-agent's board announces laconically that the house is to be sold, the passer-by is well aware that it is inhabited temporarily. Cabs, and carts, and vans, pull up at the entrance all day long. People in cars and people on foot come and go early and late; when curiosity or kindness prompts a fresh visitor to penetrate the doors, he receives a cheering impression of vast navy-blue carpeted premises, and is greeted so complaisantly that he feels he is the one person on earth whose presence is desired.

From small and tentative beginnings this wonderful work has developed into a perfect organisation for sending comforts to the Fleet. Its administrative ability is a great tribute to womankind, and its sympathy is all it should be. In the secretary's room Mrs. Jebb-Scott, the honorary secretary, and her assistant secretaries are busy from morning till night acknowledging cheques and parcels, answering inquiries, and attending to the many secretarial duties that are inevitable. In the unpacking room the clothes are arranged under the care of Mrs. Longland, another member of the committee. There is no confusion, no misplaced energy anywhere—simply a desire to send good things out to the Fleet, and to accomplish this as speedily as possible before the cold becomes too bitter. Further on in the packing room Miss Kathleen Scott directs the energies of her assistants. Here the parcels are made up; they are sent off, with a list and a message in each, at the rate of a hundred and a hundred and twenty a day, and already two hundred ships have been cheered and comforted by these practical evidences of sympathy from the Mother Country. Over a ton of clothing and hospital equipment has been sent to the Naval hospitals at Haslar, Chatham, Plymouth, and Southend. The work has been done with the approval of the Admiralty; it has been assisted very generously by Queen Mary's Needlework Guild, and has co-operated with Lady Jellicoe's fund.

The amateur packer becomes expert in a few days. Her parcel must pass severe scrutiny before it is allowed to risk transit; but the labours of the packers are amply repaid by the grateful letters received telling that "the men look like balloons," so well are they protected, or "the arrival of the parcels was the great excitement of the day." Piloted by Miss Matheson, another member of the executive, the hospital room, where all the emergency night-shirts, bed-jackets, appliances, etc., are stored, is reached. Here the visitor is brought up face to face with stern realities, and then up a few stairs is shown the large reception rooms of the house, turned for the time being into a work-room, as busy and as businesslike as that of any factory. Here Mrs. Walter Scott and Mrs. Fuller administrate, and the work is turned out beautifully. It is the result of voluntary effort almost entirely, though a few paid machinists are working there under ideal conditions. ERICA.

A SUNDAY LECTURE

NEXT Sunday, at 4 p.m., Mr. Hilaire Belloc, whose weekly articles in *LAND AND WATER* are commanding considerable attention, will deliver a lecture on "The Strategy of the War" at the Globe Theatre, Shaftesbury Avenue, which is being lent by Mr. Oscar Asche and Miss Lily Brayton for that occasion. The proceeds of the afternoon will be devoted to the *Daily Telegraph* Belgian Relief Fund. Seats may now be booked by written application to the manager at the theatre. Ordinary theatre prices (10s. 6d. to 1s.) will be charged.

THE Cardinal Publishing Co., of 3 Wine Office Court, London, E.C., have just issued their No. 1 of "War Hero Portraits" from the original copperplate etchings by William Renison. One of these will be found as a frontispiece to *LAND AND WATER* this week. The price is 3d. each, or 1s. 6d. the set of six.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *LAND AND WATER*.

SIR,—Apropos the recent article in *LAND AND WATER* querying female adders swallowing their young, will you permit my telling what I witnessed when a boy?

My home in North Wales was locally renowned for the number of snakes one could find in those days on its 300 acres. Always interested in them, the opportunities afforded for observation were many; besides, I have had several snakes in captivity.

Once I was passing near a stone wall that separated a small plantation from a grass field when I spotted a snake, dark brown and white in colour. Having got nearer—some two yards away—I saw five or six baby snakes about 4 in. long. They were close to and in front of their mother. The family were on a low rock, just above the surface of the ground.

I saw the mother snake open her large mouth—the lower jaw did not seem to move—and most distinctly did I see the five or six little ones wriggle into that mouth and disappear. The parent slid away and through the dry wall, and was lost to view in the grass on the other side.

As she left the rock I thought her mouth remained open. I heard no hissing or other invitation to her children. That snake, I should say, was not more than 2 ft. in length. All this was a matter of seconds only.

I take it that as soon as she was beyond the wall, i.e., out of danger, the little ones reappeared. In about an hour I returned to the spot—this time very cautiously—but I only saw three of the baby snakes, and I captured them.

It must be borne in mind that the gullet of a snake is very elastic. It is fair to presume that the little ones did not go lower than the gullet, for there they had the air taken in by the mother at the time of their entry—inhaled by her for the purpose of the youngsters.

I have opened British snakes, and several times found young ones inside, but never in the gullet; they were invariably in the oviduct. I doubt whether they had ever seen daylight before, though on emerging they wriggled about. I rather think it was premature birth, those snakes being viviparous. Of the hundreds I have handled and seen, I never knew one larger than 3 ft. 5 in.; and that was a harmless green snake with the white collar.

I have watched wild snakes catching and devouring their prey; but only once did I see young ones taking refuge in the mother's gullet.

Doubtless it will astonish many of us to be told that in a certain part of England there are to-day snakes 8 ft. and 9 ft. in length. Luckily they are not venomous. Also that south of the Amazon, in the swamps of Brazil, anacondas have been killed that measured 65 ft. long, whilst others have been seen approximating 85 ft.

The largest of snakes never kill for their food anything more bulky than a marsh pig or a dwarf deer—shall I add travellers' tales notwithstanding?

Yours faithfully,

Sunny Bank, Coldbrook,
Abergavenny.

P. PICTON.

THE NECESSITOUS LADIES' HOLIDAY FUND

To the Editor of *LAND AND WATER*.

SIR,—You were good enough on previous occasions to allow me space in your valuable paper to appeal for contributions to provide holidays by the sea or country side for necessitous ladies. Through the generosity of your readers I was enabled to bring rest and refreshment to many.

I appeal again for help to send away governesses, typewriters, hospital nurses, secretaries, musicians, actresses, and ladies engaged in other professions, who, unable to provide holidays for themselves, and without the possibility of earning money in the summer months, are left behind in London, exposed to the sufferings attendant on poverty.

I appeal for those too proud to plead for themselves, for the delicate, and more especially for those broken down in health from overwork.

All contributions sent to me will be thankfully acknowledged and distributed among deserving cases if sent to appended address.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

CONSTANCE BEERBOHM.

48 Upper Berkeley Street,
London, W.

AMONG the well-known employers who are holding out inducements to their staffs to respond to the call to arms, Messrs. James Carter & Co., of Raynes Park, S.W., the well-known seedsmen, are not only keeping positions open but paying half wages to all members of their staff who are accepted for service. No distinction between married or unmarried is made, as Messrs. James Carter & Co. realise the latter have dependents also.

THE WORLD'S WAR.

THE MEANING OF MILITARY TERMS AND THE READING OF MILITARY NEWS.

WHEN two independent communities conflict in will, if neither give way, there must be recourse to force. That is, each community must attempt to render life so unpleasing to the members of the other community that, rather than continue under such conditions, that other community will accept its enemy's will.

For example: If nation A desires to take the goods of nation B, while nation B desires to retain its goods, then there is a conflict of wills. If nation A refuses to give up its project, and nation B refuses to give up its goods, recourse to force is inevitable.

Such a recourse to force we call *A State of War*, and the operations whereby force is exercised on either side we call *War*.

It has been found by experience that men are better able to impose their will thus by force upon other men in proportion as they are (a) armed with a superior weapon; (b) numerous as compared with their enemies; (c) so organised and so informed with certain habits both of routine and of obedience that they can act in great numbers to the dictation of one central authority, with the maximum of cohesion and at the same time with the maximum of elasticity.

A number of men so organised is called an *Army*. The operations of an army, especially against another army, are termed *Military Operations*.

These operations, having now many generations of tradition behind them and a continued development, have accumulated a number of technical terms, and are spoken of in a language of their own.

Some of these technical terms are unavoidable, because they relate to things peculiar to warfare; others are merely the equivalents of everyday words, and to use them in general description is unnecessary. But all *Military News* comes to us expressed in such terms, both necessary and unnecessary, and these terms must, therefore, be understood if we are to read military news intelligently.

In order to understand these terms and the way in which they are used, we must begin at the beginning and discover (1) what is the Composition of an Army; (2) under what conditions an Army lives and moves; and (3) what task it is expected to accomplish.

I.—THE COMPOSITION OF AN ARMY.

THE essential feature in the composition of an Army is that it must be divided and subdivided into separate parts, both (a) because only so can its numbers be controlled, and the central command conveyed to all its members. (b) Because only so can there be the power to use any part for a time independently of the rest; in other words, only thus can *elasticity* be secured. (c) Because an Army demands the services of men in various ways, armed and unarmed, and because, among the armed, the weapons differ in their nature and use.

A modern national army is first of all divided into *Army Corps*. Each *Army Corps* is in itself a complete model. It is an army fully found. If a nation can put into the field but one *Army Corps* it can none the less put into the field a perfect though small army. For every *Army Corps* has its due proportion of the various arms and auxiliary bodies which together make up a modern army.

Each such *Army Corps* is under the command of a general officer who is aided by his staff, and it is the peculiar business of the staff to work out the details of timing, provisioning, etc., in the movements of a *Corps*. It is a fair rule of thumb to reckon an *Army Corps*, upon a war footing and at the beginning of a campaign before wastage sets in, at about 40,000 men.

An *Army Corps* is again divided into *Divisions*: usually two in number: in some services and in some special cases, three. Each *Division* contains a due proportion of every arm and each is under a General Officer, subordinate to the General commanding the whole *Corps*. But though *divisions* thus make up an *Army Corps*, they do not entirely constitute it. Certain groups of men, both armed and unarmed, are ascribed to the *Corps* as a whole, and not to the *Divisions*. For instance, in most services, of all the guns present in an *Army Corps*, only some are attached to the *Divisions*, others are under the direct control of the *Army Corps* as a whole, that is, of its General in command.

Divisions are again subdivided into *Brigades*. And here we approach the cross-division of all armies into bodies using different kinds of offence, or, as they are technically called, "*Arms*."

It is customary to speak of "the three Arms" that is, Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery. But an arm separate from these is that of the Engineers who prepare communications, undertake the larger forms of fortification, and attend to all scientific work in general, as also what is termed nowadays sometimes "the fourth arm"—that of the men who work the Flying Machines.

Not all these arms are organised in *Brigades*, but Cavalry and Infantry nearly always are, and a *Brigade* normally consists of two or three *Regiments*. The *Brigade* is commanded by the lowest grade of General Officer, who is responsible to his General of *Division*, who is again responsible to the General commanding the whole *Army Corps*.

Below the unit of the regiment are, of course, many other subdivisions, of which the most important to retain is that of the *Battalion* in the Infantry, for that is the unit of the principal fighting arm. The *Battalion* may be taken, by a rough rule of thumb, to number, on a war footing and before wastage sets in, about a thousand men; and the strength of a *Brigade* is reckoned in *Battalions* rather than in *Regiments*. Thus the French *Brigade*, which [made the reconnaissance in force the other day into Upper Alsace beyond Altkirch, and which was in its turn a portion of a whole *Division* advancing from Belfort, numbered six *Battalions*; and a *Brigade* of Infantry in the field may generally be reckoned at from five to eight of these *Battalions*.

Another important subdivision to retain is the *Battery* of Field Artillery. In some services a *Battery* consists of six, in others of four, guns.

A rough list of the various arms and auxiliary forces into which any complete armed force is divided comprises not only the main arms of Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery, and Engineers, but also a Medical Corps, the New Flying Corps, and a number of smaller bodies—the interpreters, for instance, the despatch bearers, etc.

A rough general idea of the proportion these arms bear one to the other is obtained if we give about 60 per cent. to the Infantry, rather more than 20 per cent. to the Artillery and Engineers, not 14 per cent. to the Cavalry, and the small remainder to the train, to the administrative Corps, etc. Or again, still more roughly, we may consider a modern Army as being as to nearly two-thirds of it Infantry, and as to the remaining third mostly Artillery and Cavalry in not quite equal proportions (the Cavalry less than the Artillery), with a small margin of a twentieth or so left over for administrative and all other services.

Of the actual combatants who form but a large majority and not the totality of any force, it is customary to speak in terms of one of their weapons. Thus we say that in such and such an action, such and such a Commanding Officer could count upon so many *Bayonets* (Infantry), so many *Sabres* (Cavalry), and so many *Guns* (Artillery).

Finally, it must be remembered that when a great modern national army goes into a Campaign, its *Army Corps* are grouped together into various larger forces, each with a General Officer in supreme command. And these larger forces are usually designated by the name of some natural feature in the neighbourhood of which their operations are to be conducted. Thus three *Army Corps* under Generals A, B, and C, will be grouped together to act in the Meuse Valley, will be put under the supreme command of General D, and will be called the Army of the Meuse. The operations of the whole national army, including every *Army Corps* and the various groups into which they may be combined, are controlled by a Supreme General Staff with a General Officer usually called a *Generalissimo*. In the present struggle General Joffre occupies that position upon the French side, and General Von Moltke upon the German.

A modern Army is further distinguished in its composition, with all the Great Powers save Britain, by the feature of *Conscription*, and in every case, Great Britain included, by the feature of *Mobilisation*.

Conscription is a system whereby all the able-bodied males of a country are, on arriving at maturity (that is, in their twentieth or twenty-first year) summoned according to a register that is

kept of them, and examined to see which of them are fit to bear arms.

Of those fit to bear arms the Government then takes a certain number, greater or less according to its financial resources, the task expected of its army, and the theory the politicians and their advisers may hold as to the length of training necessary to the making of a soldier and the number required to provide a first line. Thus, in France nearly all those called up and practically all those fit to bear arms are taken. In the German Empire a much smaller proportion. The men so taken are put, as it is called, *with the Colours*. That is, are put into uniform and into barracks to live for a certain time the life of a soldier, and to be trained in all the duties of a soldier and in the use of their weapons. This time varies from two to three years.

Each yearly batch thus called up is designated by the name of the year in which it was called, and is called a *Class*. Thus when we talk of "*The Class of 1905*" we mean all those men who were called up for Service in 1905, whether they were taken for the Colours in that year or not; and these men remain marked by that term throughout the whole of their connection with the Military organisation, that is, from the moment they are first examined till they are over forty years of age. If we hear that the Government has, in say, 1913, when they have long ceased to be with the Colours, "*Called up the Class of 1905*," it means that it has summoned back to the Army the survivors who were first examined as to their fitness for service in that year.

A man having served his two or three years "*With the Colours*" passes some seven years or so in the "*Reserve of the Active Army*," the years immediately succeeding these he passes into the Territorial Army, and later again, before coming to his fortieth year, he passes into the Reserve of the Territorial Army.

There are thus in every country where Conscription is instituted, four groups of men; the first and youngest group in uniform and being trained as soldiers; the next, the immediate Reserve coming up a few days at certain long intervals, to renew their training; the next oldest subject to very short periods of training but still in connection with the Army; the fourth, no longer coming up for any training, but forming the last Reserve of all. These four groups cover the trained male population between the ages of 20 or 21 and 42 or 45, and while they are called by different names in different services, are everywhere arranged in these four sections and correspond roughly to these four groups of ages.

A very important exception to this system must here be noticed because it will be of the greatest moment in the present war.

In the German Service, only a certain proportion—far smaller than the French—of the young men are taken for the Active Army. The Germans have a larger population than the French by more than fifty per cent., and they claim that in this fashion they can pick the best men, and yet have an Army equal to their neighbours. Meanwhile they put the rest into a special sort of Reserve, of which some are slightly trained and some are not trained at all. This Special Reserve (not to be confounded with the Regular Reserve of trained men, who have passed through the ranks), which is of course very large, is called up in time of War, incorporated with the trained men, and trusted thus to acquire a sufficient military habit to be usable in the Front line before the war has long proceeded.

With this system of a short-service active Army, backed by a much more numerous Reserve, consisting of men who have already passed through the ranks, which system is to be found in all modern countries (even in those which, like Britain, have not the institution of Conscription), necessarily goes the other modern feature called *Mobilisation*.

It is evident, before a short-service modern Army can begin great operations in the field, the men actually with the Colours must be supplemented by a greater or lesser number of the Reserves, who are no less a part of the Army than those actually in uniform and in barracks. This process of bringing up the Reserves, and so putting the Army upon a War footing is, with certain other activities involved, called by the general name of *Mobilisation*, which means the turning of the Army from an incomplete and, as it were, stationary condition, into a complete condition in which it is *mobile*; that is, loosed from all local ties and necessities which could hinder its action in war.

When mobilisation is decreed, the Reserve men, who have left the Colours from one to twenty years ago, come up to be clothed and armed. They join certain *centres of concentration* until as many of them as the Government has chosen to call up are gathered together in places where they can be put into uniform, given their weapons, and drafted into the Corps in which they belong.

Every Conscript in a modern army has a booklet or papers describing the place, length, and character of his training; with notes on the way in which he served, his abilities, rank in the service, etc., and in particular a notification of the place to which he is to go when he is mobilised and the exact day on which he is to reach it.

It is clear that the concentration of many hundred thousands of men occupied in their various civilian duties over the whole surface of a country could not be undertaken in one nor even in a few days. The carrying capacity of railways, the time taken to distribute the order, etc., the necessity of preventing confusion, and the further necessity of grouping men from smaller centres of concentration into larger ones, all take time. The soldier, therefore, who has passed into the Reserve, has marked upon his papers his duty to present himself at such and such a place not necessarily on the first day of mobilisation but on the third, or fifth, or whatever day may be appointed.

Further time is taken up in clothing and arming, in drafting, each into his own corps, the men called up, and in moving the first troops towards the scene of action.

Mobilisation is again lengthened by the concentration of stores, the liberation and movement of Reserve weapons, and a host of other operations.


The consequence is that even with everything moving exactly to a scheduled time, the mobilisation of any great modern national army will always take a considerable number of days. In France and Germany it is not far short of a fortnight; in Russia it is certainly over three weeks. The amount of rolling stock available, the length and direction of railways, the distribution of population, all enter into this calculation; and if there is any considerable hitch or confusion that period might be very disastrously prolonged.

It is this operation of *mobilisation* and the length of time attached to it which explains not only the delay between the beginning of a state of war and the first decisive actions, but also much of the strategics of the campaign.

For instance, in the present embarrassment of Germany the fact that Russia mobilises more slowly than France determines the whole of Germany's main plan. She must try to put France at least half out of action, to prevent the French Army at least from pressing her badly upon the West, before Russia comes into play on the East; and that is why she mobilised secretly before anybody else, and why she made her great effort of the very first days of the war against the Belgian defences which block her easiest road for attacking the French forces.

II.—THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH AN ARMY LIVES AND MOVES.

An Army being of its nature a body of men compelled to live under highly artificial conditions, consuming all kinds of wealth and yet producing nothing, covering at any one time a comparatively small area, which could never produce even the food it requires, and being in many other ways restricted by its special formation and purpose, can only be moved from place to



place under certain peculiar conditions, and according to certain peculiar rules.

The body of knowledge and practice concerning these rules and conditions is (together with the art of bringing it against the enemy in the best posture) called *Strategy*. The word Strategy simply means "the conduct of an Army."

It is clear that, even in its simplest state such a body of men will require accumulations of food especially designed to maintain it in being. Under modern conditions it will require accumulations of many other things beside food. Modern missile weapons (the rifle and the gun) cannot be used, save with special missiles designed for each particular type of weapon. A modern Army is further a mass of machines (guns, rifles, telegraphic and telephonic apparatus, aeroplanes, dirigibles, etc.) all of which will be in constant need of repair and maintenance.


More than any older and similar force, it will require repeated supplies of clothing, horses, medicine, accoutrement. Of all these things, great stores must be got together; the stock of

such stores in any one place is called a *Depot* or *Magazine*, and the place where the *Magazines* are accumulated is called a *base*.

It is obvious that a *Base* of this kind is not easily or quickly moved. It is fixed; or at least only to be transferred at a vast expense of time and men. But it is equally obvious that an Army is useful in proportion to the freedom of choice you have in moving it.

An Army goes forward from its base towards the place in which it thinks it can best meet the Army opposing it, and as it goes forward, it must be continually supplied with ammunition, repairs and food. If it were not so supplied, it could not fight more than a very short time, nor could its members even remain alive; they would starve. This line, which it rolls out behind an Army in movement, connecting it with its base; which grows longer and longer as it advances, and which is a prime necessity of its being is called its *Lines of Communication*, or, more shortly,

PLAN II



its *Communications*. The simplest elements of all Strategy then, may be represented in such a conventional plan as Plan I.

Where A-B is the Army, C its communications and D its base.

It is the very first thing to remember, when we are considering the position of any Army, its chances of success or of defeat, or, in military history the causes of either, that an Army is thus necessarily tied by its *Communications* to some vitally important *Base of Supply*. An army must not be compared to a swimmer moving at will through the water. It is better compared to a diver who is supplied with air through a tube and will perish quickly if that line be cut. It is not an island, it is a peninsula; it is not an isolated or detached thing, it is a fruit upon a stalk, which is gathered and consumed if the stalk be severed.

In practice, of course, these simple elements are infinitely complicated and diversified. For instance, as an army advances and its direction is determined by circumstances, *advanced bases* are thrown out. Again, a line of Communication that has become too tortuous can be straightened by short cuts, after the army has advanced; and again, Communications may be continually subject to interruption even by the enemy, and yet, if such interruptions are not too prolonged, may remain intact for the purpose they have to serve. But the general elements are what I have described and condition all warfare.

Before we go further, it is as well to establish a certain number of consequences following upon this triple arrangement of fighting force, communications and base; they are seven in number.


(1). Communications are maintained more easily and at a less expense of energy and of men in inverse proportion to their length. The longer they are, the more difficult they are to keep intact and to keep working smoothly. After a certain extension, the difficulty increases very rapidly indeed. We all know in practice how true this is of any long sequence of human activity. In a procession, for instance, the difficulties of keeping a time-table increase very greatly with the length of the column.

(2). It is therefore important to have communications as direct as possible from the fighting body to the base—that is, perpendicular to the fighting front—and the advantage of this is increased when we consider the *vulnerability of Communications*, for:—

(3). Communications, even in friendly country, must be guarded against secret attack; and in hostile country or in the neighbourhood of the enemy, from open attack. On which account:—

(4). Communications take up a great number of men in the guarding of them, and, therefore, as an army advances it grows weaker and weaker in the field, not only from a natural wastage through disease and wounds, but also because it has to spare more and more men to guard its Communications. Napoleon's Campaign in 1812 affords the chief example of this.

(5) Communications are not only the channel by which an army is fed with its necessities for living and fighting, they are also, and the same, channel by which an army rids itself of encumbrances, of its wounded, etc. They are largely the channel



up and down which orders and information are conveyed. Therefore, with this "backwards and forwards" business they are liable to clog; and if they clog the army is lost. Therefore, again:

(6) It is urgent that a *wide front* should be served by many parallel lines of communication. If (as in Plan VI.) the broad front A-B must have all its Communications passing through the narrow issue at C, it is in peril. It is free if it has separate lines for each corps (Y, Y, Y, Y) leading but to separate bases A, A, A, A).

(7) Though an Army cannot live or fight for more than a very short time detached from its Communications, it can drop one line of Communications and, as the phrase goes, "Pick up" another. Thus in Plan II., if a General in the position A-B wants to get to E and is afraid that in so doing he will unduly lengthen or will be in peril of being cut off from his line of Communications along C to D, he will not be afraid to march upon E so long as E is not too far off, and so long as he knows that E is in touch by another line of Communications F with another base at G. A force cut off from its Communications is said to be "in the air." Blücher's march to Wavre after Ligny is an example of thus picking up an alternative line of Communications.


So much for Communications and the way in which an Army is bound by them.

The next element to consider in the conduct of an Army is the space which it occupies, and the effect of space upon its progress.


A great body of men depending upon instruments, many of them delicate, many of them cumbersome, all—food included—

dependent upon wheeled traffic or boats, must use some convenient avenue of advance; a railway, a hard road, or, in the case of heavier supplies, a river or canal. But such avenues of advance are invariably narrow compared with their length. They are mere lines or thin ribbons. A great body of men must, therefore, advance in *columns*. That is, in groups which are very long in proportion to their width. But these bodies must also, when they come to fight, *Deploy*, that is, spread out from column into line (Deploy is but the French for "unfold") otherwise they could not meet the enemy with their full force. If the body A-B (Plan III.) desires to defend itself against or attack the enemy's body C-D, it must get its guns and its rifles to bear upon C-D, and it can only do that by getting them out of the long marching column formation A-B into the new formation E-F.

Now, it is evident that this *Deployment* will take longer and be more cumbersome in proportion as the line A-B was extended. Therefore, the commander of an Army Corps, let us say, will try to advance in as many short, parallel columns as possible, subject




always to the difficulty of keeping to many such parallel columns, all abreast one of the other. It is obvious an army marching thus (Plan IV.) can deploy into the position E—F more rapidly and easily than one marching thus (Plan V.). A General will therefore prefer, if he can get it, a country in which there are numerous more or less parallel roads, railways, and opportunities for water carriage leading more or less side by side towards the extended front where he thinks he will have to deploy, and in



country, such as mountains and forests, where such roads are few, advance is hampered. On open and populated plains, where such roads are many, it can be swift.

It is a further consequence of this state of things that a large body is, in proportion to its size, compelled to *try* to act over a wide stretch of country. So long as it is confined to a narrow issue it is cramped and can only present a small part of its forces to the enemy, and unless an Army Corps, say, has half a county to work over it is at a heavy disadvantage. (We shall see later of what importance this principle is in the present campaign in connection with the narrow issue between Liège and the Dutch frontier.)

A body compelled to move in one long column and unable from natural obstacles of wood or marsh, or mountain, to deploy,



is said to be passing through a *defile*. When it comes to more open country where it can spread out it is said to *debouch*.

All this applies to the moving and the keeping in existence of any army in the field; even when it is not in touch with, aroused by, or in conflict against another army. And this part of strategy which concerns the mere moving of a great body of

armed men is essential to final success because the health, numbers, and disposition of the force when it comes to fight will all depend upon how far such obvious conditions have been considered and observed.

III.—THE TASK OF AN ARMY.

The task of an Army is the task of reducing an opposing Army to military impotence. That is, an Army must try to render the enemy opposed to it *unable or less able to continue its activities as an Army*.

There are two main ways in which this can be accomplished:


(A) You can destroy the cohesion of the enemy's force and turn him from a united and organised whole into a broken mass incapable of combined action.

(B) You can cut off the enemy's force from its sources of supply, and so compel it to the alternative of starving to death (with its weapons useless in its hands from lack of missiles), or of surrendering itself prisoner, and giving up those weapons into your hands.

I will take these two methods in their order.

(A) When one Army defeats another by breaking its cohesion this is accomplished (save in the case of partial envelopment, leading to panic), by piercing the line of that Army in one or more places. It is evident that when the enemy's line is pierced you have reduced his force—originally comparable in numbers to your own—to two armies each no more than half your own. You have further overwhelmed at one point a considerable number of his troops; killed many, scattered more, and disorganised the rest in the neighbourhood of the point where your shock succeeded. You have, again, completely put an end to his unity of command; so that even the remnants of his Army cannot co-operate against you. The enemy's line thus pierced is defeated more or less completely according to the degree in which you have reduced his forces from an organised condition to chaos.

PLAN VII



An attack of this kind is called *A direct Frontal Attack*. An historical example of a battle attempted to be won in this fashion (but missed) is Napoleon's attack on Wellington's line at Waterloo, or again Napoleon's attack upon the Russian line at Borodino.

It is evident that superiority in numbers is here as in every other case the deciding factor. It means that, while you A—B can oppose to your enemy C—D equal numbers at every point in his line, and so engage and "hold" him, you are free further to mass at some point K—of your own choosing—larger numbers

than those opposite at that point; and these numbers can direct against the point opposed to them a superior volume of fire and a greater weight of men. (Plan VII.) This superior volume or weight should break his line. When this direct effort of one line against another takes place, the scheme is often called "a parallel battle."

But superiority of numbers, where this is at all considerable, is better and more commonly utilised in the second form of attempting victory, which shall be next described.

(B) This second form consists in *flanking movements*, which have for their ultimate object *Envelopment*.

Let A—B, C—D, (Plan VIII.), be two armies drawn up in line opposed one to the other and approximately equal in numbers. Add to A—B some considerable body E—F, either connected with the original line thus (see Plan IX.) or coming up from elsewhere in aid of A—B, thus (see Plan X.). This extra body, whether belonging to the original line A—B (as in the first of these two sketches), or coming up from elsewhere in aid of that line (as in the second sketch), threatens by its movement what is called the *Flank*, that is, the side of C—D. It comes, fully deployed (that is, using its maximum offensive power) just on that part of C—D's arrangement which is least able

to defend itself. For the line C—D has nothing to oppose to this flanking movement but the few men near its extreme end.

Observe that, in order to meet this threat *whatever* C—D does will weaken him. Supposing that when he sees the prolongation of C—D's line at E—F, he stretches his own line out to face that prolongation, then he makes his line thinner and leaves it in peril of being pierced by superior forces opposed to it at every point.

PLAN VIII



Suppose he turns round two of his sub-divisions M, M to face and hold off the flanking movement, as in Plan XI., then he leaves the other four sub-divisions N—O, N, O, faced by superior forces (six) which may pierce them or overwhelm them.

As a fact, what usually happens when a flanking movement has been executed with sufficient promptitude is that it begins to turn into *Envelopment*. That is, the inferior force C—D bending back first on one wing M, M, to avoid attack from one side, leaves itself inferior as against the original force A—B opposed to it. That original force then begins a flanking movement on the other wing before which its inferior enemy again bends back (O, O), and by that time the communications of C—D are in danger of being cut. (Plan XII.)

If they are cut and the envelopment is complete, you get a result such as that of Sedan, in which the enveloped Army being no longer able to receive food or missiles, is compelled to surrender. Sometimes, before the process is complete, you get a result like that of Waterloo, where the Army threatened with envelopment breaks under the strain, loses all unity and cohesion, and is routed; that is, turned from an organised unity into a chaos.


It is evident that in all these cases the presence of superior numbers is, other things being equal, the decisive factor. It has been well said that the art of Strategy consists in getting two men to a place where only one man is ready to meet them.

But it does not follow by any means that of two national armies that which is the larger is certain to succeed.

What is meant by the aphorism is that wherever a particular battle or general action is fought, wherever, as another term goes, things are brought to a *Decision*, superiority of numbers on that particular field at that particular moment, is the chief deciding factor. Thus, Napoleon in the Campaign of 1814 fought against superior total numbers; but he kept the various bodies of his enemies separated, and attempted to be, and often was, their superior in each particular engagement.

Now it is in connection with this truth, that not superiority in the total numbers ultimately available, but the superiority

PLAN IX




in the numbers present on the *decisive spot* and at the *decisive moment* decide an action, that we can best appreciate the meaning in war of the *Obstacle*; and of *Fortification*, which is (in most of its uses) no more than a particular case of the *Obstacle*.

When we talk of an *Obstacle*—a river, forest, marsh, or hilly country—presented to the strategical advance or offensive of an

army, we do not connote by that term what is connoted by it in civil affairs. We are not considering the mere difficulty of passing it. For the unhampered army of a civilised people can


PLAN X



pass any such obstacle if sufficient time be allowed it. What we connote by it is the *Factor of Delay*.

Here (Plan XIII.) is a river A—B. Two forces, E the lesser,

PLAN XI



and F the greater, are in presence. A third force G is coming up to effect its junction with E. If it succeeds in doing so the combined force G+E will be greater than its enemy F. The


PLAN XII



river A—B is an *Obstacle*. It is an *Obstacle* in favour of E, who is on the defensive, and against F, who is on the offensive. But its only value to E is in its power of *delaying* F while G comes up. If there were no G to come up and help E the river could not

save the weaker force. Sooner or later the superior force F, holding E by an equal force, could detach a free portion of his men and throw a bridge over the river. The handicap which the river A—B lays upon F is solely a handicap of delay while G is coming up. The river is not something behind which E can defend himself indefinitely. It is something introducing the factor of time to the advantage of what is, in one particular place and time, the weaker party.

A good defensive position, that is, a natural formation (such as a crest of rolling land with a long open space before it) from which the most effective fire can be delivered upon an assault, is but a particular case of an obstacle. A position artificially fortified, all fortification, is but an obstacle rendered by human art particularly difficult to pass. Given sufficient time any



fortification can be reduced—if only by famine; but fortification introduces, for the benefit of those holding it, the element of delay.

A considerable space furnished, or furnishable, with lodgings for men and horses and with storehouses for ammunition and food and so fortified that it is defensible upon every side is termed a *fortress*, or, on the largest scale, an *entrenched camp*.

And here a modern element of the utmost interest in the present campaign appears.

The great range of modern heavy artillery involved a corresponding increase in the fortified circle that a complete enclosed defensive position would have to be surrounded by. To create a fortress under such conditions a wide ring of forts, each isolated and each designed to defend itself alone, was designed. Such a ring would be anything from six to ten miles across, and anything from twenty to thirty miles round or more. The French constructed many such after their disasters of forty odd years ago, notably the great chain or barrier of fortresses *Belfort*, *Epinal*, *Toul*, and *Verdun*, on the Eastern frontier.

When it was first thought that Belgian neutrality was in danger *Namur* and *Liège* were added to continue the line. To some extent, and at wider intervals, the Germans copied this plan. But two schools arose with two opposite doctrines upon this hitherto untried system.

The one school, largely German, would have it that with a sufficient sacrifice of men, some one—or more—of the forts on the ring could be “rushed,” and the system broken.

The other (mainly French) thought that such “rushing” was impossible. That, with a sufficient army to hold the spaces between the forts, the stores, etc., within the ring were safe for months, and that even with a small force the forts themselves could be held (though the ring might be pierced in the intervals) and would continue to bar any continuous supply.

Supposing the second school to be right and such forts to be capable of long resistance, then a modern ring fortress would serve the following purposes:—

- (1) To delay, till its forts were reduced, the passage of supplies past it or in its neighbourhood, whether by road or, much more important, by railway. Thus such a ring protecting a junction of lines or covering one main line of supply is of great importance.
- (2) When it was supported by other neighbouring fortresses and was strongly garrisoned, to prevent an Army passing between it and the next fortress.
- (3) To serve as a refuge within which a force no longer strong enough to hold the field could still maintain itself and detain a greater number of the enemy before it.
- (4) To act as the “pivot” upon which a turning movement could revolve. If (Plan XIV.) I want to move that end of my force A—B, marked as M to threaten the flank of my enemy C—D, I may not be quite superior enough in numbers to do so without leaving a dangerous gap at X. But if at X I have a fortress F barring the passage for some twenty miles, I can use that fortress as a “pivot” for my projected movement. It will also supply me, or at least supplement my supply.
- (5) To threaten the flank of an Army which desires to pass it.

If in the accompanying sketch (see Plan XV.) the area A B C is that commanded by the guns of a ring fortress, and if


this ring fortress contains a large body of armed men with their munitions; then another army of the enemy's trying to pass by it along the line D—E will be exposed to a two-fold peril. It may be caught in the act of marching, when an army is unable to defend itself, or, having marched by, the communications which it unrolls behind it will be in danger of being cut at any moment, for the large force within the fortified area A B C can come out and attack the comparatively weak and highly extended forces which defend a line of communications. This junction in a fortress is greatly exposed when not one fortress but two, joined by a line of forts, presents a large concentration behind that line as in the line D—P.

So obvious is that that there is never any question of passing a fortress containing a considerable garrison without first “Masking” it. To Mask a fortress is to leave over against it, and between it and the line of march of your own forces an Army (as at G—H) large enough to check any sally which the Army contained within the fortress might make against your communications.

With this we nearly exhaust the terms technical to this kind of news, and the comprehension of them. There remain to be mentioned certain other terms requiring a brief mention:—

All those operations which are subsequent to the general movements of an army and are concerned with its immediate fate when it is at grips with the enemy, are called *Tactical Operations* as distinguished from strategical. They are so called because they take place after the opposing forces have come in touch with one another or, to use the common term, are *In Contact*.

A number of other terms are too familiar to need more than a mention. We speak of the *Defensive* when we mean the expenditure of energy in the resisting of an attack and of the *Offensive* when we mean the expenditure of energy in the delivering of it. Wellington, for instance, fought a defensive action at *Waterloo* because all the earlier part of that day and much the greater part of it was taken up in preventing



the French from piercing his line until Blucher should come up in flank and threaten them with envelopment.

We say that a General has the *Initiative* or is “taking the initiative” not precisely when he is on the *Offensive* (though the two things usually go together), but when he is in a position to choose

his point of effort and when his opponent is only in a position to meet such a movement after, and as soon as he has discovered it.

There is in connection with military news not only the difficulty of following military terms, but a certain confusion resulting from the way in which modern news is at once haphazard, far too quickly delivered, and deliberately and wisely starved by military censorship. I cannot do better in order to explain how I, at least, should read this news, and how in my comments I shall try to piece it together, than put down in a list certain rules which occur to me:

Rule I.—This rule is, not to believe things physically impossible. Thus in one week we have had such statements as the presence of a German force upon the River Aisne in France, a Brigade (of 6,000 men) suffering a loss of 30,000 men (in front of Mulhouse), and French Cavalry East of Liège a week before there were any French troops near Namur.

Rule II.—Pay attention only to reports which deal with definite results. Words like “havoc,” “rout,” “disorder,” usually mean very little in military news. On the other hand a precise account of a number of guns taken, of places actually occupied, of the number of prisoners, etc., is information upon which you can base an estimate.

Rule III.—Always believe the enemy's reports to be more accurate and sober than those from your own side. Thus, when Berlin let us know through Holland that Liège had fallen, the phrase was misleading and false, but verbal accuracy could be pleaded for it, for though Liège the fortress had not fallen, German troops had got into Liège the town. On the other hand, the statement that 25,000 Germans had been hit in the first assault was manifestly an impossible exaggeration.

Rule IV.—Remember that observers nearly always overestimate the effect of their own fire, particularly in the case of Artillery.

Rule V.—Follow, upon a large scale map, every movement of which you hear, and compare the scheme of those movements from day to day, noting the nature of the arm and the supposed numbers.

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THESE notes upon the operations taking place on the Continent are written upon the evening of Wednesday. They are corrected or amplified according to the news received in London upon Thursday morning up to noon. They are in the hands of the public on Friday morning.

It is impossible to avoid in the chronicle which they attempt to establish that gap between the Thursday noon and the Friday morning which printing demands. The same criticism applies to the deductions made from such news as has been received in London.

It is the object of these comments, and of the deductions from news received which they will contain, to explain, as much as is in the writer's power, the nature of the operations on land. In order to do this, it is first necessary to get some idea of the process of events in the Western theatre of war since the first days of mobilisation.

I say "In the Western theatre of war" because operations in any way decisive of the result have not yet taken place in the Eastern theatre of the war upon the Eastern and Southern frontiers of the Germanic allies, unless we are to accept the now detailed accounts of an Austrian reverse at the hands of the Servians at Shabat.

In the Western field, upon the other hand, operations which will be of weight in the final decision, and others which have begun to define the probable direction of the opposed armies, have already taken place.

In thus attempting to establish the succession of events which have led up to the present situation in the Western field of the war, we must exclude what is merely political and consider only what is military.

Upon Saturday, August 1st, the French Government gave the first open orders for mobilisation. What previous steps it may have taken in preparation of the general mobilisation we do not know. But, at any rate, the life of the country was quite normal up to and including this Saturday, August 1st, and certainly nothing in the shape of general mobilisation had yet taken place. The full operation of mobilisation only began in France upon Sunday, August 2nd.

What the corresponding steps may have been upon the German side we do not know. Germany had already declared martial law, and she may have begun her mobilisation—in part, at least, and particularly in the North—before France did. An examination of the first operations makes this still more probable, but we have no positive information upon the point.

Plan A.



The process of full mobilisation in both countries is at least 12 and like to be in practice more nearly 14 days: using the phrase "full mobilisation" to mean not the bringing up of the troops to the field of action, but the putting of them all upon a war footing. How many days must elapse before the mobilised armies could begin to undertake their principal actions would depend upon the field in which those operations would take place; certainly, fifteen or sixteen days is not too much to allow, seeing that the strict theoretical minimum (which was bound to be exceeded) was at least eleven days.

The French mobilisation proceeded with quite unexpected smoothness; a state of affairs most fortunate for the French, which was due to political factors with which we are not here concerned. The results of its accurate working will be later pointed out.


Meanwhile, upon that same Sunday, August 2nd, the German Covering Troops from Trèves had violated the neutral territory of Luxembourg, entering that independent State by

several bridges, particularly by those of Wasserbillig and Remich.

At 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day the German Minister in Brussels presented an ultimatum to the Belgian Government demanding unopposed passage for German Troops through Belgian territory, in other words, demanding the aid of Belgium against France. Twelve hours were given for the reply, that is, until 7 a.m. of the following Monday morning. The Belgian Ministry met and discussed the position in the small hours of Monday, and somewhere about 4 o'clock returned a negative answer to the German demand. They determined to resist the violation of Belgian territory.

Upon Monday, August 3rd, therefore, the German troops crossed the frontier between Germany and Belgium; the troops

Plan B.



first effecting this violation of neutrality being those of the VIIth Germany Army Corps coming from the region of Aix-la-Chapelle. These troops were not nearly as numerous as has been represented. They could not have been fully mobilised troops, but only the covering troops of the region. The task set them was to force immediately the fortress of Liège.

Let me describe this task.

The fortress of Liège is a modern ring fortress: that is, it consists of an area roughly circular, about, or rather less than ten miles in diameter, protected by a ring of forts (twelve in number) surrounding the great industrial town of Liège. The River Meuse runs right through Liège and through the middle of the ring. One of the main railways of Europe runs through the same circle and leads from the chief German bases of supply in the North to the Belgian Plain; other railways also come in and effect their junction with this main line within the circle of the Forts. This ring of forts lies quite close to the German frontier—a day's march at the most away; at the nearest point, less than a day's march. Further, there is here but a very narrow passage between Liège and the neutral Dutch border round Maastricht. The Germans, though prepared to violate the neutrality of Belgium, were determined not to violate the neutrality of Holland for political reasons that have nothing to do with these notes. Therefore until the Liège ring of forts were in their hands: (1) They could only use road traffic to supply their advance into Belgium. (2) They could only use even road traffic over one very narrow belt, between the range of the Eastern forts of Liège and the Dutch border.


To the North of the Liège ring of forts, then, there was no entry into Belgium save by a very narrow gut between the extreme range of the forts and the Dutch frontier. Right across this gap of five miles or less was the obstacle of the Meuse, having but one bridge, that of Vise, a little town lying on the right bank of the Meuse, that is, the bank towards Germany. Upon the south side of Liège was difficult, high, and barren country consisting of upland woods and heaths through which the progress of supplies would be difficult, and further supplies coming that way would have to cross the Meuse higher up to reach the Belgian Plains. (See Plan A.)

Now it was the plan of the German General Staff—a plan which they had foolishly divulged to the whole world, as is their custom—to turn the whole of the French frontier from the North.

They designed to pursue the operation shown in Plan B.

The fortified French Frontier running from Verdun to Belfort they thought too strong to be forced. North of Verdun runs northward and eastward to the Channel the frontier between France and Belgium. The Germans proposed

PLAN 'C'



with a sufficient force to "hold" the French upon their fortified frontier between Verdun and Belfort. They proposed upon a line A—B to keep the French there in check. Meanwhile they proposed using the fortress of Metz (at M) as a pivot round which to swing great masses E—F upon their right, some through the difficult Ardennes country south of the Meuse, but the greater part through the Belgian Plain (north of the Meuse). They proposed to appear very early in the operations—in quite the first days of the war—over the unfortified Belgian frontier of France along the line G—H, and this operation, this swinging round of their forces, threatening to envelop the French by the French left flank, they proposed to execute according to the following necessary conditions:

(1) Since it is impossible to execute a flanking or enveloping movement unless you have superior numbers, and since the Germans had not superior numbers to the French, if the total of the national forces be considered, and trained men alone be counted, they proposed to have superior forces for the moment, and in that particular field, by mobilising secretly some days before the French, and by appearing suddenly upon the position E—F (a) before the French were gathered in their full numbers; (b) while the French were guarding their frontier along C—D; (c) with covering troops only, to be rapidly followed by their fully mobilised main army.

(2) This flanking movement pivoting upon the fortress of Metz and proceeding partly through the very difficult country of the Ardennes, mainly through the Belgian Plain (with its ample supplies, innumerable roads, easy open country, and exceptional mileage of railways and furniture of rolling stock), they would effect without any check or delay, because Belgium would be too weak to resist, and would allow them to violate her neutrality. As for the two great fortresses of Liège and Namur, they would, if defended, confuse the whole plan, but this discounted neutrality of Belgium forbade the idea that they would be defended.

(3) By the time the German flanking movement had got to the position E—F the direct march upon Paris was open to it. This threat would so frighten the French along their main positions upon the Eastern frontier at C—D that they would either disarrange all their previous plans and begin hurrying Northward to save Paris (and so leave themselves open to be also turned by the left wing of the Germans from the South along the arrow line (1)); or they would sacrifice Paris, in which case the flanking movement would close upon them, disturb their mobilisation before it was completed, and throw them into irrecoverable chaos; or at the least drive them southward and compel a surrender.

When it was perceived that the Belgians would, most unexpectedly, interfere with the plan by refusing condition 2, the order was given to rush the ring of forts at Liège.

We have seen that one school, especially favoured in Germany, believed that your ring fortress could always be broken by the rushing of particular forts. With a sufficient sacrifice of men and conducted upon a sufficient scale one fort at least, or two, could be swamped, and the ring would be broken. From the night of that Monday, August 3rd, until the afternoon of the Wednesday, August 5th, this bold attempt was made and continued—especially during the hours of darkness.

I desire to eliminate, as much as possible, from these comments all political considerations. But it is impossible not to pause in admiration of the military effort here made. Men in fairly close formation (the density has probably been exaggerated) sacrificed themselves in assault after assault upon that section of the ring which looks towards Germany. They were but the men of the covering troops of the Seventh German Army Corps; they cannot have been heavily supported. They had no siege artillery behind them as yet. The effort was hopeless because the theory was wrong; but the courage and the discipline presented to that task must have been quite exceptional.

In the mid-afternoon of this Wednesday, August 5th, the whole ring held as strongly as when it was first attacked. The Germans were, therefore, exactly forty-eight hours behind their time-table.

Upon the Thursday, August 6th, the forts were still holding out, but the covering troops of two more Army Corps had been brought up from the south and south-east against them, and either before or after darkness fell upon that day the insufficient garrison of Liège found it impossible at once to hold the forts and to cover all the intervals between them.

It must be remembered that Liège requires for its full defence 50,000 trained men, and that the Belgian service was largely composed of Militia, and could not send two-thirds of that number at so short a notice to the defence of the place. The holding of the intervals, therefore, broke down; and, though the forts were still intact, bodies of German troops penetrated in the darkness between those two forts which look to the south-east and towards the German frontier.

When the morning of Friday, August 7th, dawned, it was discovered that a considerable force of Germans had got into the ring, and were established in the town of Liège itself.

The situation was paradoxical. Liège in the military sense of that name had not fallen; Liège in the civilian sense had. The ring of forts, not one of which had been captured, could still prevent supplies passing through the roads and railways commanded by the forts. Therefore, no advance through the

PLAN 'D'



Belgian ring was any more possible than it had been before the German entry. Liège, the military fortress—which only means the ring of forts—still blocked the way. But Liège, the great industrial city, was held by German soldiers. So far as mere strategy was concerned, and apart from all moral effect, Liège the fortress was nearly as strong as ever. Nearly, but not quite, for the forts were now no longer co-ordinated by one central command, and it was now possible to assault them, each individually, upon every side.

On this day, Friday, August 7th, the German Commander asked for an armistice, partly, no doubt, for purposes of parley. It was refused.

On this same day, Friday, August 7th, appeared at the very other end of the field of war the first signs of a movement that was to have a profound effect (the future will show it) upon all succeeding operations.

The careful student of foreign affairs will remember how, fifteen years ago, in a famous trial at Rennes, there came out unexpectedly the fact that the French General Staff intended to adopt the offensive in Alsace.

Now on this Friday, August 7th, the small advance guard of the French—a brigade, to be accurate—with some cavalry and certain supports of artillery took, just before sunset, the town of Altkirch. Upon the next day, Saturday, August 8th, this little force, or at least the mounted portion of it, rode on into Mulhouse.

The effect of this raid (for it was no more) was to rouse the Alsatian people to the conception of their deliverance. It was (as so many things will be in this war) political rather than strategic; but, as we shall see in a moment, it was not done haphazard; there was strategy behind it.

On the next day, Sunday, August 9th, the Fourteenth Army Corps of the Germans, composed of the men of Baden, advanced against this daring French Brigade and against the division of which they formed a part and drove them out of Mulhouse again, but did not proceed so far as to recover Altkirch.

From that moment, let it be noted, the French troops had established themselves in the Southern extremity of the Alsatian Plain—that is, in the beginnings of a flanking movement against the extreme German left. They had done this (Plan C) upon the extreme Southern end of the 300-mile strategic front. They were to do more.

By Monday, August the 10th, the next day, it is time to turn to the other extremity of the long line of operations and to consider how the German Commanders proposed to treat the unexpected situation created on the Belgian Plains by the check they had received from the resistance of the forts at Liège.

It is now quite clear what they did. They could not, as they had originally intended, push forward great masses of men across the plains north of the Meuse. They did not yet command the railways by which alone they could supply those masses; but what they could at least do was to push forward cavalry with emergency rations and with orders to live as best they could upon the country. To send forward a cloud of cavalry thus was not a useless or merely theatrical operation; it protected the slower advance of the infantry, which could be made either when the Liège forts fell or whenever, more slowly, supplies could be pushed up by road over pontoon bridges thrown over the Meuse, down river and up river, out of reach of the Liège forts. This ill-provided but mobile body of cavalry, with a little artillery, machine guns, and a few supporting infantry, did as in Plan D.

It was on Monday, August 10th, along the line A-B in the Plan D. By Wednesday, August 12th it was along the line C-D, and was checked in a hot action in front of Haelen by the Belgians. Before the end of the week, that is, before Sunday, the 16th, it was already along the line E-F and menacing Brussels. Meanwhile, quite a large body of cavalry with considerable infantry supports had tried on Saturday to pass the Meuse at Dinant, and had failed before the French artillery defence at that point.

So far we heard nothing in this country of what was going on behind this successful Cavalry advance of the Germans, and we could not judge how much, if at all, the big masses of the Army were backing it up. Monday, the 17th, and Tuesday, the 18th, this screen of Cavalry pressed no further forward; apparently, therefore, it was waiting for the mass of troops which it was designed to shelter to come up—but that hypothesis I will discuss a little later. We leave the advanced German Cavalry with their few Infantry supports and their horse artillery and machine guns on this advance line upon Tuesday last, the 18th, and return to the southern extremity where the offensive was the other way and the French were proposing to push in the German left.


We have seen that on Sunday, August 9th, the French advance guard had been driven out of Mulhouse. But that week-end the French were making good their positions upon the crest and in the passes of the Vosges Mountains. Although we heard little about it in this country it was clear that, now their mobilisation was complete, the French in considerable force—perhaps altogether three Army Corps—meant to push against the German left in Alsace and to try and roll it up. They knew then, what we know now, that Germany had no equal forces to oppose to this push.

The fighting to secure the Passes of the Vosges (Saales, Ste. Marie, Bonhomme) went on for five days; the Passes were secured and the Valleys leading down on to the Alsatian Plain were held in force. It was the second step towards the turning of the German left, of which the reconnaissance upon Altkirch and Mulhouse before mobilisation was completed had been the first.

All the German commanders could do against superior forces in this Alsatian field of war they did. They could not stop the superior numbers of the French from pouring over the mountains on to the Plain of the Rhine; but they ordered the

considerable number of their troops which are round and in Metz to check the French advance by threatening its rear and by acting on the western side of the Vosges Mountains in the open Lorraine country.

Already upon Tuesday, August 11th, the Germans conducted a raid into France, about one day's march in extent, along the arrow marked (1) in the Plan "C," and the next day, and the day after that, another raid along the arrow marked (2). The first of these blows was directed towards Spincourt, the others towards La Garde and Blamont. If this German effort had been maintained and pushed further forward it is evident that



the French positions in the Vosges Mountains would have been untenable. They would have been threatened from the rear and would have had to retire out of Alsace. But the German effort could not be maintained. Both these raids were beaten back by the superior French forces in this region, and by Sunday, the 16th, the French securely held the frontier round Avricourt and thus protected the rear of their columns pushing over the Vosges.

On the next day, Monday, the 17th, the French had filled and completely held all the mountain valleys which lead down from the crests of the Vosges on to the Alsatian Plain. Upon Tuesday, the 18th, they achieved a stroke of capital importance. They got astraddle of the main railway line uniting Metz and Strassburg by occupying the town and region of Saarbours, and their general situation on this part of the front was as in Plan F.

It was now clear that a very strong French offensive upon the extreme left of the field of operations—that is, against the weak South of the German line—was seriously intended by the French. They were strongly posted just between the two great fortresses of Strassburg and Metz. They held, at Saarbours, the main railway junction of that line. They threatened to advance further north immediately, and to threaten all the southern communications of the German army. It was almost equally clear upon co-ordinating all the news relating to that Tuesday evening, the 18th, that at the other extremity of the field, upon the German right in the Belgian Plain, a serious, though belated offensive, was contemplated against the Franco-Belgian left.

(By this time the whole of the English Allied Force had been landed, and was presumably arrived at its allotted post).

If we pause to sum up the situation as it was revealed to be upon Tuesday night and Wednesday morning of this week in the telegrams which reached London upon the Wednesday evening, it runs as follows:—

The strategical front of the Germans upon which the whole of the operations had begun, and upon which at any moment


the first blows of the main shock might be felt, stretched in a long line, slightly convex towards the west and concave towards the East, from a point about 10 miles south and west of Brussels to Strasbourg: south of that town bodies of German troops occupied the Alsatian plain to a point 10 miles south and east of Mulhouse in Alsace. We had not exact information as to where this line ran across the Ardennes country between A. and B., but we can be pretty certain that it ran much as the dotted line does on plan K., because it would be folly to bend it too much forward in front of that line, and an equal weakness to leave it too far back. We come to certain knowledge of it again just south of Longwy, where there had been contact with the French troops, and again south of Metz, and in a line leading from south of Metz up round by the north of Saarbourg to points on the east side of the Vosges, where the mountain valleys open on to the plain of Alsace.

The Allies lie immediately in front of this line and presumably everywhere in contact with it, or were nearly in contact. The public information we have is sufficient to tell us that contact has actually been established on the Belgian plain (and that of course, for some days past), on the Meuse between Namur and the French frontier, in the open country between Longwy and Verdun, and, most important of all, right along a line stretching from just south of Metz to Mulhouse.

Now, such a situation as this obviously and necessarily connotes a few clear issues. Exactly where the German forces are chiefly massed—and where, therefore, the first German offensive will come—we can only guess. We can be certain that the main concentration is in the north of this prolonged line, because the south of it has already partly yielded.

The first thing we notice is that a *general* German offensive, which is too commonly taken for granted, is not yet the necessary result of the situation. It is true that everywhere from the Meuse, and along the Meuse, and down as far as Verdun at least (it would be more accurate to say as far as Toul), the French, up to this moment, are standing upon the defensive.

PLAN 'N.'



It seems to be no part of their plan to do anything but hold the enemy between those points and all along that line. But to the south of that line, along the whole field of the fortified frontier south of Toul, the French have evidently begun a vigorous offensive, and that offensive is no longer merely the work of covering troops—it is clearly the beginning of a movement in force.

Now, circumstances such as these may be resolved into a few simple elements.

(1) There is a northern field of operations, the extreme left of the allied line, the extreme right of the German. This field of operations is the densely populated and well provisioned Belgian plain north of the River Meuse and of the River Sambre.

(2) There is a centre, most of which runs through the barren, difficult, sparsely inhabited, and ill-supplied district of the Ardennes.

(3) There is a southern field of operations (the French right, the German left), which runs through well-populated, fertile, and provisioned land, from Southern Luxembourg to southern Alsace. But this southern field (the French right wing, the German left), is sub-divided into a northern portion next the centre, which is the basin of Lorraine, and a southern portion which is the plain of Alsace; between these two subdivisions lies the very difficult country of the Vosges. This difficult country does not separate the two portions of the southern part of the field into two entirely distinct portions, for the Vosges sink gradually as they go northward until they merge with the rolling country characteristic of Lorraine: but those mountains, the Vosges, are a sufficient obstacle wherever they correspond with the French frontier, to determine at once, when we have news of action in their neighbourhood, which of the two forces upon either side of them is acting upon the defensive.


Of these three fields of operations, which together make up the whole field of the war to the west of Germany, it is

certain that in the southern field and over nearly the whole extent of it (up to the point where that field is covered by the fortress of Metz) the French have massed so many men as to be able to deliver a vigorous offensive, which they intend to continue.

It is equally certain that there is not as yet in the southern field a German force sufficiently strong to meet this offensive and beat it back.

If, therefore, a German offensive is anywhere to be looked for, it must either be in the northern or in the central field.

In one of these—that is, either on the Belgian plains north of the lower Meuse or to the south of that river, an attack in



force must be delivered by the German armies if they are to escape disaster. And in this second alternative, the central attack, there are two possibilities. The concentration of the Germans to the north-centre, through the Ardennes. The concentration of the Germans to the south-centre near, and north of, Metz.

Well, in trying to determine whether the German plan would be to attack in strength towards the north, or to attack in strength upon one of the two regions of the centre, and, if so, which one, we are met by this very difficult dilemma.

On the one hand the original German plan was undoubtedly to deliver the first, and, as it was hoped, overwhelming offensive stroke by way of the extreme north, across the Belgian plain. They intended to be across the French frontier to the north of the Meuse in very considerable force, probably five, certainly over three, Army corps, before the French mobilization was even complete. All this has been described above. The turning columns of this great flanking movement should have been upon French soil between Lille and Mézières more than a week ago. We all know how that plan, the essential of which was its rapidity and surprise, was checked, delayed, and confused in its development through the defence of Liège. By the evening of Monday, August 17th, only the cavalry screen and its few supports had reached the line turning north of Namur.

But though there was delay, it did not follow that the plan should be abandoned. The turning movement was now too late to be executed as against an inferior foe. But when a General Staff has worked out all the plans for a main advance along one piece of country, it is extremely difficult for it to



change its line of advance, even though unforeseen accidents render the use of that line perilous.

To abandon your detailed plans, which had prepared one line of advance for the mass of your troops, and to compose another set of plans for another line, at high pressure and with the shortest possible delay, involves such a choice of results as we are continually meeting in everyday life.

Knowing what everyone knows of the Prussian character, the highly methodical, very stiff and inelastic work, immensely detailed and correspondingly strong and brittle, which is the Prussian tradition in these things, it seems impossible that a main line of advance, once determined upon, can be abandoned in the midst of the first great decisive effort.

From all this one would conclude that the chief blow against the French defensive is still intended to be delivered across the Belgian plains and on into the flat country of North-East France.

But it is here that the dilemma comes in, for while it is almost inconceivable that such a body of men as the Prussian General Staff would, or could, change a general plan before even the first main shock was delivered, it is almost equally impossible to see how that general plan can be maintained.

Consider first what evidence we have of its failure, and secondly, the sheer physical necessity of changing it, with which the enemy would appear to be confronted.

(a) As to evidence, we know that until Monday night or thereabouts all the advance through the Belgian plain had been the advance of a screen of cavalry. But here there was something abnormal—namely, no news of the presence of large bodies of troops other than cavalry, even for two or three days' march behind this screen.

Note that the news from the front in Belgium has been fairly full; perhaps a little too full. Note, what is more important than all in this connection, that, while time was essential to the operation, and rapidity its most necessary characteristic, you have a whole week occupied in the covering or pushing forward by little more than twenty miles of this fan of cavalry, and that when, as has occasionally happened, the points on the fan have been pushed back, no considerable supports have been discovered behind it.

(b). The other things we know which lead us to doubt, by surmise rather than by direct evidence, the continuation of the original plan, are: (1) The known fact that the forts at Liège were intact until at least the night of Wednesday, August 19th; (2) the fact that the forts of Liège command the junction of the main railways by which supplies could reach a large body in the Belgian plain north of the Meuse; (3) that to supply that body from the south of the Meuse across temporary bridges and across the bridge of Huy (which appears to be in German hands) would seem impossible without a good line of railway to depend upon.

The Meuse between Liège and Namur in the Plan I, with its single permanent bridge at Huy, with a gap of less than 20 miles between the furthest point dominated by the western forts of Liège and the furthest point dominated by the eastern forts of Liège, is a considerable obstacle to supply even when such supply is not opposed. Supply could not come by the main railway, which is seen marked running along the left or northern bank of the Meuse, because that railway is commanded by the forts of Liège. Were there a railway running along the southern bank, or near it, and then leading to the German bases of supply, out of range of the forts of Liège to the south (as along the imaginary dotted line A—B), then certainly three, possibly five, Army Corps could have been kept supplied, though they were to the north of the river. For short road journeys across the bridge at Huy and across the other temporary bridges (as at O, P, Q, etc.) would have put little strain upon the organisation of that supply. But there is no such railway.

Further, the whole of this country, the Ardennes, which stretches south of the Meuse, has its communications running along deep valleys and precipitous ravines which lie north and south; traverse communication east and west, even by road, is difficult and slow.

The alternative line of supply for any considerable body of invaders upon the Belgian plain would lie, of course, by the main line running through Liège and following the left or northern bank of the Meuse. This main line directly taps the German bases of supply in the Rhine Valley, has ample accommodation (being one of the great European arteries) and is in every way fitted for the operation.

There is no doubt at all that the use of this line was at once essential to the plan of the German General Staff, and taken for granted by that Staff. There is hardly less doubt that any proper forwarding of supply on to the Belgian plain from the bases in the Rhine Valley, until that line is clear, will be impossible.

Here, then, you have the crux in guessing whether or no the main German effort could still be made over the Belgian plain to the north of the river. On the one hand, it is almost impossible to change your general line of advance; on the other hand, it seems equally impossible to maintain under existing conditions the supply necessary to such an advance. But, sum up everything, especially considering the known existing concentration to the north and the bad conditions of the centre, and one can but believe that, against fearful odds, the original Prussian plan will still be finally attempted, and the effort to break through made over the Belgian plain, the northern field.

In the central field there is a fairly broad avenue of operations in the southern half from before the fortress of Metz up to and beyond Longwy. The country, though hilly, is full of good roads, well populated, and served by great main lines. In

the north of the central field, in the Ardennes from Namur to Longwy, the country is difficult, ravined, wooded, ill-provided with transverse roads and railways. It would seem, therefore, that if the blow is to be delivered in the central field, the main German mass must be organised to strike in the southern part of that field.

It is true that in the case of the Belgian attempt the march would present a flank to the fortress of Namur; but Verdun has to the south of it a fortified line running all the way to Toul, generally known as the *Côte de Meuse* (which I have indicated in the sketch by little crosses), and behind this there is room for a rapid French concentration northward against and upon the flank of anyone attempting to break through above Verdun. There is no such line running south from Namur, only the natural strength of the difficult Ardennes country.

One may sum up the elements of the whole situation as it appeared in the news of yesterday—that is, as it was in the field upon Wednesday, by the use of the accompanying diagram:

There is a strategical front consisting in three main sections which lie slightly convex and facing the west: the three main sections, A B to the north, C D in the centre, and E F to the south. A B is the body in the Belgian plain, C D, the body between the Meuse and the Moselle, E—F, the body between the Moselle and the Rhine.

Of these, the central portion C—D naturally subdivides itself into two, a portion C Q corresponding to the difficult Ardennes country, and a portion Q D corresponding to the easier Lorraine and southern Luxembourg country; while the southern section E—F is again naturally subdivided into that part which lies in the Lorraine basin E R, and that part which lies in the mountains and the plain of Alsace R—F.

In front of this line you have the corresponding line of the French and their Allies, G—H, marked black. [See Plan O]. Somewhere behind the German Line from A to well past E, but not quite as far as F, there is concentrated a force larger than elsewhere, whose business it is to strike such a blow on G—H as will break that line. It may be at S, in the Belgian plain; it may be at T, in the Ardennes; it may be at U, in southern Luxembourg and northern Lorraine. It is certainly not further down, nor anywhere between U and the Rhine.

The chances of its being at S, depend upon the difficulty of abandoning an original plan, for at S, the concentration was undoubtedly originally intended, and the blow to be struck along the arrow marked (1); but against this is the difficulty of keeping supplied across the Meuse and the impossibility of providing it through Liège until the forts of Liège are taken. The chances of its being behind T, depend upon the fact that in front of T, there is no fortified line; it is an open gap. But, on the other hand, such a blow along arrow (2) would have to be given *against* naturally strong defensive positions, and to be delivered *from* badly supplied and badly communicated country. The chances of its being at U, and of the blow being delivered along the arrow marked (3), depends upon the good communications and the ease of advance in this direction, but they have against them the fact that such a blow would have to be struck with the fortress of Verdun on its flank and beyond Verdun the wall of forts from Verdun to Toul, behind which the French masses could come up securely.

Now at one of those three points at least a German mass must break through if the whole German forces are to escape disaster, for to the south they are already being pressed back by a turning movement of the French vigorously pursued across the Vosges along the line of the arrow (4). If the centre and the north of the German line can be held by the French while this turning of the weak German south succeeds, the general communications of the whole German forces across the Rhine would be daily more and more imperilled, and the German armies would at last be compelled to abandon all attempt at breaking through the line before them upon the north; they would have to mass southward against this French advance in force from Alsace-Lorraine, and to fight it with the risk, if they were pushed back on their left, of finding their communications with their bases of supply to the east imperilled.

To sum up, what seems the chance of the immediate future is an attempt to break the allied line north of the Meuse-Saône line and across the Belgian plain. If it succeeds, the pressure on the German armies from the south will at once cease and all French effort will be concentrated to save the north. If it fails, the French advance on the German left flank from Alsace-Lorraine will decide the campaign.

That conjecture, at least, seems to repose on better grounds than any other: but a mere conjecture it remains until we have news of the main German advance to decide our judgment.

It need hardly be added that if this main German attack is delivered, as I have presumed, through Belgium, then how many men, and what men, may be in Antwerp on its flank will be one decisive factor in the result.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

IT is now possible to discover with some reasonable accuracy what were the German plans for the naval side of the war—plans which have been hopelessly wrecked in the Mediterranean by Italy's refusal to co-operate with the Austrians. The scheme there was that the combined Italian and Austrian Fleets, reinforced by the *Goeben*, should move against the French, the bulk of whose fleet is based on Toulon.

A glance at the map (in this and in all other diagrams the sizes of the squares correspond to the approximate fighting value of the various squadrons) will show that half the Mediterranean would at once have been behind the allies, and the French in marked inferiority.

Taking the unit of the original Dreadnought as worth 10, the approximate relative figures of the available Mediterranean forces—ships available for fleet action—under the German plan were as follows:

Italy	90	France	130
Austria	70	British	43
German	9		
	169		173

This gives a slight superiority to the Triple Entente, but it has to be remembered that in the first place Germany expected us to remain neutral, and, in the second place, it involved that our Mediterranean ships would immediately return to Home waters. Never for one moment did Germany imagine that our Mediterranean Squadron was anything but a temporary bluff. The *Goeben* was detached to the Mediterranean and kept there in that sure and certain hope.

What Germany planned for was	169 to 180
What she actually had was	79 to 173

Which explains why the *Goeben* ran for the safety of the Dardanelles directly she had secured such mild glory as was to be obtained by the bombardment of an inoffensive and innocuous Algerian town. The programme arranged for her was the capture of prizes, what time Italy and Austria did the work required to bottle up the French in Toulon and Bizerta. However, as Admiral Wiren said about the last days at Port Arthur, "Things did not come off quite as expected."

All the same, however, the *Goeben* could easily have fought with the certainty of taking a British battle cruiser to the bottom with her. Her tactics were not "blue water school" but "blue funk school," and the moral effect on the German

Navy is likely to be serious. For the *Goeben* was the show ship of the German Navy. Everything in her was "for war." In her, for at least eighteen months was demonstrated the difference between the "inefficient British Navy" and the "business-like efficiency of the German Fleet." It was the stock subject; and it was so realistic that all of us who saw her thoroughly believed the latter. As for the German Navy, it swallowed both the ideas *in toto*. It was taught to despise in a quiet way the British Navy. This was not arrogance but carefully calculated policy.

And—the *Goeben* did what, had she been a British warship, her captain would have been shot for! Rank cowardice is the only explanation of her captain's action, despite all the allowances we can make for the upsetting of everything by the discovery that Italy declined to sacrifice herself for the War Lord's dream of "Der Tagg." Or if not rank cowardice, ordinary common sense—which in war comes to about the same thing!

I have devoted a good deal of space to this matter of the *Goeben*—more space than it may seem to warrant. But, personally, I believe that it is the real Trafalgar of the War. Big battles we may have, and if so they will make headlines beside which the story of the runaway *Goeben* will appear quite a trivial side issue. Very likely. The war will very possibly be long and strenuous as generally supposed, but the star of the German Navy set for ever what time the *Goeben* turned and fled for the safety of the Dardanelles.

Years ago the experts used to write that the history of the world would be settled in the Mediterranean. For the last ten years we have laughed at that. And now, in an utterly unexpected way, Time has proved them right. The crack ship of the German Navy in the Mediterranean funk'd the British cruisers. The moral effect of this is bound to be absolutely unlimitable. Whether the *Goeben* becomes the Turkish *Mitylene*, whether she remains interned, whether presently she comes out again, matters nothing. The Chino-Japanese War result was settled when the *Tche Yuen* ran away from Captain Togo of the *Naniwa* at Asan. Yalu was merely a sequel. And so the flight of the *Goeben* has settled the result of future battles.

That the French should have penetrated the Adriatic at the earliest possible moment was, of course, obvious; but that they should have done so so quickly augurs well for their efficiency. A month or two ago any home prophet would have described it as highly improbable. The fact, however, is that



SITUATION IN THE BALTIC AT THE START OF THE WAR.

For obvious reasons the position of the British Fleet is not shown. Proportionate sizes of the Fleet are uniform, as in the other maps.

the French Fleet just at the present time is extremely efficient—another of those points which the Germans have overlooked. The French *camaraderie* between officers and men has been described by competent independent witnesses as “beyond belief.” Little wonder, therefore, that no boggling occurred in the rush for the Adriatic, though we may accept stories of naval battles with judicious scepticism.

Austria had nothing out except some small cruisers operating against Montenegro, and the circumstance that the *Aspern* was sunk merely goes to indicate that the French arrived before they were expected.

calculations). Against these the Second Squadron and Reserve Squadron, value 56, appear to have been sent. This Second Squadron consists of pre-Dreadnoughts, of no immediate value in the North Sea. It was possibly reinforced by some Dreadnoughts sent through the Kiel Canal; indeed, there is some reason to suspect that the bulk of the German Fleet is at present based on Kiel and not at Wilhelmshaven.

The reported battle and defeat of the Russian Baltic Squadron lacks confirmation. It is doubtful whether the ships have left Libau, as there would be no object in facing certain defeat, and Russia has everything to gain by delay, because one,



DIAGRAM SHOWING THE CONDITION OF THINGS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AS CALCULATED IN THE GERMAN WAR PLAN.

The tinted section shows the anticipated bases of attack.

Austria had nothing to gain by risking her battle fleet against heavy odds—here as everywhere else in the war there is a species of stale-mate with battle fleets. Nowhere do they face each other in anything like equal strength—everywhere the moral effect of the larger force paralyses the lesser.

It is improbable that the French will go any considerable distance up the Adriatic. To keep the Austrians in ensures the safety of all Mediterranean trade; to attempt a close blockade would be to run serious risk of torpedo attack without any prospect of gain worth the adventure. As things are, if too much pressure is felt, torpedo attacks are likely to be attempted,

if not two, of her new Dreadnoughts are very shortly to be available as a reinforcement. Meanwhile the Baltic must be a German lake, with the Russian trade more or less completely stopped and German trade probably proceeding without hindrance.

Once the Russians can utilise two of their new Dreadnoughts their approximate fighting strength would be 55, and a move against the Germans may be expected. Such a move would have a most useful effect, not only from the consequent weakening of the main German Fleet in order to reinforce their division in the Baltic, but also in its demands upon the German



THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS GERMANY FOUND IT.

The tinted section shows the Triple Alliance actual bases. The course of the ignominious flight of The Pride of the German Fleet is shown in a dotted line. For such conduct a British Officer would have been court-martialled and shot.

since, though the Austrians have only eighteen destroyers, they are known to be extremely efficient.

But it is even chances whether Austria will not presently change sides. Of the sentiment in her army I cannot speak with authority, but I do know that the feeling in her navy is distinctly pro-British. The close friendship between the British and Austrian navies is a very long-standing affair indeed, and it may be taken as certain that Austria will not throw away anything that she can avoid against the British Navy in order to satisfy the German Kaiser in his rôle of War Lord.

Turning to nearer home we come first of all to the Baltic.

The total Russian force has an utmost paper value of 33 (here as elsewhere I am using the figures used in German official

destroyer flotilla. This flotilla consists of about 150 boats, and something like one-third of this force would have to be withdrawn from the North Sea in order to meet the Russian advance.

Indeed, as Russia has some eighty destroyers, the demand might well be heavier. It will thus be seen that the main German Fleet is not in a position to operate against us at anything like full strength, and it is by no means improbable that the bulk of the fleet will be used against the Russians in the Baltic, because it is there that the “greatest danger” threatens. There is nothing to entice the German Dreadnoughts into major operations in the North Sea, as nothing short of a decisive victory over the British Fleet could materially affect the situa-

tion. Rather, we may look for a continuance of the present state of affairs. The German policy is clearly to attempt to weaken the British force by submarine attack and by mines.

How far the Germans have gone in for indiscriminate mine-laying we have no means of ascertaining, though personally I do not think they did anything of the sort. The mines which sank the *Amphion* were laid under the impression that the British Expeditionary Force would sail from the Thames Estuary or Harwich. It is not desirable to say anything about the transport of that force, except that the German calculations concerning it were not successful.

The war has already been a war of surprises, and chief among these is the extremely small inconvenience caused to British merchant shipping. It is reasonable to expect that such commerce-destroyers as Germany may have on the high seas will automatically die a natural death from want of coal unless they are allowed to supply themselves by the "coal sufficient to reach the nearest German harbour" subterfuge. Even so, their power for mischief has apparently been greatly exaggerated in the past. We most of us seemed to have failed to realise how very rigid the trade routes are. To do any mischief at all a privateer must get on the trade route, where she is sure to meet cruisers looking for her—cruisers in wireless communication with the proposed victims of the corsair.

The capture of a merchant ship is an operation requiring time for its performance—time enough for a defending cruiser to come up, if anywhere near. In addition, there is the problem as to what is to be done with prizes when captured, owing to the virtual impossibility of getting them into a German harbour.

Many people have anticipated that the German battle cruisers will sooner or later attempt to rush for the trade routes. Of course, they may do it; but, if so, they will be very ill-advised, and there will not be the least occasion for the public to be perturbed. It is moderately certain that, if they do manage to get out, they will never get back again; and even getting out is not likely to be easy.

The general indications are that for the present the War on the water will continue uneventfully until circumstances force the Kaiser to send his entire fleet to sea as a forlorn hope, in much the same way that circumstances more or less compelled Napoleon to order Villeneuve to leave harbour in the Trafalgar campaign.

The official German war plan, however, is for the fleet to remain safe behind the impregnable fortifications which stud the whole of the German coast in hopes that the British battleships will come off the coast and allow themselves to be thinned down by submarine and destroyer attacks.

If and when the rush does come, it is more likely to be via the Channel than in the more obvious Scapa Flow direction. It would be a rush of desperation with the object of doing as much damage as possible. However, it is inadvisable to speculate in details.

DIARY OF THE WEEK

DAY BY DAY.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 14th.

The French War Ministry officially announced that the French troops which entered Belgium by Charleroi are in touch with the Belgian Army.

The situation at Liège remained the same, all the forts were intact, and the troops in excellent spirits.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies was informed by the Governor of Nyasaland that on Thursday morning the Nyasaland Government armed steamer *Guendolen* seized the German Government armed steamer *Von Wissmann* at Sphinx Haven on the eastern shore of Lake Nyasa. The guns and engines were removed from the *Von Wissmann* and her crew taken prisoners.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 15th.

The Tsar addressed to the Polish populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria a proclamation promising to restore to Poland her territorial integrity with complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and the use of the Polish language. A great battle took place in and around Dinant, on the river Meuse. The action lasted from six in the morning till six in the evening, when the Germans had been driven about nine miles south to a point between Givet and Rochefort. All the forts at Liège reported to be still intact.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 16th.

Ultimatum delivered by Japan to Germany demanding the withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East and to deliver on a date not later than September 15th to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition

or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. Germany given till noon on Sunday next to send her reply. The Japanese ultimatum to Germany was regarded in America as the gravest development of the war. Viscount Chinda, the Japanese Ambassador, informed the United States Government that every American neutral interest would be safeguarded. Japan's promise to restore Kiaochau to China regarded by the United States as satisfactory.

MONDAY, AUGUST 17th.

The Press Bureau announced that the Expeditionary Force, as detailed for foreign service, has been safely landed on French soil. The embarkation, transportation, and disembarkation of men and stores were alike carried through with the greatest possible precision and without a single casualty. Mr. F. E. Smith, who made this announcement, stated, "Lord Kitchener wishes me to add that he and the country are under the greatest obligation to the Press for the loyalty with which all references to the movements of the Expeditionary Force in this country and on their landing have been suppressed."

Lieutenant-General Sir James Grierson died while travelling in the train. General Grierson had been designated to command the Third Corps of the Expeditionary Force. By his death the Army has lost one of its best leaders. General Grierson was fifty-five years of age, and joined the Royal Artillery in 1877. In 1914 he was appointed Director of Military Operations at the War Office, and afterwards commanded the First Division at Aldershot. In recent years he had greatly distinguished himself at manœuvres. He was a brilliant linguist, and was a qualified interpreter in French, German, Russian, and Spanish.

The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp, and adequate measures taken to assure the defence of Brussels and to protect it from a surprise attack.

The Press Bureau announced that the French troops, in the course of a rapid advance along the Valley of Schirmeck, secured a thousand prisoners.

The French Fleet in the Mediterranean made a sweep up the Adriatic as far as Cattaro, and a small Austrian cruiser of the *Aspern* type was fired on and sunk.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 18th.

It was announced that the King had approved the appointment of General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien to command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in succession to the late General Grierson.

The Press Bureau issued the following statement: "Some desultory fighting has taken place during the day between the British patrolling squadrons and flotillas and German reconnoitring cruisers. No losses are reported or claimed. A certain liveliness is apparent in the Southern area of the North Sea."

The French captured the greater part of the Valleys of the Vosges on the slopes of Alsace, from which the French Army will soon reach the plain.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19th.

Reported that the Germans had entered Tirlemont early on Tuesday afternoon, and that a fierce battle was taking place between the Belgian and German troops along an extended front.

From official sources in Berlin came the news that Germany will not consent to evacuate Kiaochau, or to agree to Japan's other demands. The capture of Kiaochau, it was declared, would have no more effect on the war than the taking of Togoland.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 20th.

Reported that the Servians had gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near Shabatz. Three Austrian regiments were practically wiped out.

The Russian forces came into collision with First German Army Corps near Stallu-Pönen, defeating the enemy and capturing eight guns, twelve caissons, and two maxims.

Despatches received suggest that the German advance in Belgium, North of the Meuse, has begun. The Liège forts still hold out. An official statement was received from Brussels to the effect that severe fighting had begun along the whole front from Bale to Diest. Latest despatches announced the evacuation of Mechlin by the Allied troops on the Belgian fighting front, and a threatened attack on Brussels by the German forces. In the eastern war area the Russian Army was reported to have vigorously assumed the offensive.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Aerschot.—A village midway between Louvain and Diest, on the main road connecting these two points.

Antivari or Bar.—So called from its position opposite the Italian Bari, is a town eighteen miles north-west from Scutari, near the Adriatic coast, and surrounded by dense forests of olive trees. The population is mainly Albanian, and amounts to about 1,600. The harbour will accommodate only vessels of light draught, but is well-protected. Antivari is about twenty miles distant from the Austrian frontier, and forms the most important harbour on the Montenegrin coast.

Belgrade.—Capital of Servia, with a population of over 60,000, is the most important town in Servia, and one of the most important in the Balkan peninsula. It is situated at the confluence of the great rivers Save and Danube, on a triangular ridge, of which the southern side slopes up by way of the Avala Hill to the Shumadiya mountains of central Servia. At the northern end of the city, on a chalk ridge 200 feet above the river level, is situated the citadel, and just opposite this the Hungarian town of Zimony stands on the other bank of the Danube. The position of Belgrade has always been considered one of great strategical importance, more especially as regards an advance against Hungarian territory. It is not of such great importance for an advance from Hungary to Servia, as its garrison can fall back on the hills toward which the city slopes from the river, and thus can command a succession of strong positions. From Roman times onward the citadel of Belgrade has been garrisoned, and, previous to the Servian Government's authority, it was held by a Turkish garrison. Belgrade is said to have known more battles under its walls than any other fortress in Europe. It was delivered to the Servians by Turkey in 1866.

Brussels.—The capital of Belgium and of the Belgian province of Brabant, lies in the valley of the river Senne, which river, flowing through the city, is enclosed by an immense arch. In old times Brussels was strongly fortified, but at the present time it has little in the way of artificial defences; its chief military station is the suburb of Etterbeek, where is accommodation for a large force of cavalry and artillery, together with a military school and shooting ground. The Charleroi and Willebroeck canals meet in Brussels, and railway lines radiate from the city to Ostend, Antwerp, Amsterdam, Bale, Paris, Lille, and, in times of peace, to Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. The population of the communes comprised in the Government of Brussels is well over half a million.

Cattaro.—Capital of the Government of the same name in Dalmatia, on the Austrian Adriatic coast. It is situated at the head of a winding gulf, of which the shores are hilly and strongly fortified. The garrison of Cattaro in normal times is about 1,500 men, and the total population of the town is about 6,000, mainly Slav, with a German minority. Cattaro lies quite near the Montenegrin frontier, and, although well protected against attack from the sea by its system of forts, is liable to attack from superior heights on the Montenegrin side of the border, whence such fire can be brought to bear on the town and garrison as to make the position practically untenable. It is connected by road with Cetinje, the capital of Montenegro, and by steamer service with Trieste.

Chateau Salins.—A small town on the river Seille, in German Lorraine, twenty-five miles south-east from Metz. It is a railway junction for the Metz, Nancy, and Saargemund lines of railway, and takes its name from a salt works in the neighbourhood.

Chaudfontaine.—The fort of Chaudfontaine forms one of the most important points in the defence of Liège from the south-east. The village of the same name, in the vicinity of the fort, is situated on the Liège-Verviers line of rail, at about six miles distance from Liège.

Colmar.—A German town in the territory of Alsace-Lorraine, forty miles south south-west from Strasbourg by the Strasbourg-Bale line of rail. It is an important centre of trade for upper Alsace, and has a population upwards of 40,000. It is connected by rail with Mulhausen, Strasbourg, Halstatt, Münster, and Freiberg, and forms an important junction of the strategic railways of the German frontier system.

Corroy Le Grand.—A village of the province of Brabant, about five miles south-east of the forts of Wavre.

Delle.—A frontier town in French Alsace, situated on the railway from Belfort to St. Ursanne. Although situated on the Swiss frontier, Delle is the point of junction for two main roads from German Alsace.

Diest.—A fortified town in the Belgian province of Brabant, thirty-eight miles south-east of Antwerp, with which it is connected by rail, on the Antwerp-Maastricht line. Also connected by rail with Brussels *via* Louvain. The population is over 8,000, and the fortifications are of only secondary importance.

Eydtkuhnen.—The German frontier station on the line of rail from Königsberg in Germany to Vilna in Western Russia. The corresponding station on the Russian side of the frontier is Wirballen.

Hasselt.—The capital of the Belgian province of Limburg, forty-seven miles east of Brussels, and at an important junction of railway lines by which it is connected with Dutch and Belgian centres. The population is about 15,000. Hasselt is situated in wooded hilly country about midway between Diest and Maastricht on the Dutch frontier.

Huy.—A town about midway between Liège and Namur, on the river Meuse and the Liège-Namur railway. Its principal industries are the extraction of coal and the manufacture of firearms, and it is a centre of considerable importance, standing in wooded, hilly country.

Kiao-Chau.—This important Chinese port was seized in November, 1897, by the German Fleet, nominally in reparation for the murder by the Chinese of two German missionaries in the province of Shantung. The result was the leasing by the Chinese of the port and 117 square miles of territory on either side to Germany for a period of ninety-nine years, together with a further protected area. Large sums have been spent by Germany in the construction of a breakwater and the dredging of the harbour, and, since the expulsion of the Russians from Port Arthur, China and Japan have viewed with disapproval the existence of a fortified German port on the Chinese coast. The terms of the Japanese ultimatum of the 17th inst. provide for the delivery, "on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial Japanese Government, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China."

Kiel Canal.—Known also as the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, is fifty-one miles in length, and connects the mouth of the Elbe with Kiel Bay at the western extremity of the Baltic. It is so constructed that vessels of the largest size can maintain a speed of ten miles an hour throughout its entire length, and is so defended that it is absolutely unassailable from the sea at either end. The object of its construction was to double the fighting value of the German Navy, for any attacking fleet would have to maintain a blockade at the western end of the canal, and also would have to blockade the entrance to the Baltic, north of Denmark, in order to confine the German Fleet from the North Sea, while a third naval force would be necessary to prevent the German Fleet from taking action in the Baltic itself. The canal traverses the province of Holstein from west to east, and at its eastern end is situated the naval base of Kiel, on Kiel harbour, where sufficient accommodation is available for the whole of the German Fleet. There is no doubt that the canal, which was finished only a few months ago, adds enormously to the striking value of the German Navy, but it is generally considered, with the short experience afforded of its usefulness by the present war, that its value has been rather overrated.

Liège.—Situated at the confluence of the Meuse and the Ourthe, Liège is one of the principal Belgian centres of industry, being engaged largely in the production of coal and the manufacture of small arms, of which latter it produces more than a million pieces annually. Metal-smelting, tools, electrical machines, and railway material are also important products, while Liège is the centre of several important industrial localities. The principal lines of communication are the Meuse and a canal which runs from Liège to Maastricht, while the railways run to Namur, Brussels, Hasselt, and Limbourg, to Maastricht, and to

Aix-la-Chapelle—the last-named line has been destroyed since the outbreak of the war. The Meuse, which flows through the city, is upwards of 500 feet wide at this point, and is spanned by six bridges. The population of the city is about 200,000. The ring of forts which surrounds the city, although constructed in the latter half of last century, is of great strength, and provided with thoroughly up-to-date armament. In historic times Liège has already undergone six sieges; one of these was conducted by the English Marlborough in 1702, when the citadel was taken by storm from the French garrison; in 1792 the French inflicted heavy defeat on the Austrians here. The fort of the Chartreuse and the "Citadel" command the town effectively from both banks of the river, and these, together with the remaining forts of the ring that encircles the town, render this one of the strongest positions in Western Europe.

Longuyon—An important railway junction in the extreme north of the department of Meurthe et Moselle. The Mezieres-Thionville and Luxembourg-Nancy lines cross here. It is about twelve miles from the German frontier.

Longwy—A fortified town in the arrondissement of Briey, department of Meurthe et Moselle, sixty-three miles west-north-west of Nancy, and situated on a plateau commanding the Chiers, a tributary of the Meuse, and also commanding the Luxembourg road. The fortress is about 400 feet above the level of the surrounding country, and is strengthened by outlying fortifications. In times of peace the garrison is maintained at a strength of about 5,000, of which about one-fifth are cavalry. The present population is about 10,000, and the chief industries are iron and steel mining and smelting. The town is situated on the railway line from Longuyon to Arlon, and for the past 300 years has been a fortified centre.

Louvain—An important manufacturing town twenty-eight miles east of Brussels, in the Belgian province of Brabant. It is connected by rail with Brussels, Liège, and Malines, and other important centres, and has a population of nearly 50,000. The town is laid out in rectangular fashion, and is traversed by the small river Dyle. Its town hall is considered one of the finest specimens of architectural art on the Continent.

Luxembourg—The Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg is a neutral and independent State, bounded east and north-east by Prussia, south by Alsace-Lorraine, and west by the Belgian province of Luxembourg. It is governed by a hereditary grand duke and a House of Representatives consisting of forty-five members, and the total population of the duchy is about 250,000. The State possesses valuable iron mines, and is traversed by about 300 miles of railways. It consists for the most part of wooded, hilly country, especially in the Ardennes or western region, and from a strategic point of view is exceedingly difficult country. As a state whose neutrality has been guaranteed, Luxembourg possesses no important fortifications.

Maestricht or Maastricht—The capital of the Dutch province of Limburg, situated nineteen miles by rail north-north-east of Liège on the Dutch State railway from Maastricht to Aken. The population of the town is about 40,000, and its chief trade is in paper and firearms. It is built round the junction of the Geer and Maas rivers, and is practically on the border between Belgium and Holland.

Messina—The city of Messina, which was destroyed by the most disastrous earthquake of modern times, was a strongly fortified and flourishing city at the north-east corner of the island of Sicily, with an excellent harbour opening on the Straits of Messina. These straits, in which the *Goeben* and *Breslau* sheltered for a time from the British and French fleets, are waters neutral to Italy, and are under five miles in width between the Sicilian coast and the mainland of Italy. The straits run in a north to south direction, from Reggio, on the Italian mainland, to Point di Faro, at the extreme eastern corner of Sicily.

Metz—A first-class fortress guarding the German frontier in Lorraine, of which it is the German capital. It is situated on the river Moselle, ninety-nine miles north-west of Strasbourg by rail, and 10½ miles east from the French frontier. The principal fortifications consist of a ring of modern forts, encircling the town at a distance of from two to three miles from it, and the garrison, made up of Bavarians, Prussians, and Saxons, is about 22,000 in times of peace—a number that would be enormously augmented on a war footing. The population of the town is about 60,000, and its industries are of little importance. It shares with Strasbourg the distinction of being the most important German fortified station on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier.

Mulhausen—A German town in the Upper Alsace district, twenty-one miles north-west from Bâle and the Swiss border by rail. It has a population of about 90,000, and ranks

as the centre of the cotton industry of Alsace. Its importance as a railway junction is considerable, and it is connected by rail with Bâle, Thann, Belfort, Colmar, and Strasbourg, and Mulheim and Freiburg.

Munster—A town of German Upper Alsace, sixteen miles west-south-west of Colmar by rail, and at the foot of the Vosges mountains. Its population is about 6,500.

Namur—Capital of the Belgian province of the same name, thirty-seven miles south-east of Brussels, with which it is connected by rail. It is situated in wooded and mountainous country, on the left bank of the river Meuse, and is connected by rail with Liège, Paris, Rheims, and Luxembourg, as well as with Brussels. The population is about 35,000, and the town is defended by fortifications on the surrounding heights. It is even more strongly protected than Liège, and is well garrisoned and difficult to invest, on account of the nature of the surrounding country.

Nish—The second most important town in Serbia, situated on the left bank of the Nishava, a tributary of the river Morava. It forms a junction for the important roads of the Balkan Peninsula, and is the point at which the Vienna-Constantinople and Vienna-Salonica railway lines divide. The hills surrounding the town are fortified by earthworks, and Nish is always the seat of a strong garrison, being considered of great strategical importance. It is one of the most prosperous towns in Serbia, and has a population of nearly 23,000.

Novo Radomsk—A railway station in Russian Poland, on the Warsaw-Tchenstochow line, about thirty-five miles from the German frontier.

Pola—The chief naval base and arsenal of Austria-Hungary, situated near the southern point of the peninsula of Istria, on the Gulf of Venice. From the village of Fasana, which overlooks the Fasana Channel, to the Brionian Islands, a system of fortifications protects the harbour and port of Pola, which is in normal times occupied by a garrison of about 8,000 men. The total population is about 45,000. Pola forms the southern terminus of a railway extending from Trieste, with a branch to Rovigno, a small port on the Istrian Peninsula.

Rechicourt—Village and railway station on the Luneville-Saarbourg line of rail. It is situated just on the German side of the frontier.

Saarburg—A manufacturing town in German Lorraine, about twelve miles from the French frontier. The population is about 4,000.

Sanna—A river flowing to the Vistula from the east and forming the extreme northern boundary between Austrian and Russian Poland. The actual frontier line includes the north bank of the river, which is also known as the "San."

Sieradz—A station on the Warsaw-Kalisch line of rail, situated in Russian Poland about twenty-two miles from the German frontier.

Sopshider—A strong mountain position on the bank of the river Save, in Serbia, about ten miles south from Belgrade.

Tirlemont—A village about ten miles east of Brussels on the main road to Liège, and directly north of Namur.

Verdun—A town and first-class fortress in the department of the Meuse, France, situated at the junction of the Sedan-Toul and Rheims-Confians railway lines. The detached forts surrounding Verdun form a circle of about twenty-five miles circumference, and are placed both on the right and left banks of the Meuse, and connected by defence works with the forts of Toul. Verdun ranks as the most strongly defended town of eastern France, and has a civilian population of about 14,000.

Vosges—A department of France on the eastern frontier, adjoining Upper and Lower Alsace of Germany, traversed by the rivers Meurthe and Moselle, and bounded on the east by the Vosges Mountains, which form the frontier line between France and Germany practically from the Swiss border in the south to the latitude of Strasbourg in the north, where they bend north-eastward into the territory of Lorraine and the Bavarian Palatinate. Forming as they do a natural frontier line, the Vosges crests are of great strategic importance, and occupation of them is absolutely necessary to a force desiring to dominate either the department of Vosges on the west or the territory of Alsace-Lorraine on the east.

Waremme—The first point of importance westward from Liège on the Liège-Louvain road. Situated about ten miles west of Liège, on the railway from Liège to Antwerp and Brussels.

Wavre—An important fortified point on the road between Antwerp and Brussels, about ten miles south of Antwerp. It is situated slightly to the east of the main line connecting the two cities, and its two forts form protection for the important town of Mechlin against an advance from the north.



THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE NEWS with which the English public is confronted this week from the seat of war is at once exceedingly serious and largely indeterminate, at least it is undetermined at the moment of writing.

It is serious because it clearly points to a reversal all along the line of the plans formed by the Allies. Against the French offensive in Alsace-Lorraine to the south, a German counter-offensive has succeeded. In the north, against the German offensive, the counter-offensive of the Allies has failed.


Such news, in spite of its gravity, remains indeterminate, because there has not (Thursday noon) yet reached London or Paris any news to show that the check to the counter-offensive in the north, or to the offensive in the south, has resulted in any clear diminution of military power in the forces of either combatant. There has been as yet no decision.

With so much said by way of preliminary, we will turn to the details of the news, and I would remark that in following these details, apart from the few sketches and diagrams that illustrate particular points, a reference to the outline set above this article will always be useful. It gives in the simplest form the field of operations upon the French frontier, with its fortresses, its main lines of defence, and the areas of difficult and easy country for the passage of troops.

On Wednesday last, August 19th, the world was in doubt upon what will be the main question of all this war in its earlier stages: to wit, where the main forces of the two opposing groups of armies were to be found.

This doubt extended in some degree (as events have proved) to the General Officers in command of those groups.

This doubt did not begin to be solved for the general public in France and England until the morning of last Sunday, August 23rd. It was not fully solved until there came the very grave news of the following day, Monday, August 24th, as to the retirements in portions of the front which the accompanying sketch will make plain.




Enough was said last week to show that, other things being equal, what determines success or failure in war is the element of numbers.

The German advance, the falling back of the Allies, was in each case over a belt of from 12 to 21 miles in width, in each case occupied some few days, and in each case has been due to the presence, on one particular front of the Allies, of numbers superior to those that were expected—though in the second field, that of the Sambre and the Meuse, another element besides that of numbers entered into the calculations, to wit, the factor of Namur.

1. THE GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN LORRAINE.


It will be seen in the accompanying sketch that this frontier, running from in front of Metz down to Belfort, is divided into two sections by the Vosges Mountains, along the crest of which it runs for some little way. The French offen-



In all this vigorous offensive effort, the combined Army Corps forming the army of Alsace-Lorraine under General Pau had, up to and including the day of Wednesday, August 19th (that is, Wednesday of last week) been successful. The object of this move was threefold:

(2.) Secondly, and far more important, it had for its object the putting of pressure upon the extreme German left, so that the enemy's forces might be drawn down in that direction and weakened in their main attempt, which was likely to be in the north. At the same time, a successful campaign in Alsace-Lorraine, proceeding from south to north, would gradually close one bridge-head after another across the Rhine, and cut the communications between the south German depots and stores and the German armies in the field.

The importance of this third point a little consideration will explain. The Allies occupying, as they did, positions in the north between Lille and Longwy, if the Germans had struck in between Metz and Longwy, they would not only have taken the line of the Allies in the rear and have threatened it with envelopment, but they would in particular have cut off what is technically called a *salient*. A *salient*, in this connection, means a position occupied by troops such that it is thrust out like a horn from some general line. It is evident that in the line Lille—Longwy, the allied forces upon the Sambre and the Meuse from Mons through Namur to Mezieres (in the sketch opposite) were such a salient in the general allied line.



Now, if a salient is taken in reverse the effect is the more disastrous, from the fact that in a salient so many of the men are at a distance from and unable to get back to the rear where their communications are threatened. To cut off an enemy occupying a salient angle thus is a more complete operation than the mere turning of a line. One great historic example of such a peril is that in which the French stood a little before the battle of Tourcoing. They were thrown out in exactly this way, on a projecting angle, and the Duke of York drew up his plan of battle with the object of cutting them off along the base of the salient angle.

I said last week why it seemed unlikely that the *principal* German effort would be made from between Longwy and Metz. Such an effort would have to be made right in front of the fortress of Verdun. But though the *principal* German effort would, as I thought, probably be made in the Belgian field to the north and against the Allied line from Mons to Namur, yet it might be accompanied by a subsidiary movement of the Germans from between Longwy and Metz coming up in the direction of the arrow.

Now, if by a vigorous offensive along K.K.K. you could engage all the attention of the enemy on the Metz-Strasbourg line and bring all the troops he had to spare in the south at N.N., you would, whatever luck your offensive had, good or bad, prevent him from going from M., between Metz and Longwy, in the direction of the arrow, and you would to that extent be saving your northern positions between Lille and Longwy from anxiety.

All this being clear, and the reason why an offensive in Alsace-Lorraine, ultimately threatening the line Metz-Strasbourg, was attempted by the French, let us see why and how far it failed.

Beyond the Vosges, in the plain of Alsace the success was considerable, especially in the neighbourhood of Mulhouse. Every pass in the Vosges was taken, that at Saales, that at Ste. Marie, and that called the Bonhomme further south, being the most important. The great mountain mass which is the culmination of the Vosges range on the north, and called the Donon, was occupied. In Upper Alsace, up to the line of the Rhine at R.R., General Pau had a complete success. He drove the Germans across the river, reoccupied Mulhouse, and took twenty-four guns and many prisoners. Meanwhile, further to the west, that is in front of Saarbours and Metz, the left wing of this army also went forward and, as we noted last week, it successfully got across the Metz-Strasbourg railway and occupied the junction of Saarbours.

That was the position on the evening of Wednesday, August 19th, the Wednesday of last week. Then came the German counter-offensive.

The French progressive movement into Alsace and Lorraine had the effect of bringing a very considerable body of the enemy down south to meet it. How many we do not yet know. I doubt whether it was less than four Army Corps. Then this German counter-offensive was concentrated upon the western part of this particular field, that is, upon the left of General Pau's army, between Metz and the mountains. It threw back the inferior French forces opposed to it, recrossed the



frontier, and by Sunday, August 23rd, it had bent back the whole of that French left wing to such a position as is indicated in the following sketch. The French were only holding the line of the River Meurthe, nor everywhere holding that. The Germans were in Lunéville. The troops on the Donon and in the Pass at Saales had had to retire with the general French retirement lest they should be left isolated. The passes on the southern part of the mountains, however, were still held by the French, and their troops still dominated the upper plain of Alsace, the town of Mulhouse, and the left bank of the Rhine at this part.


The German success to the west of the mountains, when they pushed the French back on to the line of the Meurthe and beyond it, did not only consist in compelling the inferior

French forces before them to retire, but included the capture of many guns and prisoners; the German claim in this respect being fifty guns and 10,000 men taken, while the French Government affirm—as is, indeed, probable under such circumstances—that the figures are exaggerated.

To sum up, there was, on the extreme left of the general field of operations (300 miles long), a very distinct German success achieved between Metz and the Vosges Mountains, which had the effect of driving the French back across the frontier from twelve to twenty miles south of the furthest positions they had reached in Lorraine. The success was accompanied by the capture of many guns and men, and involved the loss of the northern part of the Vosges Mountains with their passes, though not as yet of the southern part nor of the plain of Upper Alsace beyond. Pressure was removed from the south of the German line, and the communications of Alsace-Lorraine with South Germany, were, after this success, secure.

On the other hand, the bringing of such large German forces—perhaps a quarter of all the German army—so far south, made impossible any taking in reverse of the Allies in the northern field, that is upon the Belgian frontier, for the moment.

So much for what happened in Lorraine and in the south between Wednesday, August 19th, when the French offensive was still successful, and Monday, the 24th, when the left wing of that offensive found itself pressed back upon the Meurthe by the German counter-offensive. This German success was followed by the evacuation two days later of all Alsace by the French, and the abandonment by them of all the passes of the Vosges. From the dotted line which they occupied 10 days ago



they have been forced back to the line shown by crosses. Nancy—an open town—was still intact, but the Germans are everywhere across the frontier. They further claimed the capture of many field pieces abandoned in the Vosges mountains.

The French having retired to the line of the Meurthe in French Lorraine, some miles within the frontier, and their right having retired to the frontier itself in front of Belfort and along the crest of the southern Vosges, they remained in this position upon the defensive throughout the Monday and up to Tuesday morning. Last Tuesday, however, a general attack was delivered by the enemy along the whole of the French front in this region. It was repelled. Since then we have had no further news from the southern extreme of the frontier, save one message, which indicates that fighting for the moment had ceased, and announcing considerable losses to the enemy in his retirement of three days ago.

It is certain that by this time every available man is being drafted towards the principal field of operations in the north, and that the French in the south will remain entirely upon the defensive.

Much more important in the final event will be the measure of success attending this other German effort in the northern field of the theatre of war upon the Franco-Belgian frontier, and to that I will next turn.

2. THE MAIN GERMAN FLANKING MOVEMENT THROUGH BELGIUM.

By that same Wednesday, August 19th, Wednesday of last week, it was apparent that the main German effort was going to be made through the Belgian plain, which lies north of the Rivers Sambre and Meuse. That the main effort would be made here was, as we saw last week, probable, because that was undoubtedly the original plan of the German General Staff when they took it for granted that the Belgians would sell their honour and allow the passage of the German armies through their country to proceed undisturbed. The unexpected resistance of Liège, before siege artillery could be brought up against it, had disturbed and delayed this plan, as we all know. But it is exceedingly difficult to change a line of advance once determined and plotted out in detail; and however much delayed, it was still probable that the original plan would be followed. Followed it was. The siege artillery had come up and silenced the forts

of Liège, and much the largest body of the total German forces beyond the Rhine in the west was massed to the north of the Meuse. A sufficient supply was accumulated for this great effort, and it is probable that when an accurate history of the war is available we shall find that not less than seven, and perhaps eight, Army Corps out of a total of certainly less than twenty, were massed thus north of the Meuse upon the extreme left wing of the Allies for the great flanking movement round their line by the north.

The last stand that could be made by the Belgian Army to these immensely superior forces was made on that same Wednesday, a day's march east of Brussels, and after it the Belgians retired behind the guns of Antwerp, leaving Brussels open to the advance. In the late morning of the morrow, Thursday, August 20th, the Thursday of last week, the heads of the German columns appeared before the capital of Belgium, which had been left open to admit them without resistance. From about half-past two o'clock of that day, throughout the whole of the remainder of that day, the German commanders organised a military parade, the object of which, though confined to what is called "moral effect," was military and defensible. They marched through Brussels one of their Army Corps specially picked for the job because it was quite fresh. They had specially accoutred it, given it a good rest, put into it for a veneer a few of the units that had been in the earlier fighting, and bidden it prepare for the show as for a review. These 40,000 men they passed through the city, accompanied by music, and by every adjunct which could impress the civilian spectator—even to the stiff parade step which is characteristic of the Prussian drill.

Now it is here advisable, after the somewhat ill-timed ridicule which was poured upon this manifestation, to explain what is meant by moral effect in warfare, and why a commander will, under some conditions, wisely employ it.

WHAT IS "MORAL EFFECT"?

Strictly speaking, all operations of war depend for their success upon moral effect, with the exception of that operation in which a hostile force is completely surrounded and may be exterminated.

In every other case you obtain your success over your enemy—or at any rate over the survivors among your enemy—by reducing them into a condition of mind in which their opposition is ineffective. The whole discussion between closer and more open formations: between the power of modern fortifications to withstand modern siege artillery, and the opposite theory: between the survivor and non-survivor and shock tactics for cavalry—all these depend ultimately upon one's judgment of "moral effect."

But there is evidently a difference in degree. No one can doubt the overwhelming result of a double flank movement enveloping an inferior force. To depend upon such a movement as that for success is to depend upon something like a certitude in human psychology. At the other end of the line you get the story of the Chinese troops that terrified the enemy by making faces and imitating the cries of wild beasts.

There is a whole category of actions in warfare which are of doubtful use because they lie beyond the line after which the psychological effect is weak. Such actions are specially said to have no true strategic but only a "moral" effect.

For instance, the proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick threatening Paris with destruction before the invasion of France in 1792, is rightly regarded by historians as a blunder. Its moral effect, if any, was to strengthen the French *moral*. Again, Napoleon's entry into Moscow was effected at an enormous expense of men, after an advance far too prolonged, and the corresponding moral effect of holding the capital in such a country as Russia was in no way worth the expense of time, men, and energy which it cost.

Now what we have to seize in the present campaign is that the German Government and the German military commanders have carefully estimated and intend to apply this factor of "moral effect" apart from direct action in the field, up to a certain point and in certain particular ways, for which we must be prepared. I do not say that their estimate is just: I should even imagine that they will exaggerate this factor. But what I do say is that their action here, as in every other matter, will be detailed and calculated; and it will be very foolish on the part of those who are their opponents to imagine that any piece of parade, severity, or demonstration has been undertaken by the German commanders at random, or without their having seen, just as clearly as we see it, the vain side of such accessories to war.

By marching through Brussels, for instance, the German commanders added a full day's fatigue and a full day's delay to at least one body of their troops, and perhaps to as many more. The choice of a fresh Army Corps was a patent thing which deceived nobody into thinking that the troops which had recently been fighting were those fresh troops whom the populace of Brussels gazed upon. The breaking into parade step made no careful observer believe that those who indulged in it were on that account the more formidable in battle; nor did the playing of brazen instruments, and the rest.

None the less, the decision of the German commanders to make this demonstration was not, as too many have imagined, a piece of empty theatricalism. Its effect was calculated beforehand, and that effect has been in part attained. No one reading the press hostile to Germany on the morrow of last Thursday, when the news was known, can have doubted that this piece of parade did in some degree—perhaps in a less degree than the German commanders had hoped—affect the spirit of their opponents.

It is exactly the same with the much graver policy of torture and murder. The German troops have here direct orders from their superiors and a clear object before them.

They expect to be operating in hostile country—at any rate they have good hopes of being in hostile country during all the earlier, and perhaps more critical, phases of the campaign. If they meet with resistance upon the part of the civilian population (though that only consists of women, elderly men, and children), their difficulties will be enormously increased.

Since these elderly men, women, and children have, in the nature of things, no kind of organization, the terror inspired by the fate of individuals may be expected to cow all the rest. Therefore, orders will be strictly observed to adopt any means of spreading such terror whenever there is so much as a suspicion of resistance upon the part of the civilian population, and on this account we must be prepared for not only the summary shooting of elderly men and youths who have been caught with arms in their hands, but also of any who have been suspected. Again, whenever there is a suspicion against the population of any place, we must expect the putting to death of elderly men and women, and even children, the destruction of property upon all sides, the burning of homes.

I do not say that this is wise upon the part of the Germans. Personally, I think that in so acting they are handicapping themselves politically, and probably, in the later phases of the campaign, militarily as well. But the point to remember is that these actions are calculated actions. In Belgium, for instance, there is no doubt that the absence of all civilian resistance after the first few days has encouraged the German commanders in the belief that these methods are of immediate military value. They will be pursued in France as in Belgium, and, should a force land in England, in England as in France. We must be prepared for it.

The same rule applies to the ransoming of towns. Here it is not the town into which terror has to be struck, but the financial power of the enemy. Take, for instance, the case of the Belgian towns and provinces in the last few days. A total of about £10,000,000 has been exacted. England and France at once granted this sum to Belgium, which is as much as saying that Germany, by her successful occupation of Belgium, has fined her principal opponents already £10,000,000, and inspired in the minds of those who have no country in particular and whose principal object is cosmopolitan finance, the dread of further loss. Germany knows how powerful these men are, and relies upon their indirect support.

THE THREAT TO THE SEA COAST.

Finally, there is the very powerful moral effect upon which Germany is certainly counting, and for which we must in this country be specially prepared: *the occupation of the sea coast*. There is nothing to prevent comparatively small detached bodies of the German armies, especially strong in cavalry, from occupying Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and ultimately Boulogne, *except* a decision in the valley of the Meuse adverse to German arms. If the Germans are successful in the valley of the Meuse they will certainly occupy the ports of the Straits of Dover.


We may tell ourselves, and tell ourselves truly, all manner of concrete, solid, and consoling things concerning such an occupation:—That the Fleet can always master any particular section of coast to which it directs its attention; that there are no vessels of war in these ports; that it is just as easy to fly over to England from the western part of the Belgian plain as from the sea coast; that no mine-layer could get out of these ports without observation from the fleet; that British communications over sea with the British forces and their Allies could be maintained further to the west, &c., &c. It is still true that the presence of German troops upon the further side of the Straits of Dover would profoundly affect the state of mind of the Allies. It would be of a "moral effect" apparently disproportionate to the effort required. Whether it will *really* be disproportionate or no only the event can show; but at any rate it will be attempted—unless the series of actions upon the Meuse goes adversely to the German arms. And we shall be very unwise indeed unless we prepare ourselves for the news of such an occupation of the sea coast.

Let me now return to the consideration of the series of actions that have taken place, and at the moment of writing are still taking place, in the Meuse valley.

THE CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE MEUSE AND SAMBRE.

We left those operations upon the Thursday of last week, when the Germans were marching through Brussels. It was by the Friday, in the afternoon of that day, that the first German shell fell into the station of Charleroi, upon the River Sambre; and it is from this moment that the general operation of the Allied armies against the German armies of the Belgian plain and the Ardennes begins.

If the reader will turn back to the general map published at the head of these comments, he will note that in the northern field of operations the River Meuse turns a sharp corner at the town of



Namur; after having run roughly from north to south it begins to run roughly from east to west. At this corner there comes into the Meuse the River Sambre which, running from east to west, continues the line of the Lower Meuse. North of this line lies, of course, that Belgian plain of which mention is made so frequently in all descriptions of the campaign. South of that line is to be found rough wooded country, deeply ravined, and called the Ardennes. It is rougher and wilder to the east and to the south, and falls into cultivatable land as one goes westward and northward, the Sambre itself coming from sources in almost flat country and only running through hilly country as it approaches Namur.

Now, when it was evident that the Germans would make their principal attempt through the Belgian plain, the Allies occupied a line passing through Lille, Mons, along the Sambre by Charleroi to Namur. That was a clear necessity, but they also massed some very large numbers on a line bending back along the Upper Meuse from Namur southward. The English contingent lay about Mons. It was the French Fifth Army, largely composed of troops from Algiers, that lay along the Sambre from above Charleroi to as far as Namur. Namur itself appears to have been somewhat insufficiently held by a Belgian contingent. Behind were the large French forces continued up the valley of the Meuse.

So much we know because it has been made public property by the authorities. Something more we know from official telegrams and from private accounts that have been printed in the press of Paris and London. But there still remains a much greater part to conjecture.

Let us first deal with what we know.

The German attack came in full force upon the line of the Sambre, and there, of course, greatly outnumbered the defenders. Its chief objective was not the extreme of the line to the west, as might be expected of German tactics and a desire to outflank, but in a direct attack, the bridges at and near Charleroi. This attack was maintained throughout Saturday and through the first part of Sunday without result. The English contingent held its ground on the left near Mons against forces which seem to have been superior to it by approximately 20 per cent. The French along the Sambre, particularly pressed for the possession of the bridge at Charleroi, lost and recovered, again lost and again recovered that passage. While this was proceeding the larger French forces along the Upper Meuse were proposing to pass eastward through the Ardennes country. Had they succeeded in pressing far eastward through this difficult and highly defensible land of forests and deep ravines, they would have threatened more and more with every mile of their advance the communications and the supply of the German armies in the Belgian plain, for that communication and those supplies largely come by road across the Meuse between Namur and Liège. Further, such an advance would have separated the northern German army from the southern portion, which was operating from Luxembourg.

One hypothesis of what followed upon and after the Sunday is the following:

It is obvious that this advance eastward through the Ardennes would pivot round the fortress of Namur. The advance along the arrow marked (1) in the above sketch would march the furthest; next that along the arrow marked (2), and last along the Meuse itself, depending upon the success of the two more southern columns, that along the arrow marked (3). While, so long as the line on the Sambre was held, this turning movement round the Ardennes by the east was in no fear for its rear.

Such is one hypothesis upon the nature of the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the vigorous German offensive undertaken from the Belgian plain.

That counter-offensive—according to this conjecture—broke down; and this breakdown is the gravest news of all that has yet reached us from the seat of war.

The advices received and published in London and Paris up to and including the news of last Wednesday morning pointed, indeed, to no decisive result. They did not indicate that the one opponent had as yet appreciably diminished the military power of the other; but they did strongly suggest that the counter-offensive designed by the Allies against the German advance had failed, and they made it seem exceedingly improbable that any immediate attempt to restore it would be attempted.


The failure appears to have depended upon two isolated events—a check in the southernmost French effort, marked (1) upon the above sketch, and, much more important, the fall of Namur: at least, the fall of the eastern forts and the consequent loss of the bridge-heads over the two rivers Sambre and Meuse at the critical point where these rivers meet.

If Namur had still held as a pivot upon which the turning movement could depend, the fact that the southernmost French column was arrested in the neighbourhood of Neuchateau might not have had very permanent results. The second column to the north coming up on the flank of the German armies from Luxembourg might, indeed, have reversed that result; and in any case, the occupation of even a part of the Ardennes country by French troops would have menaced the supply of their opponents upon the Belgian plain.

But when (or if) Namur went, the hinge upon which all that arm was swinging went with it, and not only would the French turning movement eastward through the Ardennes become impossible, but it would become equally impossible to hold the valley of the Sambre.

All this, I repeat, is pure conjecture. It is based upon the supposition that the news of Namur came at the critical moment and that on receipt of it only was the retreat from the Sambre determined upon. The fuller accounts that will reach us later will show whether this hypothesis is sound or no.

The way in which Namur was essential to the whole plan will be easily appreciated when we consider that the ring of forts protected the junction of the two rivers and of the bridges whereby they might simultaneously be crossed.




Observe the effect of this. In the accompanying diagram you have the complex obstacle A. A. A., consisting of a main river and its tributary, which obstacle is presented both to M. advancing upon it and to N., who is preparing to meet him and to take a counter offensive against him. A fortress, X, X, X, X, held by N.'s men, contains and protects the two opportunities, bridges (B.B.), whereby the obstacle can be surmounted. N. can move at his choice across the obstacle by

these bridges, under protection of the fortress, and appear in force where he chooses. He could appear in force attacking along line (1) or along line (2) at his choice. The various parts of his enemy M are separated and delayed by the obstacle: *he* is not. So long as the fortress holds, N commands the bridge-heads which surmount that obstacle in his favour, while leaving it still a cause of delay to his enemy.

But suppose the fortress X, X, X, X to fall, and the conditions are exactly reversed. Then it is M that has the bridges: it is M that is no longer suffering from the obstacle, and it is N who is restricted by it. Further, the line which N is holding along one part of the obstacle up to and reposing upon the fortress is turned by the falling of the fortress into the hands of M. M can pour over on to N's flank. The obstacle which N is holding is no longer an obstacle to him, because he possesses the bridge for crossing it; and N. will be rolled up unless he falls back immediately.

M being here the German attack, N the allied defence along the Sambre X, X, X, the fortress of Namur protecting the bridges across the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse (which together form the triple obstacle in question), with Namur in German hands, the position of the Allies defending the Sambre becomes impossible. The Allies have to fall back, and at the same time the counter-offensive to the east across the Meuse through the Ardennes can no longer be pursued.

The total result under this hypothesis is that from holding the positions (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) on the




accompanying sketch, the Allies had by last Monday evening to fall back upon positions roughly represented by (2) (2) (2) (2) (2). Here, however, conjecture becomes necessarily vaguer and less well based, because we shall not precisely know (and even for those who know, it would be a duty to be silent) where the *whole* defensive line against the next German advance will lie. We shall not know this until the news of its retention, or the failure to retain it, reaches us. It is even possible that a large French force is still free to act and to take the counter-offensive—we do not know.

It is however already evident that the full plan of the Allied General Staff involves what is called a "refusing" of their left; that is a bending back of their left wing from the general line. This left wing was lying upon Wednesday last along the line Cambrai—Le Cateau. This extreme portion was held by the English contingent. That of course leaves

the whole of the north-east open to a German advance, but at the same time it leaves the flank of that advance open to attack from the south if that unknown factor, the French masses upon the right, can come up in time and in sufficient numbers. This is indeed the whole object of refusing a wing—you do it when your enemy is trying to turn you if you think that you have enough men to strike up at his flank during the turning movement.

Our information, then, 24 hours before this appears in print, is no more than the following: the Allied line has retired from its original positions (1) (1) (1) by very heavy marches for three days to (3) (3) upon its extreme left. It has fallen back from the neighbourhood of Mons to the neighbourhood of Cambrai. The task of the heaviest marching has fallen upon the English contingent, which is extended between Cambrai and Le Cateau. To the right, anywhere within the triangle, A B C, are the main French masses, certainly 10 Army Corps in number, perhaps already more. What they have in front of them we do not know; they certainly had superior numbers in the fighting of last Sunday; the new arrivals from the south may already have redressed the balance. Meanwhile, there is of course nothing to prevent the German cavalry from working round by the left in raids if they think it will be of useful moral effect to do so, and some of that cavalry has already appeared near Lille and near Douai, and even further upon French territory.



SKETCH SHOWING RETIREMENT OF ALLIED TROOPS FROM THEIR POSITION OF LAST WEEK,

(1) (1) to their present position (3) (3), of which the portion between Cambrai and Le Cateau is published, while that representing the main French Body to the right is not certain, but lies somewhere within the space marked with a query.

THE NATURE OF THE FALL OF NAMUR.

It is again a matter of conjecture, but of conjecture most vital to the fortunes of the whole of our campaign, what exactly happened at Namur. For, if Namur was sufficiently held and was taken—or at least, certain of its forts were taken—so quickly only under the effect of shell fire, it must mean that the whole theory under which ring fortresses were built, and upon which the Allied plan was based, is erroneous; it must mean that the German theory is sound and the French theory is unsound in the matter of fortification; it must mean that your ring fortress can be carried in a comparatively short time, if not by a rush, then under the effect of siege artillery.

Now, putting together all the very slight evidence which had reached this country by the morning of Thursday last, it is by no means certain that so grave a conclusion can be drawn. The eastern forts of Namur appear to have been silenced late upon Saturday, or early upon Sunday, the town to have been occupied in the course of Sunday, and certain of the western forts to be still holding out in

the evening of that day. At least this view of the matter is established by two converging pieces of evidence, the one from German, the other from French sources. Again, by the Sunday evening the retreat from the Sambre was in full swing and the Allied cannon were in front of Phillipeville back several hours' marching from the Sambre. We hear of a very small garrison in Namur, and that garrison Belgian—3,000 is the almost incredibly small figure given. We are further told that the most eastern of the forts round Namur, that furthest advanced down the Meuse, was silenced almost immediately; and more than that we are not told. Now we can be perfectly certain from the experience at Port Arthur, that the immediate silencing of a modern fort by mere shell fire is quite abnormal, as we know by the experience of both Er-lung-shan fort at Port Arthur and of Fleron fort and others at Liège that it is impossible (also under normal circumstances) to rush it. More than that we do not know. But it will require very strong evidence indeed to prove that modern fortification is subject, when it is properly defended, to immediate disaster of this sort. If it is, not only Namur, but Toul and Verdun—and not only Toul and Verdun, but Metz and Strasbourg—are in the same boat.

All this reading, from sparse and unco-ordinated news of what has happened during this week upon the Sambre and Meuse, is based upon the hypothesis that Namur did fall as was announced, and that the Anglo-French line did retire from one to two days' march behind the line Mons-Namur, which is roughly the line of the Sambre.

But there is a further element in the combination which had not been accounted for by Wednesday night last. Much more important in number, and even in composition, than the French forces upon Sambre, were the French masses to the South of that river, which were destined to operate in the Ardennes.

We have seen that of these great bodies, one was checked in front of Neufchateau by the German forces proceeding from southern Belgian Luxembourg; but until we have news of those masses as a whole we cannot determine the result of the conflict upon the north-eastern frontier. Even though we know that the troops holding the line of the Sambre fell back, their ultimate fortune, their immediate future task, and the chances of a decision one way or the other, would still depend upon the positions taken up by these masses to the south of the Sambre line, and the action upon which they might be directed. The most probable conjecture is that we shall find them, when the veil is lifted again, extending the line of the others towards the south. We remain—late upon Wednesday night—in necessary ignorance of their position and their movements.

One or two things which may explain the postponement of a decision appears through the very meagre information to hand. It is evident, for instance, that the mass of the German attack was directed against the Sambre line, and had there a great superiority in numbers over the defensive. It is further evident, since men cannot be in two places at once, that there is a correspondingly weak body opposite the Middle Meuse, where the French forces should be strongest. But, on the other hand, we know that in this country of the Middle Meuse, and to the east of it, are the best defensive positions for a force weaker than its opponents, and wooded country in which the superiority of the French field gun is largely lost.

Another thing that comes through from the telegram is that the Germans have used in this great effort the very best of their troops. Not only numbers, quality also has been demanded for this supreme effort. The guard was there.

Finally we know that, up to the last telegrams received, the enemy's movement had, as a turning movement, failed. The German offensive had not yet threatened the Allied line in flank. If or when the concentrated German mass in the north now passing the Sambre could achieve a decisive result, the general Allied line along the French frontier would be turned. If this, its extreme northern portion, was either pierced or enveloped, the success of what is known to be the German strategy in this campaign would be sealed. We know that the enemy will make every effort to achieve that end.

At one moment, when the news of the fall of Namur came in upon Monday morning (the general public had it early in the afternoon of that day), it looked as though the Allied flank was broken or cut. The later telegrams, extending over more than two full days, though they tell us little, do not confirm that; while the position in which the guns of the retreat were drawn up, according to the "Times" correspondent upon Sunday night, point to the falling back of the line as a whole, not to its having been pierced. We may be quite confident that up to the time this last telegram was sent the line was intact.

It should further be remarked that the direction of the full Prussian advance upon Charleroi makes us suspend our judgment as to a further attempt at outflanking by the west. You cannot outflank indefinitely, unless you have indefinitely superior numbers; and, though the numbers which the enemy has here massed against the extreme of the Allied line are superior to what is in front of them, they are not so greatly superior, apparently, as to permit of an immediate further extension westward beyond what they have already achieved. Were that so, their effort would not have been against Charleroi, but to the west of Mons. They would only have attempted to hold the French forces upon the line of the Sambre while they brought their greatest pressure to bear upon the western extreme of the line against and beyond the English left.


We may sum up and say that, until further news is received, there is no evidence of a decisive result here upon the Franco-Belgian frontier, but only of a retirement on the part of the Allies, with a corresponding advance on the part of the Germans.

Meanwhile, what is most probable is an attempt of the Germans to turn the Allied line round Cambrai. Whether that operation can be successfully carried out or not will depend almost entirely upon the unknown factor—the numbers the French have gathered within striking distance south and east of Le Cateau.

THE OPERATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE.

Two things predominate in any comprehension of the campaign upon the eastern frontiers of Prussia. The first is the extent of the Russian advance, the second the racial and political conditions under which that advance is taking place.

Both these points in their most general characters are expressed in the accompanying sketch.



Sketch showing the approximate frontier between Polish and German nationalities, frontier of Province of East Prussia now in Russian hands and of the fortified line of the Vistula which bars the advance on Berlin.

It was upon Saturday last, the 22nd, that the first wave of the Russian advance won what may be called, without exaggeration, a decisive success in the neighbourhood of the town of Gumbinnen, about twenty-five miles from the frontier: the "first wave," because it is in the nature of the mobilization arrangements of Russia that three successive bodies shall follow westward across the frontier, and it was the first of these, amounting to perhaps somewhat less than 200,000 men, which won the action at Gumbinnen.

The forces over which this success was achieved were estimated at some 160,000 men, or three Army Corps, with perhaps certain divisions of cavalry. The advance was followed up to Insterberg, some fifteen miles further along the main railway, by which line the invasion is proceeding.

We must remember, in all that we hear of the fighting in this eastern theatre of the war, that the great mass of the men opposed to the Russians are taken from that half-trained or untrained reserve which is a feature of the Prussian military system. They are not expected to do as well as the regularly trained troops. What they are expected to do in this part of the German dominions is to impose delay upon the enemy, and little more.

At any rate, the success of last Saturday obviously isolates, as a glance at the map will show, the town of Tilsit. But there is more than this. Apart from this advance directly westward across the frontier by the Russians (which has for its base the town of Vilna), there was moving up in flank from Warsaw another Russian force which marched upon Allenstein, and this advance in flank determined the precipitate retreat of the German forces, and may be said without exaggeration to have given, by the evening of Sunday, all East Prussia east of the line Königsberg-Alenstein into Russian hands. Twenty-four hours later it was already evident that one portion of the rapidly retreating Prussian forces would throw itself into Königsberg, and already, at the time of writing, all retreat to the south out of Königsberg is cut off. The other portion of the defeated German army has, as reported above, fallen back upon Osterode, abandoning in its rapid retreat a certain number of field guns and vehicles, and losing also a certain proportion of prisoners, presumably stragglers from so rapid a retirement.

We do well to remember in all this that we have only heard so far the victor's story. But there can be no doubt, to sum up the general result, that the province of East Prussia is now dominated as a whole by the Russian forces, which have invaded it from the south and the east at the same moment. Tilsit is certainly isolated and Königsberg probably already isolated also. A belt just east of the boundary of the province—including Allenstein itself—was still in German hands last Wednesday, but the forces occupying it were in retreat.

Meanwhile it is well to warn the reader in the west of Europe that we should not too hastily assume for the Russian advance a rate comparable to the advance of successful invading armies in the west, and further that we do not really know the rate of the possible or probable Russian advance *until the line of the Vistula is successfully negotiated*.

As to the first of these points, the rapidity of advance in this part of Eastern Europe is checked by the comparative rarity of good hard roads—a week's rain turns most of these tracks into a morass—the fact that the south of the Province of East Prussia is a mass of small meres with marshes lying about them, and the fact that behind the Russian advance is an insufficient railway system; that is, a sparse series of lines, a net-work with very wide meshes, which will not supply an advancing army as the western railways of Europe could do.

The line of the Vistula is of the first importance. It is, roughly speaking, the line Thorn—Graudenz—Danzig; both Thorn and Danzig are obstacles of the first class, and the line as a whole is not weakly held.

If or when the line of the Vistula is passed, we may regard the Russian advance as beginning seriously to threaten and incommode the German powers: not before. And we must remember that it is just when the Vistula is crossed that Austrian pressure from the south may become serious for the Russians.

The total length of this first field of the Russian invasion, from the nearest point upon the Vistula to the corresponding nearest point upon the eastern frontier of Prussia, is no less than 130 miles: that is the distance the invader must cover before he begins to exercise any real pressure, and even then he will not exercise it until he has masked or isolated the Vistula fortresses.

If or when the Vistula is passed, the invaders will find themselves not only in territory every mile of advance through which will more and more grievously incommode Prussia politically, but actually within 200 miles of Berlin itself.

Further, when the line of the Vistula is crossed, the front of the Russian advance to the north will be abreast of any further advance attempted from the western districts of Russian Poland: as, for instance, an advance directly upon the Polish town of Posen (to give it its German name) so long oppressed by Prussian domination.

It will be seen from all this that with the best of luck the Russians will not begin to exercise just yet an effective pressure in this field, and *it cannot be too often repeated that though the element of time is a factor in every campaign, and is a factor of peculiar importance in this campaign, that there are yet several weeks in which the Prussians are free to operate in the west before they need be really anxious about the attack falling upon them from the east.*

Almost as important as the probable movement of the Russian armies and the rate of their advance is the distribution of the population through which that advance will take place; for it is certain now that the Polish population will favour the Russian advance at the expense of Prussia. It is exceedingly important to seize the racial realities underlying the artificial political frontiers in this district. They will explain a great deal of what is to come.

It will be seen upon the sketch map printed opposite that the conquest of East Prussia is the conquest of a sort of bastion of Germanism out and beyond Poland, and that, as the Russian advance approaches the Vistula, it enters what is, for the purposes of its march, friendly territory. It will further be seen to what a great distance westward stretches this solid group of Polish population, upon whose moral support the invader can rely. It is true that the younger men have all been taken to serve unwillingly under the Prussian flag, but it remains equally true that in all the ambient business of information and in every other form of succour, whatever of the populace remains in all that wide flat land will be a force adverse to the Germanic powers, and, for the moment at least, sympathetic with the invader. Nor will that feeling anywhere be stronger than in the town of Posen itself, should the invader reach it, for nowhere is the subterranean conflict between the Slav and the German more bitter, and nowhere has the former security of Prussia affirmed itself with greater harshness.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

JULY 23RD.
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.

JULY 25TH.
King Peter of Serbia's appeal to Russia.

JULY 27TH.
Sir Edward Grey proposed a London Conference between French, German, Italian, and Great Britain's Ambassadors.

JULY 28TH.
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

JULY 29TH.
A partial Russian mobilisation, confined to the Army Corps on the borders of Austria-Hungary, was signed on receipt of the news of the bombardment of Belgrade. English Stock Exchange closed. English Bank Rate, 6 per cent.

AUGUST 1ST.
General Russian mobilisation ordered. German mobilisation ordered by Emperor. Germany declared war on Russia and followed up this declaration by immediately invading the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the neutral State between France and Germany. King George made a final effort for peace, dispatching a direct personal telegram to the Tsar, offering mediation. Before it could reach St. Petersburg Germany declared war.

AUGUST 2ND.
Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.

AUGUST 3RD.
Sir Edward Grey stated British policy and revealed Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting our obligations to France. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany after Belgian appeal to England. German and French Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin.

AUGUST 4TH.
Germany rejected ultimatum. English Government took over control of railways. War declared between England and Germany.

Vice-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe appointed to command of the Home Fleets, with the acting rank of admiral.

AUGUST 5TH.
Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for War. H.M.S. *Amphion* struck a mine and foundered. Many German ships seized.

AUGUST 6TH.
House of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by 500,000 men. State control of food prices. The German battle cruiser *Goeben* and her escort driven into Messina by two

British cruisers. A fierce battle still continued before Liège. Italy declared her neutrality.

AUGUST 7TH.
The German cruiser *Goeben*, with her escort the *Breslau*, left Messina. Germans outside Liège asked for a twenty-four hours' armistice to collect their killed and wounded. Armistice refused by Belgians.

AUGUST 8TH.
French troops invaded Alsace and reached Mülhausen after a sharp engagement, in which the Germans were routed with the bayonet. Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000 men.

AUGUST 9TH.
One of the cruiser squadrons of the Main Fleet was attacked by German submarines. The enemy's submarine, U15, was sunk by H.M.S. *Birmingham*.

AUGUST 10TH.
France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Liège forts still untaken. Germans advanced on Namur. The new Press Bureau established by the Government for the issue of official war news opened.

AUGUST 11TH.
The *Goeben* and *Breslau* took refuge in the Dardanelles. England declared war against Austria.

AUGUST 12TH.
Goeben and *Breslau* purchased by Turkey. Bombardment of Liège forts resumed.

AUGUST 15TH.
The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and the use of the Polish language.

AUGUST 16TH.
Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.

AUGUST 17TH.
The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in France. Death of Lieut.-General Sir James Grierson. The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.

AUGUST 18TH.
General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appointed to command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in succession to the late General Grierson. Some desultory fighting took place in the North Sea.

AUGUST 20TH.
The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near Shabatz.

DAY BY DAY.

PRODUCTION OF FOOD.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 21st.

The German forces entered Brussels and were met by the Burgomaster, who informed them that Brussels was an open and undefended city.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 22nd.

The Servian Press Bureau announced that the Servian Army had won a great victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

The French War Office frankly admitted that the French reverse in Lorraine was more serious than was thought at first, but officially denied the ridiculous and exaggerated accounts sent abroad by the Wolff Bureau.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 23rd.

Since no reply was received to her ultimatum of August 15th, Japan declared war on Germany. In official Japanese circles it is considered that it will take three months to reduce the garrison at Tsingtao. They are fully provisioned for eight months. The Russian General Staff announced that the Russian Army had gained an important victory near Gumbennen against a force of 160,000 Germans.

The Germans are reported to have suffered enormous losses.

MONDAY, AUGUST 24th.

It was announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground.

The British troops were opposed by two German Army Corps and two Cavalry Divisions. The British casualties were not heavy, but the enemy suffered very heavily.

Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

The British Commander-in-Chief, China, reported that on Saturday afternoon the destroyer *Kennet*, whilst chasing a German destroyer, *S90*, approached too close to the battery at Tsing-tau and sustained the following casualties—Three killed and seven wounded.

The *Kennet* was not materially damaged.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 25th.

Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons that the Government had heard from Sir John French that the withdrawal already announced of his troops to their new position had been successfully effected. They were pressed hard by the enemy, who were, however, shaken off.

The Field-Marshal provisionally estimated the casualties at something over 2,000.

Lord Kitchener, speaking in the House of Lords, said:—

"The Expeditionary Force has taken the field on the French north-west frontier, and has advanced to the neighbourhood of Mons, in Belgium. Our troops have already been for thirty-six hours in contact with a superior force of German invaders.

"During that time they have maintained the traditions of British soldiers, and have behaved with the utmost gallantry."

Lord Kitchener telegraphed to Sir John French as follows: "Congratulate troops on their splendid work. We are all proud of them."

A telegram received by the Foreign Office reported that a Zeppelin airship passed over Antwerp on Monday night. Six shrapnel bombs were dropped. Much damage was done to property, and twelve lives were lost.

Such a bombardment constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the fourth Hague Convention.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 26th.

Situation unchanged.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 27th.

Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German armed merchantman *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on the West African coast.

This was the ship which had been trying to arrest traffic between this country and the Cape. It was one of the very few German armed ships which had been able to get to sea.

The survivors were landed before the vessel was sunk. The losses on H.M.S. *Highflyer* were one man killed and five slightly injured.

A strong force of British marines has been sent to Ostend and has occupied the town without opposition.

THE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have received from their Consultative Committee the following recommendations, which must in all cases be dependent upon (1) local conditions, and (2) the circumstances of the individual holding. The Agricultural Consultative Committee are of opinion that, in the existing circumstances agriculturists should do all in their power to secure that the supply of home-produced foodstuffs may be in excess of the normal. In this respect the requirements of the future with regard both to cropping and to the maintenance of the fullest complement of live stock that holdings can usefully carry, must be carefully borne in mind.

1. The acreage under wheat should be largely increased wherever practicable. In this direction it should not be forgotten that on clean land, and by the aid of suitable artificial manure, good crops of wheat can be obtained in successive years. Attention is drawn to sect. 26 of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908, which permits any system of cropping subject to the holding being protected from deterioration.

2. Where wheat cannot be grown, the sowing of winter oats, winter barley, and rye might be substituted. These crops ripen early, and allow the labour on harvest to be distributed evenly.

3. The cabbage crop is also one to be considered where land can be spared. It provides a considerable weight of food suitable for either human or animal consumption.

4. There is much land of a certain class now under grass which would probably pay for breaking up. If this land is scheduled as arable in the farm agreement, the tenant has the option of ploughing it up. If it is scheduled as grass the Agricultural Consultative Committee suggest co-operation between owner and occupier as to the advisability of breaking up certain fields in view of the national question of increasing home-grown foodstuffs.

5. Where a surplus of grass or clover exists ensilage might be made. Particulars of the best methods can be obtained from the Board of Agriculture Leaflet No. 9.

6. The slaughter of immature or breeding stock of every description should be avoided. Where circumstances permit the total head of live stock should be increased, particularly animals such as pigs, which multiply quickly.

Ewe lambs might with advantage be put to the ram towards the end of the year.

7. While there should be no diminution in the numbers of live stock kept, the strictest economy (subject to proper conditioning) and foresight with regard to feeding is advocated.

The cheapest efficient forms of food should be used, and no waste, spaces capable of producing food for animals should be allowed. No recommendation is attempted as to the exact description of the foodstuffs to be grown, as this must depend upon the special circumstances of each case, of which generally the individual farmer will be the best judge; if in doubt, he can obtain advice gratis from the recognised Agricultural College in his "Province," or from the County Agricultural Organiser. But the following crops among others are worthy of consideration: Trifolium, vetches, rye for spring feeding, and Italian rye grass. By adopting such measures the more valuable foods would, so far as possible, be freed for human consumption.

The composition of the Consultative Committee is as follows. The Right Hon. Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, K.C.B. (Chairman), Mr. Charles Bathurst, M.P., Mr. Charles Bidwell, Mr. H. Trustam Eve, Mr. S. W. Farmer, Mr. C. B. Fisher, Mr. E. N. Nunneley, Mr. Francis H. Padwick, Mr. G. Scoby, Mr. G. C. Smyth-Richards, Mr. Richard Stratton, the Hon. Edward Strutt, Mr. Christopher Turnor, Messrs. A. Goddard and C. B. Marshall, joint secretaries.

THE YEAR'S CROPS.

THE Board of Agriculture and Fisheries have expedited the tabulation of the agriculture returns collected in June last, and are now able to estimate, subject to final revision, the acreage of certain crops, and the number of live stock in England and Wales this year. On the basis of the reports received from their Crop Reporters, the Board are able to make an estimate of the total production of the following crops:

	1914. Quarters.	1913. Quarters.	Increase + or Decrease --	
			Quarters.	Per Cent.
Wheat	7,320,000	6,642,000	+ 678,000	+ 10
Barley	6,140,000	6,323,000	- 183,000	- 3
Oats	9,100,000	9,379,000	- 279,000	- 3
Beans	1,080,000	915,000	+ 165,000	+ 18
Peas	435,000	422,000	+ 13,000	+ 3
	Tons.	Tons.	Tons.	
Potatoes	2,880,000	2,895,000	- 15,000	- ½

The wheat crop is not only 10 per cent. larger than in 1913, but is well above the average of the last ten years. The crop of beans is the largest since 1907, while that of potatoes is only slightly below that of last year, which was the largest on record.

UNDER its statutory constitution the Road Board has available a considerable sum, at present over £1,000,000, to provide work upon the roads at such times as these. The Roads Improvement Association, in view of the disorganisation of industry consequent on the war, is compiling as rapidly as possible, for submission to the local authorities and the Government Departments, a series of suggestions for road improvements in various areas upon which this unemployed labour could be most usefully utilised. The various provincial branches of the Roads Improvement Association have been asked to send in lists for their respective districts. Readers not in touch with any of the R.I.A. branches who would like to submit proposals should address communications to the General Secretary of the Association, Mr. Wallace E. Riche, 15, Dartmouth-street, Westminster, London, S.W. Details should be forwarded of trunk and important roads that need widening, strengthening, and re-surfacing where the minimum amount of land is required, or where it can be acquired without much difficulty.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE MINE QUESTION.

IT is not possible, nor would it be desirable, to record naval incidents on day-by-day lines. The first official report is necessarily brief, and when a more extended one appears it usually puts things in a more or less totally different light.

The sinking of the *Amphion* is a case in point. The fuller official report should go far to reassure public opinion on the subject of mines, which, since the *Petropavlovsk* was blown up instantaneously at Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War, have been regarded by the public as "appallingly, etc., etc., etc., deadly."

In one sense what the public thinks does not matter. In another sense it matters a very great deal, for public apprehensions are certain to be communicated to relatives in the Fleet, wherein everyone day and night knows that a mine may be struck. The best logic for that is Farragut's "Damn the torpedoes."

This, attitude, however, will become difficult to preserve if men are constantly receiving letters from their nearest and dearest about "those diabolic mines!" Psychology is everything in naval warfare, and "nerves" are easily communicated if the process goes on long enough. Far too much about "the mine danger" has appeared in print.

As a matter of fact the mine is merely potentially dangerous. The *Petropavlovsk* was not sunk in a moment by a mine, but because that particular mine exploded her main magazines. That did the mischief. Similarly, the *Amphion* would probably have still been afloat had she hit the mine anywhere except where she did hit it. Even so, she remained afloat for a considerable time, and the loss of life directly due to the mine seems to have been small.

The Russo-Japanese War was prolific in mines, both sides having ships hit. I chanced to have many personal friends in both fleets, and after the war "experiences" were, naturally enough, very get-at-able.

Of the Japanese ships which hit mines the *Hatsuse* took some two hours to sink, and no lives were lost. The Russians aver that she sank in three minutes, like the *Petropavlovsk* did, but that in no way corresponds with the narratives of her crew.

The *Fashima* kept afloat for many hours, and foundered slowly while being towed home rather too fast a day later.

The *Asahi* was hit by two mines, which both glanced off, and exploded without doing any more harm than wetting everybody.

The *Shikishima* hit one mine which did not explode.

The *Mikasa* hit nothing.

That is the true story of the most dramatic mine incident in the world's history—the entire Japanese battle fleet steaming unconsciously into a mine field.

On the Russian side the *Petropavlovsk* was, of course, as stated, blown to pieces immediately by the explosion of her magazines; but the cruiser *Bayan*, when she hit a mine, merely had one compartment filled, and steamed into harbour at a reduced speed.

These are in each case bits of information from those who had been in the ships mentioned; and—since blockade mines have not been made materially more deadly in the interim—these details should serve to remove the impression that a mine is necessarily any worse than a torpedo or big shell. The only really terrible thing about its menace is that it (like the submarine) is unseen attack.

For the rest, it may be added that mines may play a most useful part in the British blockade, since it is far easier for us to secure results by mining a definite area which must be

passed than for the Germans to accomplish things on the "dropping by chance" principle.

There is one matter which I have omitted in the foregoing, and that is the part played by the mine-sweepers—i.e., small vessels fitted for removing mines laid by the enemy.

The tremendous importance of this last is that, whether or no the British fleet lays mines, the German fleet dares not move out without sweeping its way. Sweeping is not the kind of thing which can be done at battle-cruiser speed. It is to be done easily enough, but it takes time. And time is everything, for it allows due notice to be given of every move of the enemy; in other words, it renders an evasive surprise (humanly speaking) impossible.

Meanwhile, several neutral merchant ships have been sunk by mines, and an Admiralty notification issued to the

effect that the Germans have mined trade routes well out in the North Sea. This is a violation of International Law. Also a senseless proceeding, as it is devoid of any military utility. In the North Sea neutral ships are the chief victims; in the Adriatic the Austrians have lost a torpedo boat and a fine liner by their own mines!

The only real use of mines is:

(1) To "contain" a hostile Fleet.

(2) To prevent hostile movements along an anticipated route.

As regards the first, the British Fleet was at sea and in position long before Germany could attempt the operation. As for the second—as mentioned last week—the *Amphion* was sunk because she chanced to run into a

legitimate German anticipation of the movements of our Expeditionary Force.

The mines dropped on trade routes out at sea come in neither category. They simply indicate that those in control of German mine-layers are animated by the "Goeben spirit," which, being translated into plain English, is "only hit where there is no risk of being hit back."

TRADE AND NAVAL WARFARE.

An event of the utmost importance is now in process of taking place without most of those immediately concerned realising that the Fleet has anything to do with the matter. I refer to the organised attempt which has recently been initiated—the attempt to capture and hold all the German trade markets. It is a remarkable illustration of the truth of the old proverb, "Trade follows the flag."

All the same, however, there is a certain situation to be faced. We have swept and—unless the unexpected occurs—we shall go on sweeping German commerce from the seas. This means the automatic capture of all German markets—a prospect of unexampled prosperity for the British Empire at the expense of Germany.

Germany cannot protect her trade. We can protect ours. The deduction to neutral merchants is obvious.

Herein, however, lies the danger. Germany has nothing more to lose, but she has everything to gain. If she can get even a portion of her trade under the American flag, the proverbial coach and horses through an Act of Parliament will save her from utter trade disintegration.

In such case we can only press our advantage at the expense of America. Germany may have her own dreams about destroying America once she can succeed in destroying her European rivals. But no American is likely to dream that particular dream. And so there is always the risk that in American diplomacy present advantage may bulk larger than future possibilities, especially since the recent Japanese action. Whatever Japan's intentions may be, they are bound to be



followed with apprehension on the part of the United States, to whom our Oriental ally is a menace in the same way that Germany has been a menace to us for many years past—i.e., owing to the pressure of circumstances.

So far as Japan is concerned, her quarrel with Germany is terribly genuine. A victory for Germany would mean something infinitely worse than the Russian menace in the past. The terms of peace in the German scheme of things include the handing over of Saigon and Hong Kong, possibly of Vladivostok also.

In 1899, soon after Russia had taken Port Arthur, I had it from the Tsar's own lips, "We only took Port Arthur to keep the Germans out of it. We have no quarrel with Japan, but we do not trust Germany."

Germany made up for things by "leasing" Kiao-Chau. Russia and Japan subsequently went to war, and Port Arthur is now Japanese. But after the war, when Russia and Japan compared notes, they found German influence behind all the trouble, just as surely as when all England was shouting about the Dogger Bank affair, the British Navy was watching, not the Russians, but the Germans.

These details may not seem exactly germane to the present state of affairs, but actually they are very much so. Germany had her own schemes of a Japanese alliance. Its terms were probably about as reliable as the alliance offered to Belgium, but that is a side issue. On the principle of *Timeo Danaos dona ferentes*, Japan has joined the Triple Entente.

The final issue now rests with America. Will the United States sacrifice her trade interests to honour and the fight against Germany's bid to rule the entire world? Or will America in 1914 do what she, at Napoleon's bidding, did in 1812? From the Kaiser's point of view she will.

The hour is not yet, and further discussion of it can be reserved for a more convenient season. I content myself here with indicating the possibilities which lie on the water. American public opinion we are sure of; but since Japan has entered into the World War we should not place too much dependence on American bosses. Already Carnegie, of free library fame, has made a better apology for the Kaiser's action than anything ever issued in Berlin.

The fact is that this is the first war of modern times in which trade issues have been predominant. Great merchant navies have grown up in the steam era. They have grown up in profound peace. True, there have been wars, but this generation has seen no war in which any appreciable commerce was at stake, and a World War like the present was in the category of the "unthinkable."

At the present moment the Stars and Stripes is the only neutral flag of any account, and even it is not likely to remain useful to belligerents very long. The rulers of the sea will control the world's trade.

According to German calculations in the past, we might destroy German trade as we have done, but we should do so at the expense of our own, because Germany would give us so much trouble that all trade would pass to the U.S. flag.

It may so pass; but only if Germany be able to dispute the mastery of the seas with us. More on this matter is likely to be heard later on—it is even conceivable that one or two German-American millionaires may yet force the United States into playing Germany's game. It is, anyway, one of the things that Germany counts on.

We had our chance to stand out and take our gruelling in the Kaiser's own season. Sooner or later—probably sooner—the U.S.A. will have to decide on the same question.

The Kaiser's bid for America has been long and heavy, and what Napoleon managed to do a hundred odd years ago is possible of repetition to-day. Far greater issues depend on President Wilson than the British man in the street has any idea of.

At present everything seems at "set fair." Commerce war is not a subject for headlines. It is purely nautical, and so dull and interesting.

THE NORTH SEA.

About the North Sea it is impossible to write fully. It is so very easy to give away something in perfect innocence. So far as I am concerned, I do not propose to deal with anything save week-old official reports, nor any too fully even with these. Readers must understand that in a life and death struggle like the present, restraint may be necessary, even where official reports are concerned.

So I confine myself to stating that the German submarine U 15 has gone below to stay there; that the pretty unofficial stories since published are bunkum pure and simple, and finally that the Germans are trying something which they are unlikely to pull off.

Everything written about this war gets to Germany within an hour or so, and it would be sheer idiocy to satisfy natural public curiosity any further just at present.

The only other thing that I can add is that the German submarines' service has been unexpectedly bold and daring. Our authorities credited it with being that, and—well, "things did not happen as expected"—by Germany.

Presently, as many of the Germans as are not *Goebens* will come again to "a certain place."

They will go below and stay there till the Judgment Day. That is nearly all that is to be said about the matter.

There is nothing to add, except that when the German authorities read this they will think it a bit of glorious bluff. "Righto." (German officers commanding submarines, please note.)

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The Austrian battleship *Zrinyi* has now been officially sunk so many times by a single French shell that I am constrained to imagine that the report may be true. Otherwise I should have been entirely sceptical—mainly along the argument that there is no conceivable reason why she should have been out to get hit. In this war of surprises, however, one never knows.

Otherwise, there is nothing to expect in the Adriatic but a strict Franco-British blockade to the Austrians, varied with a few torpedo attacks. Battle fleet actions

are excessively improbable for reasons stated last week. There may be one—but only absolute lunacy can dictate it.

THE FAR EAST.


Japan's action so far as the Far East is concerned does not materially alter things. One way and another we alone are superior to anything of the German Navy in the Far East, but we have no troops for the necessary military assault. Kiao-Chau will fall eventually, but it is likely to prove a second Port Arthur, even if (like the Russians at Port Arthur) reported guns have been reckoned as existing. According to my information the place is not really very strong—anyway, nothing like reported. And so the Japanese will either get it within a week, or else besiege it much as we besieged Sevastopol in the Crimean War for many weary months.

Everything depends on whether the officer commanding is *Goeben* or otherwise. If he be sufficiently otherwise, Kiao-Chau may yet remain German at the end of the war. This possibility at least should not be forgotten.

For the rest, it may be as well to remember that Admiral Kuroi (who commanded the naval land battery which sunk the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur) is somewhere in the Pacific with the *Asama* and *Azuma*. He is a very old friend of mine, and I do not want to puff him unduly. But—if the betting fraternity has turned from horses to ships—I will give them the tip that it is a two to one that Kuroi is not the central figure in the Far East operations. If the Germans at sea evade him—all right. If they meet his two cruisers—God help them!

SITUATION IN THE ATLANTIC.

Very little is really known about this. It would appear that German commerce destroyers are being too harried by British cruisers to do much mischief. This situation should continue till the corsairs die out automatically. There is,



however, a very great risk that what with secret bases and making the most of "within the meaning of the Act" in International Law, many corsairs will live beyond the otherwise natural terms of their existence.

The trouble will not last. The corsairs, sooner or later, will disappear or cease to fly the German flag (*à la Goeben*), but we must be prepared to expect losses in the interim. Every weak neutral affords a potential German base, and the difference between the old-time pirate and a German "corsair" is likely to grow finer and finer.

Luck may save us; otherwise we must be prepared for temporary losses in the Atlantic.

Reports of actions there should be accepted with caution. The German naval cruisers about are very fast, and nothing short of the direst necessity would induce them to fight. This avoidance of action is not *Goeben*, but correct naval strategy. It will be well if we all remember it. There are many good men who command German cruisers. They will not *Goeben* till forced to it.

Atlantic reports are meagre, and unofficial at that. But in so far as they indicate anything, they do indicate that the captain of the *Goeben* is not fit to black the boots of the German captains in the Atlantic. "Honour to whom honour is due"—even though he be an enemy. Our immediate job is to scupper the efficient enemy afloat on the high seas. After that, it will be quite time enough to talk about the German ships hanging about in harbour.

The Germans on the high seas are sportsmen, and should be treated as such. Their ultimate fate is certain as anything can be. Sooner or later we shall get them.

Just at the present moment it probably sounds silly to suggest that the fate of the world depends on that "sporting instinct" which for untold years the Nonconformist conscience has told us leads straight to damnation and hell.

I cannot add the proofs. I can assert that I am not a "sporting prophet," but that is all. I have never followed "sport" sufficiently well to say more; but so far as I can calculate the Germans have nautically very much backed the wrong horse.

When you size things up exactly, "war is sport in war time and contrariwise sport is war in peace time." The transition is by no means so great as some would suppose. This is where we have the Germans.

As placed here and self-censored, it probably sounds a trifle incoherent.

A month hence I may add some explanation. To-day, I dare not. I can merely go in for the tiresome reiteration that—so far as the Navy is concerned—the Germans have "backed the wrong horse."

It sounds like bluff and "swank" to say that "Der Tag" is far more likely to end at the bottom of the North Sea than on the shores of England! But so it is. Some of it depends on the land defences of Lord-knows-where being prepared.

I cannot go into details (God grant that they never come!); but so far as these lines concern ordinary British people, I want them to be prepared for learning one day that a dozen or so of our Dreadnoughts have been sunk.

The thing to do in such case is to remember that there is a good supply of other British Dreadnoughts to take the place of any who go under.

The German Navy long ago gave up serious reckoning as to its battle chances against the British Fleet. To-day it no longer trusts to guns or torpedoes, submarines, or to aircraft, but to "common or garden" panic. It seeks to create that panic. The Germans will continue to lie in harbour till the dark days of winter come along. Then—

Well, none of us are quite certain about that "then," or that "Der Tag" (query *Der Nicht*). Personally, I am not of opinion that German sailors who have been left lying for months in port saying "Der Tag" to each other are any more likely to prove up to the mark than did Villeneuve's men when, an odd hundred years ago, they went out to meet Nelson's war-worn people at Trafalgar.

As stated last week, and as I shall state every week hereafter, the captain of the *Goeben*, when he funk'd things, sacrificed every German hope on the sea.

Till then, we believed a good deal of their bluff. Now not a man in the Fleet believes it.

We have got the moral scoop, and the most important duty of the Fleet at the present time is to hold it. People can calculate as they will about "tons of projectiles per minute," but things of this sort have no real war meaning. Hence:

(1) The *Goeben* ran away.

(2) The Germans not fitted with white feathers will try at all costs to make up her deficiency.

The result (with any luck whatever) will be a foregone conclusion.

No doubt there are fights to come—the German captains will put in the best they can; but, as I prophesied last week, the cowardice of the *Goeben* has settled the ultimate result of the war on the water.

FINAL NOTE.

The general situation at the time of writing remains absolutely unchanged from what was described last week, except that the German advance towards Ostend probably indicates that an attempt to land a small raiding force in this country is in contemplation. The Germans have apparently no prospect whatever of getting over any considerable body of men, but we may at any time look for the unexpected arrival of a "forlorn hope," consisting of from 500 to 1,000 men, which will be landed at the most unexpected point, not with the object of accomplishing anything vital, but for the sake of moral effect.

If such an attempt be made, the probable landing (let us hope) is at the bottom of the North Sea; but, failing that, anywhere—that is to say, Seaton in Devonshire, or Aberystwith in Wales, are just as likely to be objectives as those places along the East Coast which are awaiting a possible German invasion.

The situation in the Baltic is apparently unchanged. It would seem that the Germans are keeping up a very distant and cautious blockade of the Russian coast, and that the Russians are waiting unmoved until some of the Gangoot class are ready for sea.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Aix-la-Chapelle.—Known in German as **Aachen**. A town and watering place of Western Prussia, situated between the Meuse and the Rhine in the Rhine province, forty-four miles west south-west from Cologne, on the line of railway from Cologne to Liège. Although situated in German territory, Aix is practically the point of junction of the German, Belgian, and Dutch frontiers, and is a town of considerable importance, with a population of nearly 150,000. Its thermal baths are widely celebrated, and it is one of the great customs stations of Western Germany. Two treaties of peace have been signed here—the first in 1668, the second in 1748.

Alsace-Lorraine.—A German imperial territory, embracing the former French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and styled in German **Elsass-Lothringen**. It extends from the Luxembourg border on the north to Switzerland in the south, and is bounded on the east by the Palatinate of Bavaria, and on the west by the French frontier, as defined on the conclusion of peace in 1871. The total population of the territory is upwards of two millions, and its chief towns are Strasbourg (capital of the territory), Metz, Mulhausen, Colmar, Hagenu,

and Saargemund. The railways total upwards of 1,300 miles, and the territory is of great fertility, being chiefly devoted to agricultural pursuits. The Government is vested in a Governor-General, appointed by the German Emperor. The Vosges mountains form a natural frontier defence practically from the Swiss boundary to the latitude of Strasbourg, on the western side, and the Rhine valley, in the east of the territory, forms another line of great natural strength. Good roads and a system of canals afford means of communication, in addition to the railways of the territory. The Rhine valley in Alsace is the more fertile portion of the whole, Lorraine lying almost entirely on the high plateau reaching from the Moselle to the Saar, and being devoted in great measure to coal, iron and salt mining. The line of German fortifications stretches from Altkirch in the south to Thionville in the north, and is connected by a strategic railway linking up all the principal fortified points.

Antwerp.—Capital of the Belgian province of the same name, situated about fifty miles from the sea and twenty-five miles north of Brussels by rail, on the right bank of the River

Scheldt. It is one of the chief European ports, over sixty shipping lines having their headquarters here, and the quay accommodation extends nearly three miles along the bank of the river. The total population is about 400,000. Antwerp is surrounded by a ring of forts of modern design, the strongest line being that toward the east and south, where eight forts, placed at regular intervals, less than a mile distant from each other, defend the city. In addition to the regular ring of defences, the forts de Wavre and de Waelhem, in the south-east, and Fort de Schooten, in the north-east, form outpost defences. On the west forts St. Marie, St. Philippe, de Zwynrecht, and de Cruybeke, defend the approaches to the Scheldt, which has to be crossed before the city can be reached from this direction.

Charleroi.—A town of nearly 28,000 inhabitants, and the centre of the iron industry of southern Belgium. It was fortified up to 1868, when its fortifications were converted into promenades. It is situated on the main line from Mons to Namur, about half-way between the two towns, and is about fifty miles directly south of Brussels, and roughly twenty-five miles from the French frontier.

Elbe.—One of the most important rivers of central Europe which, after leaving the Bohemian-Saxon frontier, turns north-west, passing through Dresden to the North German plain, flowing by way of Torgau, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, beyond which it divides into the north or Hamburg Elbe, and the south or Harburg Elbe, surrounding the island of Wilhelmsburg and several smaller islets. Beyond the islands the two rivers join again at Blankenese, forming a stream of four to nine miles in width to Cuxhaven, where the river empties into the North Sea. From Hamburg to the sea the bed of the river has been dredged to a depth which will admit vessels of 26 feet draught, and the total navigable length from the mouth is 525 miles. Between Cuxhaven and Freiburg the Kiel Canal has its western outlet to the Elbe at Brunsbüttel. From Freiburg outward to the sea the banks of the river are strongly fortified, and the defences, together with the fortifications on the island of Heligoland, off the mouth of the river, render the river and canal practically impregnable to attack from the sea.

Galicia.—An Austrian territory with a population of about 7½ millions, of whom the great majority are Poles and Ruthenians. It is virtually a self-governing province of the Austrian Empire, and, occupying the northern part of Austrian territory, borders on Russian Poland and Russia itself, the frontier being defined for a great distance in the west of the province by the river Vistula and the Sanna or San. The chief towns of Galicia are Lemberg, Tarnow, Jaroslaw, Tarnopol, Brody, and Sanok, while the chief town of Western Galicia is Cracow, an important railway centre near the Russian and German frontiers. Railways cross the Russian frontier from Brody to Dubno in the east, and from Cracow to Czenstochowa and Kielce in the west of the province.

Heligoland.—Belonging to the Frisian group of islands, and situated 28 miles north-west from the mouth of the Elbe, Heligoland was ceded to Germany by Great Britain in 1890, and has since been made one of the principal defences of the Elbe mouth and the western exit from the Kiel Canal. It forms one of the strategic bases of the German fleet, and possesses a harbour, the Duneninsel, in which the largest vessels can coal in safety. The population of the island is, in normal times about 2,500, and it ranks as a fashionable North German watering place. The island is little over a mile in length, but in its area are to be found some of the strongest and best equipped forts in existence. It is reckoned as part of the province of Schleswig-Holstein—at present.

Insterburg.—An important town about fifty-five miles east of Königsburg, in East Prussia. From Insterburg five railways branch to Königsburg, Memel, Thorn, and Lyck in Germany, and Kovno in Western Russia. It is the chief town of a circle in the government district of Gumbinnen, and is situated at the point where the Inster and Angerap rivers join to form the Pregel. It is an active agricultural and manufacturing town, with a population of about 20,000, including a garrison, in normal times, of about 3,000.

Lille.—A town and important railway centre of northern France, about 155 miles north of Paris by rail, and about ten miles from the Belgian frontier. It is the capital of the department of Nord, and is situated on the low plain of the River Deule, a tributary of the Scheldt. Canals afford communication both with Paris and Belgium, and railways extend from Lille to Calais, Ghent, Brussels, and Paris, while the town is also an important point on the railway which follows the northern frontier from Dunkirk to Longuyon. It is one of the most important manufacturing towns on the northern frontier; its population is upwards of 200,000, mainly devoted to flax-spinning and kindred industries, while it is also the site of a State tobacco factory.

Luneville.—Chief town of an arrondissement in the department of Meurthe et Moselle, seventeen miles south-east of Nancy, and 240 miles east of Paris on the Paris-Strasbourg line of railway, and also on the Epinal-Nancy line. In times of peace it is one of the most important French cavalry stations, and is fortified, being an outpost point of the Nancy-Belfort line of frontier defences, and about ten miles distant from the German frontier. The district round about is mainly agricultural, but the town itself is a centre for several manufacturing industries. Its population is about 25,000.

Mechlin.—Also "Malines," of which the more popular name is a corruption. A Belgian city on the River Dyle, and an important railway junction about midway between Antwerp and Brussels, with lines extending in practically every direction, as well as a number of main roads connecting with all the important points of north-western Belgium. It contains extensive railway workshops connected with the Belgian State railways, and has a population of about 60,000.

Mons.—Situated about forty miles west of Namur, and about 140 miles from Paris. It is the centre of the chief coal-mining district of Belgium, and is an important railway junction, being the point at which two lines branch to Paris from the north. The eastern, or more direct line, is *via* Maubeuge, and is 155 miles to Paris, while the western route, *via* Douai and Arras, is 176 miles. Mons is situated on a hill and has been fortified for the past six centuries; it is connected by rail with Charleroi, thirty-five miles distant, and with Brussels, about forty-five miles away.

Nancy.—Chief town of the French department of Meurthe et Moselle, and up to 1871 the capital of the French province of Lorraine. The population, which is upwards of 110,000, has doubled in the last thirty years owing to the number of people who have crossed over from German Lorraine in order to be under French rule. Nancy is the headquarters of the 20th Army Corps, and is situated about fifteen miles from the German frontier, on the Paris-Strasbourg railway and also on the Mezieres-Nancy-Epinal strategic line of frontier railway. It is strongly fortified, and is of considerable importance among the frontier defences of France in the south-east. The Marne-Rhine Canal flows by the town, and adds to its facilities for transport.

Oertelburg.—An important railway junction in East Prussia, being the point where the railway running west from Lyck divides for Allenstein and Neidenburg. It is about twenty miles north of the Polish frontier.

Sambre.—A river of Northern France and Southern Belgium, rising in the valley which lies between the towns of Maubeuge and Guise in the north of France (department Nord). It flows north-east by the town of Maubeuge, after which it turns more directly east, crosses the Belgian frontier, and continues a fairly straight course to Charleroi, whence it flows by many curves and convolutions to Namur, where it joins the River Meuse, which, later on, becomes the Maas in Dutch territory.

Strasbourg.—German capital of the territory of Alsace-Lorraine, and a first-class fortress, standing two miles from the left bank of the Rhine, and about ninety miles north of Bale. Its normal garrison amounts to 15,000 men, and it is the headquarters of the 15th German Army Corps, while the fortifications have been enormously strengthened since the war of 1870-71, and brought up to date and fitted with guns of the most modern and powerful type. Its population is over 150,000. Railways connect it with Metz, Nancy, Bale, and all the principal German garrison stations, the lines towards Germany being constructed with a view to reinforcing the Strasbourg garrison to any extent that may be required.

Thorembais.—The name of two Belgian villages, situated about two miles apart in the province of Brabant, on the road from Tirlemont to Gembloux. The more eastern of the two, about nine miles from Gembloux, is the larger and more important.

Valenciennes.—Situated on the right bank of the River Scheldt, about 157 miles north of Paris on the Paris-Brussels railway, at the point where the Schœnelle and Scheldt join. It is the centre of an extensive and rich coalfield, and is largely engaged in iron and steel industries. Its population is upwards of 25,000. It is connected by rail with Lille and Maubeuge, as well as with various other centres, and is one of the most important towns of the department of Nord. The Belgian frontier is about eight miles distant from the town. The lace for which Valenciennes used to be famed is but little made here now.

Willenburg.—A German village, about fourteen miles north of the Polish frontier, and an important point on the strategic railway of East Prussia.

"The War by Land," by Hilaire Belloc, "The War by Water," by F. T. Jane, the *Diary of the War*, and the series forming a *Topographical Guide*, commenced in the issue of *Land and Water* dated Aug. 22nd, which can be obtained through any newsagent.



THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

AT the moment this article was first written—some thirty-six hours before it could be in the hands of the public—the situation at the front in the western field of the war was more difficult to grasp, and one's judgment upon it was more dependent upon mere conjecture, than had been the case in any previous phase of the operations. The news was more meagre than it had yet been, and, while meagre, was made the more useless by occasional very vivid and very ignorant descriptions of warfare, written by correspondents who had in mind, not our information, but a momentary nervous effect and a corresponding profit for their proprietors.

Nevertheless, it was possible upon that, Wednesday, evening to arrive at a general judgment of the situation, or at any rate of the positions; and one which did not include too much doubtful matter. The news of Thursday corroborated those conclusions.

If the reader will look at the sketch outline which is set at the head of this article he will perceive that there is no mark made upon it for the position of the opposing troops or for the frontiers existing before the war between the different governments, French, German, and Belgian. Both these omissions are deliberately made, because I desire to show by a series of reasoned steps what has happened—and only then, by diagrams, to show how the Allied line fell back.

I will therefore beg the reader to follow the very elementary exposition I shall now undertake with the aid of the few lines and points marked upon this sketch map. It only concerns the northern front between Verdun and Paris, because it is upon this front that the issue of the first phase of our western war will be decided in the next few days. What is happening south of Verdun is of little consequence to the great issue north and west of that fortress—it is of the less consequence since the repelling of the Crown Prince's army, which was attempting to pierce the line of the Meuse north of Verdun.


It will be remembered that from the Friday evening, August 21, to the Sunday evening, August 23, the Allied line was massed upon the River Meuse above Namur, and also along the line of the Sambre, and so on to Mons. This long cordon of men from a little west of Mons to Namur itself passed through Charleroi. It consisted upon the left (that is in the neighbourhood of Mons) of somewhat less than 80,000 British troops. The remaining two-thirds of the line running up along

the right through Charleroi and along the lower Sambre to Namur (where the Sambre falls into the Meuse) was held by the 5th French Army, including Algerian troops. There were, perhaps, upon the whole of this line five army corps, including the two of the English contingent; there may have been six, but the lesser number is the more probable. It was against this line, from Mons to Namur, that the whole weight of the German shock was delivered. Whether eight or whether ten Army Corps attacked we do not know, but we are certain from the nature of the fighting that the offensive (as was to be expected) came on in much larger numbers than the defensive it had to meet.

The Anglo-French line from Mons to Namur stood the shock thoroughly during those two days. The weight of this attack came against the centre, upon Charleroi; it was there delivered at once with the intention of breaking the line of the Sambre and also of securing the passage of the river. That attack, though the line swayed backwards and forwards across the Sambre at this point, failed in its immediate object. The Allied line was not broken by the German assault.

At 2 o'clock, however, of that same Sunday, August 23rd, about the fortieth hour of the struggle, the eastern forts which defend Namur down the Meuse valley were silenced by the siege howitzer fire of the Germans; and through a gap of about seven miles so opened, the Germans entered the town and thenceforward commanded the bridges over the two rivers. They were not perhaps in full command of those bridges till about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, but the fact that they would be in command of them was known to the French commanders not long after 2 o'clock, when these eastern forts were silenced.

As I explained in my notes of last week, it was the fall of Namur with its bridge-heads which changed the whole aspect of the campaign. Until that moment a counter-offensive through the Ardennes was the French game, after it a purely defensive strategy was imposed. The Allied line between Mons and Namur, which the Germans had tried to break and had failed to break, now had to fall back because the fortress protecting its right was gone. The French round Charleroi, getting the news first, began to retire on the Sunday evening, and the English to their left immediately afterwards in the darkness between Sunday and Monday. I illustrate this by the accompanying diagrams, because,



SKETCH SHOWING HOW THE FALL OF NAMUR IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON OF SUNDAY, AUGUST 23RD, INVOLVED AN IMMEDIATE RETIREMENT OF THE WHOLE ALLIED LINE, PROCEEDING FROM RIGHT TO LEFT, AND NOT UNDERTAKEN ON THE EXTREME LEFT, WHERE WAS THE ENGLISH CONTINGENT, TILL DARKNESS HAD FALLEN.

though the matter was described last week, it not only bears reiteration, but needs it. The fall of Namur has changed, prolonged, and, perhaps, made more decisive the whole European War.

The French counter-offensive through the Ardennes to the east of the Meuse, pivoting on Namur, and intended to thrust up against the German communications in Belgium, could no longer pivot on Namur, because Namur was gone. It had also to fall back. The Allied troops which had held the line of the Sambre, prolonged from Namur to Mons, fell back, heavily pressed by the enemy, to the position Cambrai-Le Cateau-Mézières. There were, as a fact, troops beyond Cambrai towards Arras; and there were, of course, many troops protecting the line of the Upper Meuse between Mézières and Verdun.

Now it will be noted from the map at the head of these comments, that the English contingent which had held the country round about Mons had not fallen directly back, but backwards *and to the left* at the same time. The retreat was diagonal. For the line Cambrai-Le Cateau is not directly behind the line Mons-Charleroi, but at an oblique thereto.

This bearing to the left during the whole of that retreat meant, of course, that the march was longer than it would have been if it had been a direct falling back. It was immensely arduous, kept up more or less day and night, and involving heavy losses in men who could not keep up and men who

were wounded as the operation proceeded. It will be found, when the detailed history of the war is written, that certain units must have covered not less than 15 miles a day during the whole of that terrible business. And the English contingent thus falling back from Mons to the line Cambrai-Le Cateau accomplished with success as difficult a task as is ever set to men in the prosecution of a war. They accomplished it successfully.

The pressure of the Germans upon the retreating force was kept up through the astonishingly rapid advance made by those enemies—a rapidity upon which I shall comment later in this article in a different connection.

The Cambrai-Le Cateau-Mezières line was reached, and the Allied troops re-formed thereon, upon Tuesday night, August 25th.

Upon the Wednesday, August 26th, the superior German forces to the north which had pursued thus heavily during the retreat, attacked with the bulk of their forces (and the best of their forces) to the west; that is, they attacked the Cambrai-Le Cateau section, the left section, of the Allied line, with peculiar vigour and in numbers drawn thither for the purpose of an immediate and decisive blow, comparable to that unsuccessfully delivered three days before at Charleroi.

They did this because it was now their object, not to break through the line, but to outflank it, and to get round it by the west: to bend back and come round on to the rear of its left extreme. It was on this account that they attacked the western extreme of the line. The double arrow means that in

the first engagement, that on August 22nd and 23rd, the main German assault was hurled at the centre of the line: that in the second engagement, on the 26th, it was hurled at the western extreme in the hope of turning the whole line. At this western extreme were the English.

This project the English contingent which held that left extreme defeated. They were not outflanked: they were not pierced; but they fell back still further to a line representing about one more day's march behind, that is to the south and west of the line Cambrai-Le Cateau.

Upon the Thursday, the 27th of August the Allied line as a whole ran from Mezières westward, but no longer through Le Cateau to Cambrai with some slight prolongation towards Arras. It was bent back and ran from

Mezières, south of Hirson, south of Guise, just north of St. Quentin, to strike the Upper Somme above and to the east of Amiens.

At that moment—a moment not exactly identical all along the line, but corresponding roughly to the afternoon of last Thursday, August 27th—there begins a two-fold development of the campaign which would, had the Allied line failed, have made of the following few days the critical days in the first phase of the western war.

This two-fold development was as follows:—

First, the rapid German advance was checked for the moment, and with it (for the moment) the everlasting German routine of advancing to outflank with their superior numbers towards the west, or left, of the Allied line.

Secondly, in the checking of this, in the taking of the shock, the Allied line fluctuated in a curious and even dangerous manner. It was so bent that no one could at first tell, from the fragmentary reports reaching us, either whether it would probably break, or whether there was a breaking point in the enemy's line, or where in either case the strain would come. But though the twisting of the line did not yet afford any ground for judging the future, we could, by putting together the reports that had so far reached us, see what the curve of flexion had been, and what the serpentine front then held would appear to be. We could also judge the peril.

Remember that no connected news of the whole operations had been communicated for three days, either by the French or the English censorship, and that therefore the conjectures remained only conjectures; but they were based upon the reports of eye-witnesses in the Press, and upon the putting together of those reports.

What would seem to have happened by that day, Saturday last, the 29th, was something like this, going from right to left, from east to west, along the line:

From Verdun to Mezières, along all the upper valley of the Meuse, attempts to cross that river undertaken by the army commanded by the Prussian Crown Prince and the troops from Wurtemberg had been resisted. The line appears to have been held between Verdun and Mezières.

So much for Section I.

In the section just to the left, or west, of this—Section II.—you had a strong pressure of the enemy making for Rethel and the line of the Aisne. I take it to be certain that the enemy was south of Mezières, and we know from official despatches that he was pressing in all the neighbourhood of Soigny.

Immediately to the left (or west) again, in Section III., there was a successful counter-offensive of the French. That counter-offensive may quite possibly not have been maintained. It may have got "fore-side," and have had to retire. But there are such definite accounts of the pushing of the Hanoverian 10th Army Corps and the Prussian Guards towards Guise, that they cannot be neglected.





DIAGRAM SHOWING THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN ATTACK (A) ON THE SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, AUGUST 22ND AND 23RD, ON THE CENTRE OF THE ALLIED LINE AT CHARLEROI, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PIERCE IT; (B) ON THE WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 26TH, ON THE EXTREMITY OF THE ALLIED LINE (WHERE THE ENGLISH CONTINGENT STOOD) IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENVELOP IT.

From the next section again to the west, or left, Section IV, which was that held by the British contingent supported by French troops, the line bent back again to the south. There had been announced, for forty-eight hours past, strong German pressure towards the ring of forts round La Fère, and unless I misread the exceedingly interesting account given in a London morning paper on Wednesday, and relating presumably to Saturday and Sunday, the line was then bent back beyond St. Quentin, which is the town there described as having been abandoned. There were, even at that date, English soldiers as far back as Noyon, though it does not follow that the fighting had got as far south as that, for Noyon may have been no more than the headquarters of the resistance at this indented portion of the line.

In the fifth section, still more to the west and the left, we had the defensive line of the Allies facing along the line of the Somme from Ham to Perrone and up as far as, and perhaps, a little behind, the town of Bapaume; the cannonade on this extreme left being heard from Villers on the other side of the Somme.

Putting all these together, we are now in a position to establish the defensive line which the Allies were holding against the Prussian advance at the end of last week. How far they had succeeded in holding, whether they had not even taken the counter-offensive, no kind of information had reached London.

That line, then—the sinuous line held by the Allies during last week-end—the accompanying sketch describes. Its first section still held the Upper Meuse. Its second was bent back behind Soigny, and perhaps already to the Aisne. Its third, on the contrary, was pressed out towards Hirson



SKETCH SHOWING ROUGHLY THE PROBABLE DEFENSIVE LINE OF LAST TUESDAY (ON THE LAST TELEGRAMS RECEIVED BY WEDNESDAY NIGHT).

and Guise. Its fourth was deeply indented towards La Fère and Noyon. Its fifth went right up again and held the enemy from near Bapaume, through Peronne to Ham.


It will be immediately apparent from such a conclusion that two main offensive efforts were being made by the Germans to break the Allied line, and that the attempt to outflank it only was for the moment abandoned. These two efforts correspond to the two indentations in the line, one in front of Rethel, the other in front of Noyon. If both and each of these sections could hold against the pressure directed against them, the line would remain intact, though it should still further retire. If either were forced, the line would be pierced and the first phase of the war decided in favour of the enemy. That was the peril six days ago.

The indentation pointing towards Noyon corresponds to the valley of the Oise, and is the shortest road of approach to Paris. It was upon this notch presumably that the weight of the assault fell.

Certain corollaries attach to these conclusions. Thus it is evident that from this week-end the main communications between Paris and London, which run through Boulogne and Amiens, were so gravely threatened that travel along them had to be abandoned, while the supply of the English contingent had also in future to come from further west along the coast.

It is again evident that the threat on the Oise valley, the deep indentation of the line before Noyon, meant two things. It meant, first, that the extensive left of the Allied line was in danger of being cut off, and therefore the numerical inferiority of the Allies—already pronounced—would be gravely emphasised, and that the Allies would have suffered their first defeat in the field. It meant, secondly, that, even if the Allies' left should succeed in retiring and escaping such a disaster, the advance of the German extreme right upon Paris would be the next step. Such an advance would not mean that the French Army in the field had accepted an adverse decision. It would still be in being and still be able to continue the struggle indefinitely. It would not run the risk of shutting up any considerable portion of its total forces behind the forts of Paris. It would reserve itself for continued free action upon the flank, and (if possible) upon the communications of the enemy as he advanced upon the capital. To advance upon the capital would be, for the enemy, nothing but a stroke of moral effect. What moral effect means in war, how it may lead men to wasteful energy, when and in what degree it may be of value, I discussed last week.

But it is not to be believed that a German Army could resist the temptation, if the opportunity offers, of a march upon Paris, strategically useless as such a march would be. It is hardly any more to be believed that a modern French Army, engaged in this war upon the stupendous task of saving the culture of Christendom from dissolution, and historic France from final disaster, would hesitate to sacrifice the capital, and to preserve the strategic advantage such a sacrifice would involve. In plain English, the German advance is now in contact with the outer defences of Paris. This means that we must expect as a possibility, or a probability of the immediate future, a falling back of the whole defensive line from Verdun to Paris through, or perhaps south of, the Reims Camp, abandoning La Fère, and roughly following the Valley of the lower Marne. That advance should, before these lines appear, have reached the outer ring of forts in front of Paris. Though the forts will be defended, I do not believe that a French armed force of any size will allow itself to be detached and contained within that entrenched camp.



SKETCH OF THE TWO LINES OF THE ALLIED RETIREMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST SIX DAYS, AND OF THE LINE THAT WILL PROBABLY BE HELD WHEN OR IF THE ALLIES REPOSE THEIR LEFT ON PARIS.

I conceive that the next phase will consist in a withdrawal of the Allied Army in the field, its left based on the resistance of the forts round Paris—short or long—its main object a prolongation of the struggle with the enemy drawn further and further in, and with the army preserved intact to take a counter offensive, however belated, at last. Strategically, the Germans should mask Paris, and not waste time, space, and men in a diversion towards that particular area of ground. The moral effect of their entry into Paris is already discounted. Whether their dramatic instinct can be conquered by their strategical reasoning in this matter remains to be seen. They know, as strategists, that their one and only business is to put the Allied Army out of action, not to enjoy the barren effect of an occupation. It will be a waste in any case. How much of a waste only the length of the resistance can show. Perhaps they will not so waste their remaining energy. We cannot tell till the event. Whether their brains will master their appetite we shall know in a very few days.

CERTAIN SUBSIDIARY POINTS.

There are many matters in connection with this rapid German advance, the check received eight days ago, its resumed heavy pressure upon two points, the sinuous line of advance thus hammered out, and the present advance on Paris, while subsidiary to the main issue, are of poignant interest to the people of this country.

The first, of course, is the nature of the casualties suffered by the English contingent, their proportion and their meaning.

With regard to these the following points should be noticed:

(1) The total casualties, when they are known, will considerably exceed 6,000, the first figure given. Over 5,000 have already been received for rather less than three-fourths and rather more than two-thirds of the British forces engaged.

(2) Whenever a force *retires* fighting before another force which *advances* fighting and which presses upon the retirement of its opponent, much the greater number of casualties of the retiring force must be marked "missing." This distressing word does not mean that the men are lost, still less that they are killed; it does not mean that they are wounded in so rapid a retirement. Men who cannot

keep up with a pressed march fall out and are taken prisoner. The losses count to the full in a military sense; they are complete losses to the effectives of the fighting force; but they do not spell death or even wounds necessarily; their numbers are in excess of the total number of killed and wounded.

(3) The descriptions given of a force in retreat (descriptions which never ought to be given unless full news from the war is permitted) are utterly misleading to the civilian mind, and confuse it. They veil from it the true nature of that operation. A retreat is disheartening, it is painful, and all the rest of it; but in mere strategy it is an operation like any other. It only differs from an advance in this—that you abandon to the enemy that wastage from your organisation which you would, in an advance, send back out of the way and well cared for to your base.

There are certain simple mottoes in the reading of warfare, whether historical or contemporary, which everybody should have before him as immutable guides to judgment. They may almost be reduced to three. At any rate, three such epigrams are the basis of all sound judgment in the matter, and the cure for all panic.

I will put them thus and emphasize them by italics:—

(1) *Any armed force advances or retires in columns. It fights deployed in a line.*

(2) *Until an army has been rendered materially weaker in numbers or equipment to its opponent, no decision has been reached: that is, there has been no victory and no defeat.*

(3) *Save in the exceptional case of an army caught in column before it can deploy, there is no rendering of an army materially weaker, still less is there any destruction of an armed force, until its deployed line is either (a) turned, or (b) pierced.*

The army of the Allies, though it repose, as it may repose before these lines appear, on an invested Paris, though it retire south from an occupied Paris, is not, to the hour of my writing this, turned or pierced. It is in full being.

THE EASTERN FIELD OF WAR.




SKETCH OF THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN, AND THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN ARMIES.

I said last week, and it will have to be said frequently in the course of comments upon these campaigns, that to depend upon immediate pressure exercised by the Russian armies upon the Germanic powers, and particularly upon Berlin, is to depend upon a vain thing.

The pressure cannot come—I am willing to wager that it will not come—before the close of October. And it cannot be an immediate pressure from the very nature of the operations to which Russian Armies in the eastern field of war are condemned. This is due to three quite evident factors: (1) the great distances involved, (2) the paucity of communications to the east of the Russian

frontier and to some extent in the belt immediately west of it, (3) the presence of considerable opposing forces.

As to (1): I think the most striking way of showing to the eye of the reader what this dependence upon "the Russian steam roller" means, is to put before him the following diagram. It is absurdly simple, but I think it is effective. Here are three arrows. The first (a) represents the



ARROWS SHOWING COMPARATIVE LENGTH OF ADVANCE:

- (A) FOR RUSSIANS IN EAST PRUSSIA UPON BERLIN.
- (B) FOR RUSSIANS BEFORE POSEN UPON BERLIN.
- (C) FOR GERMANS ON THEIR PRESENT POSITION UPON PARIS.

advance which a Russian Army must make from its extreme starting point to Berlin: even if it were as rapid in its advance (which is impossible) and as successful (which it has not hitherto been) as the German forces in the west. The second arrow (b) represents the distance which the Russian armies would still have to cover after they had masked or taken the frontier fortresses, thoroughly invaded the heart of Prussian territory, and had passed the town of Posen—an advance which could not be made until the Austrian menace upon their flank had been destroyed. The third broader arrow (c) represents upon the same scale the distance at the present moment separating the Prussian Army (with its Austrian auxiliaries) from Paris. I think the contrast is sufficiently striking.

But it is already evident that the Russian advance will be neither unchecked nor particularly

rapid. Two things have happened this week, the one certainly fortunate to Russia, the other certainly unfortunate, which give one the right to speak in this fashion.

The unfortunate thing is a heavy defeat suffered by the forces which have been invading East Prussia. This defeat appears to have taken place in front of Osterode. We have the German official account (and German official accounts have hitherto been singularly accurate) which speaks of 30,000 prisoners and of a total defeat. We have the Russian admission of a check, and we have the further admission of great numbers having been brought up against two army corps which were caught in isolation. We ought not to attach undue importance even to an action of this kind, which would have been decisive in any of the smaller wars of the past; but it is a very important thing. It will be retrieved; and it will be retrieved by numbers, as also by the intense determination of the Russian people. But, for the moment, it makes progress towards the line of the Vistula, Danzig, Graudenz, Thorn, impossible, and the Russian sweep through Eastern Prussia towards the lower Vistula has been held up.

The second piece of news, fortunate rather than unfortunate to Russia, though not yet conclusive, equally proves with what deliberation the western advance must be undertaken. It is upon a larger scale than the check received to the north of Russian Poland in East Prussia, and the field in which it has taken place is Galicia—that is, the northern belt of the Austrian dominions between the Carpathians and the Russian border, and the southern part of that western projecting lump of Prussia which corresponds to Russian Poland. Here an Austrian advance had been proceeding during the week, not without successes that might be called victories, towards Lublin, and attended by a peculiar success at Kielce. This advance appears to have been checked by the Russians and to be heavily threatened at this moment by a counter-offensive directed against the town of Lemberg to the south. We have now authoritative news that this counter-offensive was entirely successful. Thus the main Austrian attack upon Russia has failed, and its momentum has been checked and broken. Therefore, after due delay for re-organisation and for coming up westward, the Russian masses will be free to cross the extreme western boundary of Russian Poland, and begin their march upon the line of the Oder. But not till some time hence.

But the process, even though unchecked for the future, must necessarily be a slow one. Until the line of the Oder is reached, there is no threat to Berlin, let alone any heavy pressure which could make Prussia retire her men from the Western theatre of war. And in general, I repeat what I have said before in these notes: I think there will not be, under the most favourable circumstances, any anxiety in the Western field for what is going on in the East until after the middle of October. If the circumstances are not favourable, but are unfavourable, then there will be no such pressure for months. For, after October, the few roads will be difficult and the approach of winter will handicap all advance.

If anyone has placed reliance on the extraordinary telegrams which announce the retirement of men from the Western field of war to help in the Eastern, he may be content to forego that consolation. The Prussians (and Austrians) to the west of the Rhine will use every man they can in that Western theatre of war for many weeks to come. The train-loads seen going eastward through Belgium are either train-loads of wounded evacuated towards the base, or men being moved from one part of the Western field to another. Men drafted to the East they most certainly are not.

I will conclude by some appreciation of what, I think, has been in everybody's mind during the past week—the success of certain German theories, the coming true of many German prophecies, and the achievement of tasks which Germany had openly proposed to herself. But I will suggest not only the success of Germany in these matters, but also the modifications of that success, which I now append.

We are, at this stage of the war, at last able to appreciate more or less in their right proportion certain facts which were conjectural and doubtful during the first weeks; and before we proceed to our weekly summary and reading of what has happened to date in the two fields of operations, the Western and the Eastern, it would be well to enumerate those facts and to grasp them for the purposes of our further judgment.

1. THE FACTOR OF NUMBERS.

As was pointed out in the first of these articles, other things being equal, the deciding factor in a campaign is the factor of numbers—not necessarily of numbers as a whole, but of numbers at the decisive place and time.

Now the first fact dominating all the others is this: The attack of the German and Austrian Empires upon France has been made in far larger numbers than was expected by the French and their Allies. That is the simple explanation of all that has happened hitherto in the West.

If we go by the elementary method of counting the adult males subject to the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs and contrasting them with the adult males citizens of the French Republic, we get a disproportion of roughly 12 to 4. It is, as a fact, rather more than 12 to rather less than 4: it is almost exactly 121 to 39: it is an overwhelming disproportion.

I repeat: in military affairs, other things being equal, the deciding factor is numbers. It was so in the great effort of the French Revolution. It was so in 1870. Those "other things" are nearly equal in the great modern conscript armies: training, equipment, and the rest. Numbers should decide.

If, then, the proportion of more than three to one had held, the result in the Western theatre of war would have been a foregone conclusion. It should not have taken three weeks. But there were, of course, a great number of most important qualifications to so crude a contrast. These modifications may be roughly but accurately summarised under five heads, which I place in order of their importance from least to most:

(1) Not all, nor nearly all, of the adult male population of the two central Empires is trained to arms. This is of less and less value to the French as every day of the war passes, for the untrained men are being with every day digested more and more thoroughly into the trained mass.

(2) One of the two Germanic monarchies, the Hapsburgs, had to deal with a heterogeneous population, much of which was ill disposed to the German spirit and to government by German speaking men. Therefore, the numbers which Austria could lend to Germany for action against France, though large, was, in any case, very much less than the mass of her forces. And this heterogeneous character of the Hapsburg dominions further weakened Austria in a matter which was the match that lighted the whole war—the Slavs, upon her southern boundary, who had escaped her control, and whom she had foolishly proposed to govern against their wills; the Servians.

(3) The French Army discovered, when the crisis came, two influences in its favour—the Belgian resistance and the English alliance. The unexpected and very valuable resistance of the Belgians who, though not possessed of an army trained on the same lines as the great conscript armies, though able to put immediately into the field but a very small proportion of their total adult males, and those, in part, militia, determined a delay of at least twelve days in the plans of the German General Staff. It is not exaggerated but sober language to say that the sacrifice of Belgium promises the redemption of Europe. It will not count less but more as time goes on.

Far more important, in the military sense, was the final decision of the British Government to support the French. That decision effected two things. It gave to France a small but very valuable accretion of troops, six per cent. of all forces, not quite ten per cent. to the total of the first line, but more than 16 per cent. of the total in the area where the chief blow fell, and the British contingent thus afforded was not only of most excellent military character, but, what is even more valuable, under-estimated by the Germans. Few things are worth more in war than an under-estimate on the part of your enemy, either of the numbers or of the quality of the troops he is going to meet at any particular point.

Of further and still greater importance to the French was the opening of the sea to them by the British Fleet. So long as the sea remains open to the one group of enemies and closed to the other, so long there is necessarily a slowly increasing strain upon the one and a permanent source of supply open to the other.

(4) The plan of attack long designed and openly described by the German Powers was one in which everything had to be done at once and in the first stages of the campaign. There was no arrangement in fortification or in strategy for delay. There will prove to be little arrangement for retirement.

It will be asked why this last feature can be counted as a modification of the enormous numerical preponderance against the French. The answer is that though it does not affect that preponderance at the beginning of the war, though, on the contrary, it is actually due to the presence of such a preponderance—the rush system was only designed because those who designed it counted on superior numbers—yet if it is checked it modifies the value of numbers in two ways. First, the checks, partial and temporary though they be, involve enormous losses quite out of proportion to the losses of the defence; second, they bring the front of the defence more and more parallel to the German lines of communication. That is, until the defending line is outflanked or pierced the offensive opposed to it goes on into a more and more perilous position with a less and less chance, *unless it succeeds*, of securing its line of supply against a counter attack.

(5) Finally, the most important modification, which everybody has noticed, is that in the long run the immense numbers of Russia will begin to tell. When or if they are telling with all their force, the numerical preponderance which was so enormous at the beginning of the campaign will gradually turn to its opposite. The German Powers will be putting not a little more than 12 men against somewhat less than 4 men, but a little more than 12 (even if they had had no losses) to a good deal over 16 or 17. Already, from the presence of Russian armies over the Eastern frontiers, the proportion of German and Austrian troops to French west of the Rhine can hardly be more than 7 to 4, and is perhaps by this time as low as 6 to 4. And the great main business of the Allies is,

by further English contingents, by perpetual wearing down of the enemy, by compelling him to expend men on his communications, to make the proportion 4 to 4 at last—and then to take the counter offensive.

These things being so, it is obvious that the one outstanding thing in the present situation is the power of the defending line to hold. It may fall back. In falling back it may expose to every kind of suffering the French districts that are abandoned. It cannot but, in so falling back, affect in some degree the state of mind of the defenders. But it remains mathematically true that so long as that line holds, and so long as it is neither pierced nor turned, (1) there has been no decision, (2) every day that passes is in favour of the Allies.

2. THE SUCCESS OF GERMAN THEORY.

The second outstanding fact which the progress of the war has hitherto revealed is the success of certain peculiarly German theories now that they have been put to the test of practice, though it is important for us to measure the exact amount of that success, and not to exaggerate it.

Among the theories characteristically German, and propounded without actual warfare to prove or disprove them during the last generation, were, in particular, the three theories—

(1) That modern fortification would fall at once to a combination of heavy bombardment by siege artillery and determined rushes thrown upon it, at great expense of life, by the infantry of the enemy.

(2) That men very slightly trained, or even untrained, could be incorporated into and digested by a trained force in large proportions, and rapidly, during the course of a campaign.

(3) That attacks in masses, and in fairly close formation, could be carried out with all the advantage of weight and numbers they connote, and could be carried out because discipline could be pushed to such a point that even the enormous losses involved would not check the advance.

Now, in regard to these three main points of German theory, we must clearly seize this fact: The war has proved them to be, upon the whole, sound. Or put it this way: if you were a determined opponent of all these theories (and I have written against them strongly myself) then the war, so far, will have proved a disappointment to you, and you will be constrained by intellectual candour to admit error.

But if you put yourself at the other standpoint, and stand in the shoes of the man who believed in those theories whole-heartedly, and who based his certitude of final victory upon their complete reliability, then it is quite another story. For while the German theories produced during peace, and as yet untested by experience, have been vindicated against their opponents, they have not been completely vindicated by any means; and the extent to which their full success was necessary to the German scheme is essential to our estimate of the chances of victory or defeat.

For instance, it is perfectly true that modern fortification has yielded to heavy siege artillery, and perhaps to a combination of that with rushes of infantry; but it has not been the sudden affair that was expected by the Germans, save in the case of Namur. The forts of Liège held out apparently for 4 or 5 days after the heavy siege artillery was trained upon them; the fort of Manonvilliers, an isolated work upon the eastern frontier, resisted for ten days at the least, and perhaps twelve. It is as well, by the way, in this connection, not to take too seriously the stories of some mysterious German howitzer which nobody knew to exist. All wars produce marvellous rumours of that kind, and nearly all such rumours are nonsense. There is no limit to the size of your siege gun or shell, save the limit of mobility, in every sense of that word, including rapidity of fire. But it is possible that the numbers and the mobility of the large German howitzers were underestimated.

We find then that, in this department of German theory the Germans were much more right than their critics, but were not altogether right, and the whole question is how thoroughly they had to be right for their general plan to be successful.

As to the second theory, we have not yet been able to test it. The use of large proportions of untrained or half trained reserves broke down badly in East Prussia at the beginning of the Russian advance, but there is no sign of any breakdown in the West, where perhaps a more moderate proportion of the untrained reserve was incorporated. It is probable that we shall find, when the detailed history of the war comes to be written, that the incorporation of these untrained masses was, as in the case of the other theories, more successful than the critics of the Germans had imagined, but less successful than the Germans themselves believed it would be. It is probable, for instance, that checks (as that before Antwerp the other day) occur wherever the proportion of untrained men is more than a certain minimum, and it is probable that the effect of these elements would be felt in any retirement undertaken, at least in the earlier days of the war. For instance, you will find the rout after Gumbinnen probably explained by this feature.

Finally, in the matter of close formation and the weight of numbers in advancing against an enemy's position, the results have far exceeded what the critics of the German theory put forward, *but*, by all accounts, the effort is exceptional, unique, and incapable of repetition. It is not a normal process of war, such as the Germans expected to establish to their own advantage. It is not, as was the charge of the column under Napoleon, an operation to be repeated by veterans indefinitely; it is a thing subject to peculiar strain, the men having passed through which cannot be used in such a strain repeatedly.

This last point, if it be established, is of the first importance to the future fortunes of the campaign, for it must mean that the losses in the effort to break the Allied line, which efforts have filled the last ten days, have been altogether out of proportion to the masses employed.

It is impossible to guess at those losses, but it is possible to establish a minimum and a maximum. They may have been over 200,000; they can hardly have been under 150,000, counting every form of loss from death to lameness.

3. THE UNEXPECTED RAPIDITY OF ADVANCE.


The rate of the German advance, to which allusion has been made elsewhere, is the third lesson we have to learn from the opening phases of the war.

It was evident from the first mention of the general German plan (and it has been openly talked of by no one more than the Germans for more than ten years past) that this plan demanded not only surprise, nor only superior numbers, nor even only the added success that was promised against fortifications, but also a power of exceedingly rapid advance; for a blow is not a knock-out blow unless it is a swift blow.

Now, in this, as in the other matters I am here examining, the German theory has justified itself in the main, but, here again, not as completely as full and immediate success demanded; further, the success is subject to a most important qualification with which I shall deal in a moment.

When the French fell back from the line of the Sambre after the fall of Namur, the pressure exercised upon the retreat by the German forces was never relaxed during the whole of three full days and nights. It was a marvellous piece of organisation and of effective military will.

The new line taken up by the Allies made an angle with the old line, and at the same time was more extended to the West than the old line. The conversion was roughly from the line A—B on the accompanying sketch, held till Sunday night, the 23rd of August (12 days ago), through the dotted



SKETCH SHOWING NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE RAPID ALLIED RETIREMENT AND GERMAN ADVANCE, AUG. 23RD-26TH.

— THE ALLIED LINE.
— THE ENGLISH CONTINGENT.
..... THE INTERMEDIATE POSITION ON EVENING OF THE 29TH.

line E—F reached on Tuesday night (ten days ago) to the line C—D held on Wednesday night and Thursday morning a week ago; and because there was this angle between the old front and the new, and because the new front extended more to the West than the old front had done, the heaviest of the marching fell, as we have seen, to the western part of the line; that is, upon the English contingent; which is represented in my sketch by the thick part of the lines.

But the remarkable thing about even that western extremity is that the Germans were able to keep up their pressure throughout the whole of so rapid a retreat. It was the true pressure of an army; it was not merely cavalry keeping in touch, nor advance bodies feeling the way for the main columns. When the fighting was fiercest upon Wednesday, the Allied line had still in front of it—after 26 to 30 miles of retreat—as heavy a body of attack as it had had upon the Sunday before upon

the Sambre. The German advance had averaged in some places 12 to 15 miles a day for those two and a half days.

I repeat, the character of this advance, carried out by such an enormous body of men without a hitch, is unique. It would be fast going for a well-organised army approaching a distant goal undisturbed. For an army actually fighting as it advanced, and fighting against so equal a resistance, and moving in such unprecedented numbers, it is amazing.

But after saying so much, we must again qualify our admission of the German achievement by certain considerations which greatly modify its value to its authors.

It is now apparent that these very rapid strategical moves upon the part of the Germans are of a piece with the corresponding tactical policy of a rush, dense and rapid, which, if it fails, involves a considerable period of recuperation to follow. The three days of Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, from ten days to a week ago, saw this very rapid rush from the line A—B to the line C—D. The four days following saw hardly any advance at all; and, so far as can be gathered from the very confused, fragmentary, and hitherto quite incomplete telegrams received this week, the three following days (Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday last)—making six days in all—also saw very little advance.

In other words, this rapidity, which it would be folly not to admire and pedantic not to be astonished at, is a rapidity essentially local and essentially restricted to efforts isolated in time. It is not like the rapidity which marked the great advance of the Grand Army upon Ulm, or any other of the rapid general advances of history. It is not even a rapidity corresponding to the marches which shut up the French Army in Sedan 44 years ago. It is a rapidity essentially not continuous. This is not to say that it fails to achieve its purpose—far from that: so far this strategical rush and halt has achieved its immediate purpose—but it has not achieved its end. The Germans have plenty of time before them, measured by the rate of their first advance. The time is more restricted if it be measured by the rate of their advance plus the first halt which succeeded it. It is more restricted still if we consider another factor, to which I will now turn.

That factor is what I may call "the expense of rapidity."

There are two principles upon which any great effort may be based in any form of human activity. You may strain to increase the productivity of your capital and spend only the income of it, or you may spend the capital itself. You may be aiming at creating an extra force which shall be always in existence and always dependable, or you may be aiming at an effect which is necessarily restricted to a short time because the achievement of it wears away your very means of achievement.

Now it is clearly evident in the present campaign that this astonishing and admirable rapidity achieved by the advancing body of German forces in the north is an expenditure of capital. It is a rapidity acquired at an expense which limits it strictly to a certain not very prolonged period, and condemns it as certainly to exhaustion, unless a decision is reached within quite the first weeks of the war.

Of many proofs of this, one is sufficient. The rapid extension westward and southward of the German advance has been effected by the bringing along westward perpetually of fresh men and bringing them up behind the front that has last been fighting. The thing has resembled a wave which breaks in bias upon a sandy beach. When its effort is spent, when there is no more fresh material wherewith to extend the line, the advance is checked. I do not mean by this that the swaying backward and forward of the line of contact, which has gone on for now six days since the first check given to this rapid German advance, is a situation in favour of the Allies and against the Germans: whether it is for us or against us can only be determined by the result, and by the discovery, at the close of the struggle, that our line is pierced or theirs. All I mean is that, so far as the mere element of rapidity is concerned, this halt to which the Germans were constrained between their first rapid advance (August 23—26) and their second (August 30—September 1) proves at what an expense the rush is effected.

4. THE PERFECTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.

Finally we have, subject to less qualification than any other of the German successes, the success of the German intelligence system, or, to use an old-fashioned word, the success of the German spy.

Very few people in this country have the least idea either of the perfection of the spy system that has been organised throughout Europe from Berlin, or of its almost incredible extent. The French themselves, though they had ample cause for suspicion and a national memory that should have left them in little doubt upon the matter, were divided (before the war) in their judgment of this essential to a German success; and I have heard and have half-believed the ridicule that was poured upon those who talked of the "avant-guerre."

As for England, the German spy system therein has been almost entirely neglected by the Government and by the people, and to this day I doubt if one educated man in a thousand has even yet suspected its extent and its exact organisation. Conversely, the German Government and military authorities have been able to keep from their enemies all knowledge of such affairs domestic to their forces as they desired to keep secret.

I say that in this capital point we have the success of a German theory—or, rather, the triumph of a German claim—which we can qualify less than any other, and which is the most perfect of all. But even this one is subject to some modification, a modification parallel to those which we have been able to apply to every other form of German success we have examined. It is this: that the element of time is against it. A perfected intelligence system, the use of a great horde of spies spread throughout Europe and admirably co-ordinated, is of supreme importance at the beginning of a war, as is the converse achievement of keeping from one's enemies knowledge of one's own movements and material. But it is, on the face of it, an advantage which suffers rapid attrition in the progress of a campaign. Fighting has not long proceeded before the enemy upon whom you have spied knows what you have found out, and has also begun to discover and to destroy your intelligence system within his lines. Fighting has not long proceeded before the enemy from whom you have kept knowledge of certain points of your material and organisation discovers them by your very successes.

It would be folly to depend upon this consideration for the belittling of a good intelligence system. A good intelligence system gives immense initial advantages, and initial advantages often determine a campaign. But my point is that the advantage is essentially an initial advantage alone.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

JULY 23RD.
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.

JULY 25TH.
King Peter of Serbia's appeal to Russia.

JULY 27TH.
Sir Edward Grey proposed a London Conference between French, German, Italian, and Great Britain's Ambassadors.

JULY 28TH.
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

JULY 29TH.
A partial Russian mobilisation, confined to the Army Corps on the borders of Austria-Hungary, was signed on receipt of the news of the bombardment of Belgrade. English Stock Exchange closed. English Bank Rate, 8 per cent.

AUGUST 1ST.
General Russian mobilisation ordered. German mobilisation ordered by Emperor. Germany declared war on Russia and followed up this declaration by immediately invading the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the neutral State between France and Germany. King George made a final effort for peace, dispatching a direct personal telegram to the Tsar, offering mediation. Before it could reach St. Petersburg Germany declared war.

AUGUST 2ND.
Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.

AUGUST 3RD.
Sir Edward Grey stated British policy and revealed Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting our obligations to France. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany after Belgian appeal to England. German and French Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin.

AUGUST 4TH.
Germany rejected ultimatum. English Government took over control of railways. War declared between England and Germany.
Vice-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe appointed to command of the Home Fleets, with the acting rank of admiral.

AUGUST 5TH.
Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for War. H.M.S. *Amphion* struck a mine and foundered. Many German ships seized.

AUGUST 6TH.
House of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by 500,000 men. State control of food prices. The German battle cruiser *Goeben* and her escort driven into Messina by two British cruisers. A fierce battle still continued before Liège. Italy declared her neutrality.

AUGUST 7TH.

The German cruiser *Goeben*, with her escort the *Breslau*, left Messina. Germans outside Liège asked for a twenty-four hours' armistice to collect their killed and wounded. Armistice refused by Belgians.

AUGUST 8TH.

French troops invaded Alsace and reached Mülhausen after a sharp engagement, in which the Germans were routed with the bayonet. Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000 men.

AUGUST 9TH.

One of the cruiser squadrons of the Main Fleet was attacked by German submarines. The enemy's submarine, U15, was sunk by H.M.S. *Birmingham*.

AUGUST 10TH.

France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Liège forts still untaken. Germans advanced on Namur. The new Press Bureau established by the Government for the issue of official war news opened.

AUGUST 11TH.

The *Goeben* and *Breslau* took refuge in the Dardanelles. England declared war against Austria.

AUGUST 12TH.

Goeben and *Breslau* purchased by Turkey. Bombardment of Liège forts resumed.

AUGUST 15TH.

The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and the use of the Polish language.

AUGUST 16TH.

Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.

AUGUST 17TH.

The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in France. Death of Lieut.-General Sir James Grierson. The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.

AUGUST 18TH.

General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appointed to command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in succession to the late General Grierson. Some desultory fighting took place in the North Sea.

AUGUST 20TH.

The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near Shabatz.

AUGUST 21ST.

The German forces entered Brussels.

AUGUST 22ND.

Servia announces that their army had won a great victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

AUGUST 23RD.

Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian army gained an important victory near Gumbinnen against a force of 160,000 Germans.

AUGUST 24TH.

It was announced that Namur had fallen. The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

AUGUST 27TH.

Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German armed merchantman *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on the West African coast. A strong force of British marines has been sent to Ostend and has occupied the town without opposition.

DAY BY DAY.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 28th.

Early in the morning a concerted operation was attempted against the Germans in the Heligoland Bight. The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the *Mainz*, receiving only very slight damage. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, *Köln* class, and another cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire and in a sinking condition.

All the German cruisers which engaged were thus disposed of.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced in the House of Lords that "The Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India. The first division of these troops is now on its way."

SATURDAY, AUGUST 29th.

No official news.

SUNDAY, AUGUST 30th.

The following statement summarises that communicated by the Secretary of State for War:—

Although the official dispatches from Sir John French on the recent battles have not yet been received it is possible now to state in general outline what the British share in the recent operations has been.

There has, in effect, been a four days' battle—on August 23rd, 24th, 25th, and 26th. During the whole of this period the British troops, in conformity with the general movement of the French armies, were occupied in resisting and checking the German advance and in withdrawing to the new lines of defence.

The battle began at Mons on Sunday, during which day and part of the night the German attack, which was stubbornly pressed and repeated, was completely checked on the British front.

On Monday, the 24th, the Germans made vigorous efforts in superior numbers to prevent the safe withdrawal of the British Army and to drive it into the fortress of Maubeuge. This effort was frustrated by the steadiness and skill with which the British retirement was conducted.

The British retirement proceeded on the 25th with continuous fighting, though not on the scale of the previous two days, and by the night of the 25th the British Army occupied the line Cambrai-Landrecies-le-Cateau.

It had been intended to resume the retirement at day-break on the 26th, but the German attack, in which no less than five Corps were engaged, was so close and fierce that it was not possible to carry out this intention until the afternoon.

The battle on this day, August 26th, was of the most severe and desperate character. The troops offered a superb and most stubborn resistance to the tremendous odds with which they were confronted, and at length extricated themselves in good order, though with serious losses and under the heaviest artillery fire.

No guns were taken by the enemy except those the horses of which were all killed, or which were shattered by high explosive shells.

Sir John French estimates that during the whole of these operations, from the 23rd to the 26th inclusive, his losses amount to 5,000 or 6,000 men. On the other hand the losses suffered by the Germans in their attacks across the open, and through their dense formation, are out of all proportion to those which we have suffered.

Since the 26th, apart from cavalry fighting, the British Army has not been molested. Reinforcements amounting to double the loss suffered have already joined.

MONDAY, AUGUST 31st.

At one point in the centre of the Allied line the French troops succeeded in beating the enemy back as far as Guise.

The Queen of the Belgians and her three children arrived in England.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1st.

The Russians met with a check in East Prussia, but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2nd.

Continuous fighting was in progress along almost the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinction, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten guns. The French Army continued the offensive and gained ground in the Lorraine region. The Russian Army have completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near Lemberg, inflicting enormous losses and capturing 150 guns.

Most timely and appropriate is the production of a volume entitled *War and Alien Enemies*, which has been written by Mr. Arthur Page, and published by Messrs. Stevens and Sons, of Chancery Lane, at five shillings. The book gives full information about the laws affecting the definition of alien enemies, their state and property on land, their state and property at sea, the rules of contraband of war, the right of alien enemies to contract or trade, and the way in which war affects partnerships or companies in which alien enemies are concerned. Written by a barrister-at-law who is thoroughly conversant with this branch of legal work, the book is a clear guide to the law on the subject, and will doubtless be found of great use by all who are in any way affected commercially and directly by the present colossal struggle between the nations.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE NORTH SEA.


ON the morning of August 28th there occurred certain operations which were hailed by the daily Press as a "great naval victory" which is, of course, an incorrect term to employ for what after all was merely a "minor operation" of war. The mere fact that the German official report conceals nothing indicates that the vanquished so regard it; and in naval warfare it is always *the opinion of the vanquished which matters most*. Had the German Admiralty issued an incorrect report, our advantage would have been greater. But of this later on. Let us first review what happened in detail, and then proceed to draw conclusions.

Heligoland is a small island some 46 miles from Cuxhaven, which guards the entrance to the Kiel Canal, and in or near which the German High Seas Fleet was probably lying at the same time. It is also about equidistant from the naval arsenal at Wilhelmshaven. Lying as it does at the apex of a triangle

The first act of the drama was a species of prologue. We learn from the official report that British submarines have for the last three weeks been in the habit of cruising in what is known as "outside the enemy's front door." It is the first time in history that submarines have been used as scouts; hitherto they have always been regarded as sharpshooters and agents of destruction generally, their unique possibilities in the way of inshore observation having apparently escaped attention. Those who knew of the intention to use submarines in the scout capacity have ever been careful to ignore the subject.

The Germans—so far as we can surmise—were ignorant of the submarine scouts. They doubtless kept a very sharp look-out for submarine attack; but not being attacked considered the coast as clear—a legitimate assumption on the part of any Fleet which regards the submarine from the conventional standpoint.

For reasons which—since nothing about the matter has



between these two important points, Heligoland is a vital outpost in the German scheme of coast defence. Enormous sums have been expended on fortifying it, and in the construction of a harbour proof against torpedo attack.


The utmost secrecy has always been observed about Heligoland, but it was obviously always intended to be the advanced base of the German light squadrons and submarines, behind which the battle fleet could move with impunity between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, via Brunsbüttel and Cuxhaven.

The exact constitution of the attacking British force has not been stated, nor for various reasons is it likely to be stated for some time to come. We are simply told of "strong forces" of destroyers (under Commodore Tyrwhitt) supported by light cruisers (under Commodore Goodenough) and battle cruisers (under Rear-Admirals Beatty, Moore, and Christian), acting in conjunction with submarines (Commodore Keyes). From the Navy List the names of most of the principal ships employed can be conjectured; but such conjectures may not necessarily be correct, any more than that the official account necessarily gives all the story.

appeared in the public Press at the time of writing—need not be more specifically referred to, there were grounds to believe that a German torpedo squadron would be creeping out sometime on or about August 27th.

It came; light cruisers and a number of destroyers, probably two divisions of twelve each, as the Germans generally work in groups of that number, with a cruiser at the head of each. The third German cruiser, *Ariadne*, was old and slow. She was not in commission before the mobilisation of the fleet, and it is improbable that she was leading a destroyer division. It is more likely that she was an ordinary look-out ship.

Accounts, other than the official report, are necessarily vague and conflicting. In matters of this sort personal impressions go for very little, save from the psychological standpoint. The ordinary participant sees little or nothing of the game save in his own immediate vicinity, and he is generally too much occupied to see very much even there. His feelings are, therefore, more valuable evidence than his vision or supposed vision.



Psychologically—and deducting fifty per cent. from all stories for “literary licence” on the part of journalistic transcribers, we arrive at the pleasing conviction that our men took the matter very much as they took similar operations in peace manoeuvres. This is a valuable psychological asset.

The official report—entirely on the material side—is wisely none too explicit. It, however, gives us all that we really need to know.

It is an old adage of naval warfare that the only effective defence against torpedo attack is what is known as “stopping the earths.” To look for the enemy at night on the sea is equivalent to seeking for the proverbial needle in a bundle of hay. The only effective way of catching the enemy is to be “outside the door” to catch him either starting out or returning. To catch him starting is difficult; he is likely to be far too wary to be caught coming out. The scientific method is to let him go out, see to it that his chances of doing mischief when out are small, and intercept him on his return! And this is exactly what Admiral Beatty did.

Led by the *Arethusa*, our destroyers got in and lay in wait somewhere off the north-west of Heligoland. Here in due course they were found by—or rather they found—the Germans coming back. In the action which ensued it would appear that two German cruisers (probably *Mainz* and *Ariadne*) engaged the *Arethusa* with a certain amount of success, at a range of “about 3,000 yards,” which suggests an early morning action.

Neither of the Germans carried anything heavier than the 4.1, whereas the *Arethusa* had a couple of 6 inch available. All the same, however, the Germans had ten 4.1's bearing against the two 6 inch and three 4 inch of the *Arethusa*. According to our official report one of the Germans was badly damaged by a lucky shell (6 inch we can safely presume). This was to be expected; but the odd chances were all German.

The damaged German then withdrew, but her place was presently taken by another cruiser, and the *Arethusa* (as was to be expected) was somewhat badly knocked about. It is probable that at and about this early part of Act Two the Germans expected to sink or capture her.

Meanwhile all the destroyers on either side were in action. The result of any such action was a foregone conclusion. German destroyers are “torpedo boats” first, and “gun ships” afterwards. British destroyers approximately average half the German torpedo armament and double the German gun power.

The German destroyers put up a fight against heavy odds, and then scattered and escaped. One (or two) were sunk. The rest are officially assumed to have been “well punished.” This assumption is probably correct; but the outstanding result is that they got away. How much stomach they may have left for further fighting remains to be seen. Personally, I incline to the opinion that it will not be long before they are heard of again.

From here onward it is very difficult, if not quite impossible, to reconcile the two official accounts. The British account, so far as it reveals anything, suggests that the German cruisers persistently attacked the *Arethusa*, and that she was in a very tight place when the British battle cruisers arrived on the scene and saved her.

The German official account, however, reads as quite a different story. It implies that, so far from seeking to complete the destruction of the *Arethusa*, the German cruisers were driven off by her and the destroyers. “Went in a westerly direction” can only have one possible meaning. West is directly away from Heligoland; it spells running out to sea in hopes of getting back later on. It is curious that in describing the Second Act each side should (between the lines) suggest that it had rather the worst of the encounter! Of course, this is the general impression always left by confused fighting. From which we may take it that the fighting was very confused indeed, and that the fall of the curtain on Act Two was that each side imagined the other to be top-weight.

This is not a popular interpretation by any manner of means; but so far as I can piece things together from the data available it is the bed-rock truth of the matter.

Act Three is far simpler. Whether, as they believe, the Germans were in flight; whether, as we imagine, the Germans

were seeking to complete the destruction, the next stage of the drama is one and the same thing.

It is fairly clear that the German cruiser *Mainz* was sunk by our light cruiser squadron; It is far more abundantly clear that our battle cruiser squadron performed the same office for the *Köln* and *Ariadne*. All three of these German light cruisers have now ceased to exist.

In addition, the Germans admit to the loss of the destroyer V 187. They do not mention the actual loss of any other destroyer. Personally, I think that only one was actually sunk, and that our "two sunk" is due to two conflicting accounts of the sinking of the V 187.

It is the easiest possible mistake to make in war. There is not the remotest reason to believe that the Germans, having officially admitted more serious losses, would risk concealing the loss of a further inferior vessel.

I put the result of the battle as follows:—

BRITISH.	GERMAN.
SUNK.	<i>Ariadne</i> (light cruiser). <i>Köln</i> (light cruiser). <i>Mainz</i> (light cruiser). V 187 (destroyer).
BADLY DAMAGED.	<i>Nil</i>
<i>Arethusa</i> (light cruiser). <i>Laurel</i> (destroyer). <i>Liberty</i> (destroyer).	
DAMAGED.	10 to 20 destroyers (probably 10 only).
<i>Nil</i>	

All of which spells a British victory clearly enough, but it does not spell anything to which the epithet of "great" should be applied, because its material effect on the naval war cannot be other than subsidiary.

In the matter of details: our light cruisers are of approximately the same speed as the German ones, but our battle cruisers are considerably faster. To this probably is due the fact that the other two German cruisers were accounted for. They could, of course, neither fight nor run away from the *Zion* and her sisters. Incidentally, the fact that our light cruiser squadron was undamaged further suggests that the Germans were running from them.

According to the first official report—the second one is silent—at some time during the proceedings the battle cruisers were "attacked by submarines and floating mines." There is a vagueness in this phrase. It may mean either that the big ships nearly ran on to a mine field, or that the surprised German cruisers dropped mines in the hopes that the enemy would run on to them—a very old device. If it were this latter, then probably the Germans will have to do a great deal of mine sweeping ere they can safely venture out again.

It is difficult to believe that the submarine attack and the "floating mine attack" on our battle cruiser squadron took place at the same time or place, except in so far as the submarines may have—by showing themselves—manœuvred to drive or lure the British Fleet on to a mine field.

The apparent impotence of the German submarines, which did no harm, is not a matter on which to lay much stress. The fact that they were on the spot at the psychological moment indicates that the German submarines are efficient. That their efforts were unsuccessful comes in the chapter of accident.

We have now to consider the psychological side of the matter. Had the German cruisers tamely surrendered to our battle cruisers, it would merely have been bowing to the inevitable. From things as they happened we can therefore draw the inference that the morale of the German Navy on August 28th was still quite good, despite the deteriorating influences of being more or less shut in.

The vessels which went out must have gone out knowing that theirs was a dangerous mission. It is easy to surmise their particular objective, and they must have known that that would be suspected by the British Fleet. But probably at the moment when they were surprised they were congratulating themselves on being safely back in their own waters, having met neither good fortune nor bad.

Now comes in an interesting problem. The presence of British battle cruisers with the light squadron indicates that the possibility that the German battle cruisers would come out to support the German light squadron was allowed for, and likely enough it was thought or hoped that the German High Sea Fleet would follow.

No big German ship intervened. They may all have been too far away to do so. But that attributes lack of prescience to the enemy—ever a dangerous thing to do when one is endeavouring to estimate hostile intentions.

Rather, in my opinion, the German heavy ships kept out of the way as part of a deliberate plan. A trap was to be suspected. Nothing was to be gained by coming out, whereas a sortie was bound to mean fresh losses. Hence, as I read it, the immobility of the High Sea Fleet. If this reading be correct, it goes to indicate the correctness of my assumption in the first of these articles—that the High Sea Fleet intends

playing a waiting game, and will only come out before "der Tag" under pressure of home circumstances. Such home circumstances had obviously not arisen by August 28th.

If Admiral Beatty sought to draw the Main Fleet, his operation, brilliantly conceived and executed though it was, was to that extent a failure, or rather will be so regarded by the Germans.

Hence the inappropriateness of that term "Great Naval Victory" in which our Press has so freely indulged. To adopt a chessboard simile, we have had a success; but that success is merely the capture of a pawn. It brings us materially nearer to checkmate, but a series of several such captures will be needed before checkmate is arrived at.

Since the *Goeben* affair—especially since it has transpired that this battle cruiser and the *Breslau* ran away together from the small British cruiser *Gloucester*, little more powerful than the *Breslau*—there has been a tendency on the part of the public to despise the German Fleet. We have all of us perhaps forgotten that the truth about the *affaire Goeben* has probably been sedulously concealed so far from the German Navy. At any rate, the affair of Heligoland seems to indicate that we shall have to wait awhile before reaping the moral benefit of the *Goeben* incident.

Or it may be that, having realised the deceit of the policy under which they were educated to despise the British Navy, German sailors (possibly ever less credulous than their leaders imagined) have risen to the occasion, and are seeking to prove themselves. However things may stand, even from the bare official reports (I place no reliance whatever on published personal narratives), it is abundantly clear that off Heligoland the German Navy did acquit itself well against overwhelming odds, and that we shall do best to esteem our enemies accordingly.

For the rest, the most pleasing feature of the action off Heligoland is that our Admirals obviously take nothing for granted, any more than Nelson and his compeers did in the great wars of a hundred years ago. "One Englishman is worth three Frenchmen" was taught to raw recruits; but our Admiralty wisely saw to it that their forces were ever two to one at the crucial point!

In concluding this survey of the Heligoland affair, it is necessary to draw attention to the curious story (vouched for by the official Press Bureau) that when the German cruisers sank, and their survivors were being rescued, German officers were observed shooting their own men.

Unofficial stories to the effect that German prisoners assert that they had been given to understand that if captured they would be put to death by the British with great barbarity may be dismissed as a fiction, probably invented this side of the North Sea. Even if told it on the other side, it is very unlikely that the most unsophisticated German sailor would really have believed it; it is certain that no German officer did or does. So the "to save them from a worse fate" story can go by the board at once.

The shooting incident would never have appeared in an official report unless it were absolutely authenticated. It did take place, and the explanation, as I read it, is this: "Der Tag" (which we used to believe was merely a British scare-monger's fancy) was a very real thing indeed to the officers of the German Navy.

We have probably even now no conception as to what it meant to those who treated our Fleet so handsomely at Kiel only a few short weeks ago.

In the past I have known German naval officers fairly well. At any rate, well enough to know that they would never lose their heads in any circumstances sufficiently badly to shoot their own fellow sufferers without some very good and valid reason.

That reason is not to be supplied over the circumstance that small cruisers were sunk by the battle cruiser squadron. The obvious is necessarily the obvious.

We must, therefore, seek further back for the cause of this extraordinary incident. It is probably to be found in the vague happenings of Act Two. I take it that in one or more of the German cruisers under fire from our destroyers and light cruisers panic occurred. Or, if there were no actual panic, there was shooting so wild that it amounted to the same thing. Game to the last, the German officers spent their last moments in avenging themselves upon those who they credited with being responsible for the failure of "Der Tag" as they had realised it.

In a general way, this action is probably regarded as insensate and insane. It may be so, but I view it in quite another light. To my mind it indicates that, whatever the German bluejacket may be, his officers are of the highest possible metal. We will do well to reverence and respect them as enemies worthy of our steel.

Officially, Germany has admitted a defeat in the affair of Heligoland. But we shall be wise to realise that at sea we are fighting against men who are inspired by a spirit which it is

impossible not to respect. When we consider the *Goeben* fiasco, I am by no means sure that, despite the losses sustained, the Heligoland affair may not be a German moral success.

The more we appreciate matters from this point of view, the better for our ultimate success.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

The most important event during the past week has been the sinking by H.M.S. *Highflyer*, off the West Coast of Africa, of the armed German liner *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. As the *Highflyer* sustained some casualties, the liner evidently put up a fight of some sort. That she was brought to book is a matter for sincere congratulation. She was capable of a speed of 23 knots. It is doubtful whether the *Highflyer* at the present time is good for more than about 20, and the other British ships on the station are slower still. At any rate, the liner was far the swifter, and the fact that she was brought to book comes in the chapter of luck.

The career of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was somewhat mysterious. When war broke out she was at New York, where rightly or wrongly the Germans have long been suspected of having a secret store of guns and ammunition represented as "spare parts."

The liner left New York, and for eleven days nothing whatever was heard of her. Then off the African coast she stopped the Castle liner *Galician*, asked for news of H.M.S. *Carnarvon*, arrested two passengers, but did no more. A little later she stopped another Castle liner, but again made no attempt at capture. On the other hand, she ordered the wireless to be thrown overboard. Her next meeting was with the *Highflyer*.

One explanation of the mystery is that this commerce-destroyer which destroyed no commerce had been ordered to reserve herself for some special purpose. Another possible solution is that she was so flurried with the possibilities of meeting British cruisers that she did not dare risk standing by to capture a prize. Yet another, that having found herself on the scene of operations, she realised the impossibility of doing anything with a prize, and so trusted to damaging trade by terrorising. This last seems to me the most probable explanation.

Elsewhere on the high seas the process of clearing them of hostile merchant shipping continues. It is an example of what Mahan has called "the silent pressure of Sea Power." It is far less dramatic than the fighting side of naval operations, but it was none the less useful on that account. Also, whereas fighting entails expenditure, elimination of the enemy's trade represents a substantial profit both for the immediate present and for the future also.

In this connection, however, I would once more draw attention to what I mentioned last week: the danger that German diplomacy may drag the United States into the quarrel and on to the German side. An official note from the British Government to the U.S. Government on the subject of German liners interned in U.S. ports brings the matter one step forward. The American Press and the American people are splendid in the matter of realising what we are fighting for. But "business is business."

Mr. Churchill spoke nothing but the bald truth when he told the United States, "If we go under it will be your turn next." On that particular point I have already elaborated. It is waste of space to reiterate. But here lies a very real danger point.

Wednesday brought us an official Brazilian announcement to the effect that the German cruiser *Dresden* had sunk a British merchant ship off the Brazilian coasts. The *Dresden* normally belongs to the cruiser division of the High Sea Fleet (i.e., German "Home Fleet"). It would look as though she had some secret base in or near Brazilian waters. Her coal supply is nominally sufficient for 5,500 miles at slow speed; it actually suffices for hardly a thousand miles at full speed or standing by for full speed, as a commerce destroyer must do—that is to say, three, or at the outside, four days' steaming. Even making all allowances for her having lain by a good deal, she must have had to coal at least twice since war was declared.

THE FAR EAST.

Japanese operations against Kiao-Chau have commenced. The whole of the German squadron, which consists of the armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, the small cruisers *Emden*, *Leipzig*, and *Nurnberg*, four gunboats, and two destroyers, together with the old Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elisabeth*, is understood to be blockaded inside the harbour. It will probably lie there inactive till such time as the Japanese have established howitzer batteries for its destruction. We may depend upon it that they will attack it as they attacked the Port Arthur Fleet in the Russo-Japanese War.

Kiao-Chau is believed to be very strongly fortified. The garrison, 5,000 strong, has made every preparation for a siege and bombardment—all buildings likely to be useful as marks for Japanese gunners having been destroyed. So also have the Chinese villages inside the territory. The place is said to be provisioned for eight months, but this is probably a very generous estimate.

The financial conditions of Japan are likely to influence largely the plan of campaign, that is to say, it is probable that the naval part of the operations will be entrusted to the ordinary "active fleet," which is ample to deal with all contingencies. The place is, of course, certain to be taken; consequently Japan can well afford to proceed economically.

The operations of British warships in Far Eastern waters will necessarily be of an undramatic, but none the less useful nature. German trade with China has been very considerable, and a great deal of useful spadework will be done by "showing the flag" in all Chinese harbours. The Chinese are an unimaginative people, and the mere cessation of German imports will not of itself give us the markets as schemed for by the Government. The Chinese will have to be impressed with object lessons in the shape of continually seeing British warships and having the disappearance of German ones pointed out to them.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The situation here, up to the time of writing, continues normal. The Austrian Fleet remains effectually shut in while the French are bombarding Cattaro, which is one of the several Austrian naval stations in the Adriatic. The indications are that the majority of these stations will eventually be reduced. The Austrian battle fleet is hopelessly inferior to the Anglo-French blockading force. It is probably cruising near Lissa, but common prudence will prevent it from engaging in a fleet action unless compelled.

Such action could in no way affect the present general situation in the Adriatic. Torpedo attacks will come along later, but at present the Anglo-French forces are at least 200 miles from the main Austrian base at Pola, and so too far away for a concerted effort to promise much if any success.

The probability of immediate hostilities between Turkey and Greece may profoundly affect the Mediterranean situation. At the present moment the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are Turkish, but once war is declared German crews for them are likely enough to materialise from somewhere.

The possibility of this will necessitate a certain weakening of the Adriatic blockade, and this may tempt the Austrian fleet to come out to try conclusions with the Anglo-French force.

THE BALTIC.

Baltic operations are somewhat obscure. As mentioned last week, it is probable that the Russians are more or less waiting and that the Germans are more or less blockading. The "Russian battleship driven ashore" of earlier reports is now almost certainly to be identified with the German light cruiser *Magdeburg*, which is officially admitted to have gone ashore and subsequently to have been blown up.

Of the various official and non-official tales of this incident, I am most inclined to believe the story that she got aground by pure accident, and was subsequently found and blown up by the Russian cruisers. There is nothing to indicate that any actual battle on a considerable scale ever took place. We have to remember that Russian trade interests are comparatively trivial, and that nautically Russia has everything to gain by delaying major operations till some of the Gangoots are ready for sea.

It is an open secret now that Russia knew that this war was coming, but that she did not expect the Kaiser to strike for another two years. Consequently she did not accelerate her new ship construction, wisely considering that her first task was to train the necessary crews, without which mere ships are useless.

When the Russian fleet does go into action the men who man it will be something very different from those who perished at Tsushima. So long as Germany has a numerical superiority she can keep the Russian Navy at bay in the Baltic; but I question whether the Germans would have much chance against an equal Russian force. The Russian Navy is now trained along Franco-British lines—that is to say, officers and men have cultivated the *cameraderie* of the French Navy while they have imitated the British in playing football together. It is things of this sort that count altogether beyond "paper calculations."

On the water, the Germans appear to have regarded the Russians as a negligible factor or thereabouts. We may yet see them very seriously undeceived on this point. There is a very wide gulf between the Grigorovitch Navy of to-day and the Rodjestvensky Navy of ten years ago.

As for the *Magdeburg*, she was one of the latest German cruisers, nominally designed to steam at 25 knots, but capable of something up to 30 knots at a spurt. Her armament was slight—twelve 4.1-inch guns, but she had a belt of 3½ inches, and so was fairly immune (any way on paper) against attacks from others of her kind. She is correspondingly a decided loss to the German Navy; for all that the Russians have nothing available in the same class with her. Such Russian cruisers as are available are considerably more powerful, but also a great deal slower.

The consort of the *Magdeburg* was the *Munchen*, of about the same gun power, but somewhat slower and unarmoured.

In the division presumably employed in the Baltic are three other light cruisers—*Augsburg*, *Stuttgart*, and *Danzig*.

Of these the first is nominally nearly as fast as the *Magdeburg*, but rumour has it that her turbines have been damaged. The other two little ships are comparatively old.

The net result of Baltic operations to date is that the really effective German scouting force is reduced about one-third, and that apart from this there have been no losses on either side, saving the few Russian lighthouses which the Germans have wantonly destroyed. The value of this particular operation is the cost of the rounds which the Germans have fired.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Allenstein.—An important railway junction on the East Prussian strategic railways, upward of fifty miles north-west of the Russian frontier, and about midway between Gumbinnen and Thorn. It is connected with both these points by rail, and is also on the line from Oertelburg to Marienburg and Dantzig.

Belfort.—The territory of Belfort, at present about twenty-eight miles in length by thirteen in breadth, is all that is left to France by the Treaty of 1871 out of the former Department of Haut Rhin, and comprises less than six of the former thirty cantons of which the Department was made up. It is bounded north-east and east by German Alsace, south-east and south by Switzerland, north by the Vosges Department, and west and south-west by the Departments of Haute-Saone and Doubs. The chief town of the Department, also named Belfort, is 275 miles south-east from Paris, on the railways Paris to Bâle and Lyons to Strasbourg. The population of the town is nearly 35,000. Its fortifications have been greatly strengthened since the war of 1870-71, and the town is now one of the strongest frontier defences on the French side. The chief fortification is the citadel, in front of which is placed a colossal figure, "The Lion of Belfort," by Bartholdi, erected to commemorate the brave defence of the town by the French in 1870-71. Situated as it is among the wooded hills of the Vosges range, Belfort is of great natural strength, and this, together with the French fortifications, renders it an almost impregnable position to attack from the German side.

Chambery.—Capital of the Department of Savoie, situated between the upper valleys of the Rhone and the Isère rivers. Population about 22,000. It is about fifty miles distant from the Italian frontier, on the Paris-Lyons-Turin line of railway.

Diewze.—A railway station in German Lorraine, on the Saargemund-Avrécourt line of rail. It is about ten miles from the French frontier, and about five miles north-east of Marsal.

Gumbinnen.—The chief town of a Government district of the same name in East Prussia, situated on an affluent of the River Pregel, on the railway from Eydtkuhnen to Königsburg, and about twenty-two miles west-south-west from the Russian frontier. The population, including a small garrison, is estimated at about 12,000, and the town is engaged in various industries, of which the chief are iron-founding and the manufacture of agricultural machinery.

Jodoigne.—A small town about seven miles south of Tienen, in the province of Brabant, Belgium. It is a station on the Namur-Tienen line of rail.

Johannisburg.—Situated on the strategic railway from Lyck to Allenstein, in East Prussia, on the south of the Spieding Lake, and about fifteen miles north of the Polish frontier.

Maubeuge.—A first-class French fortress town about five miles south of the Belgian frontier and eleven or twelve miles south of Mons. It is the point at which the main line from Paris to Belgium branches for Brussels and Liège, and is the site of a large arsenal. It is about midway between Valenciennes and Thion.

Philippeville.—A town of Southern Belgium about ten miles from Givet, on the French frontier, and almost midway between Givet and Charleroi. It is situated in wooded country, and is connected by railway with Charleroi and Charleville on the French side of the frontier.

Posen.—A Prussian province with an area about equal to that of Belgium, bounded on the north by the province of Prussia, on the east by Russian Poland, on the south by Silesia, and on the west by Brandenburg. The population is upwards of 1,900,000, the majority of whom are Poles, with a minority of about a third of the population Germans. Posen, the capital city of the province, is situated at the confluence of the Warthe and Cybina rivers, 150 miles east of Berlin; it is a first-class fortress of great strategic importance, consisting of an inner citadel and an outer line of twelve main forts encircling the city. The main town is on the west bank of the Warthe river, and the eastern or Polish part of the town is regarded as the poor district by the superior Germans of the west city. The total population is about 70,000, including a greater percentage of Jews than in any other German centre, and in normal times there is a garrison of about 8,000 men. The town is on the main Berlin-Thorn-Petersburg line of rail, and is also connected by direct lines with Stettin and with Breslau, from which latter town it is about ninety miles distant in a direct northerly direction. In the north, and especially in the north-east of the province, the country is dotted with small lakes and ponds, and these are interspersed with large tracts of fen and marshland. In addition to the railway facilities which exist throughout the province, numerous canals and navigable rivers afford means of communication between the principal trading centres.

St. Amand.—An important railway junction situated in the line of fortifications extending from Lille to Maubeuge, in Northern France. It is on the left bank of the River Escout, a tributary of the Scheldt, and is a junction for no less than six lines of rail, which connect it with practically all the main Belgian lines, and with Lille, Douai, Valenciennes, and Paris.

Soldau.—Situated about ten miles inside the German frontier, on the railway line from Warsaw to Dantzig on the Baltic coast. This line is crossed at Soldau by the strategic railway from Oertelburg to Thorn. Definite occupation of Soldau and command of its railway junction threatens all the railway communications of East Prussia.

Thorn.—A town and first-class fortress in the province of East Prussia, situated on the right bank of the Vistula river, about ten miles from the Russian frontier, ninety-two miles south of Dantzig. It is a point of considerable strategic importance, and has ranked as a first-class fortress since 1878. The population is about 25,000, of whom two-fifths are Poles, and the town has a considerable trade in grain and timber as well as a certain amount of manufacturing activity. The Vistula, navigable at this point, provides means of communication with Dantzig and with intervening towns toward the north, and Thorn is also connected by rail with Posen and Allenstein by means of the strategic railway of the eastern frontier, and with Warsaw to the east, and Berlin to the west by direct lines.

Wilhelmshaven.—The principal German naval station and port on the North Sea, sixty miles north-west from Bremen. The harbour has an extent of about 200 acres and a depth of 27 feet, this being known as the "new harbour," and connected with various repairing and equipment docks and with the outer harbour. There is also a special torpedo harbour, together with three dry docks and a shipbuilding basin—altogether Wilhelmshaven is admirably equipped for the production and shelter of every class of battleship and naval war craft, is protected fully against any attack by sea, being situated on the western side of Jade, or Jahde, Bay, and defended by the Elbe fortifications and the Heligoland defences.

ROME OR CARTHAGE?

NEVER since the Romans decreed the dread decree "Delenda est Carthago" has such an avowal been made to the world as is revealed in the book of General Friedrich Von Bernhardi, "Germany and the Next War," written as far back as 1911. The destruction of the British as a world-empire and their replacement by the Germans is the *leit motif*.

Every citizen of the British Empire should read the book. Quotations, however copious, are inadequate. The work has small literary craft, its arguments and technique are clumsy, but its theme is terrible.

Bernhardi continually stultifies his own arguments. He explains at length that Germany is surrounded by crafty and jealous enemies, all eager for a favourable opportunity to declare war. Later he points out, equally strongly, that Germany must go to war at all costs for the purpose of acquiring colonies either from Portugal, Belgium, France, or England. The writer is careful not to include South America, as it is obvious that friendship with the United States must be courted.

Having explained to his own satisfaction, and, no doubt, to that of the German people, that the English are incapable of colonising as it should be done by a cultured and enlightened race, and emphasised how that this great work is solely the prerogative of the races of Central Europe, he completely knocks the bottom out of argument when he says—

"The political and national development of the German people has always, so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the hereditary defects of its character—that is, by the particularism of the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels among themselves."

Mr. Edward Arnold did his countrymen a service by publishing a cheap edition, which can now be obtained everywhere. It is an antidote to British apathy. Our recruits and volunteers should carry it in their knapsacks to learn from it the details of the work before them. [Editor LAND AND WATER.]

THE TEUTON UNVEILED.

Our parks contain groups of men drilling in khaki or plain clothes (whilst uniforms are being made), but they are not a tithe of those who should become our effectives. Our business folk have failed to grasp the situation; they try to conduct *business as usual* rather than conduct it by the aid of women to fill the places of men.

The feeling is too prevalent that paying is equal to fighting, and that those who pay have done their duty. The public appear to be soothing themselves with thoughts about our Army being abroad fighting, our Navy protecting our shores from invasion, our race from the colonies sending fighting men, and whilst those lay down their lives the "Steam Roller" of Russia is coming to flatten out the Germans, so that all the patriotic work left for our people at home is to "capture Germany's trade."

Further from the capital we glean a livelier impression of alertness. The Scotch are pouring recruits into the war depôts in relatively greater numbers than the English; even in Ireland the able-bodied man is under arms, or aching to find a rifle to carry. In northern and middle England the martial spirit is aroused; they only think war! Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India are arming, and yet the War Office of Great Britain has only just got its first 100,000 men.

Yet southern England breeds no slackers, they only want to be aroused. They do not know the war game, they do not understand its gravity. They for so long have only had to fight against trade competition that battle rivalry is strange to them; they have been at peace so long and the Teuton seems so friendly, that they do not see what has been prepared for them or what they are "up against." They are strange to the inward spirit of the military Germanic race and its belief in a God-ordained mission to conquer the world and impose a domination upon the other "weaker" races peopling the Earth.

To present in tabloid form some of the doctrines of the Germanic religion of conquest the text book of Germany's military spirit must be drawn upon. It is called "Germany and the Next War." The author appears to be a German patriot, soldier, diplomat, preacher, prophet, and standard bearer.

The first of his prophecies has proved true. War has come, and with it the spirit of vengeance, ferocity, and determination. This is what he calmly prophesies as the harvest to be reaped from the seed Germany sowed. In the opening chapter of his book the song is sung of the Soldier-Priest-Prophet. It is of the splendour of war, the Divine mission of those who wage it, and the glorious paradise of the happy warrior. To understand Bernhardi and imbibe his spirit we quote his words:

THE SONG OF THE SWORD.

War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regenerative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which

excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilisation. "War is the father of all things."

Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From a given moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, they require new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors—that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity.

Night is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions rest on the very nature of things.

The efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatised as unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and thus to realise the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed to obviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts of Arbitration—that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formal law is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. The weak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and vigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the most disastrous consequences for humanity generally. . . . The inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development, must be repeatedly emphasised.

Bernhardi discusses the past of the Germanic States in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars to point out the danger of neutrality when the world is on fire.

According to all human calculation, the participation of Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive superiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had ingrained on her by his wars.

Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost. [Treitschke.]

In the opinion of the Teuton Germany is the "predominant partner" in the Germanic family and in the Triple Alliance.

The internal disruption of the Triple Alliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey, threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period which destiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparing ourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed.

While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present directly influence our policy, Turkey—the predominant Power of the Near East—is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian war, which threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. Turkey would gain in two

ways: she assures her position both against Russia and against England—the two States, that is, with whose hostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong to Russia or England.

We have to count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. . . . The apparently peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but none the less formidable, crisis—perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of the German nation.

We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the Powers of Europe; we now must decide whether we wish to develop into and maintain a *World Empire*, and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been hitherto withheld from them.

Save as regards Japan, the further the Prophet has departed from his own country the less true have been his prognostications. The distant fields on to which he cast his vision were green, but not as verdant as General Bernhardt, who appears to have taken as true the leaflets used in our domestic political strife where any and all sides predicted the woe to come from our English-speaking cousins across the sea, from our brothers in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa; from India, Egypt, and all other parts and dependencies of our Empire, if this, that, or the other political nostrum were not swallowed or rejected. He believes, or wishes his readers to believe, that the United States of America are anxiously waiting the psychological moment to blot our Empire out for ever—our great colonies and dependencies were looking for the moment when they could shake themselves free from England's detestable grasp, India to drive the last of our race into the ocean and thus be free, Turkey to take Egypt back into its empty crop and there digest her people at leisure. And when all these moments came about the day of Germany would arrive to shatter the British Empire to pieces and on the dust build up her own. Pity he was too soon for Mr. "Odell" of the Constitutional Club. The Kaiser's spy system had not then come up to date.

DOUBT! THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM.

With all Bernhardt's enthusiasm and prophetic ardour his military instinct warned him that there were difficulties ahead. These he sets out with a frankness equalling his appreciation of the goal to which Germany means to march:

Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent importance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for Germany.

Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared neutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20th, 1815, under the collective guarantee of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in the Treaties of London of November 18th, 1831, and of April 19th, 1839, on the part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself.

If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we take into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to Germany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all considerations are taken into account, our opponents have a political superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English landing force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior forces will be united against Germany and Austria.

Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily difficult.

An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity.

A highly interesting examination follows of the political complications of the European Powers. Bernhardt does not permit himself to harbour delusions. Although he had previously set forth the position of Belgium as neutral, he now more minutely discusses her position, foreshadowing her entering into a combination opposed to the Germanic alliance, and the Germanic view of the right to violate her neutrality.

COMPLICATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED.

We must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in one way

or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power.

A further question, suggested by the present political position, is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning of the last century under quite other conditions—in fact, under a different conception of what constitutes a State—can, or ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory is not *ipso facto* a breach of neutrality, for a State from which—theoretically at least—all danger of war has been removed has no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last-mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the neutrality of the Congo State must be termed more than problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutral country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development presupposes such competition.

Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the State. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, and powerful States have never refrained from a high-handed interference in the internal affairs of smaller ones.

THE RUSSIAN STEAM-ROLLER.

If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never could be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire.

Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances, launch out into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against complete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails.

We cannot count on seeing a great commander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear.

We cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel successfully the attack of our opponents.

GERMANY'S DOORS—OPEN AND SHUT.

In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our country are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the Government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion, and neutrality is only a paper bulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned through Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the country offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Their army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.

The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound, and the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a prey to our enemies.

The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland. England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire over-sea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-east alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides. This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan.

ISOLATION.

If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in carrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russia have a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly superior foes.

Such a war—for us more than for any other nation—must be a war for our political and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents can only attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land and by sea.

We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protracted campaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of our enemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue to defend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at last is won.

In the view of the dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to become its master?

The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the English fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective blockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable that such an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does not seem to me to promise any great success.

The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizes which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing our vessels to great risks.

It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications will be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the great Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might be discovered through Denmark. Our own overseas commerce would remain suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade.

It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect of her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to block these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether they would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity, or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography dictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with England and a Continental war with their German neighbours—two possibilities, each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was at issue is hardly credible.

GERMANY, WHEN THE SEA HATH SPOKEN.

Yet after a month's war only four unarmed merchant ships under the British flag have been "remorselessly destroyed," plus a boat line-fishing in Icelandic waters.

A country like the German Empire depends on an extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing population.

Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or definite destruction of our overseas trade would bring upon the whole nation, and in particular on the masses of the industrial classes who live on our export trade.

Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus raised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffer greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let us assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria—a condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and should stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In any case, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road on which we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, and also export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrial products. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. They must be elaborated in peace time, and a definite department of the Government must be responsible for these preparations.

These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by us in the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on a defensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of our coasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack.

Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockade closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish straits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or she can seal up on the one side the Channel between England and the Continent, on the other side the open sea between the north of Scotland and Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our overseas commerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping.

We must fight the French fleet, so to speak, on land—i.e., we must defeat France so decisively that she would be compelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleet to save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched to the shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on an absolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports and destroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife with France, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all the French position as a Great Power.

Who, then, can doubt that Germany has set herself the task of ruling the world?

Since war broke out Germans have burnt Belgian libraries, universities and churches, shot priests and doctors, destroyed public monuments and hospitals. Their Emperor's instructions were to act like the Goths with Alaric, and by "ruthlessly destroying" the population to strike such terror into man, woman, and child that none might dare to raise their eyes

whilst his destroyers passed. We know why General Bernhardt endorses and quotes from Treitschke's "Politik."

"God will see to it," says Treitschke, "that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!"

His Catholic allies from Austria and Bavaria secure this crumb of comfort:

The dogmatism of Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies of ultramontaniam of the Catholics must be surmounted before any common religious movement can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially, all denominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must never renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To do so would mean loss of prestige.

The late Professor Cramb (lecturer on Modern History, Queen's College, London), with his German education and wide knowledge of German history, literature, and thought, here confirms Bernhardt. He declares that Germany's part in the future is

to resume that creative rôle in religion which the whole Teutonic race abandoned fourteen centuries ago. Judæa and Galilee cast their dreary spell over Greece and Rome when Greece and Rome were already sinking into decrepitude and the creative power in them was exhausted, when weariness and bitterness awakened with their greatest spirits at day and sank to sleep again with them at night. But Judæa and Galilee struck Germany in the splendour and heroism of her prime. Germany and the whole Teutonic people in the fifth century made the great error. They conquered Rome, but, dazzled by Rome's authority, they adopted the religion and the culture of the vanquished. Germany's own deep religious instinct, her native genius for religion, manifested in her creative success, was arrested, stunted, thwarted. But, having once adopted the new faith, she strove to live that faith, and for more than thirty generations she has struggled and wrestled to see with eyes that were not her eyes to worship a God that was not her God, to live with a world vision that was not her vision, and to strive for a heaven that was not her heaven.

Very consoling for the Rhine Provinces and South Germany, apparently! Germany, if victorious, will not confine its directive powers to the ways of Nations, but will invade the realms of God and produce a new and universal religion! What a portentous concept! There is fetus in the womb of destiny which, if not destroyed, promises to grow into a monster. The new Germany seeks to tumble down old ideals, shatter old faiths, destroy human liberty, set up a spurious Napoleonism, and force us to bow before a shrine from whence the spirit has departed. Such is the new "Protestantism" on which the greatness of the German Empire is to be exclusively rooted. Its gospel, however, is not to be found in Luther, nor is it even original—it has been taken without acknowledgment from the "Decline and Fall," and is but a pale reflex of the pigments used by Gibbon.

Professor Cramb suggests that the new cult is already an established creed in Germany, for he proclaims:

In Europe, I say, this conflict between Christ and Napoleon for the mastery over the minds of men is the most significant spiritual phenomenon of the twentieth century.

More than the Europe of 1800 and 1801, which saw in the victor of Marengo the Mohammed of a new era, the enunciator of a new faith, young Germany, the Germany of to-day, in the writings of Treitschke and of the followers of Treitschke, studies Napoleonism, illumining politics with an austere and uplifting grandeur. In the writings of Nietzsche and of the followers of Nietzsche they study the same Napoleonism, transforming the principles of everyday life, breathing a new spirit into ethics, transfiguring the tedious, half-hypocritical morality of an earlier generation.

The baleful fires of Louvain University are but lit from the torch with which Khalif Omar fired the Library of Alexandria—the philosophies of Paynim and Teuton touch a common periphery.

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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

I PROPOSE in my notes of this week to begin with an examination of the Eastern field of the war. Because here things have been brought to at least a local decision.

From the very beginning of this vast series of European campaigns it has rightly been taken for granted that a factor of time was involved peculiar to this universal war.

In all wars the factor of time is a positive determinant. That is, it is a factor the neglect of which makes nonsense of all the rest, and the understanding of which is essential to the understanding of all the rest. But in this war, more than in any other which I can call to mind, the factor of time is emphasised with extreme simplicity and absolute effect.

To repeat what has been said upon all sides (and more than once in these pages), the forces of the two Germanic Powers, threatened from the West and from the East, find themselves superior to the Western, at the most equal to the Eastern, enemy. By an accident, happy for the Germanic powers, the Eastern

enemy cannot enter the field until long after the Western enemy. Therefore it is the whole business of the Germanic forces so threatened to destroy the menace from the West before the menace from the East comes into play.

The Western enemy of the Germanic Powers is the French Army, which, with its six per cent. contingent of English and its unexpected and fortunate addition in strength received through the resistance of the Belgian Militia and Trained Regulars, stands to the Germanic Powers in the proportion of rather more than 1 to rather less than 3. The Eastern enemy is the Russian Army, which is superior in mere number to the Armies of the two Germanic Powers combined.

Let me show first in more detail than has hitherto been attempted in these pages why the pressure exercised by the Russian Army will be felt later than is generally imagined.

That Russia would mobilise more slowly than France has been amply appreciated. There was here an element of delay amounting to a fortnight or three weeks.

That Russia would, once mobilised and once advancing, be unable to bring that pressure to bear during the first weeks of the war was less generally appreciated.

When the critic measures the minimum distance between some point of the Russian frontier and the Prussian capital of Berlin he is struck by the shortness of the line between the one and the other.

That point upon the Russian frontier nearest to Berlin is to be found at Pyzdry, where the river Warta leaves the territory of Russian Poland to enter the territory of Prussian Poland, and from this point to Berlin itself is almost exactly 282 kilometres, or between 175 and 180 miles.

If, therefore, the problem were merely one of a Russian advance from that point upon the Russian frontier to the capital of Prussia the factor of time would not be of the striking importance it is. The advance required in order to strike at the Prussian capital would not be half as much again as the advance required to strike from the German frontier in the West at the French capital.

But the problem cannot be stated upon these lines, and to envisage it so is quite to misunderstand the elements of the Eastern Campaign.

There are two things which prevent so simple a plan as a direct advance on Berlin from the extreme of Russian Poland.

(1) It so happens that the two Germanic Powers

Galicia, before an advance upon Berlin can be undertaken. It is not until the advancing Russian columns are, roughly, abreast along the whole line North and South from Danzig to Cracow that a direct East and West march upon the heart of Germany could begin.

(2) It so happens that the Northern of these two flanking fields (to wit, the provinces of East and West Prussia up to the line of the Vistula, between Thorn and Danzig) is composed for the most part of country particularly defensible, a mass of marsh and lake ill-provided with communications. Further, the ultimate boundary of all this, the line of the Vistula itself, is artificially defended by strong works, especially at Danzig and at Thorn, its two extremities. In other words, just where the Russians had to meet their most formidable human opposition, that of the Prussian military organisation, they also had to meet the most formidable natural conditions.

On the other hand there is a form of advance which Russia can undertake against Germany and which will bring pressure to bear upon Germany long before any direct march upon Berlin has begun. If Russia occupies Galicia thoroughly and in this region thoroughly defeats the mass of the Austrian forces: if she then proceeds Westward and by North down the Valley of the Oder, she will be striking immediately at the Easternmost of the great industrial regions of the German Empire, and will thus be bringing immediate pressure to bear upon the whole German social system.

That first great industrial region is *Silesia*: All that Upper Valley of the Oder of which Breslau is the capital.

Now it is probable from the nature of the recent Russian successes (with which I shall next deal) that Silesia will be struck before the line of the Lower Oder is reached; and when the Silesian Plain, with its dense population, its flourishing industries, and the open road it affords into Saxony (another wealthy industrial region) is reached by the Russian armies, anxiety will for the first time be seriously felt by the German Commanders in France.

But how long will it be before even Silesia, let alone the line of the Lower Oder or Berlin itself, can be thus threatened?

In order to answer that question we have to consider the measure of the Russian success in Galicia and the distances involved by an advance after this success.

The Russian success in Galicia has, at the moment of writing, every appearance of being decisive, and it would seem as though the progress of the Russian invasion would now be continued almost unchecked until Silesia itself was reached and the pressure upon Germany begun.

For the first time since the opening of the campaigns in Western and Eastern Europe one is able to give here a consecutive account of a decisive action. Indeed, this is the first decisive action that has taken place at all since the opening of the Campaign. We have, further, more detailed accounts of what took place than we have hitherto had of anything that has happened in the Western theatre of war.

To begin at the beginning.

While a rapid and, as it has turned out, premature Russian advance was taking place through East Prussia, to the north of that great projection upon the map which is made by Russian Poland, the Austrians to the south of that same projection had invaded Russian Poland with equal rapidity and success.

Before we go further it is important to remember here what the *political* object of the two Germanic



PLAN SHOWING HOW THE CONFIGURATION OF THE WESTERN RUSSIAN FRONTIER RENDERS NECESSARY THE TOTAL SUBJUGATION OF AUSTRIA AND EAST PRUSSIA, IN ORDER TO SECURE THE FLANKS OF THE ARMY, BEFORE THE DIRECT MARCH ON BERLIN IS BEGUN.

lie (by the configuration of the Russian frontier on the west) upon the flank of any such advance towards Berlin. Were the Russian Armies merely to go straight before them in an advance upon the Prussian capital they would leave behind them unbeaten upon their right in A, as upon the left in B, to the North and to the South, great bodies A Prussian and B Austrian, which, by marching, the one South, the other North, along such lines as (1) and (2) into Russian Poland, would fall upon the communications of such a Russian advance and destroy it. Therefore those who draw up the general Russian plan must first allow for the holding of German territory as far as the line C—D on the North—which is the line of the Lower Vistula—and for the holding of Austrian territory up to the line E—F, that is the whole of

powers, acting under the direction of Berlin, has been in risking the chances of this tremendous war.

That object is briefly to reduce France to such a position in Europe that she will in future count among the second-rate States, her army limited at the will of her conqueror; and this is to be done not by annexing any territory, but by crushing military victories followed by crushing financial indemnities, and a continuously crushing economic treaty enforced perhaps by garrisons. Russia is merely to be checked; to be prevented from invading Germany or Austria, and, above all, to be prevented from exercising such pressure as shall compel the Germans to return too early from their task of crushing the French, before that task is accomplished. Finally, against England the determination is to achieve so thorough a victory as shall (1) prevent England from ever becoming a military State. (2) To compel England to impoverish herself at Germany's expense and to share with Germany her present control of Colonial areas, of dependent civilisations, and of sea-borne trade. In general, England is in this plan to be a still commercial and still prosperous State—for it is not thought possible to prevent this—but a State constrained to admit the pretensions of a greater rival from which she will always ultimately have to receive her orders in Colonial and commercial policy throughout the world. It is believed in Germany that a sudden attack upon the British fleet delivered at a chosen moment of calm, and perhaps at the end of the dark, very heavily supported by aircraft, and striking at the inner blockading line, will at least so cripple that line as to leave the North Sea, already mined in regions known to the enemy, free at least for a raid. It is believed that such a raid would paralyse any British effort abroad.

Now in the prosecution of this general plan it is evident that there can be no thought of "conquering" Russia. The thing is flatly impossible. It will be much truer to describe the German conception as an ultimate understanding between Russia and the Germanic Powers for the control of the world.

Translated into military terms, therefore, the policy of the Germanic Powers is, upon their western frontiers to destroy all French offensive power rapidly, to confuse and harry England by some raid; upon their eastern frontier to prove to the Russian General Staff its inability to invade Germany or Austria.

The German General Staff (and the Austrian forces at its disposal) are to show the Russian General Staff that attempt after attempt to invade the territory of the Hohenzollerns or the Hapsburgs is doomed to fail until at last the Russian General Staff shall give up the game.

The recent success of Prussia against the two Russian army corps near Osterode is an exact model of what the German General Staff have planned throughout this war to take place upon their eastern frontiers.

It is this attitude of Berlin (and, therefore, of Austria, too) towards what the Germans describe as the "Slav peril" which gives to the great victory at Lemberg its exceptional immediate importance and may give to that action a capital and determinant effect upon the whole war. For it is the exact opposite of what Berlin hoped for and expected from the Austrians.

They hoped for a "blocking" effect—the defeat of a Russian army not followed by victorious pursuit and profound invasion, but by similar successive defeats of further Russian armies as they advanced. What they have received is the destruction of one of the two Austrian frontier forces which should have

imposed that "blocking" effect upon the enemy, and, at the moment of writing, the immediate peril of destruction to the other.

The story of the Austrian disaster is as follows:—

Two Austrian Armies were organised upon the northern slopes of the Carpathians, facing north-east, across Galicia, and it was from Galicia into the Polish Government of Lublin that the advance was directed.



The first Austrian Army (I.) reposed its right upon the Vistula, at the place where this stream forms a frontier between Galicia and Russian Poland. Its right stretched to the town of Tomaszow, its left was on the Vistula itself at Sandomir, its supplies were drawn from Przemysl. The front along which it was thus drawn up was about eighty miles in length, and it will give some idea of the magnitude of these eastern operations (which the distance of the field tends to dwarf in our western eyes) that this one Austrian front was *more than the whole front recently occupied by the German Army in France, between Amiens and the Belgian frontier.*

This first Army then (I.), the exact composition and magnitude of which we cannot yet determine, but which can hardly have numbered less than five, and may have numbered seven, Army Corps, with their full reserves and independent cavalry, or anything from 300,000 to 400,000 men, advanced directly north by east upon the town of Lublin, much at the same time as the German Army in the west was advancing across the Belgian frontier upon the line Le Cateau-Cambrai—that is about ten days ago. They established contact with the Russian forces in this region upon a line passing through the town of Krasnik, some fifteen miles within the frontier, and rather less than thirty from Lublin itself. When they had thus established contact they completed, against the Russians opposed to them, operations which they claimed in their official report of the action as a complete victory—a victory including the capture of many guns and of many prisoners.

Now when a victory is thus claimed without any proof of the enemy's line having been turned or pierced, it nearly always means that the side claiming it has succeeded in merely continuing its advance; the guns taken are the guns abandoned in the enemy's retreat; the men captured are the stragglers and the much more numerous wounded which the enemy's retreat leaves in the hands of the advancing army. Indeed, the official Austrian description which spoke of the Russians as hastily retiring towards the Valley of the Bug could only correspond to some such movement, and, in general, the Austrian forces in this field had met their opponents a couple of days' march before Lublin in a line passing through Krasnik and, in a series of actions which take their common name

from the town of Krasnik, had forced those opponents back without enveloping or breaking them.

Actions of this sort repeated in the eastern theatre of the war were exactly what the General Staff at Berlin had planned and desired. Their repetition would ultimately prove to the Russians the impossibility of invading Hapsburg or Hohenzollern territory in force.

But as it so happened, the whole effect of this success was first negated and then completely ruined by what took place immediately to the east.

This main advanced Austrian body which was marching upon Lublin and which we call Austrian Army No. I. had to the east of it, that is upon its right flank, another force which we will call Austrian Army No. II. This Austrian Army No. II. was drawn up upon a line the left of which reposed upon Kamionka and the right of which extended, roughly, south and eastward from that town down to Halicz.

This Austrian Army No. II. was presumably at first no larger than Austrian Army No. I. which was making the main advance upon Lublin; for the second Army was only thus extended upon the flank of the first to protect the first army from being turned and to cover from attack the communications, and those depots lying in the fortified town of Lemberg, for Army No. II., and for Army No. I. in the fortified town of Przemysl.

Now this flanking force, Army No. II., evidently came up against something much bigger than it expected. It had to be rapidly reinforced to meet the Russian bodies which it discovered upon its front, and the action to which it was compelled became, against the will of the Austrian commanders, much more important than that other action in which Army No. I. had been engaged near Krasnik.

These reinforcements were so rapid, and so numerous that when the shock came more than six Austrian Army Corps were in line in this second Austrian Army between Kamionka and Halicz. They were the 3rd, the 7th, the 11th, the 12th, the 13th, and the 14th, with five Divisions of Cavalry and some unknown contingent of the Last Reserves, the Landsturm.

It is especially to be noted that this great concentration of men amounted to something like a third of all those Austria-Hungary can put into the field. If we add to it Army No. I. upon its left much more than half, perhaps two-thirds, of the total Austrian forces were present upon this Galician front. The Russian Army marching to meet this Army No. II. of the Austrians lay at first with its left upon the railroad at Dubno, its right beyond Luzk. It crossed the frontier on August 20th, the day when the Germans were marching through Brussels; it pushed back the Austrian outposts very slowly; indeed, its advance appears to have been heavily contested. It was not until Tuesday, September 1st, ten days ago, that the full mass of the Austrian Army No. II. felt the shock.

The Russian attack lasted apparently over forty-eight hours, and upon the third day (just at the moment when the German advance in France had come to the neighbourhood of Paris) the Austrian forces of Army No. II. broke and partially dissolved.

It was not a victory like Sedan in which an army is surrounded and wholly destroyed. But it was a victory of the partial type in which the cohesion of the enemy's force as a whole, and therefore its military value, is so largely impaired as to destroy all its power for the immediate future and most of its power

throughout the Campaign. Very nearly one-third of the men here drawn up to meet the Russians fell into the hands of the enemy, as did 200 of their guns, and the decisive nature of the result is still better proved by the abandonment of Lemberg.

The situation by September 5th, last Saturday, was that of the accompanying sketch, with one



SECOND POSITION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES AFTER THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG.

Austrian army (I.) successful in the North and trying to break a Russian force before it in the neighbourhood of Lublin-Cholm, while the other army (II.) had broken before a larger Russian force in front of Lemberg and had abandoned that town to the enemy.

Immediately after this Russian success in front of Lemberg it became clear that this defeat of Austrian Army No. II., complete as it was, or rather because it was so complete, was no more than the beginning of the business.

It is obvious from the sketch that for the Russians so to destroy Austrian Army No. II. was equivalent to their putting themselves immediately upon the flank of Austrian Army No. I.; and the great Russian force which had put out of action one-third of the military power of Austria in front of Lemberg was now in a position to attack the second third of that military power—the fraction which I have called the Austrian Army No. I.—in flank. It could threaten its communications with Przemysl, its base.

Here a very curious situation seems to have arisen. Austrian Army No. I., threatened in flank by the enemy after the defeat of Austrian Army No. II., should have retreated as fast as it could to save itself from being turned. The first reports received were to the effect that it had so retreated. But later reports told a different story, and what seems to have happened after is that Austrian Army No. I. instead of falling back made a desperate attempt to get round the rear of the successful Russian force upon its right in the direction A—B. In that attempt it is said so far to have failed. It is even said to have lost 5,000 prisoners, and to have had the 10th Army Corps cut up in the attempt. It is obvious that a daring stroke of this sort is paid for in proportion to its daring.

Austrian Army No. I. therefore was compelled to retreat, and, at the time of writing this (Wednesday evening), the Russians already claimed a partial victory over its right wing. The retreat of the first Austrian Army cannot have taken place on Przemysl, for that line was threatened by the Russian advance from Lemberg. The retreat must be well to the west, towards Cracow, and the Russian message is to the effect that this Austrian Army No. I. thus in retreat was caught in flank and severely pressed. How thorough that defeat has

been we cannot tell until further details come in; but it is evident that the first Austrian Army was in a position to suffer defeat, and almost equally evident that it would not have escaped from its position without at least some very heavy loss. Things may even be worse for the remaining Austrian Army; we do not yet know. But at the moment of writing it is not yet cut off.

The question now arises, what use the Russians can make of this victory, if it is complete: that is, if the first Austrian Army is broken up as the second was, and if the advance through Galicia into Silesia remains unchecked.

The first thing that strikes one is the great way that the Armies have to travel. It is nearly a month's marching from the district of Lemberg to the German frontier; but against this delay in time there are two things to be said: First, it is evident from the map that once Galicia was clear of opposition, forces in Russian Poland gathered at Warsaw or between that centre and the German frontier could, if they were in sufficient numbers, come down upon Silesia, before the main Russian Army, now in the neighbourhood of Lemberg, could come up. It is an improbable because a dangerous policy. The Russians thus advancing as a detached body in front of their main body might have to meet forces superior to their own and suffer just what their companions have suffered in East Prussia. It is more probable that the pressure upon Silesia (if the Russian victory is indeed complete, and if, as seems probable, the line of advance undertaken will be westward through Galicia) will not begin until at least a month has passed.

The second consideration, however, is more practical. It is this. The wealthy industrial district for which the word "Silesia" stands is not confined to the German province whose capital is Breslau. It extends into Austrian and even into Russian territory; and the disturbance caused to the society of the enemy by his

presence in territories which can be held to ransom, and the social life of which is important to the whole Germanic alliance, will begin before the German frontier is crossed.

But before we leave this first division of this week's comments, the eastern theatre of the war, something must be said of the effect produced by the German victories in East Prussia.


The extent of the check there received by the Russian Armies has not, perhaps, been fully appreciated by the public of this country.

The German official report first claimed 30,000 prisoners—later, more than double that number. Accurate as these official reports usually are, one is disinclined to accept the very large second estimate; or, at least, one is inclined to suggest that its production immediately after the Lemberg disaster was too much of a coincidence.

It is only a conjecture made for what it is worth, but the conjecture may be risked that of some five Russian Army Corps present in East Prussia, two got pushed further ahead than was safe and were caught. That they were completely surrounded and destroyed there is no evidence. That their fighting value for the immediate future was destroyed is probable. But a conjecture it remains, and more than a conjecture it will not be until we have some full account of the reverse here suffered by our Allies.

It would be possible for the main Russian Army in Galicia to march on into Silesia before this check was set right by the occupation of East Prussia in force. But it would not be possible to begin a general advance upon Berlin, or upon the centre of Germany, while large and victorious German forces still stood upon the lower Vistula. And all this line of argument reinforces one's conclusion that it is unwise to expect the effect of the Russian pressure in the East to be felt in the west until several weeks have passed.

THE WESTERN FIELD.



In the western field of the war, that is in Northern France, we are approaching very rapidly the most critical moment in the first phase of the

operations. We can only say that the problem presents itself in a certain form; we cannot yet say how that problem will be solved.

The form in which this problem presents itself has been so clearly put in the general Press, that the repetition of it here may seem tedious to the reader. I will, nevertheless, repeat its main elements, because, simple as they are, they must be fully grasped if the future of this campaign is to be understood.


At the end of last week it seemed as though an investment of, or at least an attack upon, the Northern and Eastern sections of the fortifications of Paris was intended by the German commanders. They had successfully advanced with amazing rapidity from the Belgian frontier to the gates of the French capital. There was not anyone following and commenting upon the military history of the campaign who did not hope (if his heart was with the Allies) that this task would be undertaken by the invaders—or who did not dread it if his sympathies were with the Germans.

It is almost self-evident that to undertake a task of such magnitude as the attack upon the Northern and Eastern forts alone in a perimeter of over 100 miles, and that in the presence of an unbeaten army, would be to imperil the whole future of the German forces of invasion. But it was suggested in these comments—

(1) That the overwhelming advance upon Paris would never have been made unless Paris had been its true objective.

(2) That the moral importance of entering Paris, both positive in its effect upon the German nation and negative in its effect upon the Allies, would hardly permit the German commanders to give up the prey, even temporarily.

As a matter of fact, the right wing—that is the extreme western extremity—of the German invading line was, upon Saturday and Sunday last, deliberately halted. The forces opposed to it at the moment (in the neighbourhood of Creil) were certainly not sufficient to have compelled this halt, or to have imposed it upon a reluctant enemy. The change of plan, though certainly made at the last moment, was deliberately chosen and as deliberately acted upon by those who were responsible for the German movements as a whole. And the change of plan was this. Of the forces which had marched, one overlapping the other, until the German army of invasion was stretched over the whole of northern France from the neighbourhood of Paris at Creil in the west to Verdun in the east, the extreme western ones turned suddenly at right angles to their previous course and began marching south and east in the directions indicated in the sketch below by the arrows.



SKETCH SHOWING THE WHEEL OF THE GERMAN RIGHT WING, OR 1ST ARMY, BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 3RD AND SEPTEMBER 5TH.

Paris was left neglected upon the right; and while the remainder of the German line was advancing

southward (each body directly towards the front of the position it occupied) these western units alone (conventionally known here as the *First* German Army) turned partly away from, but in the main perpendicular to, the original direction which they had hitherto strictly and rapidly followed from Mons and Charleroi towards the French capital.

Why did they do this? What had happened?

The answer to such questions can only be found in one of two alternatives.

Either (a) the whole German advance upon Paris was not intended as a fundamental part of the campaign, but was in the nature of a feint; or, (b) the German advance had on its western extreme come up against a surprise; had met forces unexpectedly strong, had come up against an unsuspected reserve maintained by the French deliberately during all the retreat, and maintained at the cost of weakening the defensive line which retired so precipitately (but remained unbroken) during that retreat.

There is indeed a third possibility, which has only to be named to be rejected. As it has been suggested in some quarters I will not leave it unnoticed.

This third conjecture is that the cessation of the German advance upon Paris was due to an exhaustion of that advance in numbers and in energy. There are many reasons why this conjecture may be safely rejected.

It is evident that the advance was planned in great detail, and with a full organisation of its daily effort and its reserves of strength.


It is equally evident that the check, had it been due to this cause, would have taken the form of an increasing exhaustion long before Paris was reached, and of that exhaustion there has been no sign.

Further, the extreme German right wing, which was thus suddenly turned perpendicular to its original direction, has been so turning in these last few days, with full energy; it is still defending itself vigorously against what are obviously superior numbers. It has, as I write, taken a strong counter offensive upon the Ourcq. While the deliberate choice of a new and, at first sight, puzzling direction towards the east and south (while Paris lay to the west) is still further evidence of a change of plan very different in character from mere bewilderment, or from any confusion due to some miscalculation by the German commanders of their remaining energy.

Nothing can explain this unexpected wheel but the necessity of a new plan, and that necessity arising from the discovery, behind and in the neighbourhood of Paris, of a large French reserve force of whose existence, or, at any rate, of whose numbers, the enemy were hitherto ignorant.

What is that new plan which has thus been suddenly adopted by the Germans, when they discovered this unexpected weight of men on their right, and what are its chances of success?

While the German advance on Paris was taking place, the various bodies of the German Line between the Meuse and Paris were occupied in attempting to outflank the Allied line which was retreating before them. In any one day of the advance, after the line of the Sambre was abandoned, the position was always somewhat after the fashion of this diagram. The Allied line being held by bodies A B C D of the enemy, opposed to its own bodies F G H K, fresh bodies, drawn from the superior numbers of the Germans, kept coming round, as at E, to envelop the Allied line if possible. This attempt to envelop was only avoided day after day by the continued rapid, but luckily orderly, retreat of the Allies upon positions to



the rear, as at M N O, etc. Day after day the superior numbers of the invaders permitted them to extend beyond the western extreme of the Allies and correspondingly forced the Allies to retreat. They were happy to be able to retreat—even at so great an expense in guns, munitions, and men—and to escape encirclement and annihilation. For such encirclement and annihilation German strategy presupposes, and in superior numbers—acting rapidly and lavishly spent—all that over-simple strategy depends.

An effort undertaken at such an enormous expense of energy with so clear an object, cannot for a moment be regarded as intended to dupe its enemy. The immense cost in numbers alone by which the Germans hoped to purchase an immediate success, proves that this success—an envelopment—was really attempted, and attempted in a fashion easily recognisable. The extraordinary pace at which the manœuvre was forced points to exactly the same conclusion.

Suddenly, when the Allied line had been pushed back so far that its left repose upon Paris, its right upon Verdun, the German scheme changed in one day—September 4th. The attempted envelopment ceases. Quite a new manœuvre, the attempt to break the Allied line, succeeds to it.

Not only does this attempt to break the Allied line take the place of the earlier attempt at envelopment, but the breaking of that line has suddenly become an immediate necessity for the invaders. Their main game has failed. They have not got round their inferior enemy. He will now never be surrounded, and the master-idea of the German Staff has missed its goal. But if they succeed in pushing back the French lines or breaking their centre the Germans have at least saved themselves, and possibly destroyed a large body of their opponents; if they fail in this last attempt not to turn but to break the French lines there is nothing open to them but retreat.

Why is this?

Upon the accompanying diagram which, though giving only the barest elements of the position, is drawn to scale, the necessity under which the Germans now are of breaking the Allied line or retreating will be clear.

From positions near Meaux, twenty-five miles east of the forts of Paris, the German armies which had hitherto been achieving the immensely rapid invasion of northern France, after the check, extended in a great convex arc to Verdun.

They were fed, as to projectiles and everything else, by lines of communication coming from Belgium and Luxembourg in the direction of the arrows (1)—(1). Their right wing at M., Meaux, having come up against unexpectedly large reserves (there gathered to await them by the French) was bent back. It has had to turn back eastward. On their left is the great fortress of Verdun, which is still holding out; another great fortress to the south is Toul, and between these two a chain of forts at *a a a* is, if not impassable, at least only to be passed at an immense expense in men and at some considerable expense in time.

But south of Toul, and covering the gap between that fortress and the fortress of Epinal, sundry French forces at *L.L.L.* (which may be called the French army of Lorraine) are confronted by further German forces, *K.K.K.*, stretched along the frontier between France and Germany in this region.

Now observe that if the considerable numerical superiority of the French near M. permits them there to march round, and push back, the German right wing, the existing communications (1) (1) of the main German armies in the north are at once threatened. Should this considerable body of the Allies in the neighbourhood of M. continue the pressure which it has been exercising during the last four days, the German forces between Verdun and Paris, if they cannot break through to the south, would have no choice but to retreat. The initiative will have passed from them to their enemies, and it is even possible that, unless the retreat is conducted as precipitately as was the advance, their supplies might be cut and they might suffer disaster.

But if the Germans break the centre of the French line towards the east, say at some such point as V. (which stands roughly for Vitry-le-François) or even if, without breaking it, they push it back to such a line as the positions W. W. W. (corresponding roughly to a line passing through Troyes), then the Germans,




DIAGRAM SHOWING THE LINES OF THE TWO ARMIES ON AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 4TH.

though pressed in upon their right at M will have achieved their immediate object.

For:—

(a) They will have compelled the French bodies at L. L. either to retreat precipitately through the gap of Nancy between Toul and Epinal, or to be caught in reverse and annihilated:

(b) They will have permitted their own army in Lorraine (K K K) to pass through the gap of Nancy and to join up in a direct forward march with what had hitherto been their northern armies cut off from them by the projecting fortress of Verdun.

(c) More important still, they will have wiped out the strategical factor of the fortified frontier line Verdun—Toul, and Epinal—Belfort. For once the Germans are behind that line, that line might as well not exist; and the garrisons within the fortresses can be picked up at their leisure.

(d) Finally, and most important of all, the Germans (if they achieve this pushing back or breaking of the French line in the neighbourhood of V.) will pick up communications (2), (2), (2) far preferable to the only ones they now have along (1), (1). The former (2), (2), (2), are what they have always wished to have, but have been debarred from by the barrier of the fortified frontier. They are lines leading directly and shortly to their great depots on the upper Rhine and in Lorraine, well served with rolling stock, numerous, and parallel. Quite another matter from the long, crowded and insufficient lines (1), (1), through the intensely hostile territory of Belgium. Here along (2), (2), is a mass of railways—no less than six main lines, coming straight across the Rhine—to feed the invading army; and the threat to their existing lines at (1), (1), even if the French pressure around the German right at M continues and develops to the North, will have become negligible, because the German line will have new and far better service of supply from Alsace-Lorraine.


This should make it clear that everything depends in the next few days upon whether the Germans can (1) break through, or even (2) seriously push back the eastern part of the Allied line, that is the French troops stretched from half-way between Paris and Verdun to Verdun itself.

In the first case, supposing the Germans break through in the neighbourhood of Vitry, all that is caught to the east of the point, including the French troops in Lorraine at (L), (L), (L), would be doomed.

In the second case, supposing they do not break the French line but merely cause it to retire, though no decision would have been arrived at (always supposing that the troops in Lorraine had time to retreat rapidly through the gap and join their fellows beyond) and though the German forces would still find an intact and unbroken army in front of them, yet the invaders would have managed to establish themselves in a stronger position than before. The difficult and few Belgian lines of communication (1), (1), would have lost their importance. No turning movement against their north would then threaten their supplies, for their supplies would then come directly from the east, and they would have established new, much more numerous, much stronger, and much shorter lines of supply coming straight from directly over the Rhine behind them.


One may illustrate the three possible results which the situation appears to present in the three following diagrams.

In the first, where it is supposed that the




German forces in the north between Verdun and Paris have failed to pierce the Allied line, they will have no choice but to retire along their existing lines of communication (1)—(1), in the direction marked by the arrows. They will be in danger of being cut off from their fellows, K K, in Lorraine; they will be in danger of seeing their only communications through Belgium and the north (1) (1) cut by the advance of the superior Allied forces along A B.

In the second supposition, having broken the



Allied line at V, they would have cut off the French army in Lorraine, L L L, and could confidently expect its destruction. At the same time, they would feel no more anxiety about their old abandoned communications along (1)—(1), for they would depend, when the French army in Lorraine had gone, upon the new and better communications along (2)—(2). From that moment onwards the German forces would be, for the first time, in a definite position of superiority over the Allies in the Western field of the war.

The third possibility is that of the Allied line,



pushed back into such a position as W W W, joined by the troops from Lorraine and not broken, nor

having in any part suffered disaster, but henceforward faced by a German army standing north and south, based upon new and better communications coming directly from the east in (2)—(2), having turned the fortified frontier Verdun-Belfort and eliminated it as an obstacle.

It will be seen from all this that every effort will be made by the Allies during these critical days to maintain a combination of two main elements in their strength, (1) the resistance of the concave line, especially where it is most threatened which is in the sag at V. (Vitry le François): (2) the prosecution of the enveloping movement against the German right wing at M.—the region of Meaux—where there is so far a definite numerical superiority on the side of the Allies, though the Allies are still inferior in numbers to the total of the German line.

If both these factors combined are maintained—that is, if the pressure at M goes on and the resistance at V holds—there is *success*. If the resisting line breaks at V or elsewhere there is *disaster*. Even if it is only pushed back there is, for the moment, *failure*.

Such are the comparatively simple elements of this most critical moment in the first part of so vast a movement of men. Such are the three inconceivable issues of these grave days.

THE CRITICAL POINTS IN DETAIL.


It is not without interest to consider in some detail the ground over which both these critical parts of the Allied forces, the enveloping people at M and the resisting people at V, are moving.

The field in which pressure is being brought upon the German right and turning it back from Paris, is the lower valley of the Marne. A sketch of this field is here appended. The Marne is a river which flows

twenty miles N. by E. of the outermost Paris forts) there flow into the Marne from opposite sides two tributaries.

The one from the north bears the name of the *Oureq*; that from the south the name of the *Grand Morin*. The latter is known as the Grand Morin, or the Great Morin, to distinguish it from another tributary coming in further to the east and known as the little Morin, or Petit Morin. It is in the angle formed by the Grand Morin and the Oureq that the German right wing, recently in touch with the fortifications of Paris, was caught on September 4th, 5th, and 6th, when the presence of an unexpected French reserve force in and about Paris was first appreciated by the enemy. The German right wing or 1st Army was thus caught by superior forces, among which was the British contingent, which contingent lay at first along the Grand Morin four days ago, was already across the Petit Morin by Tuesday, and is now across the Marne in its advance against the German retreat. It has upon its right the 5th French Army; while upon the Oureq is the larger body known as the 6th French Army, which has behind it those reserves recently called up from Paris and from the west of that town.

It is evident that while the Germans in their retirement before these superior numbers will delay the advance of every opposing unit as much as possible, they will, or should, show peculiar energy in resisting the north-western side of the angle, the French advance across the line of the Oureq. For as this advance proceeds the German troops still lingering or hampered in the north (whence they have come) are in danger of being cut off, and the cavalry of the French reserve and other bodies which it can spare from its superior numbers, tend perpetually to approach the line A. B., by which the German right wing or




into the Seine just above Paris having come in a great bend across the Champagne country. If we fix our attention upon the town of Meaux, we shall see that in the neighbourhood of that town (which is some

1st Army originally advanced and by which it still receives its supplies.

Upon the pressure that can be exercised in this field of the war very largely depends the success of the

combined manœuvre upon which the Allies are now concentrated, and which, if it is imposed upon the German invasion, will compel that invasion to retreat.

The other field in which the Allies are concerned is the equally important one stretching in a great concave through Vitry-le-François to the fortified line between Verdun and Toul. Here the conditions are as follows:—



SKETCH SHOWING THE CRITICAL SECTION OF THE FRENCH LINE NEAR VITRY-LE-FRANÇOIS WHEN THE MAIN GERMAN ATTACK FALLS.

The eastern side of this field, that lying towards the Meuse and the fortified line Verdun—Toul, is country both hilly and thickly wooded. It is a country not only of deep ravines and considerable forests, but of pasture lands, often fairly "close" and "blind"—cut up by hedges and full of spinneys and copses as well as woods. To the north stretches the long low ridge of the Argonne, a lump of clay, crossed by five or six main roads, but only two railways. The main German effort to break the French line must be made to the west of this wooded, ravined, and difficult country, for to the west of it lie plains, at first very open and bare; and even farther east there is easy rolling ploughed and heath country with wide horizons; such as is suitable to the manœuvring of great forces.

It is across this open country—the plains which take their name from the town of Chalons on the Marne, and the great wheat district that lies to the south and east of those plains—that the main German effort to pierce the French line, now in progress, is directed. Its centre of effort is against Vitry.

In this critical effort, upon the success or failure of which will so largely turn the fate of France, the armies of the Crown Prince of Prussia and of Wurtemberg, the 10th Corps and the Guard are traversing country which has been throughout all recorded history the battlefield of the Gauls.

It is the first time, I think, in history that the parallel eastern obstacles which cover France have been thus turned, or that an invader has been approaching from the north, but, save for this anomaly, history here repeats itself in an astonishing fashion.

It must have been about the 4th of September, Friday last, that once more men from Brandenburg saw before them south of the great camp at Chalons the half-starved rolling plain of the Champagne-Pouilleuse, utterly bare save for dwarf lines of newly-planted firs. And as they looked over that mournful country, which is like a tumbled sea of hillocks and rounded dips with the dull, low line of Argonne crossing the eastern horizon, one crest and roll over which they marched bore the tomb of Kellerman, and was the lonely position of Valmy. Whatever column it was that crossed this field, some man among them as he crossed the high road rested for a moment where

young Goethe rested, and if he glanced back during a halt, may have wondered, as Goethe wondered, whether he were not at the beginning of a new world.

But there is more than this. In that same lost and barren region of the huge Catalaunian Plain, coming along the Roman Road, which skirts the Camp of Chalons and is the main avenue of advance southward, by Suippes, some column passed immediately beneath the ramparts of that amazing thing which is still called the Camp of Attila. It is a huge oval bank, reminding one in its shape of those modern tracks (such as Brooklands) where petrol races are run, and also in its size—for it is many hundred yards in length. But it is piled much higher than the banks of these modern racing tracks, and in its bulk and isolation it is the most impressive thing a man may see in the whole course of European travel. This Camp, tradition affirms, was the fortification wherein the Huns secured themselves before they marched some two days further south, and were broken to pieces at last by the discipline of the Roman people, and by that power there is in the Latin blood to digest and to bring into useful service the barbarians.

Even as I write these lines upon the Wednesday of the week I do not know, for there is no immediate news in England, whether this effort of the invader upon the French centre at Vitry has succeeded. But I know that he is marching over sacred ground where there rise against him the influences of the dead. Not so far away, a day's march behind the defending line, is the house that nourished Danton. If that line is pierced the invader may burn the house, still standing, where Joan of Arc was born.

Such, then, is the nature of the ground and such the position of the opposing forces at the most critical point of all in this campaign. Should the extreme French right fall past Revigny-aux-Vaches and approach Bar le Duc, it will be high time for the French Army in Lorraine at L L L to retire.

And here one cannot but digress to consider the arresting of the German offensive which has been achieved so far by the troops covering the open country between Nancy and the Vosges.

Indeed, one of the chief puzzles of this great war, with its astonishing armour of concealment, is the position and the implied success in their resistance of the forces that cover this bit of open ground.

I have seen in more than one telegram the phrase "Fortifications of Nancy." In particular we were told in one despatch three days ago that the German Emperor was with the troops that were "attacking the fortifications of Nancy." But the phrase has no meaning. Nancy is an open town. There are a few field works in front of it which could have no effect save to delay for a very short time any determined advance upon the city. There is only one permanent work East of the Nancy line, and that is the Fort of Manonvillers, which fell (apparently) after a bombardment of some twelve days, and has been in the hands of the enemy for over a week. For the rest the defence of Nancy and of all that gap depends entirely upon an army in the field. That army cannot be of any great size. It is only composed of just what can be spared to cover the gap between Toul and Epinal, but it has so far apparently fulfilled its task. It will be of interest to discover, when news can be given us, whether the Germans have pursued, in the case of Nancy, their hitherto constant practice of bombarding open towns. There is no town in France that would be more vulnerable to an argument of that sort and there is none where greater destruction could be caused by such a breach of civilised traditions.

Its character as the capital still of a province and but recently of a kingdom, its immense wealth, its remarkable triumphs of architecture, and its commercial character all lend themselves to this conclusion, and make it a fit subject for the experiment. On the other hand no such bombardment would have any effect upon the disposition of the armies in the field, and the position of Nancy will be held or abandoned in the present temper of the French exactly as though it were a few fields of barren ground. For the whole mind of the nation is bent upon a strategic task, and not even an entry into Paris would have disturbed that mind from its immediate object, which is not the saving of beauty or wealth, but a final victory.

THE EFFECT OF THE SIEGE GUNS.

The mention of such a bombardment, which may even now be taking place, leads me to return to a matter of which I have spoken already in these comments (last week, I think, and the week before)—the power of resistance opposable by the French fortresses to the German claim that modern fortification will always break down, and speedily, under the effect of modern siege artillery.

Namur was an exceptional case, for we see more and more, as the details come in, that Namur was not in a posture for defence. Had it held out but a few days, the French counter-offensive through the Ardennes would, probably, have succeeded; the line of the Sambre could certainly have been held. Namur fell with an unexpected rapidity, and one which will presumably not be repeated; but it is none the less apparent that the German claim is largely successful in practice, and that the new siege artillery dominates the old system of fortification.

If that is the case, as it would appear to be: if the modern ring fortress, though it may have resisting power for weeks, has not resisting power for months—and, perhaps, has only resisting power for days—the strategy of the Allies will have to consider how far, in any future development, the resistance of any modern fortification can be relied upon.

At the present moment, for instance, the whole of this great line of the Allies is reposing ultimately upon Verdun and upon Paris. It is true that against Paris no attempt has been made, nor does it appear as yet that heavy siege guns have been brought up against Verdun. But it may well be that in some future development of the campaign—and perhaps no distant development—the value of fortified positions as a pivot, still more as a refuge to armies in being, will disappear. We must expect to hear of their fall under any determined effort directed against them, and it is unfortunately true that as yet a siege artillery of corresponding force to be brought against the enemy's positions, when these in their turn are attacked, may be lacking.

There is nothing impossible, or even secret, in the construction of such large pieces as the Germans have brought forward; but it takes time. Their supply to the Allies is a task to which, without any doubt, the attention of at least two of the three Allied Powers has already been turned. It is one which they will not be able to solve before a date distant by many months from the present. One might put it so bluntly as to say that it looks as though the Germanic Powers would be able to rely upon the permanent fortifications they have established more than the Allied Powers can rely upon theirs, because the Allies cannot have for many months such howitzers to use against prepared fortresses as Prussia already commands to the number of perhaps half a hundred.

Meanwhile, it remains true that the ultimate fate of this, as of all campaigns, depends, not upon artificial works, which introduce no more than the element of delay, but upon the success or failure of armies in the field.

THE NATURE OF THE NEWS RECEIVED.

Now that we shall probably receive fuller news from the seat of war than has been either advisable or possible during the past month, it may be worth while to consider certain points about that news and the way in which we should judge it.

The first thing to be grasped is that the reports reaching us are bound to be for some time to come, as they have been in the immediate past, apparently self-contradictory.

There are four sources from which we receive information, and the motives and the methods of their authors are very different.

There is first of all the report of the journalist sent out by his proprietor in search of the picturesque and the vivid: sometimes such a source of information is acquainted with the elements of military affairs, more often he is not. At any rate the descriptions he sends cannot be of value to the comprehension of the campaign as a whole nor are they intended to be. Occasionally in such descriptions you get a phrase which supplies you with some truth to what has really happened in a particular place on a particular day, but as a rule they tell you nothing of the general movement, the fortunes of which alone concern the fate of the country.

Next there are the stories from individuals, particularly from private soldiers, which present the very high local interest, but must be put in the same category as the last, so far as general comprehension is concerned.

Thirdly, there are the despatches proceeding from officers in the field and occasionally communicated to the public by their Governments. This source of information is of course of the highest value, but it is always somewhat belated. It will be of capital interest when the history of the war comes to be written, but for following the campaign while it is in progress this source of information comes as a rule too late.

Finally, there are the official digests or short communiqués issued by the various Governments, our own, our Allies, and our enemies.

This last source is the only secure foundation on which one can build a knowledge of the campaign as it goes on, and it is important to appreciate what the qualities of these communiqués are. In the first place they are accurate so far as they go, and this is just as true of the enemies' communiqués as of ours. The public is apt to be confused upon this point, because every rumour, falsehood or exaggeration proceeding from enemy sources is lumped together with or without that distinction of origin.

I can recall no official German communiqué which, so far as it went, was not accurate. On the other hand, the newspaper comment in Germany and the stories sent by the German financial press are often ludicrous and impossible.

But the second point about these official communiqués, whether from enemies or from friends, is that they invariably suppress news which is unfavourable to their own side. For instance, the German communiqués said nothing about that decisive action in front of Lemberg which must necessarily influence the whole of the war, and in the same way we have learned from the enemy of more than one reverse which neither our Allies' despatches nor our own told us of.

Upon the whole the communiqués of the Allied Governments are less reserved in this way than those of the Germanic Governments. For instance, one could learn from the French communiqués of the retirement of the 15th Army Corps in Lorraine before the Crown Prince of Bavaria's army three weeks ago, but even when reverse is admitted it is put in such terms that it is minimised.

The object of any Government in acting thus is clear. It is twofold. It desires to maintain the spirits of its public and of its army, and it desires to keep from the enemy too full a knowledge of what his success may have been. For even a successful enemy, unless he has managed to surround, remains largely ignorant of the damage he has inflicted. There is a third character attaching to these communiqués which I have not seen noticed in the public press and which is yet of supreme importance; it is the fact that a great number of them are necessarily translations and that translation is the most difficult of all literary arts. I cannot judge of how far the translations from the German have been accurate: for instance I do not know whether the phrase about the English being encircled ten days ago was a true rendering of the German or not. But I can judge the translations from French into English and from English into French which have been appearing in the press of the two countries during the campaign, and I discover from these exercises at once the importance and the great difficulty of rendering any message, especially a terse one, into a foreign tongue.

Thus, about a week ago, I came upon this phrase in the English press, translating a French communiqué: "Our line has nowhere been really pierced." In common with everyone who read that sentence I found it exceedingly alarming, but when I got my French paper I found that the original phrase was not "really pierced" but "Réellement entamée." Now this word "entamée" does not mean pierced at all. It means damaged, bitten into, pitted. For instance, when you talk of a weapon being "entamé" it does not mean that there is a hole through it, it means that the rust has pitted the steel. Generally, the word signifies a hurt done to the surface of anything and so grave as not to be immediately repairable. What the French Government's despatch conveyed in the original was the idea that the line had been severely tested at more than one point but had everywhere recovered itself. There was no thought of *piercing* in the writer's mind when he wrote that sentence.

That is only one instance, for every day I come across something more or less of the same kind; and I think it worth mentioning in days like these when such meagre and hurried news so powerfully moves public opinion. I cannot but believe that there will be misunderstanding not only in the public mind, but on the field, unless the difficulties of that most subtle and at the same time stubborn task, the transvaluation of language, are appreciated at their true value. For educated Europe has gone back, not forward, in this during the last fifty years.

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A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

DAY BY DAY.

AUGUST 18TH.—General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appointed to command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in succession to the late General Grierson.

AUGUST 20TH.—The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near Shabatz.

AUGUST 21ST.—The German forces entered Brussels.

AUGUST 22ND.—Servia announces that their army had won a great victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

AUGUST 23RD.—Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian army gained an important victory near Gumbinnen against a force of 160,000 Germans.

AUGUST 24TH.—It was announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

AUGUST 27TH.—Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German armed merchantman *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on the West Africa Coast.

A strong force of British marines has been sent to Ostend and has occupied the town without opposition.

AUGUST 28TH.—A concerted operation was attempted against the Germans in the Heligoland Bight.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the *Mainz*. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, *Köln* class, and another cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking condition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that "The Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India."

AUGUST 31ST.—At one point in the centre of the Allied line the French troops succeeded in beating the enemy back as far as Guise.

SEPTEMBER 1ST.—The Russians met with a check in East Prussia, but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

SEPTEMBER 2ND.—Continuous fighting was in progress along almost the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinction, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten guns. The French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. The Russian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.

SEPTEMBER 3RD.—The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

SEPTEMBER 4TH.—The Russian Army under General Ruzsky, captured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

SEPTEMBER 5TH.—The formal alliance of England, France, and Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 6th.

The British Army was reported south of the Marne, and in line with the French forces on the right and left. The latest information about the enemy stated that they were neglecting Paris and marching in a south-easterly direction towards the Marne and towards the left and centre of the French line.

The 1st German Army was located to be between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Essises Voffort. The 2nd German Army, after taking Rheims, advanced to Château-Thierry and to the east of that place. The 4th German Army was reported on the west of the Argonne, between Suippes and Ville-sur-Tourbe. All these points were reached by the Germans on September 3rd.

The 7th German Army has been repulsed by a French Corps near D'Einvillle. It would, therefore, appear that the enveloping movement upon the Anglo-French left flank has been abandoned by the Germans, either because it is no longer practicable to continue such a great extension or because the alternative of a direct attack upon the allied line is preferred.

It was announced that the scout-cruiser *Pathfinder* foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 7th.

General Joffres' plans were being steadily carried out. The Allied forces acted on the offensive and were successful in checking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the German forces opposed to them.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8th.

The general position continued satisfactory. The Allies gained ground on the left wing along the line of the Ourcq and the Petit Morin river. Here the British troops drove the enemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from Vitry-le-François to Sermaise-les-Bains the enemy was pressed back in the direction of Rheims. In the vicinity of Lunéville an attempt by the Germans to advance was repulsed. As to the Russian operations in Galicia, the offensive continued. Forty guns were captured at Mikolaïoff and the Austrians retired hurriedly.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9th.

On the left wing all the German attempts to break through our troops, who were on the right bank of the Ourcq failed. The English Army crossed the Marne, and the enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE NORTH SEA.

TOWARDS the end of last week the Press Bureau reported that a number of damaged German destroyers were at Kiel, and that others had sunk outside the Canal. Speculations as to some further action were rife. Some surmised an affray with the Russians in the North Sea, but it is far more probably a belated German sequel to the Heligoland affair.

Wilhelmshaven—as the map indicates—is far nearer to Heligoland than Kiel. On the other hand, Kiel is no great distance away, and, as Wilhelmshaven is an active base for destroyer divisions, it is probable that the authorities considered it inadvisable to allow fresh and untried forces to contemplate what had happened to the division to which V 187 belonged. The boats which escaped must have been terribly mauled.

In this connection we have to remember that the bulk of the German crews are, relative to our own men, comparatively raw, and also necessarily unfortified by those traditions of past warfare which are so valuable an asset to the British Navy.

We have further to remember how sedulously the men of the German Navy have been taught to despise the British and British gunnery. Psychology, therefore, becomes a matter of extreme importance.

Another instance of the influence of psychology on the German scheme of things is to be found in last Friday's night raid on the British trawlers in the North Sea—a perfectly useless operation from the military point of view, unless, of course, it was influenced by the idea that the fifteen trawlers captured can be used for further indiscriminate mine laying, their crews being terrorised into concealing the presence of German combatants on board them.

This is a point of view worthy of consideration. If there is one thing more certain than another, it is that German warships did not risk the danger of going out for the mere "glory" of capturing some inoffensive British fishermen. So the above is one explanation of that "German naval victory" over which our Press has since made so merry.

Another, and I am inclined to think a truer, explanation is that the move was a purely psychological one. As students of history (even if not from personal experience) the German authorities cannot be unaware of the deadly effects of inaction on a

PSYCHOLOGY AND ACTION.

fleet bottled up in harbour. Just as later on it was deemed

place, to ask ourselves how we would act if compelled to do our best with an inferior force, untried, without traditions, deliberately educated on false ideals as to superiority, and with the pusillanimity of the capture of the *Goeben* to live down. "Prove something at all costs" is the only possible move.

And so we are very ill-advised to make merry about German victories (probably on the Dogger Bank) over British fishermen. Rather we should remember that the capture of a bathing machine from an East Coast watering place might well be a most valuable moral asset to the German Fleet. To the inferior naval power the most trivial gain has a real value.



DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE RESPECTIVE LOSSES IN THE NORTH SEA IN TERMS OF APPROXIMATE FIGHTING VALUE TO SEPTEMBER 7TH (ONE MONTH'S WARFARE).

One is bound to confess that the German Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet has made no errors to date.

More: I am of opinion that—thanks to the additional circumstance that we have since lost the *Speedy* and *Pathfinder* by mines in quick succession

THE EFFECT OF MINES.

— those responsible for the destinies of the German High Sea Fleet are neither disheartened nor

dissatisfied with the present situation.

They have, it is true, lost three small cruisers and a destroyer, plus an unknown number of other destroyers damaged. Against this, however, they can place the fact that their mines have destroyed three British warships, and something approaching a reign of terror is in process of being created in the North Sea. This, of course, is exactly according to the plan of campaign.

Results have not in any case come up to full expectations, but here, at least, Germany is in a position to play a waiting game. We shall do well to remember this and to keep on remembering it. The appended diagram indicates that so far Germany has lost more than she has gained so far as *materiel* is concerned. But I am by no means sure that in her opinion "honours easy" is not the prevailing conviction.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The item of chief interest so far this week is that Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne should have relinquished his command and a French Admiral taken his place in command of the Anglo-French force.


It is desirable to state the reason. The British admiral was the senior, while the French Admiral de Lapeyere had by far the biggest number of ships under his own command. The Austrian Navy is France's especial affair, and so as a matter of international courtesy matters have been placed in his hands, and the senior British admiral has come home. A senior officer cannot serve under a junior one.

There was no other solution of the problem. Everywhere near home the British Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Jellicoe, controls things; in the Mediterranean France is supreme. The weak point of allied Fleets is two leaders and the consequent divergence of ideas. Admiral Milne is sacrificed to a principle. It is a valuable principle, so no more is to be said. For good or ill the Allies must be one and undivided. Thus, and thus only, is victory to be assured.

The *Goeben* is still "interned" in Turkish waters, and has nominally passed into the Turkish Navy. But her own crew are apparently still aboard her, and the possibilities of what this battle cruiser can do, using the Dardanelles as a base, are immense.

Just at present Turkey is adopting a peaceful policy, but there is no telling how long that policy will endure. In any case the Turks are notoriously easy to "manage," so that the prospect of the *Goeben's* reappearance has to be calculated for in the general plan.

The appended sketch map indicates the value of the Dardanelles as a base, the possibilities of dodging about around



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE DOCKYARDS AND PRINCIPAL PRIVATE FIRMS AT WHOSE YARDS DAMAGED GERMAN WARSHIPS CAN BE REPAIRED.

advisable not to allow the outposts to see the effects of British gunnery on the Heligoland destroyers, so it had been desirable to demonstrate, by producing the spoils of victory, that Germany "rules the waves" in the North Sea. In attempting to assess any operation we have to put ourselves in the enemy's

the islands being immense. Also, should Turkey be at Germany's disposal, lying in wait for the *Goeben* outside the Dardanelles would not necessarily be of any avail, as coal is to be obtained at various points along the coast of Asia Minor. The principal of these are marked on the map, but there are at least a dozen other harbours which could be "arranged for," and all of them well inside International Law.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

THE situation this week is best described as "Business as usual." Certain German cruisers are still at large, but they



MAP TO INDICATE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE "GOEBEN" IN THE LEVANT, AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF CATCHING HER SHOULD SHE EMERGE.

are apparently acting without any coherent plan, and their extinction is merely a matter of time.

Material damage done by them is trivial, while the moral damage on which a "guerre de course" must necessarily depend appears to be entirely non-existent.

It should be generally realised that the duty of the British Navy is not so much the actual catching of commerce destroyers as rendering them impotent. To date this has been done. British overseas trade is just as safe at present as it was in the times of peace. The chances of German interception are considerably less than the chances of running into a drifting iceberg. In this matter the plans of the German Naval Staff have gone hopelessly "agley."

For the last week no captures of moment have been recorded. German trade, except via Holland, is practically wiped off the seas.

In this connection the position of Holland is likely to become a problem in the early future. Germany is dependent

THE POSITION OF HOLLAND.

on overseas imports of foodstuffs almost as much as we are. Her indiscriminate mine-laying has at least had sufficient method in it not to interfere with Dutch Trade. The profits to Holland are probably very great indeed—hence the pro-German attitude of the Dutch.

The Dutch Navy is of no great account, but it is still ample enough to have a potential danger where its small craft are concerned. An ultimatum to Holland would, however, materially lessen the task of the British Navy; and sooner or later some such action seems bound to occur. It is impossible that Holland shall indefinitely continue to act the "benevolent neutral" to Germany. At the present moment Holland is (indirectly) Germany's overseas food centre.

By the "silent pressure of Sea Power" our Navy can starve Germany into surrender without regard to whatever happens in the Land Campaign, to which we are attaching just at present an undue importance.

For an army to act, it must be fed. The German "machine" is fed through Holland. If this war is to be brought to a speedy conclusion, we must declare war against all the neutrals who at present keep Germany in food supplies. If they care to keep their ships in harbour, it will be probably a very benevolent war; there is no quarrel outside the food question. But—we must starve Germany into surrender.

People generally regard this as a military war, with the Navy just playing round, picking up the scraps which fall from the Kaiser's table. They are wrong. On the British Navy, and on that alone, the ultimate issue depends. Given an absolutely free hand, the British Navy would starve Germany into surrender inside a month, though Germans ruled in Paris and beat all the Russians back from Berlin. Psychology counts for as much, or more. But—food supply is a larger target still. A soldier cannot fight on an empty belly.

The trouble is that we do not realise our "Sea Power." We have not advanced an inch since a hundred years ago. We have still no conception of what a Navy (given a free hand) could accomplish; for all that most of us are ready to subscribe to the theory that "Waterloo was won at Trafalgar," eleven years before.

I have tried to think of a diagram which will explain how a British warship several thousand miles away can materially affect the local situation. I cannot produce that diagram. It is too complicated.

But I can assert my conviction that, whatever may happen on land (in front of the footlights), the real issues depend upon the British Navy (not shown on the stage). Come to think of it, stage effects are produced on somewhat similar lines. The "man behind" controls results. In this particular World War the "man behind" is the British Navy. If the British Navy has a free hand to stop German overseas food supplies, the inevitable result is "Exit Germany."

THE FAR EAST.

THE Japanese investment of Kiao-Chau is proceeding slowly. The whole of the sea approaches have been heavily mined, and there is nothing inherently improbable in the report that the Japanese Fleet has already removed about 1,200 mines. This work will probably continue for some time to come. Various adjacent islands have been occupied—mainly as look-out stations against further German efforts in the mine-laying directions. Japan is never likely to forget her terrible experiences with mines in the war with Russia ten years ago.

In the course of this week's operations she has lost one destroyer, wrecked by going ashore—a very cheap sacrifice so far to the mines around Kiao-Chau.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

SO FAR we have heard a good deal less than we expected about aerial warfare. To be sure, the Press has destroyed more Zeppelins than Germany ever possessed, and it has now created a German air fleet of "82" destined to bombard Paris from above. Details of this sort are, however, not germane to serious facts.

Turning to facts, there is good reason to suppose that Germany's sudden embarkation on war was by no means entirely unconnected with her aerial position, and a belief in the proverb, "Who rules the air, will rule the world." At the

outbreak of war the approximate aerial forces available were as follows:

	GERMAN	FRENCH	RUSSIAN	BRITISH
Battle Airships ...	15	1	—	—
Scouting Airships...	10	14	3	2
Aeroplanes—About equal either side.				

The Germans had two other battle airships in an advanced condition, and these two are by now probably completed. All Powers had airships building, both large and small. Austria possessed nothing at the moment, but one Zeppelin building

was fairly advanced. Every Power had a few small airships of no war utility, which I have omitted from the above list.

In the matter of aeroplanes Germany had a lead in efficiency and numbers over any other individual power. The Germans and Austrians between them about balanced the Triple Entente in actual efficient strength.

Since good aeroplanes can be built in six weeks or less, it is obvious that exact figures mean nothing where they are concerned. The question resolves itself into the number of pilots, who take at least six months to train.

With airships, on the other hand, exact figures go for a great deal. It takes a good year to construct a large airship, and a very considerable time to turn out merely a small one.

AIRSHIPS AND THEIR BUILDING.

That is why we can discount stories of scores of German airships built since the end of last July.

We may now briefly consider what has actually happened. A Zeppelin has dropped bombs on Antwerp; but, generally speaking, no real offensive capacity has yet been indicated. The scouting work done has probably been fairly good, but inferior to similar work done by aeroplanes, as a Zeppelin is a fairly easy target.

This has necessitated caution. The number of Zeppelins destroyed to date is three for certain—I doubt if it is more. The French appear to have lost one dirigible, name unknown. Our own dirigibles have not been near any fighting so far as is known, but have rendered invaluable scouting service in connection with the Expeditionary Force. This sums up the airship situation to date.

We may now turn to the aeroplanes. These appear to have been extremely useful in locating troops, guns, &c. A considerable number on either side have been brought down by rifle fire. This is due to the fact that in order to make effective observation a comparatively low altitude is essential. Also all troops

AEROPLANES AND RIFLE FIRE.

appear to have adopted the same method of rifle attack—a steady fire on a spot some distance ahead. Every aeroplane destroyed seems to have run into such a shower of bullets.

Unless the pilot be hit the chances of an aeroplane being injured by rifle fire are very small. Descriptions are usually so vague that it is difficult to suggest exact percentages; but at a rough approximation it looks as though at least half the




DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE APPROXIMATE TARGET OFFERED BY VARIOUS CLASSES OF AIRCRAFT. THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE BY BOMB IS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IN ABOUT THE SAME PROPORTION.

aeroplane casualties have been brought about by hasty and ill-considered movements on the part of pilots endeavouring to get out of the bullet zone. Possibly three-quarters are to be attributed to this cause. The killing of a single soldier in ordinary land fighting is calculated to require some thousands of bullets; it can certainly need no less to hit an aeroplane pilot, despite the fact that he has no cover unless he chances to be in a bullet-proof machine.

In conclusion, although comparatively little has so far been heard of the aerial arm, we may expect any day to hear of further developments.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Arys.—A town in East Prussia, on the Speiding Lake, about twenty miles west of Lyck, and on the Lyck-Rothfließ line of rail.

Audun-le-Roman.—Situated on the railway between Thionville and Longuyon, a little over a mile within the French frontier.

Bojan.—Situated within sight of the Roumanian frontier, in the Austrian province of Bukovina. It is about four miles from the Russian frontier, and is on the line of rail from Tchernovitz to Moghilev and Odessa.

Chalons-sur-Marne.—The chief town of the Department of Marne, in France, population about 22,000. It is 107 miles east of Paris by rail, and is situated on the Marne Canal. It is in time of peace the headquarters of the 6th Army Corps, and is a military training station of considerable importance.

Champenoux.—Situated about seven miles north-east of Nancy, and about four miles from the German frontier. It is slightly south of the strategic railway from Toul to Vic.

Compeigne.—A thickly-wooded district about twenty miles west of Soissons and fifteen miles north-east of Senlis. It is about thirty-six miles north-north-east of Paris.

Dantzic.—Dantzic, or Danzig, is situated at the south-western extremity of the gulf of Dantzic, on the Baltic Sea, and is a strongly fortified port of the province of West Prussia, of which it is the capital. The main city is built on the left bank of the River Vistula, from two to three miles from its mouth, and 254 miles north-east of Berlin. The fortifications include ramparts and bastions, and means for flooding the surrounding country in case of attack; a large garrison is maintained in the town, even in times of peace, and the total population is over 100,000. The Mottlau, a small tributary of the Vistula, traverses the main town, which contains a harbour; most of the port trade, however, is done through the Neufahrwasser harbour, which gives directly on to the gulf of Dantzic. The principal railway lines are those connecting the town with Berlin to the south-west, with Stettin, more directly west, and with Koenigsburg at the eastern extremity

of the Gulf of Dantzic. The manufacture of arms and artillery is largely carried on here, and there is also a naval building yard and depot, and a marine station. The imports by sea amount annually to about £3,000,000, and the sea-borne exports to a similar figure; the principal exports are grain and timber, and the chief imports coal, petroleum, and fish from the Baltic ports.

Dyle.—A river of central Belgium, tributary to the Nethe, which in turn flows into the Scheldt. The Dyle passes through Louvain and Mechlin.

Fere Champenoise.—An important junction of roads east of Paris, and about midway between Chalons and Coulommiers, about twenty-four miles west-south-west of Chalons. It is also a station on the Rheims-Esternay line of rail.

Florenville.—A town of Belgian Luxembourg, situated on the left bank of the river Semois. It is adjacent to the French frontier, and is about fifteen miles east from Sedan.

Gebweiler.—Situated fifteen miles north-west of Mulhausen, on a branch of the Strasbourg-Bale railway. Population, about 13,000.

Goldapp.—The point of junction for the Insterburg-Lyck and Stalluponen-Rastenburg strategic railway lines in East Prussia. It is situated about twelve miles west of the Russian frontier in the Government of Gumbinnen, and is a town of considerable importance.

Gorodok.—A village about eighteen miles east of the Austrian frontier, situated in the Russian Government of Podolia, near the Lemberg-Odessa line of rail.

Hal.—A town in Belgium, situated on the River Sambre, about nine miles south of Brussels, at the point of junction of the Brussels-Mons and Brussels-Tournay railways. It is about twenty-five miles north-west of Charleroi.

Kibarty.—The frontier village, on the Russian side, of one of the Berlin-Petersburg lines of rail.

Kuzmin.—Situated about twelve miles east of the frontier station of Satanoff, on the river Smotrycz, in the Russian Government of Podolia. It is a village of little normal importance.

Marne River.—Rises in the department of Haute Marne, in eastern France, among the hills to the south of the department, and flows with an average north-west direction to Vitry, in the department of Marne. Thence it gradually bends westward to Epernay and Dormans, afterward entering the department of Seine-et-Marne and bending slightly to the south to join the Seine about five miles south of Paris. Chateau Thierry, Meaux, and Lagny are the principal towns on the river in the present theatre of war in France. The Marne forms one of the principal arteries by which goods are transported to Paris from the east in normal times.

Meaux.—Chief town of arrondissement, in the department of Seine-et-Marne, about twenty-seven miles east-north-east of Paris. Its population is about 13,000, and it is the site of an important wool market in normal times. It is situated on the river Marne, and on the Paris-Rheims line of rail.

Mlawa.—A station in Russian Poland on the Warsaw-Deutsch Eylau line of rail, and about ten miles from the German frontier. It is the first station on the Russian side of the frontier.

Morhange.—In German, **Morchingen**, a town in German Lorraine, near the junction of the Metz-Strasbourg and Nancy-Saargemund lines of rail, about ten miles north of Marsal.

Montmirail.—Situated about fifteen miles north-north-west of Sezanne, on the Paris-Esternay line of rail, and at the junction of main roads running north-west and south-west to La Ferte Gaucher and La Fertersous-Jouarre.

Mortagne.—A tributary of the Meurthe, flowing between Luneville and Nancy.

Neidenburg.—A station on the strategic frontier railway of East Prussia, situated between the junctions of Soldau and Oertelburg, and about six miles north of the Polish frontier.

Nikolaief, or Mikolaiew.—A strongly fortified centre in Austrian Galicia, a short distance north of the River Dneister, and about three miles east of the railway from Lemberg to Stryj or Stryl. It is about twenty-four miles directly south of Lemberg, and is of considerable strategic importance.

Olkusch.—A railway station in Russian Poland, about six miles from the Austrian frontier. It is on the Kielce-Benazin line of rail, which runs parallel with the frontier at this point.

Ourcq, River.—A small northern tributary of the Marne, flowing west from the eastern boundary of the department of Aisne to La Ferte Milton, whence it turns due south, flowing by Mareuil and Lizy-sur-Ourcq and joining the Marne about four miles south of the last-named town.

Rawa Russka.—Situated about thirty-two miles north-north-west of Lemberg, in Austrian Galicia, and about fourteen miles from the frontier of Russian Poland. It is an important railway junction, as the Jaroslav-Sokal and Lemberg-Belzac lines cross here.

Rheims, or Reims.—A town in the north of the department of Marne, ninety-seven miles north-east from Paris by rail, with a population of about 110,000. It is the most important centre of the woollen trade in France, and is also one of the principal centres of the champagne industry, employing upwards of 20,000 hands in this business. In peace time it is the headquarters of a large garrison, and is considered a fortified town. Five railways radiate from the town to Paris, Esternay, Chalons Mezieres, and Laon, and Rheims ranks as one of the principal cities of northern France.

Schoppinitz.—A village near the eastern extremity of Silesia, in eastern Prussia, situated on the Przemsza river, near the point where the German, Austrian, and Russian Empires join.

Sezanne.—About sixty miles east of Paris, on the main Paris to Chalons road. It is an important railway junction as the Paris-Chalons and Rheims-Troyes lines of rail cross here.

Tchernovitz.—Capital of Bukovina, an Austrian province, lying to the south-east of Galicia. Tchernovitz is situated on the banks of the Pruth river, and is a thriving town of about 87,000 inhabitants. It is only a few miles from the Russian frontier, and is near the junction of the railway lines from Odessa and Bukharest to Lemberg.

Thionville.—In German, Diedenhofen, is a fortified town of German Lorraine, twenty-two miles north from Metz by rail, with a population of about 11,000. It is an important railway junction, with four lines branching to Luxembourg, Mezieres, Metz, and Saargemund, and is about ten miles distant from the French frontier.

Tilsit.—A town of East Prussia, on the River Niemen and on the Insterburg-Memel line of rail. It is sixty miles north-east of Koenigsburg and about twelve miles from the Russian frontier, and is the capital of Prussian Lithuania. The population is about 24,000. Tilsit is the scene of the signing of the treaty between Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander in 1807, concluding a peace which represented the total humiliation of Prussia. Its manufactures, and trade in timber and northern commerce, are considerable.

Toul.—Chief town of an arrondissement in the department of Meurthe et Moselle, fourteen miles west of Nancy, on the Paris-Strasbourg line of rail, and also on the Marne-Rhine Canal. It is an artillery station of considerable magnitude, and is protected by an echelon of forts of great strength; these are stationed on the summits of hills surrounding the town; and Fort St. Michel, the highest, is at an elevation of 1,400 feet. From 1874 onward attention has been devoted to strengthening the positions round Toul, and it is now one of the principal points of defence inside the French eastern frontier, being connected with Verdun by forts in commanding positions. The population of the town, apart from the garrison, is about 10,000.

Vilvorde.—Or Vilvoorden, a station on the railway from Mechlin to Brussels, almost midway between the two, situated on the right bank of the River Senne.

Vitry-le-Francois.—An important road and railway junction about twenty miles south of Chalons, in the department of Marne, and chief town of an arrondissement. It is on the main line from Paris to Strasbourg, while the line from Chalons to Troyes also passes through here, and it is also the point of junction for the Marne-Rhine and Haut-Marne canals. Cement works, iron founding, and agricultural trades comprise the chief industries, and the population is about 9,000.

Vladimir-Volynsk.—In southern Russia, about twenty miles north of the frontier of Austrian Galicia, on the main road from Warsaw to Dubno. It is a district town in the government of Volhynia, and is thirty-four miles S.W. of the south-western railway station of Kovel. Its population is estimated at about 10,000, and it is a great Jewish centre, three-quarters of the inhabitants being Jews.

OPPORTUNE PUBLICATIONS.

Admiral Mahan, of the United States Navy, contributes to the current issue of *The Academy* an article on "Sea Power and the Present War," which we commend to the notice of our readers. American neutrality is playing a larger part in the war than most people realise, and Admiral Mahan's article, embodying to a certain extent the American point of view, is as opportune as it is interesting.

Among the trades that have suffered as a result of the war, that of publishing takes very nearly first place, but here and there a book dealing with one or other aspect of the present situation stands out as noteworthy and commands attention. Such a work is issued by Messrs. George Allen and Fisher Unwin, and is entitled "The Foundations of Strategy," written by Capt. H. M. Johnstone, R.E. It is, as the author remarks, quite impossible to compress the art of strategy into the compass of a book, but it is possible to indicate the foundations of strategy, and that is what has been done in the volume under consideration. The chapters on mobility, intelligence, training and its influence on strategy, the influence of fortresses, and "turning a flank," will be found not only relevant to the present campaign now being waged by our own men, but will also be of extreme use to young officers who have to make a real study of this most interesting subject, and the book as a whole is well worthy of serious consideration by those who have to know the art of war from a practical point of view. At the same time, the book is not too technical; it is so written as to make an appeal to the general reader, and anyone who peruses its pages carefully will find at the end that he has a far more correct view of the operations at present in progress than could be gained by endless study of the reports of "our special correspondent" or "our military critic." We commend the work as not only opportune, but really useful. The price of the volume is 5s. net.

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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

WHEN these notes of last week were written it was already evident that the extreme (and largest) bodies of the German invasion—those near Paris—had already unexpectedly found themselves in the presence of a large reserve accumulated by the French commanders behind Paris. They had thus before them superior numbers and must retire.

It was then evident that the only chance the Germans had of relieving or negating this pressure upon their extreme right near Paris was to break through somewhere upon the long line between Paris and the fortified line Verdun—Toul. This French line (with its British contingent towards the left of it) ran in a great curve behind—that is, south of—Provins, La Fère Champenoise, Sommesous, Vitry-le-François, and Revigny. It was further evident that the chief German pressure in the attempt to break the French line would fall somewhere in the neighbourhood of Vitry-le-François. Whether the Germans would succeed in this or whether they would be compelled to a general retreat was still doubtful.

Since writing thus last week, events have proved that the German effort to break through was doomed. The alternative to such success upon their part, a

general retirement, was therefore undertaken, and that retirement proceeded throughout Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, until, upon Monday last, the Germans were holding a line parallel with, and north of, the River Aisne, and occupying certain heights which pass above and along the river Sûippe, a tributary of the Aisne. The Allied bodies following the Germans in this retreat passed from near Paris, through Meaux and Soissons; from Provins, through Montmirail and Chateau Thierry; from Sézanne, through Epernay; from Vitry-le-François, through Chalons towards Rheims; and, on the extreme right, from Revigny up to the southern edge of the Forest of Argonne, near Ste. Menchould. The whole of this vast movement of rapid retirement upon the part of the German forces, and of equally rapid advance upon the part of their pursuers, will be known to history under the general title of **THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE**.

Before understanding anything in detail it is necessary to understand it in general, and the general scheme of what happened in the course of last week, that is, of the sudden retirement of the German right wing from in front of Paris, with all the vast consequences that have followed upon that retirement, may be put into the shape of a fairly simple diagram.

However we number them there were in the main three great German masses, (1), (2), and (3) advancing into France from the north, and pushing back on to the line Verdun—Paris the French line with its British contingent. This French line one may roughly represent, not in size but in position, by the band A—B between the fortified line Verdun—Toul (V—T)





DIAGRAM OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN POSITIONS ON SEPTEMBER 6TH BEFORE THE GERMAN RETREAT.

and Paris (P) in which, both as to proportionate size and as to position the British contingent is represented by the shaded portion. Within and to the east of Paris the French commanders had kept back a large reserve, represented by the square block X. That was the position on September 3rd and 4th, when the largest of the German armies, No. 1., was at the gates of the French capital. The commander of this large German army (1) got wind for the first time of the existence of this large reserve in these two days. He thereupon attempted with great boldness not to retreat but to turn suddenly at right angles to the direction he had hitherto been pursuing, join up with Army No. 2 along the line C—D, and in conjunction with that Army, and with Army No. 3 break through the Allied line and cut it into two. In this attempt to march right across the front of the French left and the British contingent, along the line C—D, which was too bold, he was caught; and he had to retire the way he had come, while the men of the great reserve at X were pouring through and round Paris after him along E—F, and the British contingent was pounding up behind him.

That is the whole story which explains the change in the campaign, and it is the only story which explains it.


But once so considerable a change had been effected in the position of Army (1), the position of Army (2) and of Army (3) was at once gravely compromised. Instead of the three main German masses forming a continuous line, two-thirds of them were now threatened in flank, and the retirement of Army No. (1) upon their right compelled them to retire also; mass No. (2) having to go back somewhat more precipitately than mass No. (3). Thus the entire German advance was converted into a full German retreat, and from being originally in such a position as is indicated in the following sketch (where the black is



SEPTEMBER 6TH.—FIRST POSITION, BEFORE THE RETREAT OF THE GERMAN RIGHT.


German and the white the Allies), which was the position on September 3rd and 4th, the German armies were compelled to pass through a stage upon

September 9th roughly represented by this sketch, in



SECOND POSITION (SEPTEMBER 9TH TO 10TH), WHEN THE GERMAN RIGHT HAD BEGUN TO RETREAT, SHOWING ISOLATION OF GERMAN CENTRE AND LEFT.

which their centre and eastern portions at A and B stand for a moment in an exceedingly dangerous, isolated position. From this position they could only extricate themselves by retiring in their turn and taking up a united line again with the army that had retired from Paris, so that by the Sunday morning the whole German line was in retreat towards a defensive position along the Aisne (60 miles from Paris) after the fashion indicated upon the sketch below.



THIRD POSITION (SEPTEMBER 12TH), WHEN THE WHOLE GERMAN LINE WAS IN CONCERTED RETREAT TO ITS PREPARED POSITION ON THE AISNE.


Now to this general scheme of the retirement, which was thus forced upon the mass of the German forces, must be added one important modification. There was present in the field not only the three main masses (1), (2), and (3), but a 4th body (4) which had come round not from the north but from Luxembourg under the Crown Prince, and had already begun to bombard Verdun. Should Verdun fall, and the line of forts connecting it with Toul, yet a 5th body (5) would be present upon the flank of the French line, imperilling its advance and checking the retreat of the other three German bodies.

The task before the French, therefore, was not merely the simple one of following up a general German retreat. It could not depend upon the continuance of that retreat save by holding, until it had driven the German line past it, the fortress of Verdun, and that fortress, as we know from the experience this war has given of the lessened resisting power of fortification against modern siege artillery, was in grave peril.

So much for the general scheme, the sudden retreat of the first German mass on the left before the French Reserve, the subsequent retirement of the two other German masses to the east of this, and the peril of Verdun.

I will now take each of these in detail and first describe what took place when the Western German Army tried to march across the Anglo-French front, failed in that bold attempt, and was compelled to retire very rapidly towards the north-east. These operations, the first part of the General Battle of the Marne, may be called *The Battle of Meaux* (or the Battle of the Ourcq).

Next I shall describe in detail the ground over which the German centre retired, and the French centre advanced through the plateau of Sézanne and



SKETCH SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE FOURTH GERMAN GROUP (4) UNDER THE CROWN PRINCE IN FRONT OF VERDUN, AND OF THE GERMAN ARMY (5) IN LORRAINE.

the marshes of St. Gond, next the retreat of the German left from Vitry over the flat country of Champagne, and lastly the neighbourhood of Verdun and the nature of the peril to that fortress.

THE BATTLE OF MEAUX
(or of The Ourcq).

The field of operations which we are about to follow under the general title of the Battle of Meaux (the original action which turned the tide of the campaign), runs from Paris on the west to the sources of the Petit Morin upon the east, from the Seine and the town of Nogent upon the south to the River Aisne and the town of Soissons upon the north.

At some time upon Wednesday, September 2nd (and the anniversary of Sedan), or possibly as late as Thursday, September 3rd, the first German Army, under General von Kluck, numbering perhaps 200,000 men, perhaps somewhat more, was still facing Paris, and advancing towards that town from the neighbourhood of Creil, Compiègne, and Senlis. It then got wind of a very large reserve which had secretly been gathered by the French commanders within and behind the fortifications of Paris, and this news altered all its arrangements.

At this moment the command of Von Kluck roughly occupied the positions marked on the map by the shaded portions A A.



PLAN SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE GERMAN RIGHT WING (ARMY UNDER VON KLUCK) ON SEPTEMBER 3RD.

It had in front of it three forces which (until the reserve behind Paris could come up) were still inferior in numbers to itself. These three forces were:—

- (1) That line of the French forces on the extreme left which the French call their 6th Army.
- (2) The British contingent which had just gone south of the Marne, blowing up the bridge of Lagny behind it in its retreat, and which had in front of it the forest of Crécy.

- (3) That French force, known as the 5th French Army, which lay to the right again, probably along the Seine.

The general, Von Kluck, in command of the German Army at A A, finding himself threatened by this unexpected reserve in front of him, which had been hidden by the fortified zone of Paris, and which had been gathered there by the French commanders with the object of thus turning the tide, determined in this difficult situation to act as follows:

He proposed to march right away across the Marne and across the river called the Grand Morin, in the direction of the arrow B B, and in two days' march to have joined and concentrated up against the German armies to the east of him, which then, with his forces added, could have pierced the Allied line somewhere along the middle Seine—say, beyond Nogent.

It will be apparent that, finding thus unexpectedly in front of him forces which, when they had all joined, would be superior to his own, Von Kluck had no choice but either to retreat the way he had come (and so leave the other German armies to the east of him isolated and exposed upon their western flank) or to decide as he did, and to march along the line B B to join them.

But observe that this march along the line B B was one of those hazardous operations which every elementary text-book upon strategy (and, for that matter, all historical experience as well) defines to be the most dangerous of all. *He proposed to march right along his enemy's front.* He risked doing so because he under-estimated the power remaining to the French and British contingents upon that front of taking the counter-offensive after the severe experience of their recent retreat from the Belgian frontier.

He was aware, however, that this big reserve behind Paris would, while he was hurrying south-eastward, come up along such lines as C C and D D and gradually reinforce the line of his enemies. He was consequently concerned (a) for certain German detachments which lay isolated to the north, notably in the direction of Compiègne, and (b) for his communications, which lay roughly along the line E E.

He therefore left a very strong body upon the plateau which runs west of the River Ourcq, and particularly large forces around the villages of Penchard and Brégy. With the rest of his army he undertook that perilous advance in front of his enemy's lines which he, or his superiors, preferred to the confession of failure involved in a retirement.

Upon Saturday, September 5th, the columns of this first German Army, Von Kluck's, the largest German Army in the field, crossed the Marne at Trilport, La Ferté Sous-Jouarre, and just below Chateau Thierry. The French 5th Army fell back before this advance; and on Sunday, the 6th, the remainder of the Germans, with the exception of the large rearguard which had been left to keep off the increasing French pressure along the Ourcq, had pushed right down through Coulommiers to the neighbourhood of Provins. Its cavalry patrols had even reached the Seine in the neighbourhood of Nogent.

The situation then upon the Sunday night may be summarised in the following map.

It was in that night, the night between Sunday and Monday, the 6th and 7th September, that the counter-offensive began. The French 5th Army attacked with the bayonet and recovered some little ground north of the Seine, and by daylight on Monday both the 5th French Army and the British contingent advanced northward against the enemy. The British



POSITION OF VON KLUCK'S ARMY ON SUNDAY NIGHT, SEPTEMBER 6TH.

fought their way through and beyond the Forest of Crecy and through Coulommiers. The 5th French Army beyond them to the east attacked La Ferté Gaucher and Esternay and this southern part of the Allied line crossed the Grand Morin River and approached the next defensible line held by the Germans, the Petit Morin.

On Tuesday, the 8th, the British contingent and the 5th French Army continued to advance and pushed the German line right over the Petit Morin on to the Marne, after capturing Montmirail.

On the Wednesday, the 9th, these two bodies, the British contingent and the French 5th Army, continued to push the Germans back. The British crossed the Marne, mainly in the neighbourhood of La Ferté-s.-Jouarre, in spite of very sharp resistance at that point, while the French 5th Army, which, by the nature of the local topography had to swing further round and cover more distance to reach the Marne, put in a day and a half of forced marching, and arrived upon that river upon the Thursday, the 10th, between Château Thierry and Dormans.

On Thursday, the 10th, therefore, so far as the southern forces were concerned, they had pushed the Germans everywhere right back to and over the Marne, their sweep pivoting, as it were, upon the neighbourhood of Meaux.

But meanwhile, during those same three days, the German rearguard stretched along the plateau to the west of the Ourcq was putting up a very fine defence against the *increasing* pressure it had to meet, an *increasing* pressure because what had been the 6th French Army was now very largely reinforced, and with every hour more and more reinforced from the reserve behind and in Paris, the presence of which has turned the campaign.


The French lost very heavily during this fighting, especially round Bégy and Penchard. It was mainly an artillery action. They finally succeeded in forcing the line of the Ourcq (which is here a deep ravine between two plateaux upon either side), and when that was done, the position of the German first Army being that suggested in the following map, it had no choice but to retreat as rapidly as it could towards the north-east, along the arrows A A A., and so reach the next defensive position about thirty-five miles away along the Aisne. This, General von Kluck's great command, which, during the retreat of the Allies, had advanced directly upon Paris with such wonderful organization, speed, and success, now did with organization and speed hardly less worthy of admiration. It is true that, as is always the case in a retirement, and especially in a rapid retirement, much material, and many halting and wounded men were

left behind to fall into the hands of the advancing enemy. But the proportion of prisoners, guns, and material lost was not at all large compared with the very great force concerned. There would seem to have been picked up in the first two days of this retirement, Thursday, the 10th, and Friday, the 11th, somewhat over 20 guns, many wagons of course, and about 6,000 stragglers and wounded.

By Saturday morning, the 12th, the retreat had reached the line of the Vesle where it falls into the Aisne, and so down the Aisne to the town of Soissons, and the advanced cavalry of the Allies could observe the rapidly retiring enemy from the high, steep ridge which lies just to the south of those rivers.

During Sunday, the first check was administered to the pursuit by the German forces which was now taking up its defensive position along and to the north of the line of the Aisne.

By Monday the German retreat had thoroughly established itself in the new defensive position north of the Aisne and to the east along the Suippe. It



SKETCH SHOWING THE FORCING OF THE MARNE AND THE OURCQ BY THE ALLIES ON SEPTEMBER 9TH TO 10TH, AND THE RETREAT OF VON KLUCK ON TO THE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS NORTH OF THE AISNE AND VESLE.

was a general concentration of nearly the whole German Army—not only of Von Kluck's retreat, but of the other retreating bodies to the east of him which had come up through Champagne and joined, each in its place, along this defensive line from Soissons eastward. On that day the Germans turned on their pursuers, and began the great defensive action which is still in doubt at the moment in which I write these lines. The other parts of this general concentration concern my next section, the retreat of the Germans in the centre, and their pursuit by the French (the 4th and 3rd French Armies) over the central Marne and towards Rheims.

THE GERMAN RETREAT FROM SÉZANNE.

The story of the retreat undertaken by the second of the great German masses, that immediately to the east or left of Von Kluck's larger army, can be told in far less space. It concerns those bodies which lay east of Montmirail and west of the escarpment from which the plateau of Sézanne looks down upon the great plain of Champagne.

It would seem that the German forces here engaged belonged in the main to the command of von Buelow. They probably included the Guard. But details of this sort are unimportant in the understanding of a movement; the names and numbers of

corps are only of value in such an understanding if they enable us to keep a continuous picture in mind.

The main point to seize is that the second of the great German masses holding the line against the Allies between Paris and the Toul—Verdun line was



PLAN SHOWING THE GERMAN LINE OF RETREAT TO PREPARED POSITION NORTH OF RHEIMS.

operating upon what is called the Plateau of Sézanne, and lay next upon the left of and to the east of von Kluck's army. This second of the great German masses stood firm in front of the high road that leads from La Fère Champenoise, through Sézanne to Esternay. It extended beyond that high road at the moment of the furthest German advance towards the south.

The German forces upon and beyond this road had behind them an interesting and difficult piece of country, called the *Marshes of Saint Gond*, which are the sources of the river called the Petit Morin. These marshes are in process of reclamation, but they are not yet entirely reclaimed; and, even in a dry summer like this, they present some slight obstacle to an army that should be heavily pressed or in too desperate a retreat. They are formed by the presence in a calcareous soil of a clay basin which holds the water, and by the fashion in which the heights around leave a great flat, in which the waters can gather, but which is pinched at its western issue, where the river runs out near St. Prix between two opposing hills.


Through these marshes of St. Gond the Petit Morin runs in the shape of a canalised drain or ditch, into which the other ditches of the reclamation scheme fall.

These marshes are about ten miles long: at their narrowest less than a mile, at their broadest over two miles broad. They are crossed by no less than four country roads, branching, two from Broussy, two from Bannes; and above and below these country roads go the great high roads northwards on either side of the marsh—one through St. Prix to Epernay, upon the Marne, and the other through Morains to Mareuil upon the Marne. At Epernay and at Mareuil are bridges, and the second road—that to Mareuil—runs everywhere just upon and below that escarpment whereby the plateau of Sézanne falls on to the plain of Champagne.

I have said that in a hurried retreat very heavily pressed by the enemy these marshes of St. Gond might prove an awkward obstacle, even in a dry summer, and even though they are crossed by five roads; for a large force would be strictly confined to those roads and would be upon defiles, that is, confined to long and narrow columns, while it was crossing the

marshes. But it is evident that there was no such heavy pressure upon this retreat of the German second group. All the energy to be spent in those days by the Allies was being exercised upon the army of von Kluck immediately to the west. What happened was that when the army of von Kluck was driven out of Montmirail and all the points to the west thereof, this second German mass, lying upon the plateau and along the high road through Sézanne and Esternay had to fall back because its western or right flank was isolated. It probably fell back in the night between the 9th and 10th September. It continued its retreat (followed by the 4th French Army) over the Marne at Epernay and the neighbourhood, marching by the two great roads to the east and to the west of the marsh, and probably somewhat relieved the pressure on its columns by using the roads across the marsh as well. It made for Rheims and, in common with all the other German forces, took up by the Sunday night (September 13th) that main defensive line north of Rheims which I shall describe when I summarize all these movements.

It is possible that this retreat, which the French closely followed, was the scene of that capture of guns




SKETCH SHOWING THE DEFENSIVE POSITION ON WHICH THE GERMANS RETIRED.

of which we have had brief notice by telegram, but it is more likely that this capture took place more to the east, in the retreat of the third German mass which I shall next describe.

While I am upon this point it is worth explaining that the capture of *corps artillery* does not mean the capture of the *artillery of a corps*. The Press Bureau made a highly exaggerated estimate when they talked of 160 guns; thirty-six will turn out to be nearer the mark. The corps artillery consists only of those guns which are at the disposal of the corps as a whole and not attached to divisions. It is but a fraction, varying according to organisation, of the whole artillery attached to a corps d'armée.

THE GERMAN RETREAT ACROSS CHAMPAGNE FROM THE LINE LA FÈRE CHAMPENOISE—VITRY—REVIGNY.

Most important, and most lasting in its effects, of all the various co-ordinated German retirements last week was the retirement of the third great mass of troops, which had pushed furthest to the south and which, having come right across the great plain of Champagne, was holding Sommesous, Vitry-le-François, the railway line and the high road between them, and



SKETCH SHOWING THE GERMAN LINE OF RETREAT FROM LA FÈRE CHAMPENOISE—VITRY—REVIGNY.

had entrenched a defensive line along the River Saulx, and further along the River Ornain (its tributary) as far as Revigny.

The interest of this great German advance on Vitry had lain in the fact that it passed over the most open country of all, had reached further south than the rest, and was the front upon which, if anywhere, the Allied line was likely to be pierced.

I have described how an escarpment runs from Sézanne northward towards Epernay upon the Marne, along and beyond which escarpment went the retreat of the *second* great body of the Germans, that which retreated from Sézanne and Epernay across the marshes to Epernay, Rheims, and the defensive line beyond. From this escarpment one looks down eastward upon a great rolling plain of bare land, dotted here and there with regular plantations, which plain is the Plain of Champagne. Upon the eastern side of this plain rises hilly and wooded country, at the gate of which stands Revigny, and the principal groups of woods in which are called the Wood of Belnoue, and to the north of it the great forest of the Argonne. Between that escarpment of Sézanne on the west and this wooded country of Argonne on the east, you have an open chalky land, not unlike Salisbury Plain in many parts of it, but better served with roads and fairly served with railways, including one great trunk line; provided also with great accumulations of provisions in such towns as Chalons, its capital, Vitry, La Fère Champenoise, Rheims.

Here, upon the slightly concave line running from Sézanne, south of Vitry, to Revigny, lay, as we saw last week, the crisis of this first phase of the campaign. Here it was that the General commanding the German Corps at Vitry urged his troops (in an Order which fell into French hands after his precipitate retreat) that upon their power to advance in the next few days would depend the whole German scheme. We now know that this advance did not take place, that, on the contrary, the Germans retreated from this line between La Fère Champenoise-Sommesous-Vitry-Revigny, as they retreated from the line Sézanne-Epernay, and for the same reasons. When Von Kluck was so unexpectedly pushed back on the extreme west by the advent of the reserve which had been secretly accumulated under Paris, the whole German line, section by section, had to give way, from Paris (where the pressure began) right away to the forest of Argonne.

As is always the case in such a retirement—as was the case for instance in our own retirement from the Sambre nearly a month ago—the extreme of the line furthest from the part that retires first receives the last news and is the last to retire. This

extreme section has always therefore to retire with greater precipitation and under more difficult circumstances than its neighbours. And the German bodies occupying this Champagne country between the escarpment and the woods, an open gap of roughly 50 miles, unavoidably fell back hurriedly and a little late. Their retreat began on September 10th. They abandoned Vitry le François in particular under extreme pressure, leaving in that headquarters town many of their papers and much of their baggage. What the whole of this body may have lost in the way of guns and waggons we do not know, but they fell back, as did all the others, to the north, marching across Champagne through the end of that Thursday, the whole of the Friday (11th) and the Saturday (12th) until on the Sunday they also took up their place in the excellent defensive line which the German commanders had indicated north of Rheims. It was a hurried but a fine piece of work. There lies, isolated on the escarpment of the Plateau that bounds the Plain of Champagne upon the west, a single hill called "Mont Aimé" though why beloved, or if beloved, I cannot tell. From that lonely height a man can look eastward over all the Champagne like a sea and discover its endless rolling fields bare and empty before him and its streams of roads. On this height I could wish to have stood last Friday in the south-westerly gale watching the long lines threading northward across the flats and knowing that these were the columns of the invaders in retreat.


So much, then, for the retirement northward and eastward of the three great German bodies between September 9th—10th and September 13th—14th: that is, between the night and the early morning of Wednesday and Thursday of last week, and the night and early morning of Sunday and Monday last.

By the time the retreat was over, the German line—the retirement of whose three great sections had been accomplished with singular success, and with astonishing rapidity—was drawn up upon a defensive position in which it prepared to give battle. That battle is being desperately fought at the moment in which these lines are written, Wednesday afternoon, and has already occupied the two preceding days.

My next task will be to describe the defensive position which has thus been adopted by the enemy, and to conjecture at his motives for standing where he does to resist the further advance of the Allied line.

I would beg the reader to follow this section with particular care, for it concerns a crowning act in this war. The Germans have studied, and fallen back upon one of the best defensive positions in Western Europe and are there conducting the BATTLE OF THE AISNE AND SUIPPE.

THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE POSITION.



THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE POSITION, FROM LAST MONDAY TO LAST WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14TH TO 16TH. THE BRITISH CONTINGENT ATTACKED FROM SOISSONS ON THE LEFT TO NEAR CRAONNE ON THE RIGHT. TO THEIR LEFT UP TO THE FOREST DE L'AIGLE WAS THE FRENCH 6TH ARMY; TO THEIR RIGHT THE FRENCH 5TH ARMY. THE WHOLE LINE HERE SHOWN IS BETWEEN FIFTY AND SIXTY MILES LONG.

This position which the German armies (with the exception of that of the Crown Prince, isolated beyond Argonne upon the extreme left) took up upon last Sunday night and Monday morning is naturally divided into two quite different sections. The first, or eastern, section runs from a wood called "The forest of the Eagle," or "de L'Aigle," just north of Compiègne to the large village of Craonne, a distance of about 30 miles.

This first half of the German position, the western half, is everywhere parallel to the river Aisne and it follows the first ridge to the north of that river, a ridge in which the short northern tributaries (which are no more than brooks) take their rise. This line of heights is nowhere more than five miles from the river, and nowhere less than three. It is a good deal cut up along its front by ravines, for the northern brooks tributary to the Aisne run in rather deep little trenches with steep sides. It is an even plateau, more or less, exactly following the valley of Braisne below, and only broken by these short lateral clefts which greatly aid its defence by their steepness as also by their wooded slopes.

The second, or eastern limb of the position crosses the river Aisne near to and just south of Neuchatel and then runs along a low, flat ridge admirably formed for artillery and parallel to the course of the river Suippe. This ridge runs, as does the Suippe, below it in a great curve north-west and north of the town of Rheims. This second or eastern section of the German defensive line is of a length which we cannot discover from the telegrams. If it is properly linked up with the Crown Prince's army on the east it is not less than forty miles long, for that is about the distance from Neuchatel to the Argonne across the great plain of Champagne. If it is *not* properly linked up with the Crown Prince's army on the east (a very unlikely chance!), then there is a gap somewhere about Monthois of which the French will certainly take advantage; and in that case this eastern line is only as long as the first, or about 30 miles long.

You have, then, the German armies taking up this defensive line, certainly 60—more probably over 70—miles in length, and awaiting the assault of the Allies.

It must be remembered that the enemy's armies are intact, that they have lost little in prisoners or guns—nothing comparable to what the Allies lost in their rapid retreat from the Belgian frontier—and that they are still in numbers certainly equal to their opponents and probably superior.

Now of what nature is this defensive position which the Germans have taken up?

The very first thing a student notes about it is that it has been carefully thought out. It is not a chance position taken up haphazard or under the stress of some too rapid retreat which has at last been given breathing space. It is a line upon which, in case of retreat, the German commanders had determined to stand, and it is the line on which they can best stand between Paris and the Meuse. It has been studied thoroughly by spies during peace, and it is very good.

Consider first the character of the heights held between Craonne and the Forest of the Eagle (or de L'Aigle). They are everywhere uniform, save in the ravines of Morsain. The open ridge rarely rises to more than 300 feet above the river; it only falls to less than 200 ft. above the river upon its western edge towards the forest, and this fall is everywhere gradual. The line of the plateau is every-

where fairly even. It is, as I have said, cut up on its front by the ravines through which the northern tributary brooks of the Aisne fall; and these ravines are steep and wooded. But though such a disposition of the land a little interferes with the homogeneity and evenness of the defence, it is much more of an obstacle to the attack. It is here from Soissons along the Aisne for about 20 miles that the British contingent is at work.

So much for the western section of the German line along the Aisne. But the eastern section of the line, which runs from Craonne across to the woods of the Argonne in a flat curve across the plains of Champagne, is even better suited to defence.

It is a line of low woodland on a crest upon which a wide shelf of plough land falls down to the shallow depression in which runs the white and muddy water of the Suippe river, a tributary of the Aisne. The slope in front of this ridge of wood is quite bare, save for a few artificial plantations. It consists, as I have said, of huge stretches of plough land, now stubble; and from this almost uniform line of slight elevations it sinks southward and eastward down to the Suippe in a perfect natural glacis. On the further or southern side of the river rises a corresponding but longer slope of perfectly bare and open land which can be swept in all its breadth by artillery on the opposing ridge. This line north of the Suippe, commanding a glacis before it and dominating a slight and long rise beyond the water, is perfect, and that is the eastern section of the German line.

The two sections of the line, therefore, that from Compiègne to Craonne, and that along the Suippe in the north Champagne country are each in different ways exactly suited for defence. I repeat, it was no haphazard which made the German retirement halt precisely along this series of positions. It was a plan known and studied.

The interest of the action now engaged on this excellent line has many aspects, but the first is the question whether the German armies intend a counter-offensive, or rather intend to cover the retirement of their convoys across the Meuse?

Everything in war must be conjecture in the shape of alternatives. The best and surest commander himself in the field does not know from day to day what the hazard of war will bring. He does not know (if it brings victory) exactly what form the victory will take, nor how it can best be used: he is ignorant of it until it has come about. He does not know (if it brings defeat) how that defeat will come or how it may best be retrieved.

It is not possible, therefore, to say that the position taken up by the Germans does not mean a counter-offensive in the near future. It is impossible to say this for the simple reason that, even if the German commanders do not intend it upon this Wednesday (when I am writing the present lines), they may have an opportunity for intending it (and may therefore take it up) by the time these lines are on the machines upon Thursday.

But on the balance of probabilities it would seem that they rather intend to cover a retirement over the Upper Aisne, and later over the Meuse or into Belgium, than to attempt an immediate counter-offensive. Their forces upon the left or east, those of the Crown Prince and those of the German armies in Lorraine, are certainly moving northward and eastward—that is, retiring. Further, the opportunities for a counter-offensive are weak along the line which they have taken up. It is essentially a line difficult of assault

but not easy to move forward from; particularly upon what would be the working wing of a new advance, that part of the line which lies between Craonne and the Valley of the Oise beyond Soissons.

Another interest of the German position is whether it is in peril upon either of its wings. In other words, whether the Germans can be manoeuvred out of it by a French movement around their west—beyond Compiègne, or round their east—between the main army and the Crown Prince's. In the latter case there would be disaster. It would mean the separation of the German force, as a whole, into two, and the piercing of its centre by a French advance directed due north, along the valley of the Upper Aisne. The disaster would not necessarily be immediate. But the separation would mean the end of all offence in France and the beginning of a defensive war on German-Belgian soil. If the French get between the Crown Prince on the Meuse and the main defensive German line north of Rheims, that *must* follow. For though both sections of the retreat would reunite towards the Rhine, they would have lost the initiative for good.

But such a gap between the Crown Prince's Army and the main defensive line presupposes negligence or inability on the part of the enemy. It presupposes that his forces here are not linked up with the forces of the Crown Prince, though far round the north of Argonne; and to presuppose negligence or inability in an enemy who has conducted so masterly a defence and so rapid and inexpensive a retreat is surely foolish. We cannot presuppose without better evidence any chance of the French working round by the east through such a gap.

The other question, whether the Allies may not be able to work round the *left* or *west* of the German line is much more open. It is possible that they here have further troops. It is probable that they have the use in a rather roundabout way of hitherto undamaged railways. It is certain that nothing is held by the enemy in any force, if even by patrols (which I doubt) west of the Oise river, and it is therefore conceivable that a French manoeuvre round by the west may be attempted and possibly that it may succeed. The Germans have large bodies of their Cavalry here posted to watch and prevent it. But even so, when the Allied line does overlap the western German flank, or even before it does, while it merely threatens, the German line, having got its convoys away eastward and having built its bridges across the two rivers Aisne and Meuse, can retire in order and intact.

One truth must be borne in mind in these critical days. It is the truth to which these notes are always recurring. So long as the army of either opponent remains in no marked inferiority to the other that opponent will not remain permanently upon the defensive. Even if the German army does not attempt a counter-offensive from its present positions (the least likely of the two alternatives), even if it continues its retirement north and east, it none the less awaits, and has somewhere prepared for, a counter-offensive later on; and the retirement, so long as it is carried out in good order, means nothing one way or the other to the ultimate issue of the campaign *until* one or other of the combatants has forced his opponent to a Decision, and has, in that Decision, achieved his purpose of largely weakening in numbers, or destroying in cohesion, the organised force resisting him.

The main German line, then, is standing upon the defensive from about the middle of the Argonne, round to the north of Rheims and along the Aisne.

It is composed of the concentration of the three main German bodies, the first and largest body under Von Kluck from in front of Paris, the second from in front of Sézanne, the third from in front of Vitry. So far as the telegrams which had reached London by Wednesday afternoon inform us, this German concentration on the defensive line was still very actively maintaining its defensive at that moment; it was vigorously counter-attacking the offensive Allied line, and everywhere holding its own. If it had not new reinforcement (as was probable), it had at least received new munitions, and, if it were only fighting to cover a retirement of convoys, it was giving those convoys every leisure to retire.

But the defensive line occupied by the Germans north of Rheims and along the Aisne does not exhaust the field. There is a fourth body west of the Meuse, and east of the Argonne, a somewhat isolated body, which is of peculiar importance to the fortunes of this campaign. The position and chances of this fourth body I will attempt, from the very few indications we have received, to describe. That fourth body is, as we have seen, the army of the Crown Prince, formerly in front and to the west and south of Verdun; to-day to the north of that town.

THE CROWN PRINCE'S ARMY.



SKETCH SHOWING THE VERDUN-TOUL LINE AND POSITION OF THE CROWN PRINCE'S ARMY BEFORE THE GERMAN RETREAT BEGAN.

We have continually seen in these notes how a fortified line, running from the great fortress of Verdun to the great fortress of Toul, bars the movement of an invading army from the east upon Paris, and how in particular it prevents the use of lines of communication into France from the great depots in Alsace-Lorraine; for one of the main railways passes under the guns of Verdun, two others converge under the guns of Toul, and the railway connecting the two fortresses is everywhere under the guns of the forts that unite them in a line along the valley of the Meuse. We have further seen that in this war (so far) the German claim to reduce modern fortification quickly by modern howitzer fire has been very largely successful. It was almost immediately successful at Liège, wholly successful at Namur, and successful after about a week or nine days at Maubeuge.

If Verdun had fallen, or if the line of forts between Verdun and Toul has been pierced, the campaign would have changed altogether in aspect. The Germans would no longer have had to feel nervous, as they now do, about their long communications through Belgium: they would have had immediate short

communications open through Alsace-Lorraine. The French forces along the Moselle and the Meurthe would have been imperilled and perhaps cut off. The French line from the Argonne to Paris would have been taken in flank by the existing German forces in Lorraine, which forces, reinforced from the German centre, might have been strong enough to roll up the French line west of the Argonne.

As a fact, Verdun, Toul, and the line between them, held. But it was the particular mission of the Crown Prince's army to reduce one of the two fortresses, Verdun or Toul, or better, because more economic, to break somewhere the chain of forts between the two strongholds. With that object, the Crown Prince took up his headquarters at St. Menehould just at the western gate of the Argonne (so as to be in touch with the main German armies in Champagne) and began to operate with his separate army against the Toul-Verdun line.

It is important to note that this army *was* separate, and not a true portion of the general German line. That general line ended at Revigny, on the edge of those woods which bound the Champagne plain to the east. The Crown Prince was acting almost independently of this general German line (the extremity of which lay south of him), though no doubt he was keeping in touch with it. His function was not to help to break the Allied line in Champagne, or even on the edge of Champagne, but to do the particular and local work of isolating Verdun, by breaking the line of forts between Verdun and Toul. Then, presumably, he would proceed to the reducing of Verdun itself. As I have said, the value of the Crown Prince's task, should it be achieved, lay in the fact that it would eliminate the barrier protecting the flank of the long French line from Toul—Verdun to Paris and would open new, good, and *quite short* lines of communication for the invaders from their depots in western Germany: a relief as welcome as water to a thirsty man.

We have no indications as yet to tell us precisely when all those dispositions had been taken which made it possible for the Crown Prince to begin his attack on the Toul—Verdun line of forts which blocked the easy communications from Germany.

His army appears to have been somewhat belated and never very fortunate. Perhaps he interfered. It was twice thrown over the Meuse in its first attempts to cross a fortnight ago, and, even after the general French retirement in front of the general German advance to the west left the Meuse open, the Crown Prince's army (with which we should, perhaps, include that of Wurtemberg) advanced with difficulty through the wooded and hilly country to the west and north of Verdun.


At last (and, it would seem, not earlier than a week ago) it was in a position to begin operations.

It possessed, we may be certain, the 11-inch howitzers with which hitherto all the serious siege work has been conducted (of these I will speak again in a moment), and there could have been no more difficulty in getting them down by rail and by road to the middle Meuse valley than there was in getting them in front of Maubeuge. It was only a question of another day or two's travel. But it would seem that the fortifications of the eastern frontier were more thoroughly held than those of Maubeuge. At any rate, they have been more successful. The first, and, as matters turned out, the only, attack was delivered on the work at Troyon, and the selection of this point was as wise and as thoroughly thought out as has been every part of the German scheme—

until some unexpected accident has come to impose new dispositions upon the German commanders.

Troyon was chosen because if it fell Verdun would be isolated from Toul, the line would be broken, and the frontier open to the invaders. It is true that no line of railway here crosses the Meuse, nor even any principal road, but with Troyon captured, the victors would be astraddle of the line between Verdun and Toul, they would have cut the road and the railway between the two places and, much more important, they would have cut the line of forts between the two places. Troyon was well chosen because it commanded the widest gap in that line of forts coming between what is called the Fort of Paroches and the Fort of Genicourt. If Troyon had been taken the German forces just to the east could have advanced from their rail-head at Thiaucourt by Vigneulles to cross the Meuse under the captured work (there is a road all the way, though it is not one of the principal roads), and this advance would have been free from disturbance by the garrison of Verdun on the one hand and the garrison of Toul on the other. Further, Troyon is, of all the works along the Meuse, perhaps the strongest, and yet (under the circumstances of this campaign) the most vulnerable!

This paradox is due to the fact that these forts along the Meuse between Verdun and Toul have been built for an expected assault, not through violated neutral territory, but from the legitimate and existing Franco-German frontier. Troyon is admirably situated to withstand an attack from the east. It is not similarly well situated to withstand an attack in reverse from the west. It is dominated by the heights above Woimbley on the edge of the woods




SKETCH SHOWS THE VULNERABILITY OF FORT TROYON TO ATTACK FROM THE WEST.

of which there are positions 60 ft. above the works of Troyon: and it is doubtless upon this escarpment to the west of the Meuse that the German howitzers were emplaced.

Troyon was relieved by the necessity under which the Crown Prince found himself of retiring when the third great German body—that stretching from Péronne past Frère and Vitry through Champagne to Revigny—had itself retired past the edge of Argonne and had left St. Menehould behind unsupported.

The accompanying diagram should make the point retired (as it did retire between September 10th and




clear. M. is St. Menehould: V. is Verdun: Tr. is Troyon: T. is Toul: R. is Revigny: V. at the foot of the map is Vitry. When the German body A—B has

retired (as it did retire between September 10th and 13th) to the position C—D, it is evident that an army in the position E—F commanded from M. is isolated from its fellows and must retire northward to the position G—H. The French by September 12th had, in their advance, already reached the line M—N, and there was a moment when it looked as though the Crown Prince's army, delayed either by its heavy artillery, or by neglect, might be caught by the French advance before it could get away. At the present moment, so far as advices have hitherto reached London (on the afternoon of Wednesday), the Crown Prince's army is no longer in such danger. It has withdrawn to positions corresponding to G—H on the diagram, and is free to cross the Meuse out of reach of the garrison of Verdun. It will, of course, if that "bunching" takes place upon the Meuse which under one alternative must take place, add to the difficulties of the crossing of that river: but it is difficult to see how the Crown Prince's army can now be in real danger, unless the French kept locked up in Verdun a much larger number of men than is generally supposed. And even then, this addition to the French armies in the field could do little more than press the pursuit. It has no opportunity to surround.

Having thus dealt in some detail with the fortunes of the retiring German line during its week of retreat, and with the comparatively isolated body of the Crown Prince, we must turn, in order to complete the whole picture, to certain operations which were being undertaken in Belgium at the same time.

THE OPERATIONS IN BELGIUM.



These operations, which were taking place on the Belgian Plain while all the above was happening in France, though in no way decisive last week, nor even as yet affecting the result, are well worth our notice.

It was apparent upon September 8th that the able but hazardous attempt of the great German Army under Kluck to get past the unexpected large forces in front of him had failed. He was still heavily defending the line of the Ourcq, but he was being pressed in from the south and he must retreat. The news was presumably conveyed at once to Antwerp, and on the 9th the Belgian Army, which the fortifications of that town maintained intact, resumed operations. Those operations were continued throughout the 9th, the 10th, and the 11th of the month, that is, the Wednesday, the Thursday, and the Friday of last week, and during those days they took the form of a great sortie of the beleaguered garrison of Antwerp towards the south, the Germans in the North of Belgium falling back before this advance. On Saturday, the 12th, German reinforcements had come up from the South of Belgium in sufficient numbers to check the Belgian movement. On Sunday last, September 13th, the Belgians retired again behind the guns of Antwerp.

Let us see, first, what was the nature of those five-day operations; secondly, what was their object; and, thirdly, how far that object was achieved.

The nature of the operations was as follows:—The Belgian troops, issuing out of Antwerp, worked round to the south and east, driving the Germans out of Aerschot, and ultimately, by the Wednesday night or the Thursday morning, lying along a line from Malines to Louvain. From Malines to Louvain runs a canal. The Belgian line lay just to the east of that canal, and there was actually some fighting within the ruins of Louvain itself. More than this, certain patrols of cavalry, and, perhaps, small bodies of infantry as well, had got round to the railway line between Louvain and Brussels, cutting the same near the station of Cortenberg, which is almost exactly between the two towns, but slightly nearer Louvain. The line seems to have been cut somewhere between the two X's which I have marked upon the sketch.

Meanwhile, during the whole of that Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday the Germans were hurrying up reinforcements from the south. On the Saturday, they took the counter-offensive, and the Belgian line retreated northward, again pivoting upon Malines; on the Sunday morning or the Saturday evening they repassed and evacuated Aerschot (the inhabitants of which they put behind their lines to save them from the outrages which would follow), and by Sunday evening they were shut up again behind the guns of Antwerp.

The whole of this little manœuvre, therefore (little only on account of the vast scale of the present wars—for the numbers engaged cannot have been far short of 40,000 men), was acted upon an irregular field (marked upon the sketch as a shaded area) the longest measurement of which is less than thirty miles.

Now what was its object? Its object was twofold. First to harass the line of German communication through Belgium, and, secondly, to draw back again towards the north certain of the reinforcements, small as they were, which the Germans were sending down to stiffen their retiring line in France and probably, as I have said, to guard their extreme right from envelopment.

We should be equally in error if we regarded this little sortie from Antwerp, ending so shortly after its

first effort in a retirement, as either presenting a serious menace to the German communications or as futile. It did not present a serious menace to the German communications for the moment, but it put a fear into the German commanders for the safety of those communications, and a fear that will less constantly be renewed.

The object of such an operation as this is to make the enemy just at the moment when he is most bewildered in the crush of a retreat through too narrow an issue, feel insecure *everywhere*. The object is not to cut his communications—[there is, unfortunately, nothing like the strength in Belgium to do that, and a terrible pity it is: a couple of extra Army Corps put into Antwerp at the beginning of the war would have decided it in its present phase!]¹—but only to harass its communications. The object is to prevent the commanders of the German retirement from being able to say to themselves:—"My lines of supply through Belgium are, now that I have burnt and harried and killed civilians, as safe as my lines of supply through Luxemburg, and I can count upon them absolutely."

Now this harassing of the Germans in Belgium happens to be of particular value in the present campaign, because everything goes to show that the German commanders risked their whole strength in the advance on Paris and left their communications through Belgium guarded less strongly than has ever been the case with any other army advancing through hostile territory. They have already evacuated Termonde (after destroying it) and have only threatened Ghent. They have deliberately refused to occupy the sea coast at Ostend and Dunkirk, which they had ample opportunity of doing. They have put upon those communications their very last reserves in quite insufficient numbers, relying upon two things for their security: the establishment of a terror along those lines, and the absence of a highly trained army, with its full complement of all arms, in Antwerp.


In other words, they have run this great risk of leaving the root of their communications ill-guarded, relying upon the terror created by the murder of civilians and priests and the burning of villages and churches to make up for a lack of troops. Now this policy of terror has been successful only up to a certain point. The repetition day after day of new outrages proves that. The inferior troops of the last German reserve left in Belgium are not wholly secure from the vengeance of those whose country they have ravaged as no European country was ravaged before in modern times, and whose territory they first guaranteed to be neutral and then invaded. And while their security is thus shaken it must be equally evident to them that they have under-estimated the offensive power of the untrained and half-trained forces added to the regular forces upon their flank in Antwerp.

That is precisely the effect which sorties of this kind have; they distract.

The Belgians only got as far as the line Brussels—Louvain, and they only did that at a great expense of energy and under the necessity of an immediate retreat. But they compelled the withdrawing of German forces from the south. They checked to some extent the dribble of the remaining reinforcements into France, and, most important of all, they rendered the wholly insufficient guardians of the German communications in Belgium uncertain whether the next blow would not be more serious.

On the other hand we must not exaggerate the effects which a sortie such as this has had, and here I would beg the reader to look at the scheme of the

German communications through Belgium and Luxemburg into France as they appear upon the sketch map at the head of this section, and also in the diagram upon the accompanying sketch.



The German Armies in the field occupied last week-end, at the moment when their retirement was in full swing, an area in Northern France which may be diagrammatically represented by the shaded area A—B—C—D. Supplies of food and of ammunition could, as long as Verdun (at B) and Toul (at C) held out, and the line of forts B—C between them, only reach this area through the line A—B. Now to reach this line A—B you had, of course, a very great number of excellent roads, but ammunition in large quantities, especially for artillery, demands in modern times the control of railroads as well: and of railroads there were but two main lines upon which the German armies during their great advance could depend for supply. The one was the main line L—N—M—F', which is the great European line between Paris and Berlin, and in which L stands for Liège, N for Namur, M for Maubeuge, and F for La Fère. The other was the great line through Luxemburg, X; Longwy, Y; and Mezières, Z. In the retreat from Paris the French 6th Army has so out-flanked the German 1st Army that it can no longer depend upon the main line of supply from M to F, the extremity of the German line being pushed back east of the line M—F. But there are plenty of railways between M and Z, which I have indicated by dotted lines, and there is also one between N and Z. So long as Liège, Namur, and Maubeuge are in German hands, these subsidiary lines branching south from Maubeuge and Namur can continue to feed the army, and the pressure upon them is relieved also by a side line from G (Givet) running through Marienbourg at K. What importance the Germans attach to this connecting line is proved by their nervous destruction of Marienbourg the other day. It is one of the now too many points in Belgium where their policy has been to establish a mere terror.

So long, then, as the first great line of communications L—M—F is held by the Germans up to and beyond M they can feed their armies through their original main line, and pressure upon it is further relieved by a subsidiary line running from L (Liège) through Louvain and Brussels to Mons, where a branch connects again with Maubeuge. It was this

subsidiary line which the Belgians just managed to reach, and for a moment to cut during their operations of last week. They did not get near the main line L—M, but they did make the defenders of it anxious.

As for the second great line of supply X—Y—Z running through Luxemburg, Longwy, and Mezières, it is perfectly safe, even while Verdun holds out; for it is beyond the striking distance of that fortress, and there are no French forces to the south sufficient to menace it for some time to come. Should Verdun fall, there would be open another new line of the utmost importance to the Germans. It is a line coming straight from their depots at Metz (the line which I have marked upon the sketch S—T) and with the breakdown of the Verdun-Toul barrier (B—C) further lines, as I explained last week, will provide ample and short communication from Germany and the Rhine bases through Alsace-Lorraine.

From all the above it will be evident that so long as the two main lines L—M, X—Z and the subsidiary branch lines are open to the Germans they can be fully supplied, and they would but strengthen themselves in their retreat by shortening their lines of communication. If the French forces could (which is unlikely) get round on to the subsidiary lines south of M in the direction of the arrow marked upon the sketch, the Germans would only have (so long as Verdun holds out) one railway line to depend upon and would be in a very difficult position. But failing this, a continued Belgian menace to the line L—M gravely incommodes them, and if it were really cut they would be in as difficult a position as though the French had got round in the direction of the arrow. That, as briefly as one can put it, is the menace to the German communications from the north to-day, and the explanation of these and subsequent Belgian operations from Antwerp.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS IN THE WEST.

The whole of the above may now be summarized as follows:



OUTLINING ROUGHLY THE PRESENT POSITION IN THE WESTERN AREA.

The German line which upon September 4th occupied the positions (1) (1) (1) and was within a march of Paris, with the Crown Prince's army P, trying to break through the Verdun-Toul barrier at Troyon, now occupies the positions (2) (2) (2) from near Compiègne, along the Aisne, round north of Rheims to the Argonne, while the Crown Prince's army at P has retired to Q. There has been a general German retirement pivoting on the Argonne and amounting at its maximum to 60 miles. From a line convex against the centre of France it is now a line concave near the Belgian frontier.

This line is only just in touch, if in touch at all, with its old main line of communications between Compiègne and Maubeuge; but it still has its subsidiary line of communications (S) (S) (S) dependant on the upper part of this old main line above Maubeuge, and it has a second line of communications through Miziens, Longwy, and Luxemburg.

The defensive positions which it occupies along the Aisne and Suippe rivers (2) (2) (2), are hardly of a sort that can be pierced. They may be turned round the western end at W., or, far less probably, round the eastern end at E. The Germans may intend a counter-offensive from this ridge (2) (2) (2), but more probably they are holding it in order to protect the retirement of their convoys across the Aisne and the Meuse behind them. Such a retirement, if it takes place, with its wings at W. and E. intact, can be effected in good order, with the German army unbroken and as strong as ever it was prepared to take the counter-offensive when it so chooses, when it is thoroughly restored and remunitioned, and reposing perhaps upon the great fortress of Metz. But such a retirement if it is hampered by movements in flank by the enemy round W. or even round E. may have to cross the rivers on too narrow a front, in which case its lines of convoys, artillery, waggons, and marching men would be caught in the defiles of the bridges, and it would probably suffer heavy loss.

Meanwhile, everyone should repeat to himself that fundamental doctrine which was so continually insisted upon in these notes before the French took the counter-offensive:

Of two opponents in arms, one has not defeated the other until he has brought that other to a Decision. A Decision is not achieved until the army of one of the two opponents is pierced or enveloped.

The German army has been neither pierced nor enveloped. It is to-day what it was three weeks ago. It has lost far less in proportion than the Allies have lost; and if, though it be the less probable alternative, it again takes the offensive after holding the ridge (2) (2) (2), only, that would be an operation quite consonant to the history and nature of war.

On the other hand, if the Allies are in sufficient numbers or possess sufficiently rapid means of moving troops round the western extremity of the line (2) (2) (2), then the German retirement may be rendered difficult indeed, and perhaps disastrous.

I will conclude this part with some mention of three points which are now clearer than they were earlier in the war—a point concerning the prisoners, a point concerning the German siege artillery, and a point concerning the supply of munitions.

THE PRISONERS.

There is a factor in the issues of this war which will be considerable even if large fractions of the German forces should be enveloped and surrender in the course of it, and which will be much more important if successes of this kind do not take place. This factor is the factor of the prisoners now in German hands.

The official list issued by the German Government bears every mark of accuracy. In the case of the British contingent the numbers are surprisingly low, less than half the total of "missing." It may be hoped that these indicate the presence among the "missing" of many who will later find their regiments again. But at any rate, judged by this test, which is a fair one, the German figures are not above the mark. We must remember that in a retreat, and almost in proportion to the rapidity of that retreat, the

retiring body automatically loses great numbers of men. So slight a thing as a blister on a man's foot means, in a rapid retirement, a big chance of his capture. Nearly all wounded fall into the hands of the enemy, as do that large proportion of men in a conscript army—men only just called up from sedentary occupations of all kinds—who fall out in a pressed march.

It is, by the way, one of the most remarkable things about the first four days of this rapid retirement of the first German army and part of the second upon the line Soissons—Rheims, that it seems as yet to have lost so few men. We have not yet the full tale, but in the first four days the records sent in did not account for 7,000 prisoners, even adding to the official figures the unofficial accounts of surrenders.

Well, the figures of French prisoners in Germany on this same list come to nearly 1,700 officers and nearly 87,000 men. And this does not include the prisoners from Maubeuge, in the fall of which the Germans claimed the very large total of 40,000 prisoners.

In this last item there probably *is* exaggeration. Many of the older men in Maubeuge will have been pressed into the work of defending the city, and the estimate must have been a very rough one taken in the excitement of success. But even if you halve it, it brings the total number of French prisoners for Germany at the present moment to well over 100,000.

I repeat, if considerable bodies of the Germans now in retreat are ultimately rounded up, if there are general surrenders due to the cutting off of communications and the barring of the line of retirement, we shall soon have an equal batch of prisoners to set against this very large number. It is conceivable, though improbable, that an exchange might take place. But if no such disasters overtake the Germans for some time to come, there will be a big preponderance of this asset upon the German side. Put the matter as gently as you like, but acknowledge that the Prussian theory of war will regard these men as hostages: that is at once the strength and the weakness of what is called the "Frederician tradition," and the conclusion is that the Allies must wholly disregard all threats and all bargains connected with this great body of prisoners. It is certainly the French policy to disregard that very grave sentimental weapon in the hands of the enemy. We may presume that the policy will be carried through in spite of everything, but we must be prepared for very bitter sacrifice *unless* corresponding numbers of the enemy fall into our hands.

THE GERMAN SIEGE ARTILLERY.

The telegrams, however confused, sensational, and occasionally absurd, which we receive in regard to German siege work can, if we compare them one with another, give us some information as to the measure of success obtained by the enemy in this direction.

It is, in the first place, quite clear that the real work that has been done against fortifications so far has been done by the German 11-inch howitzer. Now this gun is nothing abnormal or new. It corresponds to the French howitzer which, if my memory serves me aright, is a 275 mm., or thereabouts: a calibre differing by *less than one thirtieth* from the German. If I am not mistaken there is in the British service a corresponding gun of about nine-tenths of the French calibre, or rather less, and about nine-elevenths of the German. In other words, all the great Powers possess a gun of this type. The only difference between them is the difference you always

get in the eternal compromise between mobility and weight. One Power thinks that a *rather* lighter gun is worth while on account of its greater mobility. Another Power risks a slight loss of mobility for the sake of a *rather* heavier gun.

It is true that the shells dropped by these howitzers have produced more effect on fortification than was expected. It is not true that they have always, and will necessarily always, produce a wholly uncalculated effect. The heaviest artillery in a modern fortress will always outrange them, and though the howitzer can hide—that, coupled with searching trenches, is the whole purpose of its high-angle fire—yet, in most cases, only good aerial observation could direct its fire sufficiently accurately from any distance to make its effect immediately decisive. It is probable or certain that we shall see not only fortresses upon this side of the frontier, but fortresses upon the other side, yield to howitzer fire more rapidly than had been expected by those who theorised in peace time upon these machines; but it is not true that we shall see miracles. It is certain that when the history of their bombardment comes to be written, we shall find that Namur and even Maubeuge were not as heavily gunned as they might have been, or were not sufficiently provided with trained men or adequately defended. It is a matter upon which we must hold our judgment in suspense, because we have not yet full data upon it; but it would seem that the big 420mm. howitzer (17 inches or rather less) has hitherto done nothing off rails and very little on rails. There is no reason why you should not make a howitzer as big as the Shot Tower, save the loss in mobility; and hitherto the consensus of opinion has been that at somewhere less than a foot you had arrived at the maximum calibre which could be combined with any real mobility for this type of weapon.

THE QUESTION OF MUNITIONS.

One of the most interesting hints we had from the telegrams during Von Kluck's retreat upon the Aisne was the apparent dearth of ammunition from which that General and his command suffered. This would seem to have been particularly the case with his artillery. The action fought along the right bank of the Ourcq upon September 7th, 8th, and 9th was, in the main, an artillery duel of peculiar violence, and it would seem as though, when the retreat was undertaken upon the 10th, throughout that day, as also throughout the 11th and 12th, the retiring German forces were short of shells.

Now we know that they were also, during those days, just out of touch with their main line of communications by rail, which main line runs along the Oise valley by Noyon and Compiègne and Creil; and the incident suggests what commonsense would also teach one: the capital importance in a modern campaign of multiplying railway communication behind one to one's base, particularly for the supply of projectiles to guns in the field.

Modern quick-firing artillery can dispose of something like ten times as much ammunition in the same time as could the guns of twenty years ago. It could, at a maximum rate of firing, dispose of far more; but in practice it can and does dispose of it, if the artillery duel be severe, at this enormous rate.

One of the vital questions, therefore, that will probably crop up in the course of the present campaign will be this question of the exhaustion of artillery supplies. It is probable that the story of General Pau having captured an ammunition column upon his left (and the German right) during or just before the

battle of Meaux may be accurate; but apart from this, it was the temporary loss of the railway which presumably made all the difference; and, perhaps, not a little of the manœuvring which is going on at the present moment upon the western extremity of the German defensive line has for its intention not only the outflanking of that extremity, but the denial to that present defensive German line of the main railway which here runs direct from the Belgian depots through Noyon to Compiègne.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

In the eastern theatre of war the decisive result of last week, when the Russian armies overwhelmed the second Austrian Army by Lemberg, has not up to the moment of writing (Wednesday afternoon) been followed up by a correspondingly decisive blow, such as was promised us, against the first Austrian Army.

It will be remembered that the second Austrian Army, which had been drawn up between Kamionka and Halicz, was after several days' fighting forced back upon Lemberg and broken to pieces. The victorious Russians in this part of the field then stood right upon the flank of the first Austrian Army, largely reinforced by their German allies, and having their right at Tomaszov exposed to the Russian attack. So far as can be gathered from the rather confused accounts which have reached us in the west, the Russians did damage this first Austrian Army on its flank at Tomaszov, but they did not roll it up, and their general attempt, upon failing to do this, consisted in a manœuvre to get round its left wing near the Vistula and force it backwards.

The latest telegrams received point to some measure of success in this manœuvre; but that manœuvre, be it remembered, is not a decisive one. The first Austrian Army is not enveloped; it is only being pushed back. The Russians have crossed the lower part of the River San, apparently at the point and in the direction indicated by the arrow in the accompanying map. They have by their own



account already got astride of the railway between Cracow and the strong fortress of Przemyśl (though it seems difficult to understand how they can have got so far in so short a time); they have—again according to the official account—secured the position of Gorodok; and they certainly have reached Mosiska. If you draw a line through these places, with a hypothetical point for the place in which they shall have cut the railway from Cracow to Przemyśl, you will see that the Russian positions form a half-circle round the Austrian Army, which is falling back everywhere upon Przemyśl. How far this success has been continuous and thorough, only the future can show. If even a half-circle can be drawn from the mountains to the mountains, enclosing the first Austrian Army round and in Przemyśl, with the main railway pass over the Carpathians behind it held by the Russians at Luskó, there should at least be a decisive result against this first

army, as there was nearly a fortnight ago against the second. But that decision has not yet been reached, and until it has been reached we cannot even approximately guess at the date when pressure can begin to be exercised in Silesia. The advance through Silesia northwards, past Breslau towards Posen and Berlin is (whatever the success in Galicia) dependant upon a corresponding success in East Prussia; and for the moment East Prussia is no longer in the hands of Russian armies but has been recovered by German ones. I do not mean that severe pressure could not be exercised upon Silesia by the Russians even while and though Germans holding East Prussia should threaten and even invade the northern frontier of Russian Poland. That frontier is too far off to interfere with the communications of the Russian army moving upon Breslau. But I do mean that before a general advance eastward can take place, before you can get past Posen and directly on the road to Berlin, you must have your northern flank secure; and that flank will not be secure so long as large and undefeated German armies occupy East and



West Prussia, and in general the country beyond the Vistula and the great fortresses upon that river—Thorn and Dantzig. Before Russia holds the line Dantzig-Thorn she may hold Silesia. But until she holds the line Dantzig-Thorn she cannot advance upon *Berlin*.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WE have received a communication from a firm of solicitors regarding a review which appeared in our issue of the 5th inst.

We take the earliest opportunity of publishing this letter together with our reply.

28, Budge Row, Cannon Street, E.C.
September 14th, 1914.

Dear Sirs,—The Committee of the Constitutional Club have called the attention of Mr. Edward Seymour Odell to the number of your paper issued on the 5th inst., from which the following is an extract:

"Pity he was too soon for Mr. 'Odell' of the Constitutional Club. The Kaiser's spy system had not then come up to date."

In view of the grave implications contained in this passage, the Committee state it is necessary for Mr. Odell to vindicate himself publicly if he wishes to remain a member of the Club.

Mr. Edward Seymour Odell is the only member of the Club named Odell, and we are instructed by him to invite you to give any explanation you think fit, and to require you to furnish us with the name of the writer of the article, to publish a full and complete apology, and to make reasonable pecuniary compensation for the grave injury done to him by the paragraph in question.

Mr. Edward Seymour Odell instructs us to say that he is the son of Mr. Frederick Odell, formerly a member of the London Stock Exchange, that he was born at Highbury, educated in London, and has all his business life been connected with the London Stock Exchange. Mr. Odell does not speak German, and is in no way connected with Germany.

This matter is of great and immediate importance to Mr. Odell, and he must take steps at once to clear himself from the imputations cast upon him. We have therefore to say that unless a satisfactory answer to this letter is received by twelve o'clock to-morrow legal proceedings will be taken.

This letter is sent to you by hand.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) WHITES & Co.

To the Proprietors and Publishers of LAND AND WATER,
Central House, Kingsway, W.C.

September 15th/14.

Messrs. Whites & Co.,
28, Budge Row, Cannon Street, E.C.

Dear Sirs,—Referring to your letter of the 14th inst., we are surprised to learn that any English gentleman should suppose our remark was aimed at him. We printed the name "Odell" in inverted commas so as to convey that a German spy had assumed the disguise of a loyal subject. We regret to learn that a genuine member of the Constitutional Club has been thereby pained.

The writer of the review heard of a German spy masquerading under that name, and that the Kaiser's devices involved visits to the club. Nothing was further from our thought than that a British member of the club could feel aggrieved, and we intended no offence or imputation against a fellow-

countryman, much less one connected with the London Stock Exchange.

The fraud on Mr. E. S. Odell has laid him open to regrettable annoyance. He and every Briton will admit that in war time a journalist's duty requires the exposure of the enemy's inroads on our hospitality.

We shall print this correspondence in our next issue, feeling sure Mr. E. S. Odell will see that a Press jealous of the nation's interest is one of our potent safeguards in time of war.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) A. DOUGLAS FARMER,
Secretary.

The County Gentleman Publishing Company, Ltd.

KHAKI EQUIPMENT.

WHEN about two years ago the War Office issued orders to the effect that all officers were to wear khaki shirts, Messrs. Robinson and Cleaver, with their usual enterprise, immediately made large quantities of these shirts to the regulation sealed pattern, and sent samples to all regiments stationed in England, so that when the demand first arose with the outbreak of war the firm was inundated with orders from all over the country. Owing to their large stocks on hand they were able to cope with the sudden demand satisfactorily, and notwithstanding the tremendous demand for khaki at the present time, Messrs. Robinson and Cleaver, owing to their foresight in this matter, are in the fortunate position of being able to supply for a considerable time to come the regulation sealed pattern khaki shirt in the reliable quality for which the firm has so high a reputation.

In the matter of socks for marching—a detail of equipment of which the importance cannot be over-estimated—Messrs. Robinson and Cleaver have devoted much time and care to the production of a thoroughly satisfactory article, and this is supplied in plain undyed wool, and also in Lovat and heather shades. Red Cross requirements are fully met by the supplies in stock, while members of officers' training corps and young officers joining the Service cannot do better than go to Messrs. Robinson and Cleaver for their outfits, which, while perfect in every detail, are moderate in price. Complete service kits, either to measure or ready for immediate wear, form one of the present specialties of the firm.

WONDERFUL WAR PICTURES AT THE SCALA THEATRE.

All London is flocking to see the war pictures at the Scala Theatre, and the greatest credit is due to the management for the enterprise which they are showing in obtaining from the various battlefields in different parts of Europe films for the cinematograph, by means of which we are able, here in England, to watch the actual incidents and phases of the fighting in the world's war. In many cases the intrepid operators, in imminent peril of their lives, have taken their cameras right into the firing lines, and the resulting films are thrilling in the extreme. A particular feature at the Scala Theatre are the numerous films shown in the actual colours by the kinema-colour process, which shows up the contrasting uniforms with splendid effect. A film (also in colour) taken in Kiel Harbour before the war, in which a Zeppelin is seen flying over the German battleships, is among the many of which the spectator is bound to retain a vivid recollection. There are several naval films, and all are capital. An excellent band and a demonstrator, who explains from the stage the successive items, add to the general enjoyment. In fact, all readers of *Land and Water* can be cordially recommended to pay a visit to the Scala, and to take their families also.

The Joint Secretaries of the National Relief Fund have informed us that their Subscription Sub-Committee has heard of a good many cases in which use has been made of its name, or of the names of those connected with it, with the object of securing support for appeals which are quite unauthorised. Our readers may be assured that any extravagant or grotesque appeals emanate from persons who have neither the authorisation nor the support of this committee.

ANIMAL DEFENCE SOCIETIES AND HORSES IN WARFARE.

By ROY HORNIMAN.

BEFORE dealing with the actual issue which I am anxious to bring to the public notice, and which is suggested by the phrase at the head of this article, it is necessary to state a few preliminary facts.

The part played by the horse soldier in the present and recent wars has entirely falsified the prediction put forward at the time when artillery was being revolutionised that cavalry would become less and less important. Its importance has, on the contrary, grown side by side with the astonishing development of gunnery of all kinds.

The exigencies of artillery and transport demand a greater supply of horses than ever before. With the growth of mechanical transport for purposes of civil life, and for more than one other reason which will be fairly obvious, the question of a supply of horses available for service in time of war has become acute. There is, in fact, great danger of a shortage.

That this is felt to be the case was shown by the feverish activity with which foreign agents were occupied in buying up all the horses obtainable in the United Kingdom for some years before the present crisis. In Ireland the writer was told that the vast majority of these buyers were Germans and Austrians, as the English military authorities declined to pay the prices asked. We allowed the supply of our best horses to be seriously interfered with to the advantage of our present opponents.

It thus becomes obvious, without reference at the moment to the humane side of the question, that any laxity in our Army veterinary arrangements, either at the front or on any other line of defence, constitutes a serious economic defect.

That these veterinary arrangements are totally inadequate no one will deny who is acquainted with the true state of affairs, or who has read Sir Edward Ward's statement on the subject. A cavalry officer, wounded and returned home, states that he lost three chargers which had been slightly wounded because there were no facilities for removing them to a base hospital, of which there are all too few. He adds that he never saw a veterinary officer. This is not surprising; it was years before the work of the Red Cross was recognised and placed on a proper basis.

Before I arrive at the main reason of my article, I should like it to be clearly understood that such animal defence societies as I am connected with are not unreasonable sentimentalists on the question of the use of horses in war.

It is clear to them that there can be no injustice in using horses to fight in defence of a country in which the practical standard of the treatment of animals is the highest in the world. Those agonies which humans endure for their enfranchisement they may clearly ask horses to share when the interests of the latter are also at stake. I would the reason for animal suffering were always so well grounded.

From this, it follows, however, that by all rules of honour and gratitude we are bound to protect them by some such organisations as the Red Cross, which has become an economic necessity and a humane duty. Hundreds of thousands of pounds will be saved and a great amount of agony and suffering mitigated and prevented. A beginning has been made. Certain animal defence societies are anxious to place all their forces at the disposal of the Government, both in the interests of the country and those of the animals.

The Blue Cross Fund of Our Dumb Friends' League came into existence at the time of the Balkan War, when it was able to send £500 to Lady Lowther, the wife of our Ambassador at Constantinople, for the use of army horses. When the present war began it at once set to work.

The committee of the Blue Cross Fund does not expect miracles. The proper care of wounded horses in warfare, and especially the removal and proper nursing of those engaged on the field of battle, is a comparatively new idea. Indeed, the whole attitude towards animal life has evolved enormously, and in this respect Britons lead the van.

To begin with, there is a very important point to be settled, a point which must be settled by international convention before any society can work efficiently on the battlefield. Certain nations which do not share the advanced views of this country would see no difference between the saving of guns and the saving of horses. With them horses are munitions of war, nothing more. The recognition of the Blue Cross will be a long and troublesome business.

This generation may not see it. But the necessary spade work leading to this end becomes difficult in the face of recent action taken by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Before the war was many days old the R.S.P.C.A. issued the following circular:

HORSES ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

In view of the great desire of a large body of the public that special steps should be taken to ameliorate the condition of horses on the battlefield, the Council of the R.S.P.C.A. announce that the Military Authorities have publicly stated that *no private, auxiliary, or volunteer veterinary corps for destroying wounded horses will be allowed to enter the sphere of hostilities, and that no voluntary assistance in the way of supplying bandages, medicines, etc., is required.* The Army Veterinary Department of the War Office is in sole charge of this work, and has provided special instruments for the killing of wounded animals by Veterinary Officers of their own largely increased staff, and by all soldiers of and above the rank of sergeant. Further, the Army Veterinary Corps has provided for a chain of hospitals for the treatment of those animals that can be cured. All funds for animals available at this time will be required for the protection of those, unfit for military requirements, left in this country to do the extra strenuous work which will inevitably devolve upon them.

By means of circulars, newspaper advertisements, and posters, the above statement was disseminated broadcast; the last paragraph definitely implies that no horses under Army control will be allowed to receive voluntary help of any kind.

This is absolutely contrary to facts.

I ask the R.S.P.C.A. to publish the facsimile of the War Office document, wherein it publicly makes the statement attributed to it.


The truth of the matter is that Army veterinary officers are, as they must do, unless they wish to be grossly inhumane, accepting help in every direction. A more kindly set of men do not exist, and it is grotesque to suppose that they are flying in the face of headquarter instructions. Many of Our Dumb Friends' League ambulances have been refitted and are in use by the military, and medical comforts have been supplied at request in large quantities. Anybody reading the statement quoted would naturally come to the conclusion that societies or individuals collecting money for the purpose of assisting Army horses were doing so without the least chance of succeeding in their object.

Indeed, as a result of the circular, imputations of bad faith against Our Dumb Friends' League have not been wanting, and to show that I have not strained its implication or its effect on the public mind, subscribers have, in some instances, asked for their money back. I am happy to say that on being informed of the true state of the case they have returned their subscriptions to the fund. The circular thus resolved itself into an attack on those societies which had once again been compelled by the policy of Jermyn-street to undertake a work which the R.S.P.C.A. might have initiated years ago.

I assert most unequivocally that, although the R.S.P.C.A. has been founded ninety years, although it is by far the richest of all animal defence societies, it has beyond argument left nearly every new departure in animal defence to those societies which have come into being. There should never have been any need for the existence of the Canine Defence Society, the Equine Defence Society, the Bird Society, the Animal Defence Society, and Our Dumb Friends' League, with its seven societies in one. Those who doubt this should read the courteous but scathing indictment by Mr. Stephen Coleridge in the *Fortnightly Review* of April, 1914.

In conclusion, the public will be glad to hear that Army horses may be helped in spite of the published circular referred to above. The work of the Blue Cross Fund grows steadily. We have a balance of £1,200, and subscriptions and large gifts of stores are coming in daily. We shall hope, when we have shown that we can be useful in the sphere open to us, to establish, under the supervision of the military authorities, base hospitals at the front.

WITH recruiting headquarters at the Hotel Cecil, a private complete battalion is being formed of 1,300 strong, hardy, sporting gentlemen up to 45 years of age. The battalion has been accepted by Lord Kitchener, and affords an opportunity for men wishing to serve of joining under congenial conditions. Application can be made personally at the Hotel Cecil recruiting office between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m., or by writing and sending name, address, age, height, weight, and medical certificate to the Officer in Command, Recruiting Office, Hotel Cecil, Strand, London.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE APPROXIMATELY THE NEUTRAL COASTS AND INLAND COMMUNICATIONS BY WHICH FOODS AND RAW MATERIALS CAN BE GOT INTO GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. THE DOTTED LINES REPRESENT THE APPROXIMATE EXTENT OF DELIVERY AREA.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE NORTH SEA.

AT the time of writing the past week has been uneventful so far as any fighting is concerned. A sweep has been made so far as the Heligoland Bight, but no hostile warships were sighted. The sweep must not be regarded as ineffective on that account, for it must have had a considerable moral value as indicating to the Germans that we are both ready and willing to attack.

By order of the Admiralty (which has secured all the more willing obedience from issuing its directions in the form of a polite "request") all lights along the coast have been greatly reduced; and in certain places the lighthouses have been left unlit. To this latter circumstance has been attributed the loss of the armed liner *Oceanic*, of 17,274 gross tonnage and 21 knot speed. She is alleged to have been wrecked, but no official details are forthcoming. Unofficial stories range from her having gone full-speed ashore on an unlit coast to having been submarined and beached.

The losses of trawlers and neutrals by North Sea mines indicates a pleasing diminution, which may be attributed partly to the circumstance that Admiralty advice as to courses to be followed is now more strictly observed, and to the untiring efforts of the mine sweepers.

Special regulations have been promulgated, and came into force on Monday, as to vessels entering the Thames. These must now all call at the *Tongue* lightship or at the *Margate*, *Deal*, or *Dover* lightships, and take on board a licensed pilot. Outgoing vessels have to take instructions as to the exact course to be followed. This, of course, means that mines have been or are about to be laid in certain places as a precaution

against Germans seeking to lay mines under the British or a neutral flag.

Some remarks of mine last week on the subject of Holland appear to have been misunderstood by one or two readers, who fail to realise that the Dutch will presently be in the same invidious position as the Danes were in the Napoleonic wars. Behind Holland is Germany—a long-dreaded power which has suddenly become very polite, for Dutch ports offer useful facilities for food supply. If the Dutch fleet is wanted, Germany will no more hesitate to seize it and use Dutch harbours as a war base against us than she hesitated to use Belgian territory as a base against France.

The immediate result would be double work for our North Sea patrols. Against this is to be put the utility of Holland as a convenient neutral through whom German supplies can be obtained. Just at present these two circumstances more or less balance each other for either side, but this balance can only be maintained so long as the Germans do not obtain control of French harbours. The value of Holland as a source of food import to Germany would then decline appreciably, while the value of taking possession of Dutch harbours and Dutch torpedo craft would rise correspondingly.

On the other hand, supposing the Germans to be beaten back and contained at bay in their own country, the question of whether we can afford to allow them to be fed through Holland will assuredly rise as a problem of naval strategy. The business of the Fleet is to fight the enemy's fleet if it comes out, and if it will not come out to put on sufficient economic pressure to compel a sortie or surrender.

We know that already, on account of the blockade, some 1500 idle ships lie at Hamburg, that food prices in Germany are very high, and that the scarcity of raw material has led

to much unemployment—a general condition which is already characterised by the German Socialist newspaper *Vorwärts* as "The Internal Danger."

On the other hand, Dutch imports have risen very considerably, and the effect of the British Navy is to that extent discredited. Sooner or later Holland will have to make her neutrality definite, or else take sides. The sheer brutality with which Germany treated Belgium is thus explained. The awful fate of Belgium was a broad hint to Holland. Thus the Dutch are placed between the millstones—German military force close by, and British naval force acting over perhaps a hundred miles away. Holland, like Belgium, will presently have to make her decision between present loss and future gain.

An official German report admits the loss of the *Hela*, sunk by a submarine. She is, however, no great loss as a fighting unit, being rather inferior to our *Speedy*.

An unofficial report says that the *Pathfinder* was sunk not by a mine, but by a submarine, and that that submarine was subsequently found and sunk. If this story be true, it indicates considerable daring on the part of the German submarine service, for it must have entailed a long above-water cruise, the distance which German submarines can travel under water being very small, probably an endurance of not more than fifty miles all told. If a submarine did deliver the attack, there is every probability that the story of her subsequent destruction is correct.

THE BALTIC.

A NUMBER of vague rumours when pieced together suggest that the greater part of the German Fleet is, or has been, operating in the Baltic, the older ships acting in the Aaland direction, and the Dreadnoughts, if any, cruising off Kiel mainly with the object of keeping their crews fit.

In the great Napoleonic Wars this "taking exercise outside the backdoor" was not possible to any blockaded fleet. It is a very considerable asset to the Germans, and one which most of us have hitherto rather overlooked. It, of course, has not the same hardening effect as actual war service, but there will necessarily be a vast difference between this "keeping the sea" and lying idle in harbour.

The "right thing" for an inferior fleet is naturally somewhat limited. Humanly speaking, it should never amount to very much. But the naval situation as I read it is that the German High Sea Fleet still continues to make no mistakes and to wait patiently in the hopes of our making some. Admiral Ingenholt is not to be lured out by the best of our devices. Our respect for him as a capable opponent should rise, not fall, accordingly.

At the time of going to press there is a belated official German report, dated Monday, to the effect that the Baltic squadron, "which consists of twenty-nine units," has fifteen vessels in action. It probably refers to some destroyer or light cruiser action.

THE FAR EAST, ETC.

HERBERTSHOE in Neu Pommern (formerly New Britain), which was ceded to Germany in 1885, was attacked and cap-

now far too strong to offer any chances of successful internment in some Chinese harbour. The objective, if any, would probably be Chee-foo.



PLAN SHOWING THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

LAST Saturday brought the news of the capture of the Hamburg-American liner *Bethania*, 7548 tons, off Jamaica, into which port she was brought, with some 400 prisoners, mostly belonging to the crew of the late armoured liner, *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, which was sunk by the *Highflyer*. The capture of various lesser ships was also reported, the total to date being 190.

Meanwhile, several German cruisers are still afloat, but their interference with British trade has been trivial. German miscalculations in connection with commerce warfare have been very considerable indeed; for all the harm that has been done we might just as well be at peace.

On the German side, however, matters are becoming acute. Various important liners are held up at New York, where they are being maintained in idleness at very heavy expense. Rumour has it that these ships have now received orders to attempt a rush home. Rumour has probably anticipated actual orders, but such orders will no doubt eventually be given. The projected sale to the United States of these big fast liners has fallen through, so they are lying at New York, unsaleable, earning nothing, and costing their usual upkeep. Wealthy as are the Hamburg-American Line and the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd, a continuation of this state of affairs must bring them face to face with bankruptcy.

If they can get the ships back there is a good prospect of sale to the Germany Navy. Hence the attempt to run home is fairly certain to occur at some time.

Success is another matter. The Channel is impossible. The only possible successful route is round the North of Scotland. To slip through here and so into the Baltic offers some prospect of success on a dark night, but the outlook for the Germans is none too rosy, unless, of course, some co-incident fleet action be taken.

This course, however, is improbable, as the consequent risk would be altogether out of proportion to the possible gain.

It would seem that, humanly speaking, the "silent pressure of Sea Power" is such that it is immaterial what the great German shipping lines do. Their choice is little but to try to discover which is the lesser of two evils.

GERMANS—ROSE-COLOURED.

MR. WILLIAM HEINEMANN has issued a two-shilling edition of F. W. Wile's book, *Men Around the Kaiser*, which gives a fairly faithful picture of the leading men of Germany—as they appeared to English eyes before the great awakening of last month. The volume is frankly eulogistic; with Louvain and Dinant still in mind, we are but little inclined to agree with the author's views on, say, the Crown Prince or Bethmann-Hollweg. Bernstorff, again, is painted in very glowing colours as "peculiarly at home in the American environment," and it is not until we come on the sketches of Reinhardt and Strauss, and their like, that we are inclined to agreement with the estimates of these men as given here. Biographically, the book is of little value, and its personal appeal is weakened by the estimation in which these men are held at the present time; as a race, we English are naturally a little biassed against the "men around the Kaiser," to say nothing of the Kaiser himself, at present. The chief value of the book lies in its power to show us what fools we were to believe—as the author believed when he wrote it—that the Germans are a civilised and peaceful people.



NEU POMMERN AND ADJACENT GERMAN POSSESSIONS.

tured by an Australian Naval force on the 11th and 12th. The capture is of importance, as it entailed the possession of a German wireless station, which might have been useful to any predatory cruiser making those waters.

At Kiao-Chau the principal operations seem to consist in German efforts to lay fresh mines, and Japanese counter-efforts to prevent. Stories of the blockaded cruisers endeavouring to break out can be dismissed as possible rather than probable. The blockading Japanese force must be by

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

THE end of last week brought us alarming rumours of a German Zeppelin invasion of England *via* Calais, preceded by a bombardment of Dover from across the Channel by monster guns. The guns we can dismiss; the suitable gun is not yet built. As for the Zeppelins, sheds for them are not available at Calais, and a Zeppelin without a shed is a very harmless sort of thing. It is like the crawling wasp of the autumn, in full possession of its sting, but not in a position to use it except in special circumstances.

Very wisely, however, the responsible authorities did not take the threat as an idle one. A naval airship was ordered to cruise over London, and at the same time a request, of the nature of a command, was issued as to the extinction of all prominent sky sights and similar leading lights.

All of which is to the good. The "aerial menace" to us so far exists merely as "newspaper yarns" or "speculations of fanatics." All of which is very good in its way, but it does not nullify the possibilities of such attack. As I mentioned last week, Germany's air superiority is probably regarded by her as her trump card. It is probably also a card to be held back and not played till the psychological moment.

The new type aerial searchlight now in full use is likely to make surprise attacks exceedingly difficult, and also every place that matters is by now well supplied with anti-aerial guns. There is consequently not the least occasion to panic. But all the same the danger is *real*. Germany in the air is just about in the same relation to us (or more so) as we are to Germany on the water, and it is idle to imagine that in her own time Germany will not use or attempt to use her superiority.

We have no occasion to fear her aeroplanes. Even from the shores of France they cannot well act from a French base; and even if they did, the damage that they could do is more or less trivial. Zeppelins, however, are quite another affair. Once a base is established in France, London's danger will be acute. It may come to-morrow, or not till next week or the week after, or later still. But the danger is there, and it should not be ignored.

Germany in her own time will seek to panic us. She hoped to do so with the commerce attack. This operation did not come off. The attempt left our traders cold. North Sea mines have been little more successful. The third vial is likely to come from the air. If so, it will rest with the people of London not to accept the Kaiser as the instrument of the Almighty. They will have to accept things with philosophical calm—no easy task.

It is inadvisable to discuss what ways and means we may have of meeting this possible aerial attack. For that matter no one knows for certain what will happen when aeroplanes attack airships. We are far too prone to seek the analogy of torpedo craft attacking battleships. The analogy is easy; but it may be absolutely delusive. For all we know the positions may be reversed entirely.

In any case it is idle to speculate too freely as to what an aeroplane can accomplish against a Zeppelin. It can certainly in the last resort ram her and destroy a gas bag—with luck, two gas bags. But the average Zeppelin has seventeen bags, and what are two among so many? At any rate, and

in order to minimise possible future panic, it should be remembered that—according to German calculations—a Zeppelin can take a great deal of punishment without suffering much for it *until she had achieved her object*.

This, of course, is identical with the theory about destroyers charging a battleship. According to the theory the battleship will very probably inflict deadly wounds on an attacking destroyer, *but* these wounds will not take effect until the destroyer has managed to achieve her especial purpose. Rightly or wrongly, German aerial ideas run along similar lines. It is held that a Zeppelin cannot be destroyed without a time interval. In that time interval she should have been able to do her work. It is along these lines, it may be noted, that German regiments are handled—without regard to the ultimate loss so long as the initial object is achieved.

Hence the danger. The public in London and other large cities can only defend themselves by implicit obedience to all orders as to the display of lights, and by keeping calm whatever happens. The actual damage to be effected even by a Zeppelin is comparatively small; the main object aimed at is "moral effect."

General French has now issued a report of the Royal Flying Corps, which emphasises the fact that in actual air fighting five German aeroplanes have been destroyed.

The report, with the expression "fired at constantly by both friend and foe," draws attention to one of the dangers to which our airmen are exposed. At the present time there is with aircraft no such thing as the "obviously British" or "obviously German" which obtains on the sea. All aeroplanes are pretty much alike (indeed, the Germans have some of British make, and we some of German make), and although they are marked on the underside, it is rarely possible to see those marks under war conditions. "Shoot first and inquire afterwards" is about the only workable order where aeroplanes are concerned.

It is persistently reported that we, the French, and the Belgians, are adopting arrows for use against troops. The arrows are so designed that they will spread in falling, and it is calculated that a bunch of 400 (the regulation supply) would do more mischief than bombs, since dropped from a height they would pierce men like bullets.

Bombs from aeroplanes have so far achieved very little—real utility work consists in scouting, directing fire, and in fighting any of the enemy similarly engaged. This last is certainly more effectually done by actual conflict in the air than by rifle fire directed from below, both as regards greater certainty of result, and also because the thousands of bullets discharged into the air must all fall again *somewhere*. No casualties whatever have so far been reported from this cause, but circumstances in which a friendly force might sustain heavy casualties from returning bullets is great. The theory that a bullet shot upwards burns itself up in the air like a meteorite is inadmissible. All such bullets must fall somewhere, and if several thousand chanced to fall on a friendly regiment, there would be little of that regiment left.

The only proper place in which to meet aerial attack is in the air.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Bar-le-Duc or Bar-sur-Ornain.—The principal town of the department of Meuse, France, situated on the river Ornain, a tributary of the Meuse. It is in the immediate vicinity of the Marne-Rhine canal, and is a station on the Paris-Strasbourg line of rail, being also connected by rail with the fortress town of Verdun. Its population is about 17,000. The town was founded by Frederick the First, Duke of Lorraine, in the tenth century, and in mediæval times was strongly fortified. A few traces of the old fortifications, which were dismantled by

Louis XIV. in 1670, still remain, and Bar-le-Duc of the present day is an educational centre with considerable trade in wool, wood, and wine.

Bielgoray or Bilgoray.—A small town of the province of Lublin, in Russian Poland, about seventy-five kilometres south of the town of Lublin. It is about five kilometres distant from the frontier of Austrian Galicia, and about five kilometres distant from the river Tanew, a tributary of the San.

Chateau-Thierry.—Chief town of an arrondissement in the department of Aisne, France, situated on the right bank of the river Marne, and connected with a suburb on the left bank of the river by a stone bridge for road traffic. The town is generally stated to have been named from the ruins of an old castle on the top of a hill near the town, which ruins are supposed to have been a castle built by Charles Martel for Thierry IV. It has been captured by both English and Spanish and pillaged in mediæval times, and has suffered pillage on more than one occasion, while during the campaign of 1814 the town was completely wrecked, and Napoleon obtained a victory over the Russo-Prussian forces in the neighbourhood. The present population of the town is about 7,000, and it has direct rail communication with Paris, Chalons, Rheims, and Laon.

Dormans.—Situated on the Paris-Chalons line of rail, in the west of the department of Marne, and on the left bank of the river Marne. It is in a hilly district, and is on the direct Rheims to Paris road.

Haringhe.—A Belgian village in the province of East Flanders, about two miles south of Rousbrugge, and practically on the French frontier.

La-Ferte-Sous-Jouarre.—A town in the north-east of the department of Seine-et-Marne, France, situated on the river Marne, and at the junction of the Paris-Chalons and Paris-Troves lines of rail. It is the site of extensive stone quarries, and is a town of considerable importance.

Laon.—The chief town of the department of Aisne, situated eighty-seven miles north-east of Paris, on the main line of rail from Paris to Belgium. The Paris-Mezieres and Paris-Le Cateau lines also branch from Laon, and there is a line from Laon to Rheims. Laon is considered "the strategic key of the whole region comprised between the Aisne and the northern frontier," and is surrounded by a ring of defences about five miles distant from the town, in addition to a central citadel. The population of the town is about 16,000, exclusive of the normal garrison, which, as Laon ranks as a first-class military post, is considerable.

Lotzen.—A town in East Prussia, about thirty-five miles from the Russian frontier. It is situated on the Mauer Lake, under cover of the guns of the fortress Feste Boyen. It is a station on the railway from Lyck to the Baltic fortress of Koenigsberg.

Lublin.—Capital of a province of the same name in Russian Poland, and one of the chief centres of south-western Russia, with a population of over 60,000. It is about forty-five miles from the frontier of Austrian Galicia, and is an important railway centre. The lines Warsaw-Bucharest and Warsaw-Ekaterineslav branch here, and there is also a line from Lublin to Radzin and Ostrow in the north of Poland.

Lyck.—A station on the East German strategic railway, situated about twenty miles south of Margrabova. Four lines branch hence to Prostken on the Russian frontier, to Johannsburg, to Rossel, and to Goldapp in East Prussia. Lyck itself is a fortified post of some importance.

Mançra.—A village of western or French Lorraine on the western slope of the Vosges Mountains, situated near the St. Die terminus of the strategic railway running east to Fraize after branching off from the main St. Die-Bruyere line.

Marchiennes.—A Belgian town on the River Sambre, about two miles west of Charleroi, in the coalmining district of southern Belgium. The population is about 19,000, and the town is situated on the Maubeuge-Charleroi line.

Soissons.—A city in the department of Aisne, France, forming a fortified post on the left bank of the river Aisne where this stream is joined by the Crise. It is on the Paris-Laon line of rail, and is about sixty-five miles north-east of Paris. Its population is about 12,000, and its cathedral of Notre Dame St Gervais and St Protas, dating from the twelfth century, is one of the principal examples of early French ecclesiastical architecture. The history of Soissons dates back to Roman occupation in France, and the town played a prominent part in the wars between England and France during the middle ages, while the town was captured and recaptured by the Allies and the French during the campaign of 1814. In the war of 1870 Soissons capitulated to the Germans after a bombardment lasting three days. It is at the present time an important railway centre, as the Amiens-Rheims line crosses the Paris-Laon railway here.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

Sea, Land, and Air Strategy, by Sir George Aston, K.C.B., is a volume intended, as the author announces on the title page, to "give us a national strategy, a national tactics." It is based on lectures delivered by the author at the Camberley Staff College, and deals principally with land strategy, such subjects as concentration and dispersion, lines of communication, fortification, and coast defence being particularly well represented. In the matter of air warfare, the author treats of recent developments, the use of aeroplanes and airships, combat between aircraft, and the use of aircraft in gaining information. The book is undeniably technical; at the same time the study of strategy involves a mass of interesting historical matter, and, while the author has been careful to keep the practical side of his subject in view throughout his work, he has at the same time made his subject an interesting one, and has refrained from writing over the head of the average man. Primarily valuable as a text book for the naval and military officer, the book is to be recommended at the present time as a work of great interest to the great majority who desire to approach the problems of the present campaign with some military knowledge. We would suggest, in view of the great number of young officers now joining the services, that a cheaper form than the present half-guinea edition of the work would have been desirable, and trust that the publishers, Messrs. John Murray, have under consideration some means of supplying to bona fide military and naval applicants a slightly cheaper edition.

SAFE criticism of war topics forms a feature of current issues of *The Academy*. The present week's issue contains an explanation of the much-discussed report in a recent Sunday edition of the *Times*, and a number of other well-informed and interesting war articles.

In our review of Capt. Johnson's book, *The Foundations of Strategy*, which appeared in last week's issue of *Land and Water*, the publishers of the book were wrongly styled "Messrs. George Allen & Fisher Unwin." The correct style of the firm, which has no connection with that of Mr. T. Fisher Unwin, is "Messrs. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd."

Few men are better qualified to judge of Bernhardt's claims and assertions than Professor Cramb, whose book, *Germany and England*, consisting of a series of lectures given at Queen's College, Harley-street, has been published by John Murray. In this little half-crown volume is shown the real reason of German antagonism to England; it is made clear that the hostility among educated Germans is due to "the fact that this Empire appears to them the main, or even the sole, obstacle to the attainment of a great national ideal, for which they are bound to labour, and, if need be, to contend." Professor Cramb, as a professor of modern history, speaks with authority, and at the same time he speaks with scrupulous fairness; his lectures form a weighty indictment of Bernhardt and the doctrine which for forty years has dominated Germany. The book is one that ought to be read by every thoughtful student of the present war and its causes, and Lord Roberts' wish, that it should be read by "everyone who wishes to understand the present crisis," is one that we thoroughly endorse.

AMONG the well-known employers who are holding out inducements to their staffs to respond to the call to arms, Messrs. James Carter & Co., of Raynes Park, S.W., the well-known seedsmen, are not only keeping positions open, but paying half wages to all members of their staff who are accepted for service. No distinction between married or unmarried is made, as Messrs. James Carter & Co. realise the latter have dependents also.

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
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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE WAR IN THE WEST.

THE whole meaning of the Western war at the present moment is this:

That the Germans have retreated up to, and are defending, an admirable defensive line about half-way between Paris and the frontier; that they have held this line, with varying fortunes, for twelve days; that this state of affairs cannot be indefinitely continued; and, finally, that the chances of its breaking down are, at the moment I write this (Wednesday) evening, against the enemy. Either (A) they will find themselves strong enough to (1) at the best for themselves to break the French line at its centre, Rheims; (2) at least to press back the Allied line, which has for these ten days been attempting to dislodge them; or (B) they will yield to the increasing pressure upon their western flank and will begin a retirement, which will be first undertaken from the plateau Craonne-Noyon, and will later extend to the whole line.

Of these two alternatives (B) is the more likely.

That is the whole gist of the war in the Western field.

Our business, therefore, if we wish to understand what is going on, is first to summarise again the three great movements which led the Germans to their present position; next to grasp the nature and exact situation of the defensive 80-mile line upon which

the Germans have taken their stand; and, lastly, through a detailed examination of this line by sections, to sum up their varying fortunes along it.

When we have these elements in hand we shall understand the great battle which has occupied the Allied troops since the 13th of this month; we shall be able to consider its tendency, and, perhaps, to guess at its end.

The summary of the operations which led up to the present position is as follows:

The Germans, bringing in through Belgium a little more than double the number of troops which the French commanders had thought them able to bring by this route, met and forced back the Allied forces, not half their own, which had been drawn up to meet them along the River Sambre. The strength of a defensive attitude would have prevented what followed had Namur, on the right of the French defensive line, stood. But as Namur fell in the first day's shock (Sunday, August 23rd), the whole line along the Sambre (including the British contingent, which stretched up past Mons) was compelled on that night and the following Monday to an exceedingly rapid and very hard pressed retirement.

This retirement, accompanied by very heavy losses upon the part of the Allies, was pursued by the overwhelming German numbers with the utmost rapidity. The whole advance upon the one side and

retirement upon the other pivoted upon the neighbourhood of Verdun; while the Western extremity of the German line, where was massed the largest body of men (like the swelled end of a club), made straight for Paris.

This tidal movement lasted ten days, from August 24th to September 2nd-3rd. At the end of it, in the early part of the first week of September, from Wednesday, September 2nd (the anniversary of Sedan), to Friday, September 4th, the main German mass in the west stood in touch with the fortifications of Paris, and the complete success of the German plan seemed assured.

This western extremity of the German line where the largest single mass of troops was gathered under the command of Von Kluck (it is generally known as the 1st German Army) was apparently about to attack the outer works of Paris. It had come south of Senlis and Creil, through the woods of Chantilly and Ermenonville, and had come out upon the great open plain which stretches for a day's march to the north-east of the capital, within a mile or two of an extreme range from the forts. It had met the most extended batteries of the defence.

At this moment, after the middle of the first week of September, ended the first phase. The invasion had pressed in a great bow south of Revigny in the very woods of Argonne, south of Vitry, south of Sommesous, south of Sézanne—right up to this plain just north-east of Paris. Everything was ready for the final blow.

The immediate business of the Germans was to break the Allied line where it sagged most, near Vitry, to drive half of it eastward against the German armies in Lorraine; the other half of it beyond or into Paris—the investment of which capital would then have been undertaken.

Just then it was discovered, probably by the airmen of Von Kluck's army, that the French commanders had accumulated, behind the screen of the Paris fortified zone, a very much larger reserve than the Germans had allowed for. For this had Joffre weakened his main line, or rather refused to strengthen it as it fell back. On this secret hoard had the French relied for turning the tide. There was a moment's hesitation upon the part of Von Kluck whether to retire from this menace by the way he had come or to march rapidly across the numerically inferior troops in front of him (before this French reserve could come up) and so to join and help the two great German masses on his left, from Sézanne to Vitry, in breaking the French central line.

He decided for the latter and bolder course. With the end of that week, the 5th and 6th of September, he was undertaking this flank march.

His boldness was disastrous to the whole German plan. The numerically inferior forces, along the face of which he marched, included the British contingent, with the 6th French Army on its left, and upon its right the 5th French Army. These were the troops Von Kluck had driven before him from Mons and Charleroi. Perhaps he thought them exhausted. Far from it, they immediately took the counter-offensive (backed by this Paris reserve coming up in greater and greater numbers from behind and from within the fortifications of Paris), stopped the whole of the German movement, and began to assume the initiative.

During all that week-end Von Kluck fought desperately along the Ourcq to save his communications. He handled the matter so well that he *did* save them, but he was compelled to a precipitate

retreat, the British and the French 5th Army pressing him back over the Marne between Meaux and Château Thierry, while the French 6th Army, and its reinforcements from the reserve, crossed the Ourcq. The fighting in this quarter during all the week-end and the beginning of the next or second week of September, from Sunday, the 6th, to Wednesday, the 9th, was exceedingly heavy, and will be known to history as the Battle of Meaux.

It was not until Thursday, September 10th, that a true result was reached, and that Von Kluck's general retreat began.

This retreat was handled so well that in the next two and a half days it had covered the whole distance to the river Aisne and the neighbourhood of Soissons, some of the German regiments being compelled to marches of over twenty miles a day, and none to marches of less than fifteen. Von Kluck's retreat was not only rapid but was also so strongly conducted that his losses in prisoners and captured guns were, in comparison with his great numbers, insignificant. At the end of the week, on Saturday, September 12th, he was upon the Aisne and about to take up those defensive positions to the north of that river which had evidently been most carefully examined and chosen before the war broke out, and upon which so desperate a resistance has been offered during the last ten days.


Von Kluck's retreat over these forty miles and more of country involved, of course, a corresponding retreat upon the part of the two great German masses lying successively to his left, between his own Army and Verdun; and while he was taking up his defensive position upon the Aisne before Soissons *they* fell back through the Plain of Champagne until they were in line with him along the continuation of that defensive position; which continuation runs north of Rheims and along the river Suippe to the forest of Argonne. By Sunday, September 13th, the whole mass of the German forces—much more than a million men—was standing at bay along the line marked upon the general map at the head of this, which line extends from the Argonne, past Rheims and Soissons, to the river Oise at a point between Noyon and Compiègne.

Thus ended the second phase of the Western campaign—a general German retreat across the river Marne, pressed everywhere by the advancing Allies, probably to be known in history as the Battle of the Marne.

The third phase opened upon Monday, September 14th, and is still in progress. It consists in a vast defensive action undertaken by the Germans all along this line of 80 miles and more which they occupy from the Oise to the Argonne; a chosen and prepared defensive position, which is among the strongest and the best in Western Europe. The nature of that position and of the action dependent upon it, the points in which it has been pressed back, the points upon which the Germans have found it possible to advance, their chances of success and failure are the main object of our study in this week's notes, and must next be described in detail.

THE DEFENSIVE POSITION.

The original defensive position taken up by the Germans, when on Sunday, September 13th, they turned after their retreat to face their pursuers is here seen to run in a fairly even line east and west from the Forest of Argonne to the Oise River, along a line of heights varying in character from east to west. The main position is marked in a broken line.



PLAN SUMMARISING THE FIVE SECTIONS OF THE GERMAN POSITION.

The first general characteristic in this sketch of the great defensive position which will strike the observer is that it consists essentially of two limbs.

(1) The plateau running from Craonne all along the north of the river Aisne past the town of Soissons to the Oise.

(2) A long low ridge, or rather swell, which goes in a great curve from the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac to the neighbourhood of the Forest of Argonne, all round, and behind, and then to the east of, the town of Rheims.

It will further be convenient, for reasons that will appear in a moment, to divide the whole line where it is to be examined in detail into five sections; numbered from west to east, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; 1, 2, 3, being the sections of the first or western limb; 4 and 5 of the eastern or second limb.

The first or western limb (which may also be called the Soissons half), is a rather high tableland which has been cut by the erosion of a number of brooks into a series of separate platforms. All of these platforms or buttresses join up to the North with one running level of land. The whole district may be regarded as a sort of flat-topped embankment rising everywhere above the north bank of the river Aisne along its lower reaches, from its emergence above the Plains of Champagne until its junction with the Oise. But it is an embankment the sides of which have been deeply scored by erosion; ravines have been cut out of it on its southern edge by the series of brooks which run from the summit down to the Aisne.

This "embankment," or plateau, falls very gradually from east to west. It is over 450 feet above the river on the west, above Craonne, where two conspicuous summits mark its culminating points. Within five miles of the Oise, at and above Lombray, it is no more than 300 feet above that river. Its total length from the village of Craonne to Pontoise on the Oise, in the neighbourhood of Noyon, is, as the crow flies, fifty-eight kilometres, or very nearly thirty-seven miles.

And here we must begin that five-fold division of the whole line which best suits an analysis of the present operations. Of that five-fold division, *three* divisions belong to the Western limb we are now discussing. Against this Soissons, or western half of the defensive line held by the Germans, you have operating:—

(a) Upon the left, between Soissons and the Oise, and up along the Oise towards Noyon, the 6th French

army, with all those reserves it has to strengthen it. These bodies are slowly but continuously pressing forward with the object of getting round the German right, in connection with that attempt to harass, and perhaps to break, those German main communications, the full plan of which I shall deal with on a later page.

(b) From Soissons, eastward and to the right, as far as some such point as Pont d'Arcy, you have, against the centre of the hills, the British contingent operating—resisting fierce counter-attacks launched by the Germans, slowly proceeding against strong pressure to force the heights in front of them, and, having reached the summit of the plateau, to press the Germans down the northern slope beyond it.

(c) To the right, or east, again, from the neighbourhood of Pont d'Arcy to where the Plains of Champagne begin, beyond Craonne, and on over the flats to the neighbourhood of Berry-au-Bac, you have the 5th French army engaged in a similar attempt upon the rather higher hills in front of them.

So much for the first or western limb of the defensive line, the operations against which I must describe more thoroughly in a moment, premising meanwhile that in this division of the whole position into two "limbs" or halves, the region between Craonne and Berry au Bac must be regarded as mixed, and as, in a fashion, belonging to both. For while it belongs to the eastern plains by its open character (flat, without a bank), it belongs to the western Soissons half in so far as it lies north of the Aisne.


(2) As to the second eastern limb of this long position, which may also be called the "Rheims" limb, it runs from the point of Berry au Bac to the Argonne through very different country. It follows the course of the River Suippe, and the backbone of it is that swell which I described last week, and which I have alluded to again this week, rising northward and eastward from the water of the Suippe, crowned generally with plantations, and stretching through the tumbled rough lumps of bare plough land before Ville-sur-Tourbes until it reposes upon the Argonne. All this eastern limb of the great defensive position stretches through bare hedgeless fields cut by orderly spinneys. It lies low along the horizon. It differs wholly from the wooded ravined and somewhat bold heights of the western limb between Craonne and the Oise.

This slight swell running beyond the Suippes is, as I have said, the backbone of the second limb of the

German defensive here; but that defensive has not found itself compelled by the pressure in front of it to remain so far back.

The Germans have found themselves sufficiently strong immediately in front of Rheims to retrace their steps and to advance well across the Suippe, and to heights that now threaten the great town itself.

The positions occupied by the Germans after the first week's efforts, successes, and failures is represented by the dotted line which in its sinuosity with its recesses and salients marks the progress of the Allies and the corresponding points where the German counter-offensive of the Germans has succeeded and the Allies have fallen back.



THE DOTTED LINE, INDICATING THE PRESENT APPROXIMATE POSITION OF THE GERMAN ARMIES, SHOWS HOW THE TURNING MOVEMENT ROUND NOYON WILL COMPEL A GENERAL GERMAN RETIREMENT FROM THE PLATEAU OF SOISSONS.

We shall not understand the whole of these operations—which may prove decisive, so far at least as the first part of the great campaign in France is concerned—unless we grasp the fact that the Germans in the course of the past week attempted, and were partially successful in, a strong counter-offensive in this region, which they themselves describe as their “centre.”

I shall have occasion with this “Rheims” limb of the defensive German line (as in the case of the first, or Soissons, limb) to discuss the matter in more detail later; but for the moment I would beg the reader to note the two groups of heights which stand well south of the Suippe and close in the neighbourhood of Rheims. The one, called the height of Brimont, is marked A upon the sketch at the head of this; the other, the heights of Nogent and Pompelle, stand right down to the Vesle, and are marked B and C.

The German counter-offensive in this region was so successful during the days Thursday, the 17th, and Friday, the 18th of September, that it advanced thus near to Rheims, put up heavy artillery on these heights, and at the end of the movement (by the Saturday, the 19th) was in a position gravely to imperil the monuments of the town, to bombard it, and to make the position of the French within and to south of it exceedingly difficult to hold.

This successful counter-offensive of the Germans just round Rheims was not continued throughout the whole length of this second limb. When one gets further east on to the Upper Suippe Valley (it is hardly a valley but rather a very shallow depression in the naked plain of Champagne) the French offensive was in these same days successful in its turn and pushed back the Germans from the line Souain-Le-Mesnil-le-Hurlus-Massiges, which they had taken up, and threatening a certain railway which, when we come to details, we shall see to be of great importance to the whole German position. In this advance the French captured a battalion.

We may sum up and say that by the end of the third week in September, Sunday, the 20th, after this undecided defensive action of the Germans had been maintained for a full week, the general result can be tabulated in the diagram of elements printed below:—

The first even line upon which the German defensive relied at the beginning of these operations is represented in this diagram by a double black line.

I have already made mention of one railway, that behind Souain. Before proceeding to the details of all this great defensive action between the Argonne and the Oise, I will say a word upon the German railway communications as a whole, for upon an understanding of these depends the whole of our comprehension of the German chances of success and of the German peril.

THE COMMUNICATIONS.

It is evidently of the first importance to notice exactly what the communications are behind the German defensive lines, and to know where they lie, and to consider their length, if we are to judge the situation correctly; for upon a threat to those communications will depend the success of the Allies and the ousting of the Germans from their positions between the Oise and the Argonne.


Of roads there are any number; good roads, along which considerable rainy weather might impede traffic, but all of which are open to the use of an army. So far as road traffic is concerned, the whole district between the Oise and the Meuse may be treated as one field, with ample opportunity, even for so large a force as the German invading army, to supply itself or to retreat. All that we have to remember about their numerous roads is the bridges over the main rivers, and these, if the retreat be orderly, are fairly replaced by pontoons.

But with railway facilities it is otherwise. There are only two lines which ultimately lead to the great bases of the Germans—to the depôts, the stores, and the manufactories and arsenals in Germany, from which the Army is fed and munitioned.

The first of these two lines, that upon which the whole original plan depended, is the main European trunk line which taps Cologne and its district, and passes through Aix-la-Chapelle, Liège, Namur, and so down the valley of the Oise to Paris. I have marked it A, A, A.

The second line, which I have marked B, B, B, connects with Germany by a more southern route. Save for these two lines, A, A, A and B, B, B, no railway leads from the enemy's front in France to his stores in Germany.

This second line is less strong than the Belgian, but still is necessary. It runs in a peculiar fashion. It taps the Treves-Coblenz region and after going through Luxemburg (at which nominally independent



THE TWO MAIN GERMAN LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

town and behind it the Germans have done everything in the way of platforms, accumulation of rolling stock, doubling of lines, &c., to facilitate their advance), the continuation of railway supply to the present German front—while Verdun still stands—is compelled to follow a very devious route which we must carefully note to understand the future of the campaign. Should Verdun fall, or should the line of forts between Verdun and Toul be pierced, a whole set of new, short and excellently provided communications would be opened (as I remarked last week) to the Germans. But meanwhile this line of theirs through Luxemburg is their only second line beyond that main one through Belgium.

Now this second line is over long and twisted. It cannot go through Verdun, so it has to run through Montmedy, down the Meuse as far as Mezières. There is no opportunity for turning back south to feed the army until Mezières is reached. There is a light railway crossing the Forest of Mazarin and the River Bar, and so uniting the main railway from Rheims to the frontier with the main railway upon the Meuse. But there can be no continuous traffic along it, both on account of the difference of gauge and on account of the very small rolling stock of this light railway. Supply must therefore come right up to Mezières and then painfully down again to Rheims, past Rethel.

Upon these two main railway lines—the chief one down the valley of the Oise, from Belgium through Namur, Le Cateau, St. Quentin, Noyon; the secondary one from Luxemburg to Mezières and then back from Mezières through Rethel to Rheims—the existence of the German army (and in particular of its heavy artillery!) depends. A great number of cross lines—especially the main line from Tergnier Junction to Rheims and the very valuable cross line from Busigny Junction to Hirson—relieve the pressure on the main lines. But for the supply of German material to the armies and for the

converse evacuation of wounded and wastage home only these two main lines exist.


The cutting of the line along the Oise, even so low down as St. Quentin or Tergnier itself, would be a disastrous thing for the German army if it had not before that moment succeeded in piercing some part of the French line. The other secondary main line Luxemburg-Mezières-Rheims is not as yet approached anywhere by an Allied force, but being tortuous and long, it is therefore, if or when it is approached, more vulnerable. Now the whole peril of the present position of the Germans lies in the threat extended by a French advance from Amiens upon St. Quentin, and by the French advance from the south upon Noyon against the main Oise line. And all the anxiety for the Crown Prince's army is due to the fear for the Luxemburg-Mezières line. Railway communications dominate the issue.

One point will at once occur to the reader, and that is, how far a railway, cut at its main bridges at least by the retreating Allies, can still be used by the Germans who have followed the Allied retreat?

Of the conditions of the railways now behind the German position we know nothing. But even if at certain points the time has been too short to provide temporary bridges sufficient to carry rolling stock, the interruption at such points does not prevent the general use of the system. Unless by some accident (which has certainly not taken place in so rapid and unexpected a retirement) the whole rolling stock of one section isolated between two cut bridges were lacking, and unless such a section were innocent of locomotives, the whole system can be used by the invaders; and the only delay in the use of it is in the trans-shipment of munitions wherever a permanent breach in the line still exists.

I will now take, section by section, the attack upon the German defensive position, with its various results, adverse and favourable, since the Aisne was reached upon Sunday, September 13th.

FIRST OR EXTREME WESTERN SECTION.



The first section is that lying between Soissons and the line of the Oise between Noyon and Compiègne to the west.

This section is somewhat over twenty miles in length. The crossing of the Aisne and the following up of the Oise in flank of the Germans was here entrusted, as we have seen, to the 6th French Army.

Sunday and Monday, September 13th-14th, were the two days devoted to the crossing of the river which, difficult though it was, could only be the prelude to the real struggle beyond.

The German defensive line does not consist in the River Aisne, but in the plateau beyond that stream to the north. As will be seen from the sketch, the general base of that plateau is exceedingly irregular, for it is deeply ravined; but a continuous central ridge is its main defensive feature. The points at which the river was crossed in force by the 6th Army were Vic and Fontenoy, where pontoons were thrown across under a heavy fire from the gun positions upon the advancing outlines of the plateau, which fall in steep slopes down from the north to the Aisne. By Tuesday morning the French troops had taken these first buttresses of the plateau, that is, they had pushed back the German line from the edges of the slopes above the river. They marched, fighting, through St. Christophe and occupied Nouvron and Autrèches and the deepish valley of Morsain. The Germans still maintained a number of guns, pushed forward upon the high flats between Autrèches and the centre ridge, and it was the intention of the French command in this district to push forward sufficiently to cut off these guns. But the attempt failed.

In the night between the Tuesday and the Wednesday a determined counter-offensive undertaken by the Germans from the district round about Nampeel drove the French back nearly to the river,

and Autrèches in particular was abandoned. All that Wednesday night the searchlights played upon the trenches the French had dug nearer the stream and the shelling of these trenches by the Germans was continuous. Upon Thursday, however, September 17th, the value of the considerable reserves which the French (in spite of their heavy work and in spite of what they were doing further west upon the Oise) still keep, was apparent. These forces were brought across the river, the German counter-offensive was checked in the forenoon of that Thursday, and the whole German line here was pushed right back to Nampeel itself and beyond. In other words it was pushed right on to the principal ridge of the plateau. But further north it could not for the moment be pushed. It stood firm. And from this, the crest of the whole defensive position at its western end, the heavy guns were still playing on Sunday the 20th upon the Valley of the Aisne below.

In this partially successful operation some six hundred prisoners and a number of machine guns were taken.

But meanwhile other French forces had been slowly working up the valley of the Oise in the west and so menacing the flank of the German position. It needs no elaboration of description to show that this turning movement would, if it were successful, compel the abandonment of at least all this part of the plateau and ridge above the Aisne by the Germans: for they would be menaced in rear. News of such a success had not reached London by Wednesday night, but a steady if slow advance was being made in this direction.

What has been said above with regard to the German communications will sufficiently indicate the purpose and value of such an advance. Unfortunately, there is nothing to tell us exactly what its extent may be up to and including Sunday September 20th. But we may take it that those reaches of the Oise above

Noyon, where the course of the river turns from north and south to east and west had not been reached, for if they had the German line would have been enveloped. Its commanders would retire before that! We are also, of course, and rightly, left in complete ignorance of the strength with which this movement is being attempted.


But, three or four days ago, the French had in this movement already reached *Lassigny* and had occupied the heights to the east of that village. The news of that occupation means (1) that the Germans still possess their main line of communications and could still use the railway down the Oise valley as far as Noyon; (2) that the French had enough men to spare in this quarter for a continued advance within a day's march of the river and of the railway line up northward and round the right German wing.

Meanwhile, much further to the north and form-

ing no part of the general French defensive line, the communications round St. Quentin were being held by the Germans against a French force of unknown magnitude, which was advancing upon them from Amiens. Péronne had already been abandoned, and the shock between the advancing army (which might here so seriously menace the very existence of the German defensive line to the south) and the German troops defending St. Quentin was upon the point of being joined: but at the moment of writing this, upon the Wednesday evening of the week, no news of contact being yet established in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin has reached London.

It is not probable that in face of such pressure on their western side and nearly behind them the Germans can hold the plateau above the Aisne. We shall almost certainly hear of a French advance here and of a German retirement.

SECT. II.—THE CENTRAL SECTION OF THE WESTERN OR SOISSONS LEVEL.



This section is entrusted to the British contingent and runs eastward along the Aisne for nearly twenty miles from Soissons past the Pont d'Arcy. The crossing of the Aisne seems to have been a matter of greater difficulty here than with the French lower down, but was effected during the same Sunday and Monday at Missy to Chivres, at Condé, and further east, unfortunately at very great expense. The Guards were heavily engaged in and near the wood of Soupir on the Monday, and it seems possible that the last detachments were not got across until the Tuesday, September 15th. Once, however, that river was bridged and crossed an advance comparable to that undertaken by the French to the west was conducted by the British contingent. The British troops took the slopes opposed to them, and occupied in particular Vassogne and Vendresse on the same day (Thursday 17th) that the French to the west had thrown back the German defensive on to the central ridge. It is to be presumed that a corresponding line was held by the British westward from Vendresse through the line of villages halfway up the slopes. This section, where the British advance had been made on to the hills, suffered from counter attacks by night exactly as the French section had suffered between the Tuesday and the Wednesday, but the British held their own firmly, and counter attacks do not appear to have succeeded in making them lose ground at any moment, or in pushing them back

towards the river. Here, as in the first or western section, the main German defensive had been thrust back on to the highest point of the ridge, but there it was during Sunday last, September 20th, still maintained. It even held the critical neck of Braye. It can hardly continue in that position. The flanking movement up the Oise, as it compels the Germans west of Soissons to retire, will compel a retirement before the British contingent also. While the British contingent had avoided being forced back during the violent counter-offensive assaults of the Germans during these days they had also captured some 200 prisoners and, like the French to the west, a few machine guns. But what was more important, a certain number of pieces from the heavy German artillery which had hitherto overlooked the Valley of the Aisne, were isolated by this advance and fell into the hands of the British.

THIRD OR RIGHT WESTERN SECTION.

The third or right western section of the German defensive position concerns a much smaller section of country than the two others to the left of it, but a very important one.

The plateau which forms the whole of the western limb of the general German defensive line here ends in the bold headland of Craonne. This headland has not only exceedingly steep sides but also stands so well up above the Plain to the east

that it is one of the most notable features in the landscape from the plain of Rheims, and has been noticed by every traveller who has come into Rheims from Laon. The village of Craonne, from which this headland takes its name, stands up on the southern slope, not quite at the top, which top is flat, and forms the eastward culmination of the whole plateau. There was directed against this important knot of hill country about Thursday and Friday last the whole weight of the French 5th Army, but what exact measure of success it obtained is exceedingly difficult to discover. The fighting reached up to the plateau itself, and a number of prisoners from the 11th and 12th German Army Corps were taken; but it is hardly likely that Craonne village was permanently held by Sunday. If it had been, the fact would have been mentioned in the French communiqué. It seems more likely that here, as elsewhere, the effort of the Allies swung up to the foot of the slopes and partially occupied them, but had not yet carried the heights. When, or if, a retirement from the plateau begins, Craonne will go with the rest; but the position is too valuable to be abandoned so long as the last chance of piercing through Rheims remains to the Germans.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS UPON THE WESTERN HALF OF THE DEFENSIVE LINE.

By Sunday, September 20th, then, the general position in the Western half of the German general position—that is, the hilly part between Craonne and the River Oise—was as follows:

The Germans everywhere still held the highest point of the plateau from Craonne right away to the heights behind Nampcel that overlook the Oise. The French and English held the ramparts of this plateau, that is the first projections which stand out like peninsulæ from the central ridge and are separated by the brook-valleys which run down from that ridge to the Aisne. The German position on the ridge was held by heavy artillery against which the Allies were bringing an increasing number of heavy guns, which heavy artillery had in the first days of the week done great execution against the Allies; had not compelled it anywhere to retire permanently, had gravely damaged the open town of Soissons, but was gradually relaxing its fire as the heavy guns of the Allies came up. Meanwhile, a French body of unknown magnitude was working up beyond the Oise to the North, round the right wing of the Germans, but had not yet occupied Noyon, nor turned that right wing, though it was already beyond Lassigny and had occupied the heights to the east of that village.

THE SECOND EASTERN, OR "RHEIMS," LIMB OF THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE POSITION.

I have said that the backbone of all the eastern limb of the German defensive position from where that position crossed the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac to the Argonne was an even swell of land running to the north and east of the river Suippe, and this was apparently the position taken up and held in the first days when the great German retreat across Champagne came to a standstill and was brought into line with Von Kluck's retreat from Meaux to the Aisne. That is, we must regard the main German line as standing from Berry-au-Bac and following the Suippe to Souain, and thence eastward through Le Mesnil, Massiges, and Ville-sur-Tourbe to the Argonne.

This first line is most rationally divided at Bazancourt because, although such a point cuts it in two very unequal portions as to length, yet these two portions balance each other in importance, and each has a character of its own.

(1) The portion between Craonne—Berry-au-Bac and Bazancourt lies directly north of E, and, as it were, threatens the great city of Rheims. Rheims, politically from its wealth and size, strategically from its accumulated stores and the fact that it is a junction of five railway lines and seven main roads, was essential to any successful counter-offensive the Germans might attempt to push home.


(2) The second section, on the other hand, from Bazancourt to the Argonne runs through very deserted country of no political importance, and contains but one, though that an important, strategical feature. This strategical feature is the side line of railway which starts from the junction with the main Rheims-Rethel-Mezières line at Bazancourt and is prolonged to the other side of the Argonne. This railway was obviously of the first value to the German Army when it undertook the counter-offensive and began to move south, for it runs parallel to the line this advance would take, and can serve the whole of it with ammunition and food. On the other hand, this railway is not prolonged eastward across the Meuse, and does not help directly to feed the main German armies from their depôts in Lorraine, or through the Belgian lines.

SECTION IV.—THE FIRST, OR LEFT, PORTION OF THE EASTERN LIMB.

What happened here in the week since the Germans took up their general defensive line on the Sunday before last (September 13th) is a strong and partially successful counter-offensive undertaken by the Germans, with the object of recapturing the city of Rheims, and, at the same time, of breaking the French line. It is in connection with this partially successful counter-offensive that there took place in the latter part of the week, upon the Saturday and the Sunday, the 19th and the 20th, the bombardment of the town of Rheims, in which grievous damage to the cathedral was inflicted by shell fire.

Of all the five sections of the defensive position, this fourth section in the centre is the most critical to the Allies, as the first on the western wing is the most critical to the Germans. We have seen how, when, in the first section, the German right is turned, the whole German defensive position must be lost; but, as against this, the Germans have made a very violent effort to break the French in this fourth, or central, section; that is, in the field round Rheims. They have here secured so considerable an advance that they actually occupy at the moment of writing a dangerous salient, and not only have they secured this advance, but they have established positions upon the heights east and north of Rheims, whence they have been able (especially from the east) to bombard the city.

The original defensive position as I described it last week is that swell of land running from the Aisne eastward parallel to and north of the Suippe River, a muddy little stream. But more than a week ago the Germans were able to get well to the south of this, up to a second defensive position nearer Rheims and lying upon the further side of the Suippe and on the edge of the plain on the further side of which Rheims stands. They did more. They took the heights of Brimont, an isolated hill to the north of



SKETCH SHOWING THE HEIGHTS ROUND RHEIMS AND THE POINTS OF MAIN GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.

the city at a range of about 9000 yards, while on the east they penetrated so far that they were able to establish themselves upon the more important group of hills, also isolated in the plain, which take their name from the village of Nogent l'Abesse. Brimont was retaken by the French in part, but lost again. Nogent l'Abesse hill was not retaken, but a lower spur to the south called Pompelle was seized by the French at the week-end, and is apparently still held by them, though it is a difficult place to hold against anybody that has the higher hill to the north. From these two groups of heights, Brimont at very long range, Nogent l'Abesse hill at no more than 7000 yards, the city has been bombarded for many days. But so far this bombardment has not had the effect of weakening the French centre. Sooner or later the French will have brought up heavy artillery of their own to that high position called "the mountain of Rheims," particularly to the gun position above Verzenay, where, though at very long range, batteries upon the hill of Nogent can be reached. Whether they hold the other group of hills to the west of Rheims above Pouillon we have not as yet been told. But if or when they do, those hills dominate the heights of Brimont at a comparatively short range and should make them untenable to the enemy.

While this artillery action from the heights of Brimont and of Nogent l'Abesse is going on against Rheims and the French troops in it and around it, with the object of there breaking the French centre, a more violent assault, consisting in successive infantry attacks, has been taking place throughout that part of the same field which lies between Craonne and Berry-au-Bac. The reason that a specially active counter-offensive has been undertaken here by the Germans in


assistance of and parallel with the attack on Rheims close by is that this point out of all the line is best suited for an attempt at breaking the French containing forces. (1) It is an open plain. (2) It is very near the place where the Allies join—always a weak point in a mixed line. (3) It is very near the exact geographical centre of the whole defensive position—which is, of course, the ideal point at which to break any line, because the largest fraction remaining after such a breach is a minimum. (4) Finally, the place must be used for the counter-offensive, or it would become itself the most dangerous field for a French offensive. If the Germans here relied entirely upon the defensive, they would be holding the only part of the whole line which has no ridge or crest from which they can dominate the advance of an enemy. It is the only serious gap in all the 80 miles.

But this attempt to break the French line by German infantry assault between Craonne and Berry-au-Bac has hitherto not been any more successful than the corresponding attempt to break it by shell fire round the city of Rheims itself.

Moreover, the Germans are here heavily handicapped by the presence behind the field of Rheims of the deeply ravined and wooded hills which run from Pouillon all the way to the Aisne and on the south by the mountain of Rheims. They are attacking men who have strong positions on which to retire.

Vigorous as the German counter-offensive with Rheims for its centre has been, and partially successful as it has been, it is threatened not only by the great turning movement near Noyon, but also by a German retirement and a French advance further to the east in the 5th section of the line between Bazancourt and the Argonne, which menaces the other wing.

SECTION V.—THE FIELD TO THE EAST OF RHEIMS.



This fifth, or easternmost, section of the long defensive line between the Oise and the Argonne is of importance proportionate to the numbers which the French can spare in their advance across it.

It forms the left of that united defensive position which the enemy has taken up all across Champagne and the Soissons country. It is a wing, and if by any chance the French could here break through, they would turn the position as thoroughly, and with more complete results, than if it were turned upon the west, though the success of a turning movement by the west along the Oise is much the more likely happening.

This eastern effort, if it were fully successful, would cut off the main German army from the Crown Prince's army upon the Meuse, and from the army of Lorraine beyond the Meuse.

But men cannot be everywhere at once, and, as the great reserve was accumulated behind Paris, it is almost certainly up the valley of the Oise that the weight of the French turning movement is being delivered, and should succeed. But even though the French should fail to pierce the German line here, they may succeed in pushing it back so much as to alter very materially the future of the campaign.


In order to appreciate how this may be, I will ask the reader to look at the few lines and names marked upon the sketch above.

It will be seen that a lateral railroad runs roughly east and west behind the German line in this part of the field; the German defensive position held a week ago, Souain-Le Mesnil-Les Hurlus-Massiges-Ville-sur-Tourbe, stretching along this line right to the Argonne. The railway of which I speak, running through St. Martin, Sommepey, and Manre, feeds the whole of this line. That railway, further, goes on through a sort of pass in the Argonne, where a main road also crosses and where there is a clearing of the woods (known as the Gap of Grand Pré), and though this railway does not stretch as far as the Meuse, it does connect up at its railhead with the Crown Prince's Army. That Gap of Grand Pré (famous in the Revolutionary Wars as one of the passes through which the Prussians forced the Argonne before their defeat at Valmy) is exceedingly important to the whole scheme of the German armies, as the following diagram of the elements involved will show.

The Crown Prince was investing Verdun in the position A B. The French advance of a fortnight ago compelled him to give up this investment and to go down the Meuse to the position C D. Now it is at that position, C D, that the railway of which we are speaking here links up the main German Armies on the great defensive position which runs across the

Champagne country and along the Aisne to the Oise. This railway, therefore, though not a main line of communication and only joining the main line at Bazancourt, is of great importance to the Crown Prince's present position. Upon the holding of it depends the command of the power to cross and to retreat by the middle Meuse below the fortified zone of Verdun. If the main German Army should fall back behind that railway, and if the French defensive in the direction of the arrows should be able to obtain possession of the line or be able to cut it, the Crown Prince would have to fall back further to the north in the direction F; he would lose much of the Meuse: the remaining positions through which a retreat could be accomplished would be correspondingly cramped; and, perhaps most important of all, the army in Lorraine, which is still in touch with him at M.N.O., would be separated by a big gap from him and from the rest.

Well, in this attempt to get hold of the railway which leads from Bazancourt through the pass of Grand Pré, the French have three main roads by which to advance. Each of these I have marked upon the sketch at the beginning of this section. You have the road leading north through St. Martin, the road



PLAN SHOWING THE IMPORTANCE OF GAP OF GRAND PRÉ TO THE GERMAN SCHEME.

leading north through Sommepey, and the road leading north through Manre.

Of the French fortunes upon the first of these roads we have heard nothing; and it is to be presumed that the advance along this has not been pushed very far, for it lies within the range of those heights of Nogent l'Abbesse to the west which we know the Germans to be occupying, and from which they have bombarded Rheims.

But the French progress along the other two roads has been considerable. On Sunday they were in Souain, and on Monday they took Le Mesnil and Massiges. They were, therefore, by Tuesday morning in possession of what had been, three days before, the advanced German defensive, and within half a day's march of the railway line, which is their ultimate object. If they cross that railway line (with the important results I have suggested) we shall know it by the mention of their presence in Sommepey and Manre, and possibly in St. Martin as well.

THE ACTIONS TO THE EAST OF ARGONNE.

As to what is going on to the east of Argonne we know very little. The numbers here involved are not very great, and the whole work here is subsidiary to the great main conflict taking place to the west of Argonne and between that forest and the Oise. But information reached this country last Wednesday that during the first days of the week there had been



PLAN SHOWING THE POSITION EAST OF THE ARGONNE.

another attempt to pierce the fortified line between Verdun and Toul, with all the consequences that would attach to such a German success: the sudden provision of shorter communications, the taking of the French advance through Champagne in reverse, etc.

The attack on the fort of Troyon was made this time not from the western side of the Meuse (as was that of a fortnight ago when the Crown Prince was still holding on) but from the east. The forts along the Meuse here (of which the principal are the works of Jenicourt, Troyon, and Camp des Romaines with an outlying fort at Liouville) stand upon the isolated summits of a bare crest which overlooks the trench through which the Meuse runs. To the east of this crest lies a wide belt of hilly and wooded country falling at last rather sharply into the basin of the Moselle. From the plains of that basin and against the line of these hills and woods a serious German attempt would seem to have been made against, or rather towards, that work of Troyon which is the central and most important work of the barrier series, and the advantage to the enemy of taking which I described last week.

The headquarters of the German Army during this attack were at Thiaucourt. A difficult region of wood and lake to the south protected it from the attack of the French forces round Toul and Nancy further south still; and the German assault was made from all along the line running through Trésauvaux and Vigneulles, to Heudicourt; that is, it proceeded everywhere from the plain at the base of the hills up the first wooded slopes. The French report that it was everywhere repelled.

SUMMARY OF THE WHOLE DEFENSIVE POSITION.

If we now put together these five sections of the line which the Germans are holding against the Allies from the Oise to the Argonne and examine the matter as a whole, what we see is what we might have expected from the routine imposed both by tradition and by national necessity upon French and upon German strategy.

You have here in the main lines and on a somewhat reduced scale a repetition of the position of three weeks ago, just before the Battle of the Marne.

Save that the Germans are technically upon the defensive instead of just having ceased an offensive movement, and save for the fact that the line as a whole is straighter than was the line between Paris and Verdun three weeks ago, the main features are repetitions of the features we then noticed in the struggle between the two forces.

For there is (a) a determined attempt upon the part of the Germans to break through the centre, in the former case at Vitry, in this case at Rheims; (b) a resistance offered at this centre by the French coupled with an attempt to work round the two German wings; this attempt being weakest and pressed with least men on the French right or eastern extremity of the line, and strongest and pressed with most men on the French left or western extremity of the line; (c) the use of a reserve by the French is also apparent. It is not an unexpected or hidden reserve like that which did so much to decide the retirement of Von Kluck from Paris. We know that the reserve is acting against the German right and

threatening the main German communications. But it is a reserve upon the size and direction of which a wise silence is preserved. All we know of this fresh French Army at this moment is that it took Peronne last Saturday and is now advancing on St. Quentin.

Should the Germans break through, either between Craonne and Berry au Bac, or between Berry au Bac and Bazancourt—that is, in the immediate neighbourhood of Rheims—it is obvious that such a counter-offensive would mean a great and decisive success for the enemy. But in our attempt to judge the future we can but note that such a success has not been approached. For ten days every effort has been concentrated by the enemy upon the central portion of the line to achieve that success. If the centre of Rheims continues to be successfully held by the French, there remain the two turning movements: the operations upon the wings.

I have said when speaking of the sections in detail that the advance along the west of the Argonne, if it shall pass and cross and hold the railway line from Bazancourt to Grand Pré, will have important results. It will compel the Crown Prince's Army upon the Meuse to go northwards; it will narrow the gate through which a German retreat could be effected; it may even withdraw pressure from the French troops in Lorraine. But an advance on this eastern side of the line would only be decisive if it were made in very great force and could count upon ultimately holding the German lines of communication here. Now these go directly north from Rheims to Mezières through Réthel, and are far from even a successful advance of the French in the east. Moreover, of a decisive accumulation of numbers upon the east, or French right, there has been no sign. *The chief operation is upon the French left and along the valley of the Oise. It is here that, of the three possibilities which the general position suggests, the most probable of all must be looked for. It should be by the turning movement here round Noyon that the Germans should be compelled to abandon the Soissons plateau.*

As we have seen, the main line of communication by which the greater part of German stores and artillery munitions comes is that which runs directly from the Belgian frontier down the valley of the Oise. After the fall of Maubeuge that line was open throughout, save of course where such bridges as the British contingent and the French 5th Army had destroyed in their retreat from Mons have been replaced by pontoon bridges and trestle bridges which cannot bear the weight of a train. But, at any rate for the most part, this line can be used and is being used by the Germans. Conversely, if that line be cut permanently and held by the Allied troops, retreat is imposed upon the Germans, and if that retreat were then delayed it would be converted into disaster.

Supposing, therefore, that the French centre is not pierced, everything would seem to turn upon the success of the French troops which we know to be operating in the Oise valley near Noyon and pushing up northward there, and the appearance in sufficiently large numbers of other troops before St. Quentin, coming we may presume from the direction of Amiens. There is a French Army there—marching, as I have said, from Peronne since last Saturday. Upon what it does, and upon what the other forces further to the south round Noyon can do, mainly depends the issue of this general action: whether it shall be decisive of the first phase of the war in the west or no.

It is just at this point, when one is summing up the whole position, that there comes in an element

which, from the present onwards, will be of increasing importance: I mean what the French call the *moral*—the mental attitude which is closely bound up with the physical condition of an army.

Whenever two forces approximately equal meet, and whenever neither has succeeded in outmanœuvring or tricking the other, the spirit turns the scale. That supreme element is not of decisive importance in the first days of a campaign, unless the campaign was begun with the opposing forces in very different states of mind—the one despondent, the other confident.

Here there was no such difference apparent between French and Germans. Neither party outmarched the other: neither party showed during the first three weeks of heavy fighting (from the Sunday when the Germans were successful on the Sambre to the Sunday when they took up the defensive position on the Aisne) any lack of confidence or any doubt of success. The German Army of invasion, as a whole, like its commanders, were still confident of ultimate victory: so were the French and the British contingent which stood with the French.

Now, it is an unwise thing, in the examination of any human activity, but particularly in following a campaign, to force a judgment of the future beyond the limits of very cautious conjecture. But it does seem as though, in this element of *moral*, time was at last working against the invasion.

The counter-offensive has, indeed, been very vigorously taken by the Germans over and over again. They have not slackened their heavy and accurate artillery work; they have lost no conspicuous number of prisoners in these operations as a whole. But their position is not one in which an army nourished upon the tradition and led by the aims of the Prussian service can feel its former confidence. To begin with, the initiative has passed to the Allied side. Next, the threat of a decision is against the Germans. If the position on the plateau above Soissons is turned it must be abandoned. That it may be turned is now an obvious and increasing peril. If, being turned, the plateau is not abandoned with sufficient celerity, it must be abandoned at a cost which may vary from heavy losses of *matériel* to disaster.

It must further be remembered that the initial efforts imposed upon the greater part of the German forces, especially those towards the west of the line (which is precisely the point where the Allied efforts are now concentrated), were particularly designed for an immediate success. The enormous expenditure of energy demanded of these men presupposed the rapid reaping of a reward. True, there was little sign of exhaustion in the retreat after the Battle of Meaux upon the Aisne. But a defensive which is threatened upon its wings, and after many days has failed in every attempt at a counter-offensive, is of its nature a weakening thing. The spiritual factor which is ultimately the decider of all warfare—where the material factors are more or less equal—favours the Allies.

THE EASTERN FIELD OF WAR.

In the Eastern theatre of war there is no news of moment this week, save the occupation by the Russian Army of Jaroslav.

We cannot predicate anything decisive of the position in Galicia, nor conjecture even upon the broadest lines a date when a victorious Russian army might appear in Silesia, until we have more definite news of what is really happening to the Austrian forces with their German reinforcements now upon the defensive along the San.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

THE week, or, rather, the week's news, has been marked by a recrudescence of German corsairs—ships which undoubtedly have secret bases in which they have probably been hiding.

Of these the most dangerous and mysterious is the 24-knot *Emden*, which was at Kiao-Chau just before the war broke out.

On Sept. 10th, nothing having been seen or heard of her in the six weeks' interval, accompanied by the *Markomannia*, of 3335 tons, used as a collier, she suddenly appeared in the Bay of Bengal, where, between Sept. 10th and 14th, she captured six British merchant ships. Of these she sank five and sent the remaining vessel into Calcutta with the crews. At some later date she was reported from Rangoon having made

ever, seeking her bases is likely to approximate to the search for a needle in a bundle of hay.

There are at least ten ways by which she can return to the Pacific. There are at least two neutral property owners—Dutch and American—on whom she can call for coal to take her to the nearest German port, and both these have scattered possessions. There are groups of islands in each case. There are scores of sheltered places in which she can coal from colliers or other vessels sent for the purpose. We can be perfectly certain that in this matter of supplies everything has been carefully prearranged.

Sooner or later we shall intercept and destroy the *Emden*, but till then she has serious possibilities, as, for example, the stoppage of all outward trade from Calcutta.

The stories of the captured who were landed at Calcutta



MAP TO INDICATE THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF CATCHING THE "EMDEN" IN THE EAST INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO. THE DOTS ONLY INDICATE THE PRINCIPAL ISLANDS—THERE ARE MANY OTHERS. THE ARROWS INDICATE ONLY HER CHIEF POSSIBLE WAYS OF RETURN TO HER SECRET BASES. THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTERCEPTION ARE CORRESPONDINGLY OBVIOUS, EVEN IF NEUTRALS BE IGNORED.

further captures. The loss incurred by her first raid is estimated at something like £300,000. On Tuesday last she again made herself unpleasantly notorious, by dropping nine shells into Madras, and doing damage to the value of £100,000.

The attack on Neu Pommern in the Bismark Archipelago began on Sept. 11th. It is probable that the *Emden* had been using the Bismark Archipelago as a base, and being kept *au courant* from the Neu Pommern wireless station, started out on her marauding career just before our attack developed, a career which may easily run into a million pounds before she is accounted for.

The total we can bring against her of vessels of equal speed or thereabouts is:—

East India Squadron	DARTMOUTH
China Squadron	NEWCASTLE
Ditto	YARMOUTH
Australian Fleet	AUSTRALIA
Ditto	MELBOURNE
Ditto	SYDNEY

Of course, if we knew her exact base, or even her exact bases, interception would be very easy. Unfortunately, how-

ever, seeking her bases is likely to approximate to the search for a needle in a bundle of hay. They agree that the German shooting was not very good, and mention the marked courtesy with which they were treated. This courtesy was also remarked on by victims of the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. It is in curious contrast to the behaviour of the German army towards non-combatants, and is suggestive in some of its details—as, for example, the giving up of cabins—of special orders.

Another circumstance is that the German officers were under the impression that Paris was invested and that several British Dreadnoughts had been sunk in the North Sea. From this distinctly German intelligence it would seem that they are in wireless touch with Germany—possibly they are directed from headquarters at Berlin. In the old days a commerce raider roamed the seas ignorant of happenings and perforce acting blindly and independently. Now, by means of wireless, co-operation on a general plan is possible, and there are indications that some kind of plan is now in operation, which certainly was not the case at the beginning of the war.

More or less contemporaneously with the *Emden's* career of destruction two other German corsairs have appeared. In each case the date was the same—Sept. 14th.

Of these the first is the 23½-knot *Konigsberg* (query *Nurnberg* or *Leipzig*), also from Kiao-Chau. Shortly before

war was declared the *Koningsberg* does not appear to have been in commission anywhere.

This cruiser happened into Zanzibar, where she found our old third class cruiser *Pegasus*, of the Cape Station, lying by in the open roadstead sweeping boiler tubes. The German armed with a broadside of five 40 calibre 4.1's, opened fire on the *Pegasus*, which could only reply with a broadside of four old 27-calibre 4-inch of short range and high trajectory.

The German cruiser, according to our official accounts, killed twenty-five of the crew of the *Pegasus* and wounded fifty-two out of a total of 234. There are also ten missing. If the German cruiser had any sense at all, her corresponding loss was absolutely nothing. She had merely to steam to and fro at long range and fire at a stationary target which could not reach her with replies.

The *Pegasus* is reported as having been beached—she probably drifted ashore a blazing wreck. The German cruiser was last seen steaming south.

So far as we are immediately concerned, this means that simultaneously with the *Emden's* performances in the Bay of Bengal we have to look for a German cruiser on the Cape of Good Hope station, where we have nothing regularly stationed capable of catching a 23½-knot cruiser.

Out of which we may expect to hear of German activities in that direction.

The third incident is that, also on Sept. 14th, the British armed liner *Carmania* encountered the German armed liner *Cap Trafalgar* (or her sister, the *Berlin*) off the East Coast of South America. This battle between two enormous liners is certainly the most curious conflict of modern times. Their very bulk protected them against the small guns with which they were each armed in this "battle of haystacks."

At the end of one and three-quarter hours' firing the *Berlin* (or *Cap Trafalgar*) capsized and sank. Her return fire killed nine men in the *Carmania*, seriously wounded five, and slightly wounded twenty-one. The survivors of the German ship, whose losses are not known, were picked up by a collier from which she had been coaling.

The British losses indicate that the battle must have been engaged furiously on both sides, but that our shooting was much the better.

This is the second German armed liner to be disposed of. Both were caught coaling—apparently the only chance of bringing them into action. The mission of a commerce destroyer is not to fight if she can possibly help it; even a victory may impair her utility. The problem of adequate repression of corsairs is thus considerably amplified.

From the public point of view the circumstance that the British Navy has so far only eliminated two of the commerce raiders may seem to suggest a certain inadequateness. Such a view, however, is entirely incorrect. The German raiders appear to be kept supplied with coal from vessels which may be lying anywhere. These come out as required and coal the raider at sea or in any convenient bay. The exact problem before our Navy is best to be expressed popularly by getting someone secretly to select a certain letter on this page and for the reader then to endeavour to discover what particular word that letter is in. Just a little something can be done along the line of probable words to be selected, but very little. Blind chance must of necessity be the predominant factor.

Elsewhere, yet again on Sept. 14th, an attempt was made to blow up H.M.S. *Dwarf* in the Cameroon River. The attempt failed. Two days later the *Dwarf* was rammed by a German merchant ship, but she was only slightly damaged, while the German ship was driven ashore with some considerable loss. The incident has, of course, no bearing on the general issues of the war, but it serves to illustrate the tenacity with which the Germans are conducting operations, and also that they are by no means unfruitful in "dodges."

THE NORTH SEA.

From further details to hand it appears that our submarine E9 (Lieut.-Com. Horton) succeeded in torpedoing the German cruiser *Hela* within six miles of the German coast. The *Hela*, it may be stated at once, was no material loss to the German Navy. She was a very old tub armed with four 15½ pounders. Reconstructed and reboilered in 1910, she was possibly capable of some 21 knots, although 18 knots is the most ever officially recorded of her. Beside her our old *Speedy* (mined by Germans) was a more efficient fighting unit, albeit though of less than half the size.

Physically, then, the *Hela* was no loss whatever to Germany. Psychologically the submarining of a German Dreadnought in the North Sea would have been of less value to us.

Up till now the Germans have generally regarded our blockade as something up by Scapa Flow and the Orkneys in the North Sea and behind the Straits of Dover in the South.

The submarining of the *Hela* has now taught them that our effective blockade commences inside their "front door," that is to say, well inside the impregnable fortifications of

Heligoland. According to calculations, German ships inside the Heligoland area might come and go as they listed. British submarine E9 has now indicated to them that this is a mistaken calculation on their part, and it is difficult to overestimate the importance of this. We do not know the exact location of the High Sea Fleet, but it is probably not at its base at Wilhelmshaven. If it be at Cuxhaven, or in the Canal, it is virtually blockaded there and cut off from its base by our submarines. Whether our submarines are there or not their presence will have to be assumed. It might be claimed by some that the High Sea Fleet is "bottled in."

Personally, however, I do not incline to this opinion. When all is said and done, a submarine is not a vessel which can stay under water for more than a limited time. For that reason modern makes of submarines are now all armed with guns, as a protection against any gunned enemy waiting till they come to the surface.

We must not, therefore, expect miracles out of our submarines which form the inshore blockade. Rather we may expect that if and when the Germans come out at the "selected moment" for "Der Tag," they will have to precede



THE DOTTED LINE REPRESENTS ASSUMED INTERIOR GERMAN DEFENCE LINE. THE BLACK BARS REPRESENT WHAT GERMANY HAS TO LOOK FOR ON ACCOUNT OF THE ENTERPRISE OF H.M. SUBMARINE E9.

the movement by a considerable force of armed submarines and destroyers.

With submarines the "machine force" is absent. All depends on individual initiative.

I have no exact knowledge of the German submarine service, but I can pretend to some fair knowledge of the German Navy generally. On the strength of that knowledge I confess to blank surprise that the U15 managed to get where she was when she was sunk by the *Birmingham*, or that any submarine should have sunk the *Pathfinder* where she did.

I am inclined to regard these boats as having been commanded by exceptionally able officers. There probably remain one or two others equally able with whom sooner or later we shall come into contact. But—so far as my knowledge can take me—there is nothing in the German Navy's ordinary routine suitable for the peculiar morale required of an effective submarine. To explain, a submarine to be effective must essentially be—for want of a better word—"democratic." The old "master and man" idea is utterly unworkable in a submarine. The "ego" of the officers and that alone counts for anything.

On Tuesday afternoon it was officially announced that the *Aboukir* had been submarined at a spot not stated, but presumably off the Dutch coast, as survivors were landed at Yuminden and Amsterdam. Her sister ships, the *Hogue* and *Cressy* stood by her, and presently shared the same fate. Thus already have we heard of those "other German submarine officers" of whom I had written above before this news came to hand.

As fighting units none of the three lost cruisers were of any particular value. They were verging on the obsolete. Originally designed for 21 knots, some fifteen years ago, they were capable of little more than 17 knots at the time of their

loss. Other particulars are: Displacement, 12,000 tons; armament, two 9.2, 40 cal., twelve 6 inch, and some lesser guns. They had a 6-inch armour belt. Their chief value to us was that there was nothing in the German Navy exactly equivalent to them. Of the German armoured cruisers—excluding battle cruisers—only the modern *Blücher* could engage them with any prospect of success. On that account they had a value in excess of their ordinary fighting value.

The real significance of the incident is that Germany is steadily pursuing her policy of seeking to destroy our superiority by slow degrees with submarine and mine attack; and it is idle to disguise that so far the policy has proved successful. She has now inflicted on us far heavier losses than we have on her. She has also demonstrated to her own satisfaction that the North Sea is by no means a "British lake."

All the same, however, losses of this kind must be expected, as I mentioned some three weeks ago. In Germany the incident will probably be hailed as a species of Trafalgar. The inference will be drawn that the *Cressies* might have been *Dreadnoughts*, and that the three lost might well have been a dozen.

Actually, however, it is greatly to be questioned whether the moral effect of the three *Cressies* being sunk counter-balances the sinking of the useless little *Hela* inside Germany's "front door." There is not the same psychological result.

The successful attack on the *Cressies* proves determination. It indicates that at least three German submarines are to some extent capable of the peculiar effort necessary to submarine success. But it does not prove them capable of the arduous duties which our submarines are performing; the torpedoing of warships comes under the head of light and inspiring duties. Also it is yet to be proved whether or no the German submarines were acting on "information received," a point which will have to be determined at an early date.

THE BALTIC.

LAST week's war and rumours of wars in the Baltic have now resolved themselves into a fairly reasonable story of two German divisions engaging each other by mistakes. I am afraid we cannot put it down to "nerves," as it is an easily made error, as manœuvres have shown before now. It has

beyond all doubt, on account of the German official statement referred to last week that "fifteen out of twenty-nine units of the Baltic Fleet were engaged in action." Whether the fifteen were fighting the other fourteen, or merely fighting among themselves, we cannot tell. But as there is a Russian official report to the effect that nothing is known of the alleged battle, we may take it for certain that the German Baltic Fleet is at present suffering from self-inflicted injuries which are probably more serious than has been allowed to transpire.

It is possible—though, perhaps, not very probable—that this particular internal error will give the Russian Fleet some material advantage in the Baltic.

Following upon this news we have had unofficial details of battles between Russian and German ships. On these I place no weight whatever. There have possibly been a few skirmishes, but it is abundantly clear that the exact game which the Germans are playing against us at the front door is being played against them by the Russians at their back doors. Neither operation lends itself to commemoration on Dibdin lines—for all that Dibdin was inspired by very little more occasionally. But we shall do well to appreciate the help which the Russian Fleet is giving us. If the Germans issue from their front door the Russians may be at their back door very quickly.

They cannot capture heavily fortified bases like Kiel. They cannot achieve various other impossible hypotheses. But they can undoubtedly in such circumstances do much to transform the Baltic from a German into a "Russian lake."


Once the Russian *Dreadnoughts* are fit to take the seas the Russian menace to Germany is going to be of a quite serious nature. So serious, indeed, that it is quite on the cards that our fleet will never obtain the satisfaction of a fleet action. The old German battleships now serving in the Baltic are no match for the Russian *Dreadnoughts*—German *Dreadnoughts* will have to be detached to meet them or a blockade in the Baltic accepted.

The situation, as I read it, is that (pending some bad mistake) Germany must hold such Baltic trade as she has at all hazards. This is the more important in that the Dutch Government has now given unequivocal signs of absolute neutrality. It has cut off those supplies which up till now have rendered our naval blockade in a minor note so far as food supplies are concerned. Henceforward, Holland has ceased to be a German supply port. It remains for us now to convince Denmark and Scandinavia that it is undesirable to play the part of the too benevolent neutral.


It cannot be too strongly emphasised that if contiguous neutrals all remain strictly neutral, the British Navy can and will starve Germany into an early surrender quite apart

from the land battles in France, or whatever they may produce.

Holland has adopted the sensible course—strict neutrality and a trust in the Triple Entente—a trust that will be suitably protected. To Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, it now remains to do the same.



Russian Aurora



German Prinz Adalbert

DAY SILHOUETTE.


long been a canon of warfare to fire at any approaching torpedo craft unless they make the private signal.

Torpedo craft approaching a supposed enemy cannot, however, do this without drawing attention to themselves and so depriving themselves of the most valuable factor of surprise. The ship attacked cannot possibly afford to risk delay by signalling—she must open fire instantly. Once fire is opened there is small prospect of the error being discovered till much mischief has been done on either side.

The Germans are peculiarly liable to make this error, because the silhouettes of German and Russian ships are extremely alike in many cases. A large number of Russian destroyers are German built or of German design, and exactly like German destroyers, while the three-funnelled cruisers on either side are none too easily differentiated even in the daytime. Regarded as silhouettes, the difference is clear enough on inspection, but the little details which we do not show at night cannot be recognised. The appended illustration will elucidate my point. The *Adalbert* class at night may well be taken for the Russian *Aurora* class, the *Boon* or *Karlsruhe* classes for the Russian *Bogatyr* class, and any four-funnelled German for one of the four-funnelled Russians.

These Russians are exactly the ships which might have been expected to be met.

The story of what really happened, of how much mischief, if any, was done, will, of course, be unobtainable till the war is over. That the incident occurred seems, however, to be



Russian Aurora



German Prinz Adalbert

NIGHT SILHOUETTE.

So far as the Danes are concerned, memories of Schleswig-Holstein probably suffice already. In case of a victory for the Allies, Denmark can ask and obtain her price for honourable neutrality. On the other hand, Sweden to a large extent, and Norway to a lesser one, have in the past been somewhat afraid of Russia, and inclined to regard Germany as a set-off.

A possible sweeping victory for the Russians cannot be regarded with any particular joy for Sweden, with memories behind her of the loss of Finland. However, Scandinavian traffic is overseas, and supplies *via* Scandinavia are not likely to reduce appreciably the economic pressure which the British blockade in the North Sea is putting on Germany.

At a largely attended meeting of the Jockey Club, held at Derby House, it was unanimously agreed by the members present that it was desirable that racing should be continued, when practicable, at Newmarket and elsewhere.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

IT NOW seems abundantly established that at the front British aviators have secured a considerable moral ascendancy over the German ones. This circumstance is all the more interesting owing to the fact that German machines, if not better than ours in all respects, are fully equal to them, and generally faster. The 100 h.p. Mercedes engine, with which most of them are fitted, is probably the best aerial engine in the world. In any case, our ascendancy has not been caused by the machine, but by the man.

Even here, however, a curious circumstance arises. The bulk of the best records have been made in Germany, and, putting aside national prejudices, one is constrained to admit that the average German aviator is the more skilful pilot of the two. There are exceptions, of course—for example, so far as I can ascertain, Germany has no pilot equal to our Captain Longcroft. But in matters of this sort it is the average which counts, and the better average in the matter of pure technique is in favour of Germany.

How comes it, then, that the ascendancy is ours? Well, so far as I can gather, it is what is vulgarly known as "a matter of guts."

Piecing together all that one can glean from official reports, general Press items and private correspondence, the net result is as follows:

The German aviator's psychological attitude on going into aerial action is—

"I'll kill you, once I get half a chance."

The British aviator, on the other hand, mentally replies:

"Blow your chances. You may or may not kill me, but I am going to kill you."

This particular mental attitude is one which the German mind cannot attune itself.

The German aerial pilots are sportsmen right enough up to a certain point. But they are not mentally constituted to stand against the—to them—"unsportsmanlike" conduct of British aviators. From the German point of view—as I read it—reckless "exchange of pieces" is one of those things best left alone. It is not done on land or water, therefore, it is improper in the air.

Our fighting aviators—thank God—think otherwise. Victor and vanquished to die together is too tough a proposition for most of the enemy. And so, when a German pilot meets a British one in the air, he is mostly concerned about getting back to somewhere where recognised military war game rules obtain.

There are no "rules of the game" for the air. There is not a pilot in the British air service prepared to conform to land conventions. Our pilots just go out "to kill the enemy." The result is that they generally do kill him, unless his superior speed allows him to escape.

"Victory or death" has been laughed at often enough as a music-hall phrase; but its practical application has certainly put the fear of God into German aviators.

A curious war incident is that while motoring somewhere in France Commander Samson, R.N. (of the British Naval Air Service), met some Uhlans, and scooped the lot without loss to us. The German Press Bureau will probably presently explain that the motor-car was armoured, and the chances uneven. That is as it may be. But the fact remains that our five flying men, against five Uhlans, secured an easy victory.

A rumour is current to the effect that German aircraft are short of petrol. This is by no means improbable. England just at present is the easiest market for those who supply petrol from overseas, and our aerial demands on motor spirit must have been very materially increased of late. There is—or at any rate recently was—danger in proceeding to Dutch or Danish ports owing to the indiscriminate laying of mines by the Germans in the North Sea. Consequently those who sail the seas with petrol take no unnecessary risks in proceeding to those neutral ports which are now Germany's supply harbours.

It will certainly be poetic justice if by this mine laying the Germans have made a petrol famine for themselves. It is extraordinary that the German machine—so absolutely perfect in many ways—should break down over side issues which should easily have been detected as dangers at the outset. To be sure, a proverb to the effect that war cannot be made by machinery dates from the Peloponnesian War of over 2,000 years ago. Here, as elsewhere, the German plans appear to

have been absolutely complete save for one thing—that the human element was not taken into account.

We shall be well advised, however, not to build too much on Germany's present aerial inactivity being entirely due to a shortage of petrol. Germany must, in any case, have enormous reserves which she does not wish to touch till necessary. There is probably a bad shortage of normal petrol supplies—but just as probably, that is all.

Rather I am inclined to attribute the present marked diminution in German aeroplane activity to stomachic troubles produced by the "I'm going to kill you whatever happens" tactics of our warlike aviators.

Zeppelin alarms still continue to reach us *via* Holland. We have had circumstantial tales of a mine layer conveyed by a Zeppelin. Zeppelins, which take at least nine months to build, are being turned out at the rate of one a week. The necessary sheds for them (which are at least as large as Rheims Cathedral) are presumably being produced at the same rate! Aeroplanes, we are told, are being turned out at the rate of seventy a week; for all that the utmost normal capacity of the entire German aeroplane industry is between half to one-third of that amount. And over 10,000 Germans have volunteered for the air fleet.

No doubt intentions exist. But the best of intentions cannot make even moderately efficient pilots inside six months.

Now, according to the official statement of the Federation Aeronautique Internationale, the number of pilots qualified and still alive up to the end of March, 1914—since when no learners are likely to have acquired enough knowledge to count for very much—is as follows:

GERMAN	...	699	BRITISH	...	694
AUSTRIAN	...	148	FRENCH	...	1,272
			BELGIAN	...	84
		847	RUSSIAN	...	215
					2,265


These figures are very approximate, because in every case the certificates obtained include a certain number of men who merely secured their certificates and then gave up flying. Also there are many military fliers who, for one reason and another, have not troubled about aero clubs. But, putting one thing with another, the trained aeroplane flyers of the Triple Entente are, roughly, two to one against the German combination.

Six months hence, if they train in the meanwhile, the odd 9,000 of the German volunteers will become dangerous, if machines can be found for them, and if they are prepared to face British methods in aerial warfare. Otherwise they are unlikely to affect the situation.

A big proportion of these 10,000 aerial volunteers will probably quickly arrive at the efficiency required to drop bombs from dirigibles on defenceless towns. But I do not think that any raw material—especially German raw material—is going to be of value for any fighting in the air.

Also there is the question of Zeppelin sheds. On account of pressure of other matter I have not space this week to illustrate where the Germans, &c., sheds are in relation to this country—and attacks on it. Next week this map will be given. Meanwhile, it is well to remember that it takes something like a year to build a Zeppelin shed, and that to pull it down and re-erect it elsewhere can hardly be accomplished inside two or three months. Also, that German tenure of French and Belgian soil is still somewhat "uncertain."

THE reissue of the book *On War*, by Clausewitz, the founder, practically, of modern German strategy, by Messrs. Kegan, Paul, and Co., Ltd., at the present time, is particularly appropriate, and the guinea set of three volumes gives appropriate form to a work of intense interest for its own sake, as well as the interest attaching to the book in view of the present European situation. Writing before 1840, Clausewitz is regarded as the Darwin of modern strategy, his one defect being a failure to comprehend the Napoleonic ideal of initiative. His theory that the defensive is the strongest form of strategy has been abandoned perforce by the German strategists of modern times, for the only hope of Germany in war lay in the offensive; yet there can be no doubt that Clausewitz was right in his conclusions. Clausewitz worked always on the idea of the survival of the fittest, and since his doctrine did not admit that the fittest for survival was always the best in an ethical sense, he stands as the founder of modern German ruthlessness. His work, however, is reasoned and sincere; it stands for all time as the great nineteenth-century analysis of the life history of nations, and, while not a book for the light reader, is of permanent value to the student seriously inclined. As a military textbook, Clausewitz's *On War* is too well known to need recommendation.



THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE.—THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENT.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESS BUREAU, THE POSITIONS OF TROOPS ON PLANS ILLUSTRATING THIS ARTICLE MUST ONLY BE REGARDED AS APPROXIMATE, AND NO DEFINITE STRENGTH AT ANY POINT IS INDICATED.

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.


THE interest of the war this week in the west turns, as it has done for now a fortnight past, upon the holding of the main line from the Argonne to the Oise, and the turning of the opposed German lines there round by our left and the German right. To that situation we are accustomed, and its slow progress varies only in certain details later to be discussed.

But there has also entered into this western field since last week a new development which may prove to be of great importance and which is at any rate of great interest; and that is the German advance across the Upper Meuse between Verdun and Toul.

Our survey of the operations in the west for this week, therefore, is concerned with a general scheme corresponding to the diagram opposite, where the main dark line B, C, and the shorter lines A, B, C, D, represent the German forces from in front of St. Mihiel at D, round to the north of Verdun at C, thence right across Champagne to the neighbourhood of Noyon at B, and thence back to the north again past St. Quentin at A.

Opposite to and in contact with this formation everywhere you have the Allied line E, F, G, H.

For a fortnight past the Germans on the defensive along B, C, have resisted the pressure of the Allies along F, G, and have in their turn failed in the counter-offensive attempts to break the Allied line F, G, opposite them. During the last ten days of that fortnight a turning movement has been bringing an increasing pressure against their right wing, and



the French force E, F, has, with varying fortunes of advance and retreat, been, on the whole, pressing back very slowly the opposing German forces A, B. If or


when that pressure passes a certain limit, if or when A B is pressed back through a sufficient angle by the advance of E F, the whole German main line B C would be so imperilled that it would at the worst find itself involved in disaster, and at the best compelled to retire; for its main communications are only protected by this right wing A B.

But meanwhile exactly the same thing is being attempted the other way round at the further or eastern end of the line, and here the enemy from C D is apparently trying to press back the French at G H, and get behind *their* line and compel them to retirement as an alternative to disaster.

There is no need to consider in detail this week the operations reported upon the main front between the Oise and the Argonne. The notes of last week give in sufficient detail the various sections of this line: the ridge between Craonne and Noyon; the great rolling plain country north of Rheims and stretching on to Argonne. And in those notes it was sufficiently shown that neither had the German defensive yet been considerably pushed back, nor the Allied offensive appreciably advanced.

village of Nogent l'Abbesse. The Prussian Guard here attacked with peculiar violence, but their counter-offensive was repelled by the French. There is no indication that the hills of Nogent l'Abbesse were at any moment occupied by French troops, but it is evident that there was a desperate attempt made to break the French line at this central point, and that it failed.

Further to the east, again, that line of railway of which I spoke last week between Bazancourt and the Pass of Grand Pré over the Argonne, and the approach to which by the French marked so important an advance ten days ago, was saved last Friday by a German counter-advance before which, according to the official French *communiqué*, the French troops gave ground at first. They later recovered the belt that had been lost, but no more. Following the French official *communiqué* of Wednesday, September 30th, very slight changes on this main front may be expressed in the following sketch, where the dark line shows the Allies' front on Tuesday last, and the dotted line its position a week earlier. They are almost identical.



SKETCH SHOWING THE VERY SLIGHT CHANGES EFFECTED ON THE MAIN FRONT DURING THE PAST WEEK.


There is this week nothing to tell but the continuation of that tale—save that there has been some appreciable advance upon the western end of the long line in the hills above the Aisne. For instance, a very heavy battery of German guns just above Condé was silenced by French and English fire on Saturday last; and at the moment of writing a telegram from Paris affirms that the quarries of Autrechies, the galleries of which have served for one of the strongest positions against Soissons, are in the hands of the French. But Craonne was still held, when that message came through, by the Germans; and the advance, such as it was, upon these hills of the Aisne, was not as yet definitive in any way. The plateau was not yet carried.

In the second part of the line, the forty miles that run behind Rheims and in front of the River Suippe towards the Argonne, very desperate counter-attacks were reported, of which the official French *communiqué* of last Sunday states that they had every appearance of being launched with the determination of settling the great battle before the beginning of this week. There was particularly violent fighting just to the east of the lump of hills connected with the

We may take it, then, that at the moment of writing, and so far as the official statements carry us, the deadlock between the region of Noyon and the Argonne continues. Each line is held by the other.

With the turning movement upon the west, slow as it has been in its progress, there has been progress, but of a chequered kind. It has been interrupted by a counter-offensive, only checked during the last three days.

Ten days ago in the official news upon which the last notes were based the French were at Lassigny—or rather had reached the heights to the east of that town towards Noyon. Three days later—that is, a week ago—they were here met by superior forces, before which they gave ground. But this retirement was compensated for by work further north. Here the French, having taken Péronne much at the same time as they entered Lassigny, held it against a very fierce counter-offensive, abandoned it again, and in the first days of this week retook it. In this renewed advance the official report tells of guns and prisoners captured upon the failure of a renewed German counter-offensive; but from the same source we learn



POSITIONS ON THE WEST, ILLUSTRATING THE CAPTURE OF PERONNE AND ATTACK ON LASSIGNY.

that the extreme point of German occupation on Tuesday last came as far as Chaumes.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

The nature and value of this turning movement round by the German right, upon which all eyes are now fixed, is best apparent when we remember that the line of the Oise and the railway following it is the main artery of supply by which the whole main German defensive position along the Aisne and across Champagne lives.

In the notes of more than one student of this campaign it has been remarked that, even if the enemy abandons St. Quentin and Noyon and crosses the Oise, he will find upon the further eastern or left bank another series of positions of wooded hills which he should be able to maintain at great length. But those who put forward this hypothesis, though it proves them to have followed the map, forget that the whole strength of the German defensive position depends upon its heavy artillery. The munition of that heavy artillery, and, for that matter, the retirement of it, makes the chief line of railway up to Belgium a necessity, and therefore, if the enemy loses the line of the Oise, down which that railway runs, he will have lost everything. On that very account, the fighting for the line of the Oise has been the fierce and hardly contested thing we have been reading of for more than ten days past. The Germans know that upon holding it the life of their army depends; the French know that upon their reaching it victory for them depends.

If the reader will look at the above map he will note the junction of Tergnier. It is a point of very high strategic importance, and that for several reasons. In the first place, it is the junction not only between two main lines, but also between two systems, each with its separate organisation—the railway company called the Nord and the railway company called the Est. Next, because it has workshops and repairing sheds, and is in every way (so far as the French retreat left it intact) a depot for railway material. Lastly, because there runs southward and eastward

from it that line which feeds Laon and then goes south itself. It is this line by which munitions are brought along the German front after they have come by the main German railway line of communication down the Oise.

Unfortunately Tergnier lies in a bay or recess of the general line which the Germans are holding at this point to defend their communications; and it will probably be reached later than other more salient points upon that line, such as Noyon itself, or St. Quentin. The holding of the main line and of the Oise north of Tergnier would be of great effect—even of decisive effect—for it would compel a general German retirement back north from the defensive position now held to the south along the Aisne. But the capture of Tergnier, where all the roads, railways, and waterways cross and branch, would be even more than decisive: it would be vital.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

There is another feature in the main German communications at this point which has been a good deal neglected in the Press of both countries, and is well worth examining. This is the canal running along the valley of the Oise and connecting it with quite the upper reaches of the Somme near St. Quentin, and further prolonged so as to connect the Oise with the Aisne. The branch from the Oise to the Aisne is undoubtedly supplying the German line on the plateau of Soissons. We know by the experience of the battle of Meaux that the barges upon the canals have been very largely used by the enemy for the transport of ammunition. Further, a canal in a flat country will probably have been subjected to less damage during the retreat when the Allied armies were falling back from Mons over this country than a railway. To carry the line of the Oise would be not only to carry the main line communication with Belgium and with the bases in Germany: it would also be to carry the canal communication, and to cut two arteries at once.


THE NEW GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE MEUSE.

So much then for the turning movement round by the West of the main German defensive position and of its progress to the present date.

But as I have already said, there is a new element before us in the success the Germans have had during this week at the other end of the whole of this theatre of war, when they silenced certain forts in the centre of the chain between Toul and Verdun, and here began crossing the Meuse.

Before I deal with that eastern movement in any detail, however, it will be well to point out how it stands relatively to the western turning movement by which the French are threatening the Germans along the Oise.

The German advance across the Meuse (as shown in diagram on the following page) after breaking the Toul-Verdun line would obviously involve, if it were pressed far enough and with sufficient strength, a rapid and general retirement of the French and English line between the Oise and the Meuse: for it would come in behind the right wing of that line. But it would not be of such vital ill-consequence to the Allies, however successful it should prove to be,



PLAN SHOWING NEW GERMAN OFFENSIVE IN THE EAST, AGAINST THE LINE VERDUN-TOUL.

as would the success of the turning movement round by the Oise be vital in its ill-consequence to the Germans. In the regrettable necessity of retiring the whole eastern or right end of the main Allied line before the serious threat of a German advance across the Upper Meuse, the French and their Allies would lose much country which the enemy would ravage; they would suffer a dispiriting check after the general success of the last three weeks; they would be retreating where they had hoped confidently to advance. The tide which had seemed to set in with a strong flood would have appeared to ebb again. But nothing essential would have gone. No line of communication serving the Allies would have been cut, and though new and much better lines of communication for the Germans would have been opened, a success of this kind could not possibly be decisive. The corresponding success of the Allies upon the west wing, upon the other hand, would be necessarily decisive. Supposing the unlikely and bizarre coincidence of a successful German advance in force across the Upper Meuse, coming at the same time with a successful French advance reaching to the Upper Oise, the *former* would have no decisive effect upon the direction of the campaign. The latter would compel an immediate and rapid evacuation by the German Army of all positions in France.

Important, therefore, as this German demonstration upon the Upper Meuse to the east is, if it is being made in force, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is secondary only in importance compared with the primary and capital business of that fighting in front of Noyon and St. Quentin, where the German Army is defending its very existence, and the Allies attempting no less than the decision of the campaign. With this warning we can turn to examination in greater detail of the new German movement which threatens the extreme French right.

During the last few days, then, the enemy has advanced from the east against the Toul-Verdun line, the barrier of forts on the Upper Meuse, and has pierced it.

The district as a whole can be best appreciated by some such sketch map as that on the following page.

The River Meuse runs in a trench a little north of north-east; on either side of this trench rise wooded heights, forming upon the east a plateau, known as the Heights of the Meuse. This plateau falls sharply on its eastern side on to the plain called "the Woëvre Country." In the midst of this stands Thiaucourt, the headquarters of the late German advance to the river. The heights of the Meuse have opposite them, beyond the river, a district nearly corresponding and about the same height with themselves, also falling steeply down some 300 feet upon the trench through which the

Meuse runs. This stretch of the river is protected as follows:

It has been made into a barrier first by the great fortresses of Verdun and Toul to the north and to the south, and next by a chain of works dominating the river valley, the larger of which are called in order from north to south: Génicourt, Troyon, Paroches, Camp des Romains, Liouville, and Girouville. Two towns of some size stand upon the river between Verdun and Toul; these are St. Mihiel and Commercy, of which St. Mihiel is the most central, lying almost exactly half-way between Verdun and Toul.

The German advance first got a footing on the plateau at the salient height of Hatton-Chatel, and then advanced to St. Mihiel, where the river was crossed after the guns within the work at Les Paroches and the work at Camp des Romains had been silenced.

With St. Mihiel and its bridge thus in possession of the enemy, the French line ran as the dotted line does upon the map. Its formation has been officially communicated through the French Government to the Press; and may therefore be printed here.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

It will be seen from the above and from the map on the following page that the total effect of the new German offensive in this region so far has been to occupy a projection or salient, the base of which is the dotted line marking the old French front of more than a week ago, the outer boundary of which passes through Apremont round to the west of the work of Paroches, and then to a point between Spada village and the Fort of Troyon. This salient gives the Germans their crossing over the Meuse. It is here that they have driven a breach through the barrier Toul-Verdun.

In order to seize the nature and importance of the newly undertaken German operations upon the Upper Meuse we have to consider four points.


- (a) First and most important, the object with which this new offensive has been undertaken on the part of the enemy.
- (b) The numbers involved.
- (c) The distances involved and the disposition of the advancing troops, French and German, so far as those dispositions are made known by the official dispatches which may be examined and explained without indiscretion.
- (d) The actual results achieved by the Germans during the past week in this effort of theirs to cross the Meuse as given us by these same dispatches.

It will be seen that of these four points the last two are concerned with established facts and can be dealt with accurately while the first two are matters our conjectures on which will depend upon our judgment as well as upon official record, and that judgment cannot be final.

Yet it is in the first two points—and particularly in the first—that the whole interest of the matter lies.

For our one concern in this very grave subject is the purpose the German commanders had in mind and their power when they at last attacked the Toul-Verdun line to achieve that purpose.

Now, whatever their purpose be their power to to achieve it will depend upon numbers; as, indeed, other things being equal, does everything in war.



GENERAL MAP SHOWING THE WEEK'S OPERATIONS ON THE TOUL-VERDUN LINE WITH THE CROSSING AT ST. MIHIEL.

But we neither know their purpose nor the numbers at their command for the achievement of that purpose, nor the forces opposed to them to baulk them of that purpose. We can only in these matters depend upon conjecture and deduction from facts communicated by the French and English commanders for official publication.

We can, however, say with certitude that, while we do not know the purpose of the enemy in thus advancing to, and wedging a crossing over, the Upper

Meuse, that purpose must be to achieve *one* of *two* objects. We can even say (as is so often the case in the history of war) that in their prosecution of the one object they may be led on to attempt the second, or that in their failure to attempt the one may be involved in a still more important failure concerning the other.

These two objects are (1) a feint, which is a distraction of the Allies not seriously intended to be pressed home, but valuable because it may make them


withdraw forces they really need elsewhere, (2) a serious effort to turn the Allied right and establish those new short and convenient lines of communication direct to Germany through Metz and Strasburg which would greatly increase the strength of the German Army.

In other words, *either* the Germans are here attempting no more than to turn off the attention of the Allies from the Oise, to make them nervous about their extreme eastern flank, and to make them withdraw men from the west (where the chief peril to the German Army now lies); *or*, they are intending—with larger masses than we had supposed to be present—a very serious operation: pushing in between Toul and Verdun, taking or masking these fortresses, and so threatening the rear of the French line between Rheims and Argonne that it will be compelled to fall back. With it will then fall back, as rapidly, and perhaps with disaster, the troops on the Upper Moselle—that is, in the region of Nancy and facing the Vosges.

It is further evident, as I have said, that the success of the lesser object might very well lead to the prosecution of the more serious one.

Though the thing was begun as a feint in order to distract the Allies and to make them withdraw men from the west, yet if it went through successfully it might assume such importance that it would be worth the German while to bring men round to this eastern point upon the Meuse, to push forward threatening the rear of the Allies, and to make the whole of the French line now in Champagne between Rheims and the Argonne fall right back, dragging with it all the troops now in the Moselle valley south of and beyond Toul.

The elements of the business should be clear from the following diagram:



Here you have the Allied line A—B, with the German line in contact with it E—F. These stretch from east to west right across from the River Oise to the forest of Argonne. To the right or east of these two lines you have a German force G—H of unknown size proposing to get through the parallel opposed by Verdun—V and Toul—T and the forts X X X between them. It is evident that if this German force G—H could get to M before the Allied line had turned back to save itself, that German force G—H would have turned the Allied line and would have brought its right wing to disaster. If, therefore, G—H is in sufficient force to go forward and if he has not in front of him at K—L French forces sufficient to stop him, he can at the most destroy the right wing of the Allies, and, at the least, compel it to fall back from A—B where it now lies to say A—O.

But if the Allied line should fall back on to M—N it would leave the remaining French armies, P—Q, which are watching the region of Toul—T,

and Nancy—N, and the Upper Moselle Valley—Z, separated from their fellows and doomed. Therefore, to avoid disaster these armies also, P—Q, would have to fall back to some such position as S—T, and the general result would be, after a German success of this kind, not only that the whole mass of the French Army, east of Rheims at least, would have been thrust right away from the frontier and have suffered all the consequences of a rapid retreat, but also that the Germans would, after their success, be able to use the new great lines of communication, X X—Y Y, which had hitherto been blocked to them from the fact that their two chief railways, from Metz the one, from Strasburg the other, run through Verdun—V and Toul—T respectively.

We may sum up this first point, then, our conjecture as to the object of the German move, by saying that it is *either* a movement in force designed to threaten the right rear of the general French line, to isolate and force back the French armies on the Upper Moselle and to establish new and much better lines of communication from the German bases to the German armies in the field; *or* it is a feint, undertaken as yet with no sufficient force, intended only to distract the French commanders so that they shall withdraw troops from the west where the existing German communications are in peril. But we may add that if the insufficient forces used merely for a feint have rapid and unexpected success, it may be worth the German while to reinforce them and turn the feint into a serious effort.

Such being the only possible alternatives, the only possible two objects the Germans have in making their new move, let us next consider what forces they can use to achieve either the one object or the other. If their purpose be only a feint, a comparatively small force would be sufficient. One-tenth of their total effectives in line between Alsace and Picardy would do the business—say six divisions or a little more. With these they could maintain the defensive which they have so carefully prepared in the difficult Vosges country; and they could fend off during the days in which the feint was in progress, even if no longer, attacks from the garrisons of Verdun and of Toul down from the north and up from the south of their forward western movement.

The reduction of the forts upon the Meuse—the opening of a breach through the barrier does not affect this discussion—it would have had to be done anyhow, whether for a feint or for a serious effort.

It was not a question of numbers, but of the power of the big howitzers against modern fortification; and the piercing of the line by the silencing of the forts, though a necessary preliminary to the success of such a feint, is not in itself equivalent to the success even of that feint, let alone of a serious blow. It may be compared to the forcing of a door in a wall when you have some unknown number of opponents on the other side of the door after it is forced, and two bodies of opponents to the right and to the left of the door to threaten your men as they go through. You have opened the door as a ruse to distract or really intending to go through—but you have done no more.

If, therefore, the Germans have not collected here any considerable mass of men ("considerable" as the word may be used in the present gigantic campaign—for forces that would have been great armies in the past are to-day but fractions of the millions engaged), if, I say the Germans have not


accumulated a considerable mass of men at this point (at least eight, better ten divisions), a feint their effort was intended to be and a feint it will remain; and the French commanders, if they can be certain that the numbers here are not very large, will not reinforce them from the centre or the west, the resistance to be opposed to the German on the Meuse; they will not weaken their line elsewhere; they will continue to stake everything upon the big turning movement against the Upper Oise. Under that hypothesis the new German offensive on the Meuse, however alarming, will not be decisive.

But if, in the other alternative, the Germans have really accumulated large masses here, even if they have enough reserves to make their feint first a dangerous feint and from that an advance in force, then the new move may be of the utmost importance to the future of the war. The door has been opened. With sufficient troops to mask Verdun and Toul upon either side of that now open door, a large force could appear in a very short time so near to the rear of the right wing of the main French line as to compel it to fall back, or, if it did not fall back rapidly enough, to involve it in disaster.

And in order to see how this is we must turn to the third point, the distances involved and the dispositions of the troops so far as they are known.

Nearly half of that is the width of the forest district of Argonne and the hilly country to the east of the Argonne again, and half-way to the Meuse is still heavily wooded. The road and the railway line from Verdun to Ste. Menchould through the pass of Les Islettes (where a Norfolk squire helped to win the battle of Valmy) are held by the French, to the north of whom, running from Varennes to the big bend of the Meuse near Forges, lies the Crown Prince's army. It will be seen from the map that the left of this Army where it touches the Meuse is just out of range, and no more, to the north of the northernmost forts of Verdun.

Now the line through which the new German offensive, whether a feint or more seriously intended, had to pass—the fortified line Verdun-Toul—is, in its greatest length from its northernmost extremity on these same northern forts of Verdun to its southernmost extremity in the southernmost forts of Toul, well over 45 miles in extent. While the space between the two nearest points in the circle of forts round Toul and the circle of forts round Verdun is well over 30 miles and nearer 35. Finally, a third measurement of the elements of this problem, the distance from the central point in this Verdun-Toul line, St. Mihiel, and a point right behind the right wing of the main French line such as Revigny, is more than 25 but less than 30 miles.



The great body of the Allied line which lies across the country of Champagne terminates and reposes towards the east upon the forest of Argonne, the upper course of the River Aisne, and the railway running parallel to these upper reaches in the neighbourhood of Ville-sur-Tourbes. From this terminus or extreme right wing of the French main line, which is opposed to the great defensive German position that has been held by the enemy for the last fortnight, you have to the outer works of Verdun a distance of somewhat more than twenty miles—two days' marches.

Let us put these distances together and see what they mean in time. With the Germans in possession of a crossing of the Meuse between Verdun and Toul, and about half way between those two fortresses, at St. Mihiel, the door to their advance upon the rear of the main French line in Champagne is open at a point more than a day's march from Toul upon the south and more than a day's march, rather nearer two days' march, from Verdun upon the north. The German columns advancing westward, therefore, across the Meuse at St. Mihiel need fear no sudden or unexpected

attack from the one fortress or the other. If they have sufficient forces they should be able to mask the garrisons of both those strongholds without fear of interruption to their columns passing across the Meuse between them.


Next, unless the forces opposed to them upon the Meuse are strong enough to arrest this westward march, it is but two days' advance from a German crossing of the Meuse in force near St. Mihiel to the appearance of the German columns at Revigny, directly in the rear of the French line. A similar number of days would bring the Crown Prince's Army down round or through the Argonne until it was at Ste. Menchould, and abreast of the companion force which had come across the Meuse from St. Mihiel to Revigny.

We sum up and find that any decisive German success upon the western or left bank of the Meuse

There is the whole matter of this new German offensive movement upon the Upper Meuse. If it is seriously intended, if it is being prosecuted with large forces, and if no correspondingly large French forces are present to arrest it after the crossing of the Meuse and the forcing of the fortified line Toul-Verdun, all these consequences will follow. But if it is only a feint undertaken with insufficient forces, and if the French commanders disregard the distraction attempted here, the decisive field of the campaign will still be, not that of the Upper Meuse, but that where the heaviest fighting is now proceeding between St. Quentin and Peronne for the possession of the Oise Valley with its railway line and canals.

Lastly, we may easily establish how much has actually been done in this region of the Upper Meuse.

To follow this I will ask the reader to look at this sketch.



PLAN SHOWING DETAILS OF THE TÊTE-DE-PONT NOW HELD BY THE GERMANS OVER THE MEUSE AT ST. MIHIEL.

at such a central point as the neighbourhood of St. Mihiel, half-way between Verdun and Toul, would mean a threatening of the Allied line in Champagne, *with two days' grace to escape and no more*. In other words, it would mean an immediate retirement of that line, coupled with a corresponding retirement of the French troops lying round Nancy and upon the Upper Moselle Valley south of Toul. The whole French line would be bent backwards behind Bar-le-Duc and the upper valley of the Ornain. Verdun and Toul would be invested, and when, or if they fell, the new and direct railway communications from Germany through Alsace-Lorraine would be opened by the enemy.

The nature of the crossing which the Germans have obtained over the River Meuse at St. Mihiel can here be grasped in some detail.

They hold a bridge-head, or tête-de-pont, and, so long as they hold it, they command a bridge in what was formerly the unbroken barrier between Verdun and Toul. But they do not possess this entry without drawbacks in their position. There are two roads leading across the hill country between the Meuse and the plain of Woeuvre. There is no railway. The rail-head is more than a day's march away at Thiaucourt. Of these two roads, the main road passing through Apremont is in the hands of the French, for the French, coming up from the garrison of Toul on

the south, have pushed as far as Apremont and occupied it. They are confined so far to the use of the smaller side road which goes round through Spada and Vigneulles. It is along the line of this side road that they have been operating the whole time from their headquarters and rail-head at Thiaucourt. They took the heights, as we shall see, at Hatton Chatel, but the French troops coming south from Verdun have got past the level of the Fort of Troyon, just as those coming up from Toul have got past the Fort of Liouville and up to Apremont. The enemy, therefore, has but a very narrow entry, threatened on both sides, and he cannot use it save with very considerable forces protecting his flanks.

The Fort "Camp des Romains," enfiling the River Meuse all above St. Mihiel town and bridge, fell into the hands of the enemy, so did the work of Les Paroches opposite. It was the fall of these works which gave them their bridge head and their crossing at St. Mihiel; but a week has passed, and they have not attempted to enlarge the breach either southwards towards Toul or northwards towards Verdun. It is very narrow—not eight miles; while its one line of supply, the side road from Spada and Vigneulles, is continually threatened from the north.

It was about eight days ago that the Germans began to bombard the permanent works round St. Mihiel. By last week-end they had silenced these two permanent works, Paroches and the Camp des Romains, proving once more the accuracy of the German forecast that modern howitzer fire would dominate modern fortification.

The Meuse was crossed by the Germans at St. Mihiel at the week-end. But after this crossing there was no advance. None (apparently) for days! An action took place upon the left bank which forced the invaders back towards the stream. They were not compelled to recross the Meuse, but their advance was checked. Since then there has been nothing to show us whether a great movement were intended or no.

The whole thing is of a piece with what the war has shown us elsewhere, to wit, that modern permanent works have not the resisting power which was expected of them, but that troops in the open upon the defensive have a greater resisting power than was expected of them. The whole of last Sunday the movement still remained hung up, perhaps on account of losses, perhaps because the German advance was not in great force after all. The whole of the Monday it still remained hung up; the lack of movement being ascribed upon that day to a dense fog which covered the Woeuvre country. The whole of Tuesday it remained hung up. I write this on Wednesday evening, and of Wednesday we have no news.

Meanwhile, one indication that the German advance was not as yet being conducted in greater force was afforded by the news that the garrison of Toul had been able to get north against the flank of that advance as far as Beaumont. This point had been reached by the columns marching north from Toul very shortly after the moment when the first crossing of the Meuse by the Germans at St. Mihiel was effected. If the French have been able to maintain those positions at Beaumont they seriously threaten the supply of the German columns crossing at St. Mihiel. There is another indication in the same sense: The troops acting from Verdun and marching south advanced in the course of Sunday and Monday. How far they advanced an official French *communiqué* has told us. They reached the work at Troyon, and

that work stands. Coupled with the advance of the Toul garrison to the north, this corresponding movement from Verdun southwards points to the presence of smaller rather than greater numbers in the German advance upon St. Mihiel and across the Meuse there.

On the other hand, we must note that, whether for purposes of distraction and of making the French command take the thing too seriously, or as a piece of real news, the German Government has put into the German Press strong statements to the effect that this German advance across the Meuse at St. Mihiel is being made in force and may prove decisive.

So much at the moment of writing (Wednesday evening) is all we know upon this important and perhaps critical development of the campaign.

The line of forts, hitherto a wall, between Toul and Verdun is broken. The enemy may or may not intend to use that advantage seriously. They may or may not be able. But the hole is there.

With this I conclude the review of operations in the western field of war. One very important development in that field, the siege of Antwerp, has opened as these lines go to press, but this operation has not at the moment of writing proceeded far enough to permit of any useful summary of its progress being made this week.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.



What has happened in the eastern theatre of war this week may be put into two sentences. The German invasion of Russia is still at a deadlock upon the Niemen. The Russian invasion of Galicia is still moving westward towards Cracow, and still at the pace to which we have now grown accustomed during the whole month of September. It is a slow but a regular advance, which it has been said here more than once cannot be of effect in exercising "pressure" on industrial Germany before, at earliest, the third week of October.

But the interest of the position in the eastern theatre of war does not consist in these expected and, as it were, regular developments. It consists in this much larger question: which of two great and widely

separated battlefields will determine the immediate future of the campaign in Poland?

I say Poland, because we must never forget that the country where all this fighting is going on, from the Baltic to the Carpathians, though hitherto artificially divided under the rule of Germany, Russia, and Austria, is really one country with an intense and living national soul. This soul it is largely the purpose of our Allies to release, and certainly the purpose of the Prussian Power to maintain in subjection.

To return to the two battlefields. There is one northern one upon the Frontiers of East Prussia, another southern one in Galicia.

Upon the north the German armies have invaded Russia. They have crossed the Russian frontier in the Government of Suwalki, and have approached the line of the Niemen. They have attempted and hitherto failed to force this line at the point of Druskiniki, somewhat below Grodno. A little above this point, the Russian forces which are defending the line of the Niemen and opposing the invasion, cross the river and extend through the forest district of Augustoff, almost to the Prussian frontier. All this is, by the way, the theatre of the first operations in Napoleon's great campaign of 1812.

Now this considerable but hitherto not decisive German pressure against the Russian armies in the north, this invasion of Russian territory, and this struggle for the crossing of a Russian river, would, if it stood alone, be comparable to the struggle in the western theatre of war for the line of the Upper Meuse and of the Aisne. More, we should be considering a German offensive possessed of the initiative; and though we should not in the case of Russia presuppose the German objective to be either a march upon the Russian capital, or any other serious form of invasion, yet we should not be discounting the chances of a Russian retreat. It is the Germans who are advancing here as they were until recently in the West.

But the great difference between the eastern theatre of war and the western, is that this Niemen battlefield is balanced by a very different state of affairs between 200 and 300 miles off to the south in Galicia. To continue the parallel with the west: the whole thing is as though, while our enemies were fighting to force the Aisne and the Upper Meuse, we had driven another body of them back through Lombardy and were approaching Milan, which was for them a point of capital importance—a point where our "pressure" upon them and the anxiety they would feel for their safety would become acute.

For the Russian armies which have invaded the Austrian Empire so successfully in Galicia are now not only proceeding at a regular rate (including all that they carry or mask by the way) of about eight miles in a day, but are pointing directly at that first part of the German territory upon which they can exercise severe pressure when they reach it—the rich industrial district of Silesia, with its chief centre and fortress at Breslau.

The Russian detachments sent across the Carpathians towards the Hungarian plain are but flanking bodies. The march of the mass of the Russian Armies in this field is directly along the main railway line from Lemberg (which was carried exactly a month ago) through Jaroslav to Cracow. The Russians have already isolated and contained Przemyśl. Their van has reached Dembitza, sixty miles west of Jaroslav. They are well within a fortnight of Cracow unless

a retarding action is fought against them by the retreating Austro-Prussian forces. They are sufficiently numerous to mask Cracow as they have masked Przemyśl, and this done, if their advance continues at its present rate, the "pressure" of which we have heard so much, the "pressure" which Russia has to exercise upon the German Empire will begin. For the head of the invading troops will be in the industrial province of Silesia, levying ransom and doing all those things which incline one's enemy to peace.

Now it is a principle universal in strategies that you must not get "off-side." That is, you must not be so far beyond your general line that your enemy, or a portion of his forces, can get upon your communications behind the too forward position which you occupy. Even a salient in a line is dangerous if it is too pronounced. To put it simply, a body which has got in front of its fellows is in danger of being cut off. That, by the way, is what happened to the two Russian Army Corps in East Prussia a month ago, when they were cut up by the Germans round Tannenberg.

In conformity with this principle, it was a sound deduction to presume that there would be no serious advance through Silesia until East Prussia was cleared of any large German forces, until, that is, the fortified line Thorn—Dantzic on the lower Vistula was passed by the Russian armies invading by the north, as their fellows were invading by the south.

This principle would still hold if the Germans in East Prussia had remained upon the defensive; but with the present paradoxical situation this principle does not hold. The Prussian forces advancing upon the Niemen are very far from being abreast of their defeated fellows and Allies in the south. Each advance may be regarded as being "off-side." The Russians advancing and attacking in Galicia are far ahead of the Russian defence and retreat on to the Niemen. The Germans advancing on the Niemen are far ahead of the Austro-German retreat in Galicia.

Two considerations, however, enable us to make something of this topsy-turvy double plan of campaign. The first is the distance between the two main fields of battle in this eastern theatre of war; the second is the comparative size of the forces involved.

The great distance of the fighting on the Niemen from the fighting in Galicia renders the operations independent of each other, at least for many weeks. There is no threat from the north upon the Russian communications in the south, in spite of the German advance in the north. There is no threat from the south upon the German communications in the north, in spite of the Russian advance in the south. In other words, the paradox of a German force content to advance on the right of a great field while its fellows and allies are in full retreat on the left of the same is tolerable for some little time because that field is so vast that many days would be required before success or failure at one extremity could be felt at the other.

It remains true that *one* of these two advances—either the German in the north or the Russian in the south—will ultimately compel even a distant enemy to retrace his steps. Sooner or later the German advance from East Prussia, if it is continued, will compel the southern Russian armies in Galicia to halt and retire, or the advance of the Russian armies in Galicia will compel the advance of the German armies upon the Niemen to halt and retire.

And it is here that the factor of numbers comes in. The operations in the south—that is, in Galicia—have been so decisive and so continuous as from this cause alone to give them a preponderance over the

operations in the north, in East Prussia, and the basin of the Niemen. But apart from this, the numbers of the Russian advance in the south are so great that without a doubt, if it is continued, it will be the deciding factor in all the eastern theatre of the war.

In other words, granted that the advance in Galicia continues at its present rate, and granted that the

Prussian success in approaching the Niemen is continued by a crossing of that river, it is the former operation that will check the latter. It is the Russian progress upon Silesia that, under such conditions, would necessarily recall the Prussian forces now operating in the north against the line of the Niemen.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

AUGUST 24TH.—It was announced that Namur had fallen. The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

AUGUST 27TH.—Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German armed merchantman *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on the West Africa Coast.

AUGUST 28TH.—A concerted operation was attempted against the Germans in the Heligoland Bight.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the *Mainz*. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, *Köln* class, and another cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking condition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that "The Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India."

SEPTEMBER 1ST.—The Russians met with a check in East Prussia, but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

SEPTEMBER 2ND.—Continuous fighting was in progress along almost the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinction, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten guns. The French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. The Russian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.

SEPTEMBER 3RD.—The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

SEPTEMBER 4TH.—The Russian Army under General Ruzsky, captured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

SEPTEMBER 5TH.—The formal alliance of England, France, and Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

SEPTEMBER 6TH.—It was announced that the scout-cruiser *Pathfinder* foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.

SEPTEMBER 7TH.—General Joffres' plans were being steadily carried out. The Allied forces acted on the offensive and were successful in checking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the German forces opposed to them.

SEPTEMBER 8TH.—The Allies gained ground on the left wing along the line of the Ourcq and the Petit Morin river. Here the British troops drove the enemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from Vitry-le-François to Sermaise-les-Bains the enemy was pressed back in the direction of Rheims.

SEPTEMBER 9TH.—The English Army crossed the Marne, and the enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

SEPTEMBER 11TH.—Our 1st Army Corps captured twelve Maxim guns and some prisoners, and our 2nd Army Corps took 350 prisoners and a battery.

SEPTEMBER 13TH.—On the left wing the enemy continued his retreating movement. The Belgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive to the south of Lierre.

SEPTEMBER 14TH.—All day the enemy stubbornly disputed the passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the crossings were secured by sunset. On our right and left the French troops were confronted with a similar task, in which they were successful.

SEPTEMBER 15TH.—The Allied troops occupied Rheims. Six hundred prisoners and twelve guns were captured by the Corps on the right of the British.

SEPTEMBER 16TH.—Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed the German cruiser *Hela*, six miles south of Heligoland.

SEPTEMBER 19TH.—The Russian army seized the fortified positions of Sieniawa and Sambor.

SEPTEMBER 20TH.—Rheims Cathedral was wantonly bombarded, and nothing is left but the four bare walls.

The British auxiliary cruiser *Carmania*, Captain Noel Grant, Royal Navy, sank the *Cap Trafalgar* off the east coast of South America. The action lasted one hour and forty-five minutes, when the German ship capsized and sunk, her survivors being rescued by an empty collier.

SEPTEMBER 22ND.—H.M. ships *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* were sunk by submarines in the North Sea. The *Aboukir* was torpedoed, and whilst the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* had closed and were standing by to save the crew, they were also torpedoed.

SEPTEMBER 23RD.—British aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered an attack on the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Flight-Lieutenant Collet dropped three bombs on a Zeppelin shed, approaching within 400 feet.

DAY BY DAY.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25th.

The German right wing was strengthened by the transfer of Army Corps both from the centre of their line and from their left in Lorraine and the Vosges. This force concentrated near St. Quentin, was attacked by the French operating between the Somme and the Oise. A general and very vigorous action took place in this quarter. Along the line of the Aisne there was little change in the general position.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 26th.

There was much activity on the part of the enemy all along the line. Some heavy counter-attacks were repulsed, and considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 27th.

ON OUR LEFT WING.—Between the Oise and the Somme and to the north of the Somme, the battle continued along a very extensive front with perceptible progress on our part. From the Oise to Rheims the Germans at several places made very furious attacks, some carried to the point of the bayonet, but all repulsed. The lines of the French and German trenches were in many places only a few hundred yards apart.

IN THE CENTRE.—From Rheims to Souain the Prussian Guard attempted, but without success, a vigorous offensive movement, and were thrown back in the neighbourhood of Berru and Nogent l'Abbesse. From Souain to the Argonne the enemy gained some advantage in the course of their attacks yesterday morning between the road from Somme-Py and Chalons-sur-Marne and the railway line from Sainte-Menehould to Vouziers. By the evening our troops regained the ground they had lost. Between the Argonne and the Meuse there was nothing new to report. In the south of the Woeuvre the Germans occupied a line which passed through St. Mihiel and the north-west of Pont-a-Mousson.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28th.

There was no change in the general situation. Comparative calm reigned on part of the front. Nevertheless at certain points, notably between the Aisne and the Argonne, the enemy made further violent attacks which were repulsed.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29th.

There was practically no change in the situation. The Allied left had some very heavy fighting, but they well held their own.

SPORTSMAN'S BATTALION.


THE Sportsman's Battalion is a corps for gentlemen up to forty-five years of age, and only those exceptionally fit and accustomed to outdoor sport are accepted. It is the only corps in England for which the age limit has been specially extended by the authorities, and has been sanctioned by Lord Kitchener, who has expressed his thanks for the offer of its services. Directly its full complement has been reached and passed by the authorities it becomes a unit of the regular Army. The Chief Recruiting Officer is E. Cuncliffe-Owen, and the recruiting station is the Indian Room, Hotel Cecil, London, applicants being seen from ten in the morning until six in the evening. Recruiting officers have also visited various provincial centres.

The corps is an infantry one, the training will be the ordinary infantry training—its length dependent, of course, on the recruits' proficiency—and the medical examination the ordinary Army examination. Payment at Army rates. Payment by the recruit for his equipment is optional.

Among applicants are:—Victor Hughes Hallett (Raymond Carew), a well-known sporting writer; Sylvester Stannard, R.B.S.; Sydney Smith, brother of Mr. F. E. Smith; Mr. John Charleton, of Ludlow, owner of a pack of hounds; and Mr. Rupert Tattersall. The corps is announced as for gentlemen up to forty-five years of age accustomed to sport. It must not be supposed for a moment that money is a bar to the recruit; all suitable applicants are welcome, and there are no compulsory expenses.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.



THE MEDITERRANEAN.

IT appears that Cattaro, an important Austrian torpedo base, is now being vigorously attacked by the Franco-British Fleet. Three Austrian battleships are said to be inside the harbour. It may be so: but they will probably turn out to be old coast defence ships at the best.

We are also told of further losses to Austrian torpedo craft blown up by their own mines. These stories *may* be true: but they bear a suspicious resemblance to events of some weeks ago.

The Austrians have made such an extraordinary muddle on land that it is always possible that they have done something of the same kind at sea. On the other hand, the Austrian Navy was of known efficiency in the ordinary way.

It has no prospects whatever of accomplishing anything, and I am strongly inclined to believe that (except perhaps a few old vessels of no fighting value) it is all safely inside the defences of Pola, and will remain there, trusting to luck that the conclusion of hostilities will see it as a force of some kind of potentiality. In matters of this sort we must not accept what we would like to see, but what is the obvious thing to do.

Now, it would be obviously ridiculous for the Austrians to split themselves into three isolated divisions, as they have been reported as having done. It would simply be asking for the ultimate destruction of one or perhaps all three of the divisions.

It is infinitely more probable that they have accepted the inevitable and adopted the only wise course of refusing to be drawn into action.

It is probable that Cattaro will ultimately be reduced. Since Lissa has already been occupied, it will form a convenient base for the blockade of the Adriatic. But beyond that we

should not expect too much. If a superior fleet prevents overseas supplies and destroys trade it has accomplished the main purpose for which a fleet exists. Here, as elsewhere, the public would do well to remember that point.

Indeed, it may be questioned whether (supposing the fortifications to be as important as reported) operations against Cattaro were necessary or advisable, *except* in so far as the provision of a handy base may have been a prime necessity. Naval warfare only accidentally consists of "Tsushimas": the real work is far better expressed in that Mahad phrase, "The silent pressure of Sea Power."

Battles come under the head of clumsy necessities. The real measure of success in naval operations is the stultifying of any efforts on the part of the enemy. Good chess players do not go in for a reckless exchange of pieces in the hopes that something may result therefrom. They play for the definite object of checkmate. The main rules of naval warfare are singularly analogous to the rules of chess.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

On September 22nd the German cruiser *Emden* appeared off Madras at 9 p.m., and her first two shots succeeded in firing some of the petroleum tanks of the Burma Oil Company. These tanks are fully exposed in the open roadstead, but at the same time the *Emden* made such remarkably good shooting, seeing it was night, that it seems clear that she must have been in possession of very accurate knowledge as to the exact location of the tanks.

The exact damage done was not very great—roughly, about £20,000. Probably doing damage was not so much the prime

objective as "moral effect" on the population of India. Anglo-Indians tell me that they think that the *Emden's* performances in this direction are, they surmise, already very considerable, and that unless she is speedily brought to book they will be greater still.

There is every reason to believe that this is what the Germans are trying to do. "Shake confidence in the British Raj" is much more probably the order than "Destroy British trade by every means in your power."

The *Emden*, of course, will ultimately be captured or destroyed. This may easily happen before these lines are in print, especially as she can now no longer retreat safely to German New Guinea or the Bismarck Archipelago.

The Australian forces have now virtually captured the whole of these German possessions, although the number of men engaged compared to the area occupied is such that considerable bays for replenishing supplies may yet be available.

For the rest, it may be conceded that if the captain of the *Emden* lives through he will certainly have earned special promotion for having conducted matters against us along the best possible scientific lines. His ship is undoubtedly being well handled, and it will do us no harm to remember that here, as elsewhere, the Germans have made no bad mistakes, since the initial error of the *Goeben*.



MAP TO INDICATE THE PLACES WHERE THE GERMAN CRUISERS HAVE OPERATED.

KA—KARLSRUHE, KO—KÖNIGSBERG, K.W.—KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE, D—DRESDEN, E—EMDEN (THE KAISER WILHELM DER GROSSE'S EFFORT OFF ICELAND WAS MERELY A FISHING BOAT).

This should not be taken to imply that we have made mistakes, but it should certainly be taken as implying that the task being accomplished by our Navy is a very considerable one; that we have certain weak points, that the Germans have shown themselves singularly cognisant of these, and that the British public must not expect bricks to be made without straw.

There is now every reason to believe that the apparent incoherence of the German commerce war in the early days was part of a settled and clever scheme—intended to lull us into a false sense of security.

But as the just issued official list, corrected to September 23rd, only reports a total bag of twelve ships of about 59,000 tons between August 6th and September 18th, and at least six raiders were employed, it is abundantly clear that—although only two corsairs (both armed liners) have been disposed of—the British Navy has certainly cried "Check" to most of the German moves. This is the utmost that we can reasonably expect outside the chapter of luck and accident.

The list of captures is somewhat interesting. It is:—

<i>Emden</i>	6 ships	totally	29,443 tons.
<i>Dresden</i>	2 "	"	29,988 "
<i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i> ..	2 "	"	2,458 "
<i>Königsberg</i>	1 "	"	6,800 "
<i>Karlsruhe</i>	1 "	"	4,650 "
<i>Cap Trafalgar</i>	0 "	"	0 "

The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had also a fishing boat of 227 tons to her credit account. The total number of fishing boats destroyed by warships in and around the North Sea is twenty-three.

The same report gives the total bag by mines as eight British, five Danes, one Swede, and one Norwegian. That is to say, taking proportions into account, the bulk of the damage has been done to neutral merchant shipping. Only the Dutch have been fortunate enough to sustain no loss.

The *Emden* has reappeared and sunk four British merchant ships valued at approximately £200,000. This exploit, however, does not materially affect the main situation.

THE BALTIC.

Reports from various sources, which on the face of them appear to be quite authentic, have been received to the effect that the Russian armoured cruiser *Bayan* has sunk a German cruiser and two German torpedo boats which she encountered mine-laying in the Baltic. The story of the cruiser is improbable, and it is far more likely that the sunken ship is one of the special mine-layers, *Albatross* or *Nautilus*, which displace somewhere around 2,000 tons and are capable of from twenty to twenty-one knots speed. These boats carry 400 mines each. Or it may have been the old fifteen-knot *Pelikan*, which is the third regular mine-layer of the German Navy.

Pending some further official German report on the matter, it may be wiser to accept the whole story with a certain amount of caution. Generally speaking, German reports have been quite as correct as our own, or any of those issued by our Allies. The story of the two German divisions engaging each other which I commented on last week has not been officially reported in Germany, but that omission is merely human nature. Their official story of the Heligoland affair was quite accurate, and it is vouched for by the circumstance that they admit a heavier loss than we had claimed in our own official report.

Consequently, we had best take the German official as true. The probable real happening is that the *Bayan* sank one mine-layer and two nondescripts which were with her. This much we can take between the lines of the somewhat vague German official statement.

Everything done by Germany to date has been absolutely according to plans and the losses sustained have been relatively slight, probably less than the Germans had anticipated. In the Baltic Russia is playing against Germany a practically similar game to that which the Germans are playing against us in the North Sea. Germany appears to be keeping open her Scandinavian trade, which just now is of immense importance to her.

In another month or so a fresh situation will arrive, because the ice will be beginning to form. At present, so far as has been reported, Libau is the Russian naval base. Libau is an ice-free harbour, but, on the other hand, its fortifications are weak, and it is doubtful whether the Russians will risk being blockaded in it. It is by no means improbable that they will shortly retire on Kronstadt, where—according to the usual peace programme—they would be frozen in.

In this connection everything depends upon how soon the battleships of the Gangoot class can be got ready for sea. Not only are these vessels altogether superior in fighting value to the German reserve vessels which are operating in the Baltic, but each of them is—by a remarkable stroke of Russian Admiralty prescience—fitted with an ice-breaker bow. Consequently, if the Russians retire on Kronstadt, it by no means follows that they will be demobilised there, as the Germans may be inclined to calculate.

I am by no means sure that of the two menaces from which the German Fleet suffers, the British Fleet in the North Sea and the Russian Fleet in the Baltic, the Russian may not be the greater menace of the two, once the new ships are ready. The "reason why" is as follows:

From the general position we can gather that the German Admiralty in its plans has made full allowance for the British blockade, and all that it has accomplished. But it is by no means so clear that they made sufficient allowance for the factor of the Russian Fleet, and its possible influence on their trade with Sweden. The Press campaign which the German agents are carrying on in Sweden is confirmation of this theory. Sweden, as I mentioned last week, is in the unfortunate position of having long and grave suspicions of Russia and her designs, and to that extent she was thrown into the arms of Germany. She by now is fully aware of the German attitude to weak neutrals which may be convenient to her. All the same, however, it is extremely improbable that in any circumstances Sweden will take sides. If she did, her conflicting interests would probably incline her to Germany, against whom she has no past grievance and against whom she has no frontier. We have to remember that every patriotic Swede cherishes against Russia on account of Finland, much the same kind of feeling that every patriotic Dane has against Germany on account of Schleswig-Holstein.

THE NORTH SEA.

Reading between the lines, the Admiralty preface to the reports of the surviving commanding officers of the three submarined Cressies is to the effect that no dictates of humanity should be allowed to interfere with the military duties of warships. This is quite right. To blame the Germans for taking advantage of the fact is foolish—"war is war."

On the other hand, the official reports of the commanding officers make it abundantly clear that the *Aboukir* was generally considered to have struck a mine, and that no submarine danger was apprehended.

The resultant out of everything published or not published is that "Run for it" is the only safe answer to a submarine attack. This, of course, is analogous to the answer to the fire-ships in the old days. So the "new danger" is not so very new after all.

The German story that U9 alone was responsible for the whole business of sinking the Cressies may be dismissed at once as absurd. U9 has only three torpedo tubes, and the 250-ton submarine able to reload her tubes in a submerged condition has yet to be invented. There were certainly two German submarines engaged—more probably from three to six, that is to say, two divisions, for submarines work in threes.

U9 and her sisters carry two tubes forward and one aft. This after tube is a species of reserve one, and in a general way would not be made use of. The class is not big enough to do much in the way of carrying spare torpedoes, and it requires a good deal of imagination to picture any of them reloading tubes while under water in action even if they did.

Now, we know that at least six torpedoes were fired, of which five hit and one missed. That is the number of torpedoes seen, and that suggests at least three boats which fired two torpedoes each, as it makes no allowance for unseen torpedoes which missed.

Why the Germans persistently assert that U9 alone did the mischief is somewhat of a mystery. The most reasonable explanation is that U9 did most of the work, and that they are seeking to create the impression that one German submarine is worth three British ships. The idea that U9 was the sole survivor of a division is more pleasurable than probable. And since German reports spoke of "hopes" of U9 returning safely, it would look as though the other boats had got back, but that the U9 is missing. Only the *Cressy* appears to have fired at anything, and she only two or three shots, with moderate uncertainty as to the result.

An incident of some importance is the story fairly general amongst the survivors of a mysterious trawler which was about at the time, and which one of our cruisers was reported to have fired at and sunk. The suggestion is that this trawler was directing operations under the guise of being a surreptitious mine-layer. If so, the ruse was certainly a clever one—though it is hardly one which is likely to be repeated with success.

The only other additional light thrown on the disaster from the official narratives is the pleasing absence of panic in the British cruisers, although they were manned by scratch crews, which had not long been together. This is a point of considerable importance, as although the Germans rely on their submarines to reduce our *materiel*, they must be relying to a still greater extent on creating a moral effect on the *personnel*.

The well authenticated circumstance of the singing of "It's a long, long way to Tipperary," and the jesting response to the effect, "It certainly is if you have to swim there," is a clear indication that this German success had no psychological effect whatever on our Navy.

The definite Admiralty order to the effect that in future no big ships are to be risked for life-saving is the surest safeguard against any similar "regrettable incident" in the future.

Meanwhile, it may still pertinently be asked, "How did the Germans come to be on the spot to intercept our cruisers"?

I mentioned this point last week, and I repeat it now. The odds against submarines, cruising aimlessly, blundering into anything, are very small indeed. It is of the utmost importance to ascertain the German system of information.

THE DUTCH PROBLEM.

When first I raised the question of Holland in these Notes I did so as a subsidiary subject, and in connection with the circumstance that if the German Army can be supplied overseas

via Holland, the starving-out blockade of our Navy must necessarily be handicapped, and the war prolonged accordingly.


Last week we heard that the Dutch Government had issued orders as regards transit of food stuffs. These orders allow of everything which we can reasonably expect. But, according to details furnished by several correspondents—who give figures to prove their points—there is reason to query whether the same control is exercised over other contraband. For instance, a very large quantity of dynamite recently went to Holland. It was certified by the Dutch firm to which it was consigned that it was required to blow up buildings in the fire zone of frontier fortresses! One cannot help suspecting that some superfluous tons will find their way to combatants who may be short of the explosive in question.

In some quarters there is a fear that too great an insistence on our rights, too strict a demand for clear neutrality, might involve us in war with Holland just at the time when the South African Dutch have come splendidly into line with the Empire.

It seems to be overlooked that—no matter what German influences may be at work in Dutch Court circles—nothing save insanity would induce Holland to declare war against us. It would simply be throwing away all her East Indian possessions, with which she does a trade of about £53,000,000 a year. The mouth of the Rhine is not worth that to her. Nor is any "scrap of paper" which Germany may have given her.

THE FAR EAST.

Operations against Kiao-Chau (Tsing-tau) continue to proceed with deliberation—the only proceedings of much interest being aerial ones, which are of the bomb-dropping order on both sides. No particular results have been recorded.



KIAU CHAU (TSING-TAU).

The Japanese must now be fairly close on the doomed stronghold, as the German ships in the harbour have been firing on their troops. The Kiao-Chau operations are unlikely to go down to history as a second siege of Port Arthur—the nearest historical analogy is the siege of Wei-hai-wei in the Chino-Japanese War. Here the Japanese closed round the shore defences in deliberate and methodical fashion, and then, at the selected moment, delivered a famous and successful torpedo attack on the Chinese warships, which they had previously shelled from the shore.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

ZEPPELIN operations on a small scale continue. The latest exploit has been the dropping of further bombs on Ostend, and (from aeroplanes) on certain Belgian villages. The damage done was trivial, but a certain amount of alarm was caused to the civil population. The precise objective at Ostend appears to have been to blow up an ammunition train, which, however, had already left when the attack was made.

There seems no particular reason to believe the theory that, where Zeppelins are concerned (the same can hardly be said for

aeroplanes) deliberate and indiscriminate bomb dropping on non-combatants is intended. This conclusion we can arrive at from a description of unexploded Zeppelin bombs which have been found. They are stated to be 4 feet long by about 8 inches in diameter, with picric as the explosive. Were the terrorising of the civil population the object, something far less expensive would be equally effective. The Ostend and other authorities would be well employed in seeking to ascertain how and in what way the Germans learned of the existence of the ammunition train.



MAP TO INDICATE GERMAN DIRIGIBLE SHEDS.

THE ORDINARY SHEDS TOO SMALL FOR ZEPPELINS ARE OF SMALL IMPORTANCE AND ARE DESIGNED FOR SHELTERING "PARSEVALS," ETC., AIRCRAFT THAT CAN BE DEFLATED ANYWHERE, AND DO NOT DEPEND ON SHEDS FOR THEIR EFFECTIVE EXISTENCE. THE FOLLOWING STATIONS HAVE SINCE BEEN ADDED: FUHLBUTTEL, SCHWIDERMUHL, MANZELL.

Stories of Zeppelins being prepared for coming aerial raids on the fleet still continue; and, judging from correspondence which I receive, there is a certain amount of public uneasiness as to how Zeppelins can be met.

The Russians have now on view at Petrograd "the remains of a Zeppelin," which is said to have been brought down by rifle shot; but if this be correct, it was a piece of luck which we can hardly expect to see repeated.

Something considerable can, of course, be done by fire-shell from aerial guns, and a naval fleet occupies so large an area that the ordinary guns of some ships are likely to reach a Zeppelin, unless she is flying at a height which would reduce the chances of bomb success to an infinitesimal fraction. The chances of correct aim in dropping on moving ships is small at the best even for low altitudes. And the amount of damage to be done to a big ship by bombs is probably not very great.

There is no doubt, however, that the most serious answer and menace to Zeppelins is from the air, whether by way of aeroplanes towing grapnels over the envelopes or propellers, dropping inflammatory bombs, or, better, by incidents such as that which recently occurred at Düsseldorf.

"Düsseldorf" represents the best possible form of defensive attack, because, deprived of its shed, a Zeppelin is useless. Unfortunately, Germany has an enormous number of sheds (thirty all told) as the accompanying map indicates; still, the majority are not out of reach of a determined attack, such as that delivered by the Naval Flying Corp. on Düsseldorf.

Here, by a bold drop to an altitude of only 400 feet, Flight Lieut. Collett succeeded in dropping three incendiary bombs on the Zeppelin shed there, owned by the "Delag" Company.

According to German statements, "a few windows were broken, but otherwise no damage was done." This may be true, or it may not! We have no means of ascertaining the damage, and the Germans, aware of that, would naturally conceal it. We may hope that the shed was fired, and that, as reported from Switzerland, there was a Zeppelin inside it at the time. But this is probably too good to be true.

The importance of the matter, however, is that our aviators have succeeded in steering themselves to the required spot. This must be very evident to the Germans; also that, having found one spot, we shall presently find others. We may confidently expect early repetitions of the Düsseldorf incident, and—since the attack on Düsseldorf was undertaken by a naval

airman—satisfy ourselves that the Navy is taking as few risks as possible in connection with German threats as to what their Zeppelins will accomplish against our Dreadnoughts.

Later news of aerial warfare consists of some very circumstantial non-official stories as to another Zeppelin brought down by Russian gun fire. As remarked a week or two ago, more Zeppelins than Germany ever built have already been destroyed on paper! The story alluded to may be a re-hash of the Zeppelin taken to Petrograd. On the other hand, the details about its being injured by two shots and brought down by a third are far more suggestive of a Parseval as the victim.

If a shell does chance to burst inside it—a not very likely contingency—it would certainly be "all up" with any non-rigid dirigible. But the odds against any such contingency are heavy. A couple of holes in the dirigible is the best that any non-special gun firing at one and hitting it can normally expect. Now the entry hole in a gas bag is not going to do much, for hydrogen does not escape downwards. Consequently, only the exit hole matters. Out of that exit hole the hydrogen will assuredly escape, but it will take its time in escaping.

A variant of the story described three motors as having been hit, and finally a hit on the fourth. Putting aside the fact that no Zeppelin has more than three motors, the story is technically absurd. The more reasonable hypothesis is that a non-rigid was brought down owing to the leakage caused by three holes in her. Also the number of captured reported (eight) is the crew of a Parseval. A Zeppelin carries about thirty men as crew. The probability is that everything in the airship line is described as "Zeppelin"—this word being used as a generic term. Occasionally it appears to be a news generic for aeroplanes also!

Incidentally, this vague idea as to what a Zeppelin is appears to be shared by quite a number of people who should know better. For example, a correspondent tells me of an engineer friend of his who asserts that he could build a Zeppelin shed (something approaching Charing Cross Station in dimensions in six weeks, and pull it down and re-erect it in one week! This would be a fair record for an ordinary aeroplane hangar.

The Zeppelin danger is real enough, as it is, without need of the accompaniment of any unreasoning panic.

The latest available list of German dirigible sheds is given on the plan above. Unless otherwise stated, the above are military sheds. All private ones capable of holding Zeppelins are subsidised.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Englemere, Ascot, Berks.
September 10, 1914.

To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.

SIR,—The result of my appeal to sportsmen who are unable to take the field to give the use of their race glasses, field glasses, or stalking glasses to our non-commissioned officers under orders for the front, has been most gratifying.

In the first three days after the issue of the appeal over 2,000 glasses were received. These glasses are being distributed as rapidly as possible among the non-commissioned officers destined for active service. I should like to take the opportunity of conveying their sincere gratitude to the owners who have given them the use of their glasses.

Most of the glasses received have been of the best modern patterns, and it is easy to realise how valuable they will prove in the field. Those who do not possess field glasses, and who desire to assist, should send cheques to the Secretary, National Service League, 72, Victoria-street, London, S.W. All glasses should also be sent to this address.

It will be my pleasure to send a personal letter of thanks to those who in this way contribute to the safety and welfare of our splendid soldiers.

Every effort will be made to restore the glasses at the conclusion of the war. In all cases an index number is stamped upon the glasses, and a record of their disposal registered at the offices of the National Service League.

Yours very truly,
ROBERTS, F.M.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

AMONG works of fiction peculiarly applicable to the present time must be reckoned Walter Bloom's *The Iron Year*, recently published by Messrs. John Lane. It is worthy of note that this book ran through twenty editions in Germany shortly after its first publication, though most people are not likely to take as a recommendation the fact that the Kaiser read it aloud to the members of his family circle. It is, however, a well-told and extremely topical story of the year 1870, and the personal interest is supplied by the love of a French officer for a German girl. The work bears the stamp of reality, and the book is interesting as a study of the first struggle between the two nations from a fairly unprejudiced point of view.

A VERY useful little pocket book for junior officers on service has been issued by *The World's Work*, of Bedford Street, Strand, at the price of half a crown. The book is novel in form, being linked at the back after the manner of loose-leaf pocket books, in order to

save wear on the back of the cover, and pages and cover alike are waterproofed. Contents include an English-French-German vocabulary of most necessary phrases, notes on reconnaissance and map reading, field engineering, field messages, and practically all the points that are constantly cropping up in the course of field operations. Light, handy, and thoroughly serviceable, the little book is one that every junior officer might with advantage add to his outfit.

If Bernhardt showed us the doctrine by means of which Germany hopes to dominate the world, so, just as surely, Franz Beyerling, in his book, *Jena or Sedan?* shows us the material with which Germany is to accomplish its ambition. Bernhardt is the enthusiast, recognising difficulties, but believing in the power of the nation to overcome all difficulties, and its right to make the attempt for world-power; Beyerling is the critic, a German writing from a German viewpoint, and telling of things as he sees them—as they are. His story concerns only the life of a German garrison; it embodies no high-flown phrases, no attempt at the expression of a creed or a belief; it is a simple recital of fact, and as such is a terrible indictment of the German army. He tells how, though the world has advanced immeasurably in the past four decades, the German army has advanced not one step; it is still the wooden machine of Great Frederick's time, and so simply is this shown that the force of the lesson is doubled. For those who would learn the real causes contributing to German errors as a military power, this story, with its wonderful realism and absence of all attempt at dramatic effect, is a convincing handbook. We recommend it to all students of the war and the fighting values of the armies taking part therein. Messrs. Heinemann have done well in issuing a two-shilling edition of this remarkable book at the present time.

MESSRS. KEGAN, PAUL, AND Co. have recently reissued von der Goltz's *Conduct of War* in one half-guinea volume. While professing to be only a summary of "the various ways of manipulating troops of which use can be made in war," it is a manual of instruction for the conduct of war, as well as a work of considerable historical value. We recommend it to all who make a serious study of operations in the field of the present campaign, as well as to those who desire to read military history intelligently. Its author was no theorist, but, as a lieutenant-general, with practical war experience, was able to base his statements on work actually accomplished as well as on the experience of former commanders. Together with the work of Clausewitz, published by the same firm, this must rank among the most important books of the season.

THE autumn show of the National Rose Society having been abandoned for this year, the Council of the Society, at a recent meeting, unanimously decided to send a donation of fifty guineas to the Relief Fund which is being raised by the Society's Royal Patroness, Queen Alexandra.

THE military authorities are purchasing large quantities of farm and market garden produce for the use of H.M. troops throughout the country. For the purpose of facilitating supply and of preventing, as far as possible, a scarcity of produce arising in one district while there is a surplus in another, farmers are urged to assist the War Office by stating the quantity of produce they have to sell at fair market price.

SPORTSMAN'S BATTALION

(Sanctioned by LORD KITCHENER).

SPECIAL NOTICE.

Applicants who have already enrolled will please report at the Hotel Cecil, Indian Room, Embankment entrance, for War Office Medical Examination and attestation as follows:—Applicants from London and Suburbs, October 6th, from 9 a.m.; Applicants from Provinces, October 9th, from 9 a.m.

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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

IN the Eastern theatre of war we are upon the eve of events which will profoundly affect the future of the whole European struggle. It may even be true to say that at the moment of writing we are in the midst of those events.

The first chapter of what will soon be a complete story has apparently been closed in the Northern part of the Eastern field between the Niemen and the frontier of East Prussia. Meanwhile the much more

important chapters that have still to be unrolled upon the Upper Vistula, in the Southern department of this same Eastern field, have not yet reached any conclusion.

It will be remembered from what was said in these columns last week, that these series of operations in Poland were remarkable from the fact that they included two quite separate battlefields. We must still use that term "battlefields," for though the actions extend over a front nowadays of anything

from 50 to 150 miles, yet the essentials which distinguish a battle and a field of battle from a campaign and the "theatre" in which that campaign takes place still distinguish the very extensive lines along which to-day a decision is reached. You have the two fronts, the contact of one with the other, the cohesion of either party, the attempt of the one either to break or to envelop the other. And the whole action is tactical, not strategical.

Using then the term "battlefield," greatly extended as it has become in time and space, for the scenes of these protracted modern actions you have, I say, in the Eastern theatre of war two distinct battlefields wherein it is sought by either party to reach a decision upon the soil of Poland. These two battlefields are independent of one another. They are occupied on the Germanic side by two separate cohesive bodies.

(1) The body which has been struggling to obtain possession of the Upper Niemen and the crossings thereof between Grodno and Kovno.



(2) The body which is concerned to arrest and if possible to thrust back the great Russian Army, which, since its victory at Lemberg has been pressing westward through Galicia towards Silesia.

It will be remembered that it was remarked in these notes last week that the Southern of the two fields was the more important.

When you have two separate actions of this sort going on, one well in front of the other, the ultimate decision which will affect the fortunes of both is most likely to arise in that field which contains the larger total number of combatants. If you have a situation such as that presented in the accompanying diagram, where an action is going on between black and white, A—B and C—D with

success of G—H against E—F will ultimately threaten the communications of A—B. In other words, when two actions like these are being fought out, not abreast of one another on one line, but criss-cross, one of the two will be the master action controlling in the long run the results of the other. It must nearly always be the larger of the two sets of bodies involved which so controls the action of the smaller set. Supposing A—B to be successful against C—D, A—B will none the less ultimately have to turn back if G—H has been successful against the much larger body of A—B's fellows at E—F.

The elements contained in this diagram are precisely those governing the general operations in the Eastern theatre of war. It will be apparent that



A—B attacking C—D and having the initiative, while at the same time another action is going on between two other sets of the same opponents at E—F and G—H, then either the success of A—B against C—D will ultimately threaten the communications of the successful G—H against E—F or the

in the Northern battlefield you had in front of the Niemen a successful advancing German body, A—B, pressing upon a defending Russian body, C—D, while down south near the Upper Vistula you had a much larger body, G—H, advancing against correspondingly large Germanic forces, E—F. The result of the action, E—F, G—H, would ultimately control the movements of the action A—B, C—D. For, however successful A—B might be in the north, G—H and E—F were really deciding the issue of the war in the whole of the Eastern theatre. They were the principal forces engaged. If E—F wins, for instance, and pushes G—H back, the success of A—B becomes of comparatively small importance. If G—H wins he will be threatening by his large numbers the communications of the smaller body A—B and compelling its retreat.

All this is supposing that A—B in the north continues to advance, but, as a fact, this smaller German army which has been attacking the Russians on the Niemen, and advancing to cross that river, has failed and is now in retreat. Meanwhile, the much larger Austro-Germany Army which is preparing to provoke a decision upon the Upper Vistula has not yet reached that decision—and upon the

result of its action, favourable or disastrous to Austria and Germany, will turn the first phase of the war in the East. Moreover, if the action is really decisive, it will violently react upon the campaign in France.


Before taking these two fields of battle in detail, I would insist on this last point, upon the very grave effect upon the war as a whole that the first decisive results in Poland must necessarily have. It is agreed that the "pressure" which Russia may be able to bring upon Germany will be of capital effect upon the

the eastern "pressure" upon Germany upon which the west so eagerly counts.

Now, it is because a decision one way or the other appears to be imminent that the operations in Poland at this moment have resumed their interest for us.

Having said so much let me turn to the two battlefields in detail.

THE ACTIONS IN THE VALLEY OF THE NIEMEN.



campaign in the West. The date at which this "pressure" might begin was very foolishly advanced, and too many organs of public opinion, in this country especially, wrote, at the opening of the war, as though Berlin were to be menaced in a few days. It was impossible, unless the rules of arithmetic were to be suspended, for any such "pressure" to be felt before the third week in October, even supposing the maximum success conceivable on the part of the Russians, and the collapse of their opponents. As a matter of fact, it is already apparent that the "pressure" will come in any case later than this most favourable date. Further, it is equally apparent that the first "pressure" which our common enemies could be put under by the Russians would be applied not in the heart of the German Empire, nor at its capital, but in Silesia, because Silesia is the nearest populous and wealthy province exposed to a Russian advance.

Now, a decision reached within the next few days or in the next week or two by the Russians over the Germans in the eastern theatre of war would mean the beginning of that "pressure" upon Silesia, an advance along the valley of the Oder, the turning of the Eastern fortresses of Prussia in Poland, notably Posen and Thorn, and the way open to a march upon industrial Saxony and the capital itself.

Conversely, the success of the Germans, should they arrest the Russian march through Galicia, and still more should they thrust back the Russians in that field, would mean the indefinite postponement of

On the above skeleton map the reader will discover the size and to some extent the nature of the field of operations in Northern Poland. It must first be observed that the artificial frontier between the Russian Empire and East Prussia, which here cuts through Northern Poland, has long been crossed by the advancing German forces, and that these have been advancing directly upon the Niemen with the object of crossing that stream.

The Niemen is the great natural obstacle to any invasion of Russia from the west; at least if such an invasion take place upon the northern part of her western frontier. When Napoleon was occupied in re-erecting Poland as a nationality, he had imposed upon the Russians the Niemen as a frontier between Russia and Poland, though, as a matter of fact, the Polish nation extends its territory far to the east of that river. It was across the Niemen that Napoleon marched his great force in June, 1812, and one might almost say that the Niemen was to the fortunes of Russia in history what the Meuse is to the fortunes of France. To obtain possession of this river and its crossing places, then, was the object of the German advance in this quarter. All the country between the East Prussian frontier and the Niemen (a matter of over 50 miles even at the narrowest point between the two lines in this region) is a mass of water and wood and marsh. Some few of the lakes I have set down in the sketch map, but the total number appearing upon any detailed map

is very much larger and the whole scheme of them and their surrounding marshes and forests very much more complicated. But even from so elementary a sketch one can see that the few roads available to an army in its advance upon the Niemen are here of capital importance. Every one of them (and particularly the causeway by which the main advance was made from Suwalki to Seiny) is a series of *defiles*: that is, of places where an army cannot march upon any but a very narrow front: a place where the columns are confined to one road only and cannot spread out upon either side.

It was on September 23rd, that is, a fortnight ago, the Wednesday before last, that the Russian General Rennenkampf, retreating from before the German advance, got his last troops over the Niemen and waited the approach of the enemy to that river. The point at which they proposed to cross, or at least the chief of the several points, was Drusskeniki. They had already thrown their pontoons across when the counter-offensive upon the part of the Russians began. The opening of it was no more than the shelling of the German pontoon bridges as the Prussians were crossing them upon the Friday, the 25th, and the next phase after the success of this check given to the invaders was a violent artillery duel between the massed guns of either army firing from positions facing each other across the river. In the hope that their artillery had sufficiently dominated the enemy's, the Germans began their preparations for a second crossing. This second attempt was made at the end of the day; before night it had failed as the first had. From this check at Drusskeniki the Germans fell back upon what has been throughout all the intervening days a retreat, sometimes so pressed as to involve local disasters. By Monday, September 28th, after four days of this retreat, the rearguard of the German retirement was at Seiny, which means that the main body had been covering quite fifteen miles a day. The whole business in its rapidity and reverse was not unlike the general retreat which we call in the West the battle of Marne. The retreat was also of course being carried out along the whole front, not only in the centre with the main columns through Seiny, but up North as far as Mariampol and Southward as far as Augustowo. There are no railways in this belt between the Niemen and the German frontier. The four German Army Corps which, according to the French Official Communiqué, were involved, could not therefore receive rapid reinforcement even if such reinforcement could be spared either from the Southern field or from elsewhere. Two days later, therefore, by Thursday, October 1st, the mass of the German forces fell back upon a line Mariampol-Suwalki-Augustowo, the retreat of the central portion which had to follow the causeway through the marshes from Seiny to Suwalki being particularly painful and expensive. The Russians advancing from the line Simno-Sereje-Lipny on the centre drove the German centre right down this narrow defile.

The decision in this extended action was reached, however, not in the centre, but, as seems necessary nowadays in any extended and lengthy modern action, upon one of the wings. The operative wing here was, of course, the Southern one, the Russian left and German right. For to get round this wing was to cut the Germans off from, or at least to endanger, their communications with their own country. There is, however on this wing a great mass of wood as well as of lake country, known as the Forests of Augustowo. It is nearly a week's march across by its few soft and sodden roads.

This was the principal impediment to the general Russian movement, but apparently upon the Thursday, October 1st, the obstacle was surmounted, or turned, and Augustowo was occupied, the Russian advance then proceeding to Ratchki, which was also taken at the point of the bayonet, and it seemed as though the German retreat in this direction would have to proceed not by the way the German advance had come, but northward and separate from the retreat of another group of German forces whose action I will now describe.

This subsidiary group in the advance on the Niemen had undertaken to protect the right flank of the advance, the investment of the fortress of Osowiec.

This separate operation upon the Southern or right flank of the general German advance upon the Niemen came a little behind the central main part of that advance. We have seen that the attempt to cross the Niemen at Drusskeniki belonged to September 25th. It was not until the morrow that the attack upon the forts of Osowiec began. The bombardment of those forts continued apparently for no more than two days. Indeed, the retreat of the centre from Niemen must have involved hasty orders from the German headquarters to the troops on the extreme right in front of the fortress, and these began their retreat towards Prussia again. In this retreat they had the advantage of a railway which their fellows in the main bodies to the North had not. But it was just as heavily pressed as the retirement of the main bodies of the North. The Russian cavalry were in Grajewo with the first of the month, and on the next day, Friday the 2nd, they were over the frontier.

All these operations, therefore, in Northern Poland and in the valleys of the Bobr and the Niemen (to which the Russians have given the name of the "Battle of Augustowo," which were fought over a front of more than a hundred miles and which occupied altogether more than ten days) have resulted in the retirement of the four invading German Army Corps back over their own frontier, and it is probable that at the moment of writing, though fighting is still going on just west of Suwalki, all the German forces have been withdrawn from that part of Northern Poland which lies over the artificial frontier between the Russian Empire and East Prussia.

THE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN POLAND UPON THE UPPER VISTULA.

It will be seen from what has just been said that the Russian success in Northern Poland is locally decisive, not that we have any account of great captures of men or material, but that the German object deliberately undertaken has not been reached and the German plan has failed. But this failure, as we have seen, only concerns four Army Corps.


The operations in Southern Poland, which have not yet come to a decision and in which the two main forces have not yet even thoroughly taken contact, must be watched with far greater interest and will have far more effect upon the campaign as a whole.

In order to grasp the way in which this great action is being approached, the way in which the opposing forces are manoeuvring for position, and the nature of the ground over which the shock will take place, we must master the very simple elements of the field, remembering that the forces that will join battle in the field, and that have perhaps already done

something towards achieving a decision at the moment of writing, *are nearly four times as numerous* in southern Poland as they are in that northern field which we have just been examining. We have, it is presumed in the official notices, fifteen or sixteen army corps, Austrian and German, drawn up to check, and if possible to throw back, the Russian advance through south and central Poland.

The general story of what has preceded the coming great action in the Galician field may be rapidly recalled.

would take. They might elect to mass the whole Austro-German force (now presumably under one Prussian Commander-in-Chief) at a point where the three Empires meet, and there to await the Russian shock, abandoning Cracow. At first, when it was discovered that entrenchments had been made just inside Russian Poland, upon the line Kalisz-Wielun-Czenstochowa, it was believed that some such plan was intended. A line of troops would stand upon the defensive to protect the river flank from being turned, and the big action would come behind, or to the west,




POSITION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES IN GALICIA, AND THE LINE OF GERMAN REINFORCEMENT FROM THE WEST.

Rather more than a month ago, just as Von Kluck was approaching Paris, the Russians broke up one of the two great Austrian armies opposed to them in Southern Poland. They broke up the army round Lemberg, Army 2, whereupon Army 1, immediately to the north of this, fell back. The Russians advanced after securing Lemberg and its many munitions and their very numerous prisoners—some 60,000—and their considerable captures in guns and material; they isolated Przemyśl, occupied the Passes of the Carpathians behind that fortress, took Jaroslaw, reached Debitza last week, and proposed to advance the remaining week's march upon Cracow. Part of the defeated Austrian Army No. 2 got itself shut up in Przemyśl, but the remainder, together with Army No. 1, fell back before the Russian advance, crossing the San river and the plains behind it, and making for the Upper Vistula and for the neighbourhood of Cracow, perpetually retiring rapidly and avoiding a decision. Should the fortress of Cracow be masked and passed by the Russians, Silesia would be open to Russian attack and a new phase of the campaign would begin with the invasion of the German Empire.

Meanwhile, large German bodies were being organised and sent eastward to help the Austrians in this southern field, to check the Russian advance and to save Silesia from the invasion that threatened it. For some time it was uncertain what form this German advance in reinforcement of the Austrians

of Cracow. But what the Germans have done in the last week shows that they and their Allies have no intention of fighting so far west, but rather propose to meet the enemy upon the line of the Upper Vistula below Cracow. Their troops have been located upon the line Piotrkow-Stopnitza, coming right down to the left bank of the Vistula at a point just north of Tarnow, and the whole series of bodies along this line is moving southward.

Such a disposition obviously calls a halt to the Russian westerly advance along the main railway through Galicia towards Cracow and Silesia. They had isolated Przemyśl and taken the passes through the Carpathians, behind that fortress, nearly a fortnight ago. They had come up to a line passing from Dukla through Krasnow to the main Lemberg-Cracow railway line ten days ago. Their vanguard had already reached and passed Debitza and was approaching Tarnow when the nature of this German move was apparent. This move they must now face by looking no longer westward nor advancing further along the main railway towards Cracow and Silesia, but northwards and westwards towards across the upper reaches of the river Vistula, in the neighbourhood of which the shock will come. They will have the advantage in this shock of a main railway, that from Lemberg to Cracow, immediately in the rear of their line, where the Austro-German forces will have one rather further back in the main line to Kielce, which is also the trunk line through Warsaw to Petrograd



THE SOUTHERN OR MAIN FIELD OF ACTION IN THE EASTERN AREA OF WAR.


from Vienna. Of direct railway communication the Germans and Austrians will have only one artery, that coming from Silesia; for the railway reaching Czenstochowa from Germany is only a light line. Further the gauge of the Kielce Railway is the Russian gauge, different from that of the rest of Europe. The Germans have axles and wheels suited to this gauge and applicable to their own rolling stock, but in what quantity and whether upon the spot or no we cannot tell. (I have marked upon the map the points Zombkovic Junction and Wielec Junction where the breach of gauge occurs). The Germans have the worst roads for supply behind them, the roads to the south of the Vistula being good macadamised roads and those to the north mainly un-macadamised tracks. The country to the north of the Vistula through which, presumably, the Austro-German advance will come, is open enough, though hilly in the neighbourhood of the river, and gets more wooded as one goes northward to the Kielce railway line. The country to the south of the Vistula, as I have marked it, is considerably wooded, and, upon the right flank of the southern or Galician Russian force, is one great, almost unbroken forest in the angle between the Vistula and the San.

Apart from the Russian army in Galicia, which has advanced from Lemberg since its victory there, a new army is coming up through Central Poland, and the Russian forces, though massed mainly to the south, yet extend up through Kielce and beyond, everywhere approaching contact with the Austro-German line in front and to the west of them: which line would seem to run from Pietrkow to Stopnitza and is extending to the south.

There are, in brief, the tactical elements of the field in which this great decision is to be challenged.

But what precise form the battle line will take when the shock comes we cannot tell. Still less can we conjecture the issue.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.



GENERAL MAP OF OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN AREA.


In the Western theatre of war there is very little that is new in France. The new thing in

Belgium is the active pursuit of the Siege of Antwerp by the enemy.

In France, two districts claim our attention—the one upon the extreme East wing, round about Verdun, and the Toul—Verdun fortified line, and Argonne, where a German offensive has for the moment failed; the other—the decisive point—the extreme Western wing, West of the Oise and North of the Somme, of which we are as yet told very little indeed, but where a series of violent actions, the decision in which may come at any moment, are being fought from Roye right up to the Belgian frontier.

To take these in their order—

THE OPERATIONS BETWEEN ARGONNE AND LORRAINE.




The operations in the field which comprises the Argonne, Verdun, St. Mihiel, and the Woeuvre will have no meaning for us until we can grasp some general object the enemy has in mind. They can hardly be desultory and disconnected actions, as at first sight they appear to be; that is not the way of any soldier, least of all of German soldiers.

In my notes of a week ago I pointed out the difficulty of determining the motive of the enemy in establishing a bridge head over the Meuse at St. Mihiel. If he was not able or did not intend to advance in force through this gap in the Toul—Verdun line of fortifications, why was he at the pains of occupying a dangerous salient and of reducing two strong permanent works and of attempting, under heavy loss (and failing), to establish himself upon the other side of the river? The Germans having opened that door have not used it. I said that if they were not intending an advance in force through this door they had opened—if they had not men enough in that region to mask Toul and Verdun and at the same time to pour a large force straight on to Revigny—then they could only be attempting a diversion, and the whole thing must be regarded as a feint, undertaken in the hopes of relieving the increasing pressure on their west wing out beyond the Oise. But there is another possibility which would also account for those attacks which take place on the west side of the Meuse with such regularity and with equal regularity fail, and that third possibility is the hope or the intention of investing Verdun. It may well be that the German General Staff, which has had

to change its major plans already twice, and must have to change details in those plans continually, have more than once determined that the fall of the great frontier fortress line was essential to their success and more than once hesitated before the task in view of the heavy reinforcement required upon the right wing beyond the Oise. Hesitation and fluctuation of this sort would account for nearly all that has happened. The idea that Verdun must be invested, the beginning of that task, its abandonment under pressure from the west, then its being taken up again will account for most or all of what has happened in this region. It accounts for the attack on the fort at Troyon to the south of Verdun before the German retreat began. Indeed in those days—the second week of September—the investment of Verdun was openly put forward as an objective in the German official communiqués. The Crown Prince's Army, which was principally occupied in this task and which had its headquarters at Ste. Menchould, was compelled to fall back as far as Varennes in the general retreat of the German line imposed by Von Kluck's peril: the retirement which goes by the name of the Battle of the Marne. But after the Crown Prince's Army had thus retreated the counter offensive was attempted several times, and both these counter attacks undertaken by the Crown Prince from the sides of the Argonne down south on to the French positions west of Verdun, and the subsequent advance from Thiaucourt on to the Meuse at St. Mihiel, were presumably combined actions having for their common object the isolation of Verdun.

The last of these numerous strokes to fail has been that of the Crown Prince on Saturday and Sunday last and of this the sketch map below gives the details.



While an unsuccessful attempt was being made to force the Meuse at St. Mihiel and so isolate Verdun from the east, the Crown Prince's Army acting from Montfaucon and the open region North of Varennes

made a determined effort to push back the French line West of Verdun and to isolate the fortress upon that side. These same forces of the enemy had already more than once tried to force that line in the neighbourhood of Clermont, or rather, in the open country between Clermont and Varennes. But they had failed in each such attempt, although they had pushed their outposts beyond Varennes itself and, until this week, had permanently occupied that town. Their attack of last Saturday was made in another direction. It was masked by the woods of Argonne from which they debouched upon the western side, turning thence southwards and aiming at Ste. Menchould. The Wood of La Grurie, through which this march was undertaken, lies to the north of the main road that crosses the Argonne from Varennes to Vienne by way of the little place called La Harazée. In dry weather it is possible to bring guns and train through this wood (a clay soil) even without the use of the great high road between Varennes and Vienne, and, if an advance in force were determined on, the railway round the Pass of Grandpré would be of great service. We have been given no account of the action, nothing more than the bare statement in the Official Communiqué that in the result the whole of the German force which has taken the offensive was thrust back behind the line of the main road, and that should mean that Varennes has again fallen into French hands. It also means quite certainly that for the moment the attempt to invest Verdun is abandoned.

Meanwhile, at the other end of this field, the garrison of Toul, which has thrust out an effort northward during the last week, is holding the southern edge of the Rupt de Mad. Of course, if it could cross that valley (which is the line by which Thiaucourt, the German headquarters here, is fed, and along which its railway runs), or if it even seriously threatened that line, the troops at St. Mihiel would have to fall back. We are not told what is passing in that neighbourhood in sufficient detail to judge whether St. Mihiel can be held much longer, but if the advance from the south upon the Rupt de Mad, slow as it is, continues, it is certain that the advanced German body on the Meuse must retire.

THE WESTERN FRONT.

With regard to the western front, there neither is anything communicated which materially modifies the situation of last week nor if any such knowledge had reached one would it be advisable to discuss it publicly, because it is evident that upon this front the decision of the campaign hangs. The general line is public property. The belt, for the possession of which the struggle rages, is that of the district round Roye, of the great open fields between Albert and Combles, and further north the neighbourhood of Arras. What fortunes that struggle will have we do not yet know, it hangs even and it is largely veiled. Certain main facts about it are public property, as that the enemy has heavily reinforced the central and southern part of that line between the Oise and the Somme; at least two Bavarian army corps hitherto elsewhere have appeared before Roye. He expects further to reinforce it with the troops he hopes to be able to spare from Belgium after the success of his present operations there. Against this special effort the Germans are making in the line protecting their communications and their west or right flank the Allies are, of course, making corresponding efforts, but of the nature of these nothing must be said.

One thing the general reader will do well to appreciate when, or before, the curtain lifts, and the

result of the great struggle is known, and that is the length of this new line which, beginning in skirmishes round Noyon, has developed nearly up to the Belgian frontier. It is no less than 70 miles; nearly a week's march. One main railway line feeds the German effort here. It is also their main line of communication in the whole front between Noyon and the Argonne. The Allies opposed to them are fed by a whole system of railways and the sea behind that system, and this stubborn defence of the German communications and this momentous attack upon them is the first of the great railway wars of the modern era. The railways are here the chief strategic factor upon our side, just as the railway behind the German line

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

These two things, the great extension of the line and the fact that railways are the core of modern movements in the field, at least in highly developed countries, must have this effect upon our judgment: that we must never consider a great modern flanking movement of this kind as presenting the element of surprise. There are conditions under which it might, by good luck, possess that invaluable element, but those conditions must be very rare. As a rule, the moving of such great masses of men over such great distances and by a method of communication every yard of which is necessarily known to the enemy, and none of which can be shifted or exchanged, a method of communication tied with peculiar immobility to certain directions, makes everywhere against the possibility of surprise. That element of surprise still exists in modern war. It was very evident when the Germans accumulated so unexpected a mass of men to the north of the Meuse before their attack upon the Sambre at the end of August. But it will hardly be found in the great flank movements whereby every modern army will attempt to defeat an enemy that is fairly its equal in numbers, material, and condition of mind. It is worth pointing out that in every theatre of the war, not only here in France, but yesterday before the Niemen and to-morrow upon the Vistula, this feature has or will appear. To break a modern line if it be properly held is, as against an equal enemy, so difficult, or perhaps so nearly impossible, that the effort will necessarily be to "claw round." On the Niemen the trick was done when the superior Russian forces got through the woods of Augustowo and carried that town, and something of the sort will presumably be found to decide each one of these enormous battles until the campaign is concluded. The exception was the lengthy action which goes by the name of the Battle of Lemberg, when the Second Austrian Army was defeated more than a month ago by the Russians. There the line broke, but the case was exceptional, for the opposed forces, even if equal in numbers, were in no way equal in homogeneity and determination.

[*Postscript.*—Since writing the above the French official message of this Tuesday evening (when these notes are made up for Press) has come in and informs us that large masses of cavalry acting as a screen for new forces of artillery and infantry behind them have appeared in the neighbourhood of Lille and Armentières. The position of these places upon the slight sketch at the head of this section and the relation they bear to the general line should

sufficiently show the importance of this news. It means that whether by the releasing of men from the garrisons in Belgium, or from the arrival of new contingents, or from transference from the east, the enemy proposes to bring further forces upon the flank of the existing French line, that is upon if not behind its western extreme. It is he who is attempting to lengthen still further the extension of this great new front which during the last fortnight has crept up from Noyon northwards until it has now reached the Belgian frontier.

What fortunes the move may have we cannot tell for at least two days.

We learn from the same communication and from one previous to it that there has again been some slight advance in the centre or rather in the left centre over the trenches that have defended the crest of the plateau above Soissons and towards Craonne. In this local success the French acknowledge the aid of the British contingents. But there has been no serious development or change along the old main front between the Oise and the Argonne.


THE SIEGE OF ANTWERP.

have the ring of "old forts," the original works by which the modern city was defended. Strictly speaking, the scheme is not a ring but three-quarters of a circle reposing upon the Scheldt, most of the country behind or to the west of which is not available for siege operations because it can be flooded, and because the last portion of it is foreign territory and Dutch.

Finally, a third set of defences, at an average of about ten to fifteen thousand yards from the centre of the city, consisting in a chain of modern forts, completes the scheme.

It is against the southern sector of these outer forts that the German howitzer fire has been directed during the last few days. The attack began last Tuesday morning upon the works of Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine. Next day it was extended to the work at Lierre. Upon Thursday evening these works were still replying, but upon the Friday a breach in the outer ring was so far effected that the besieging army was able to reach the line of the River Nethe behind it.

Here appeared, and is still appearing, what has become a characteristic of all efforts against permanent



PLAN SHOWING THE FORTIFICATIONS ROUND ANTWERP.

There are many reasons why speculation upon the course of the last great German operation, the Siege of Antwerp, should be prudently restricted. But it is impossible to give a summary of the news this week without saying something of this most important development. It will be sufficient if we confine ourselves to the official communiqués and note their bearing upon the situation.

The City of Antwerp is protected by three groups of works. First, immediately round its densely-inhabited portion the old continuous ditch or *enceinte*. This rampart, though it has no relation to modern fortification, prevents something which has happened to all the other brailment rings in the north, and which would not have happened to them had they also possessed a ditch and rampart. I mean the introduction of small bodies of the enemy between the outer forts into the heart of a place.

Next, outside the suburbs and at ranges varying from 3000 to 4000 yards to the heart of the city, you

works in this war, and what will be just as apparent when we come to attack German permanent works in our turn. It is one of the chief lessons of the campaign. Howitzer fire dominates regular fortification far more than was imagined before the war broke out, but on the other hand the resisting power of infantry and field artillery behind any defensive line is far greater than was expected. It is exactly what you had in the attack upon the Meuse the other day in front of St. Mihiel. The permanent works fell or were silenced by heavy howitzer fire in a little over two days' engagement, but the defence of the infantry upon the other side of the stream rendered useless this achievement, and, though a breach had been driven through a line of regular fortification, progress could not be made beyond that line. The Belgian Army has been able to maintain itself behind the Nethe and the Dyle ever since the first attack was made. The official communiqué which tells us that the German shells were falling as far as Contich also tells us that

the enemy failed repeatedly in his attempt to throw pontoons across the river.

The last news, which is as late as 7 o'clock on Tuesday evening, when these notes are put into their final form, tells us that this resistance was still effectively maintained and that the garrison of Antwerp had imposed three full days of immobility upon the enemy.

It is obvious that here, as throughout the campaign, time is a very important factor for the Germans. They hope by this operation against Antwerp, if or when it is successful, to effect two things: to release great masses of troops, perhaps not of the best, but hitherto held to their lines of communication through Belgium, which were always threatened by a sortie from the Antwerp garrison, such as took place two weeks ago; secondly, they propose to occupy the whole of Belgian territory with the fall of its last political centre.

But all this is so obvious that it hardly needs recital.

What is less obvious is the calculation which has made the enemy undertake this operation so late in the day. That he should have delayed upon it during the first rush one can understand, but that he should have postponed it until the fourth week of the Battle of the Aisne, that is, while his communications had been in some jeopardy for quite twenty days, is remarkable. I suggest, though it is only a suggestion, that the explanation of so tardy an action is to be found in two things. First, that the siege train is limited. We all know that it takes a long time to

make great howitzers, and the total number that can be brought against fortification restricts attacks of this kind. Nothing was done against Verdun until Maubeuge had fallen.

The other thing I suggest is, if the conjecture has anything in it, of real importance, for it will affect the whole development of the campaign.

I suggest that Germany had never envisaged the resistance of Belgium. She did envisage the resistance of the Belgian town of Namur because she thought that this point would be so vital to the French that they would seize it and try to hold it. She did envisage, of course, the reduction of the French strongholds, and, necessarily, of Maubeuge, which lay right upon her proposed line of invasion and commanded its railway.

Now, when a German plan is made, it has the merit of being thought out thoroughly; it has the demerit of not being elastic, of not allowing for the unforeseen. The places which Germany thought she would have to deal with she not only studied, but weakened by long and very closely calculated acts of treachery. They were full of spies (as England is at the present moment); all their best emplacements for heavy guns were, if not prepared beforehand (as was the case at Maubeuge) upon property which had been conveyed to German owners by stealth, yet calculated and the opportunities for making them known. I suggest that in the case of Antwerp this peculiar method of preparing war, which is one of the chief surprises of the present campaign, was neglected, and to this neglect we owe the delay.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESS BUREAU, THE POSITIONS OF TROOPS ON PLANS ILLUSTRATING THIS ARTICLE MUST ONLY BE REGARDED AS APPROXIMATE, AND NO DEFINITE STRENGTH AT ANY POINT IS INDICATED.

A TOPOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE WAR ZONE.

By E. CHARLES VIVIAN.

Cracow.—The second city of Austrian Galicia, and one of the strongest of Galician fortress towns, being equal to Przemyśl in this latter respect. The population of the town is about 100,000, mainly Polish, with about 25 per cent. of Jewish stock and 7 per cent. German. The industries of the town are unimportant as regards manufactures, but there is a large trade in local agricultural produce. Cracow is situated about ten miles south of the frontier dividing Galicia from Russian Poland, and is next only to Lemberg in importance among Galician centres of trade. It is a railway junction of some magnitude, lines branching hence north-west to Breslau and Silesia, south-west of Vienna and Austrian centres, and east to Tarnów and Lemberg. Cracow has always ranked as a great educational centre for the Polish race, and in its university the Polish language has been exclusively used since 1870; while its academy of science, founded in 1872, is the principal institution of its kind in Galicia.

Javorow.—Situated fifteen miles east of Jarosław, and the terminus of a line of rail running east to Lemberg. It is about equidistant from Lemberg, Jarosław, and Przemyśl.

Vistula, River.—The principal river of Poland, and "the cradle of the Polish nationality," has a total length of 620 miles, with a drainage area of over 70,000 square miles. It rises in the Beskides Hills, in Galicia, at a height of 3,675 feet above sea-level, and is formed of the junction of the Black and White Vistulas; in its extreme upper course its direction is north-east, through an elevated valley between the Beskides and the Sandomierz heights, and here it separates Russian Poland from Galicia, while by the time it reaches Cracow it has acquired such a volume as to be nearly 100 yards in width. At Zaniwchów it enters Russian Poland, and receives the San

as its tributary, turning due north, and traversing a valley lying below the level of the Polish plateau. This valley is bordered by limestone crags, and is about ten miles in width. From Jusefów the river turns slightly to the west of north, and attains a width of 1,000 yards at normal times; though the banks are dammed up by the inhabitants of the surrounding country, floods in the Carpathians sometimes cause the river to break its banks, when it inundates hundreds of square miles in the plains of Opole and Koźienic, the waters sometimes reaching over 100 miles from the river bed. The nature of the country below Warsaw is such that the river frequently changes its bed, so much so that towns which used to stand on the left bank of the river are now on its right bank. It enters Prussia near the fortress town of Thorn, and, forcing a way through the Baltic ridge, turns north-east and enters the Baltic Sea by way of the Frische Haff at Dantzic. It is navigable for small boats and rafts practically as far as Cracow, and, at a cost of 1,000,000 sterling, has been deepened and dredged near its mouth by the Prussian Government, with a view to increasing the value and availability of Dantzic as a port. An artificial channel has been constructed from Rothebude, twelve and a half miles up the river, to its mouth, and the minimum depth of this is six feet. The river has an extremely violent current during the rainy autumn season, and is practically unbridgable in its lower reaches at this time. General commercial navigation is maintained from the mouth of the river up to its junction with the Wieprz, and for this distance the Vistula is regarded as the chief commercial artery of Poland. Its chief tributaries on the right bank are the San, the Wieprz, and the Bug; on the left bank, the Nida and the Pilica. The principal towns on the Vistula are Cracow, Sandomierz, Warsaw, Plock, Thorn, and Dantzic.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.



CHART OF THE PACIFIC, INDICATING THE AREA OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN CHINA SQUADRON, OF WHICH SOME SHIPS HAVE APPEARED OFF THE FIJI ISLANDS.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

THE FAR EAST.

THE situation here is somewhat complicated by the fact that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, which were supposed to be blockaded in Kiao-Chau, appear to have got out before the Anglo-Japanese blockade was completed. They have been reported loose in the Pacific.

To date their exploits have not gone further than the destruction of the old French gunboat *Zélée*—which was disarmed as useless—and the bombardment of an unfortified town in the Fiji Islands. Neither exploit is glorious, but it counts.

Since these two ships have escaped, we may take it that all the swift cruisers have done the same thing, and that the present German fleet loose in the Pacific is as follows:—

Scharnhorst, 11,000 tons. Guns, 8 8·2", 6 6". Speed 22½–23 kts. Belt, 6 inches.

Gneisenau, 11,000 tons. Guns, 8 8·2" 6 6". Speed 22½–23 kts. Belt, 6 inches.

Liepsig, 3,250 tons. Guns, 10 4·1". Speed, 23 kts.

Nürnberg, 3,450 tons. Guns, 10 4·1" Speed, 23½ kts.

Emden, 3,000 tons. Guns, 10 4·1". Speed, 24½ kts.

Of these we already know all about the *Emden*. As for the others, the *Scharnhorst* went badly aground three or four years

ago, and thereafter failed to steam at any decent speed. The *Gneisenau* also was never quite a success. But the odds (on which we must calculate) are that both ships have since been brought to efficiency.

(Passage deleted by Censor.)

As for the lesser German cruisers, the fighting value of these is trivial. But they have to be caught.

The mystery is where they have all been hiding, and why they have been hidden so long. The secret bases must be more numerous than we thought. These bases can hardly be on the mainland anywhere, for, if so, some of them must have been heard of.

Coaling at sea is possible enough. A whole fleet once coaled in mid-Atlantic twenty years ago. Consequently it is by no means unlikely that the German raiders do not always use lonely islands as bases, but have certain fixed rendezvous on the high seas where they can always meet colliers and other supply ships.

This is simple enough, as outside the trade routes the whole ocean is more or less an uninhabited desert. Presently, of course, their bottoms will foul, but that will hardly be yet.

The "German Fleet" inside Kiao-Chau probably consists of most of the other ships of their China squadron. These are (or were):—

Four gunboats—*Ilis*, *Jaguar*, *Tiger*, *Luchs*.


Three river gunboats—*Tsingtau*, *Vaterland*, *Otter*.

Two destroyers—*Taku* and *S 90*.

One miscellaneous—*Titania*.

Of these the *Tsingtau* is that much paragraphed "sold-for-a-dollar" gunboat. One of the destroyers has been sunk—presumably by land fire from the Japanese, which has also put the *Ilis* more or less out of action.

The Kaiser is understood to have ordered the garrison to hold out to the last. It may obey instructions and do so. But the difference between that and immediate surrender only exists in terms of useless sacrifice of life. It is unlikely to delay the fall of Kiao-Chau by more than a few days.



KIAO CHAU (TSING-TAU).

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Official news from the Adriatic is mostly unimportant, and in all cases very stale. Unofficial news carries us very little further except that Italy appears to be the only sufferer from Austrian mines, and Austria has had to compensate heavily. The only other sufferers have been Austrian warships and merchant vessels. On a rough calculation Austria to date must be something like 500 per cent. out of pocket over her mining investment.

To the time of writing the only thing of real importance achieved by the Allies in the Adriatic is the capture of Lissa. This advanced base being secured, Cattaro can well be left alone so far as naval operations are concerned. A blockade is quite as effective and a great deal cheaper than a bombardment.

Elsewhere the Dardanelles question has obtruded itself. The Turks temporarily closed the Dardanelles because vessels of the Anglo-French Fleet stopped and searched ingoing traffic. This Turkish protest is unlikely to have the remotest effect on the Allies' strategy. So long as the *Goeben* and *Breslau* retain their crews on board them, so long will it be necessary to make certain of their destruction should they emerge from their place of presumed internment, and to intercept supplies to them.

In the press of more exciting matter it is not properly recognised what a nuisance the *Goeben* business is, nor how difficult it is to deal with. It is the old story of *Punica fides*. Germany has certainly achieved one advantage in this war. She has given us reason to believe that given a weak and complacent neutral no ordinary laws of war will count with her. And we are paying for this by ships diverted from the Adriatic operations. This, come to think of it, is a strategical gain for Germany. It is, to be sure, along similar lines to the tactics of Ananias in the past, but for the present it serves. I cannot help thinking that matters could be simplified were the Allied Fleet to make it clearly public that, in the event of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* re-appearing these ships will be regarded as pirates and no quarter whatever will be extended to their crews. Then, should they emerge and presently intern themselves again in some Turkish harbour, no awkward questions about neutrality could be raised. A pirate has no legal status.

It is abundantly clear that Germany has not complied with international law in the matter of the internment of these two ships. It is equally clear that unless international law is to become a dead letter something must be done to assert the necessity of observing it.

In the distorted perspective in which we necessarily see naval events just as they happen, this matter of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* appears as a quite minor matter. But if one truism more than another can be accepted as Gospel for the present war it is the old proverb, "It is the little things that count."

The centre of Mediterranean interest is not in the Adriatic, where the Allies are bound to accomplish more or less as they list, but outside the Dardanelles and the possibilities of a re-incarnation of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. Of itself the menace is of no great account. But it has some decided value as "the menace that waits."

THE NORTH SEA.

The Admiralty notification that mines have been laid in a certain area in the North Sea—I have roughly indicated the area by a diagram (see next page), because latitudes and longitudes convey little to the non-technical reader—is the immediate answer to the submarining of the three *Cressys*.

The mine field will considerably hamper future German submarine movements, especially those of such submarines as may happen to be out and which will know nothing of the danger awaiting their return unless warned by those "observation stations" which the Germans are supposed to have established on our East Coasts.

The weak point of a mine field is that "roads through it" must necessarily exist, and these can of course be observed, either directly as our submarines observed them inside the Bight of Heligoland or by the misuse of neutral fishing craft. On this account alone the closing of all British harbours on the East Coast to alien fishing craft or craft so registered is a very wise measure, while the public notification of the mine field will render pretty clear the status of any fishing craft found prowling about the prohibited area no matter what flag it may chance to be flying.

German submarines can still emerge from the Heligoland direction, but they will have to come along a more or less well-defined route, where there is just enough vagueness in the Admiralty statement to leave it not quite clear whether other mined areas than those mentioned do not exist.

Out of all this we can take it that, so far as the British Navy is concerned, the mine is taken to be the answer (or one of the answers) to the submarine. A submarine travelling on the surface has a fair chance of crossing a mine field without much risk, but a submarine on the surface is no particular danger to anyone. She is easily to be annihilated by destroyers and torpedo boats if detected, and detection is not very difficult.

In connection with this matter attention may be drawn to the circumstance that German official reports of submarine movements have frequently referred to "ten-day cruises."

Now, by simple arithmetic we can easily calculate that there are few if any German submarines capable of ten-day cruises unaided, allow as we will for lying by on the surface at night. The utmost radius of anything up to U 24 is "on paper" 2,000 miles on the surface. Supposing surface cruising for only twelve hours out of the twenty-four, this works out about eight days at ten knots, without taking into account fuel expended in re-charging accumulators for under-water work.

Of course it is possible for a boat to lie below water with no machinery working, and so far as machinery and fuel supply is concerned to carry this on fairly indefinitely, so long as she can keep on renewing at intervals her air supply. Nothing very definite is known as to what the fresh air supply method in German boats consists of, but in any case it is not a matter to be arranged for in a few minutes.

Apart from this machinery question there is the human element to consider, and, altogether, I for one refuse to believe that any German submarine can manage to be self-supporting for ten days under war conditions. Assuredly these ten-day submarines must have floating bases of some sort, bases which can hardly have proceeded out of the Heligoland Bight, unless they were established at least nine weeks ago.

We have got to face the circumstance that Germany is not basing her efforts against us from her own shores. She has probably been particularly careful so to arrange matters that no neutral is either involved or suspected. But bases of some kind must exist.

It is none too soon that we have virtually closed North Sea traffic except to vessels conducted by our own pilots. We perhaps ought to have done it the instant that the *Amphion* was lost, without regard to neutral susceptibilities. No honest neutral can possibly object to the precautions which we have taken. As indicated last week all neutrals, save the Dutch, have suffered badly from the German system of indiscriminate mine-laying. The only possible answer was to lay mines everywhere where the Germans have not done so, but apparently mean to lay them.

It is, of course, the duty of the British Navy to "smash the enemy." But a higher and more important duty still is to see

to it that the enemy is rendered impotent. The unfortunate thing is that quite a considerable section of the public is of opinion that "the Navy is doing nothing" on account of the fact that it has done its work so well that the main German Fleet prefers to keep out of danger. Will the public which demands an impossible Trafalgar be good enough to realise that for years the German view of things has publicly been stated and restated *ad nauseum*: "No matter what the circumstances, the plain duty of the German Fleet is to attack. Only in the attack can victory reside."

This attack has *not* been delivered. It is unlikely to be delivered until economic pressure forces it. But why not?

A good thousand years ago the all-powerful Athenian Navy met its doom because the Democracy put in its oar wrongly. On the people of England to-day it depends that the same old mistake is not repeated with the same terrible result.

If the man in the street can be persuaded to crab the Navy and to insist on its "doing something," Germany is going to win. If, on the other hand, the man in the street will merely remain indifferent and "trust the Navy," Germany's chances sink to zero.

Thus and in such way the twentieth-century Trafalgar has to be fought by the public, and the only weapon is blind confidence in the British Navy. *Blind* confidence be it noted. It may take some doing, but it has to be done.

ON THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

First place is naturally claimed by the *Emden*, which, as briefly mentioned last week, has now added five to her previous bag of six in the Bay of Bengal, and has probably added more since. As expected, after shelling Madras she made for Pondicherry, where, for no apparent reason, she anchored on September 24th. She, however, presently made off without doing anything, wherefrom we may assume that she was intent on combining a hasty sweeping of boiler tubes with such moral effect as was to be obtained by anchoring only little more than a mile away from Government House.

The *Emden* steamed away leaving Pondicherry unharmed; but the result of her commerce raiding has since come in. She has now eleven ships to her credit. But—well, eleven is not much out of four thousand. To equal the privateers of Nelson's days the *Emden* and her consorts must multiply all their captures by something like thirty. And when, if ever, they have done it, the fact will still remain that a destruction of 10 per cent. in the old Great War of an odd hundred years ago did not destroy British commerce. The 90 per cent. left carried on quite merrily. The 99 per cent. left over to-day are hardly likely to worry more than their predecessors of the last Great War. Losses can be created—they are bound to be created. But no matter how long the German corsairs may remain afloat, there is no question of their accomplishing any damage that really matters.

Another predatory cruiser has now turned up on the East Coast of America, and it is also now reported that the remaining cruisers at Kiao Chau have broken loose. This information is doubtful. But, be the cruisers many or few,

the damage that they can do is strictly limited and their ultimate fate is certain.

Of far more moment is it to record that the Cameroons in West Africa have now fallen into our hands, and that the *Cumberland*, stationed in those parts, has captured eight German merchant ships and a German gunboat.

Germany's cruisers (the *Emden* especially) are putting up a very good fight. They are acting from cleverly prearranged bases, and most of them have so far cleverly evaded interception by our defending cruisers. But there is nothing to suggest that this state of affairs can be maintained for more than a limited time. It may take weeks or it may take months, but sooner or later every German commerce raider will meet her fate. Before that occurs considerable damage will no doubt be done, but the ultimate failure of the commerce war and the probability that it will eventually cost as much or more to Germany than the damage inflicted on us is self-evident.

The Germans do not appear to be greatly perturbed by the loss of trade which we have caused them. At any rate they profess not to be, and in matters of this sort it is never wise to assume that the enemy is merely bluffing. They must certainly have calculated that the British Fleet would destroy their over-seas trade and capture all their over-seas possessions. The latter was unavoidable; the former they have minimised so far as possible by laying up their merchant ships. An instructive article in the *Times* of October 3rd quotes from Herr Heineken, head of the Nord Deutscher Lloyd, the view that all Germany



Simply because the British Navy is too much in the way. The High Sea Fleet has no prospects whatever of advantage by coming out. In consequence it remains inactive.

To adopt the chess simile, which I have used before—it is "in check." The ultimate result may be "checkmate," or it may be merely "stale mate" (for which the Germans are playing). But why expect that Admiral Jellicoe should go in for a reckless exchange of pieces which at the best could merely provide headlines for the daily press?

Or to put it another way, would any card player as fourth hand with the four of diamonds in his hand play his ace to take the three? Germany's game and Germany's hope is that the British public, looking for a Trafalgar, will demand the ace to be put down.

I have insisted till all readers must be more or less tired of it that the main elements of this war are psychological. I am afraid, however, that I must continue to insist on the point. In the strongest possible fashion I wish to impress that Germany's game is based on the expectation that presently the British nation will demand that the Navy "does something," trusting to luck that the things really accomplished by it, being inconspicuous, will not count.

A Trafalgar won by "the man in the street" is an unthinkable thing along all the lines of past history. But the past is the past. The present war is along hitherto unknown lines. To say that it is being fought in the streets of London sounds hyperbole *ad absurdum*. Yet it is something like the situation.

has to fear is a reduction of dividends during the war, and anticipation that once the war is over over-sea trade will be resumed as usual. They do not believe in the permanent capture by us of German markets.

In this connection a series of remarkable articles which recently appeared in *The Engineer* took a somewhat similar view, that is to say, it was very clearly proved, chapter and verse, that unless our traders adopt German methods—and supply what customers want without regard to whether it is the best thing for them, and take to the metric system for all transactions with countries using it—our capture of German markets will be temporarily only.

This, I am afraid, is much more important than any successes *pro or con* in the commerce war now proceeding on the high seas.

It is advisable to remember that our cruisers on the Indian Station have been busy seeing to it that Indian troops get to the front without let or hindrance. This they have done, and discounted the *Emden's* efforts to that extent. Had she managed to intercept a single transport, it would, so far as material effect is concerned, have counted a great deal more than the sinking of even a hundred British merchant ships. Morally the *Emden* has done extremely well, but she has failed to interfere with the transport of Indian troops to France. She has won with the pennies, but lost with the pounds. It is the pounds that count most.

GENERAL SURVEY.

On land something like a "stale mate" seems to exist. On the water the position is not materially different. This kind of situation cannot, however, go on indefinitely.

My reading of the whole situation, at the time of going to press, is that on land we have secured a mild advantage, but that

on the water a similar mild advantage rests with the enemy. His predatory cruisers are now remarkably well handled, and, unless luck be with us, we must be prepared for heavy losses before the corsairs are accounted for. They come from the unknown, they inflict damage, then they vanish into the unknown.

The object, of course, is to create panic in our overseas trade. This so far they have failed to accomplish. But the attempt is none the less serious on that account.

In everything it is now abundantly clear that German strategy is to face the British Navy with the virtually impossible, and trust to it that a non-technical democracy, finding the impossible unachieved, will compel a "show" naval policy instead of a certain one.

The only possible comment is that the German strategy is excessively clever, and, given a few more *Emdens*, it may succeed. The precise German target is the underwriters of Lloyd's.

On land the war is being waged by indiscriminate slaughter. On the water finer issues are at stake. The Germans have discarded all ideas of direct money-making by captures; everything is concentrated on the creation of a trade panic by losses inflicted on us.

This particular campaign is deliberate and well calculated. I view it with grave misgivings. The Germans have tricked us into believing that we hold the unquestioned mastery of the seas. Now, any number of their cruisers are contesting it on *Alabama* lines. In their doing of it they have scored a goal against us. It is folly to minimise that goal. They have far too many agents in our midst ready to cry, "Go up to Ramoth-Gilead and prosper." The problem before our guardian cruisers is a very heavy one. It is practically seeking for the needle in a bundle of hay. And it is imperatively necessary to find that needle!

We shall find it; but the naval work entailed is enormous.

THE WAR BY AIR.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

AERIAL news this week is somewhat chaotic. It mostly consists on the German side of vague bomb dropping—chiefly from dirigibles. The general result has been the expenditure of the maximum of bombs with the minimum of effect.

So far as can be gathered, the Germans, having found it well nigh impossible to hit any particular desired object, have given up this particular aspect of the air campaign, and are now seeking to create a reign of terror by indiscriminate bombs dropped anywhere where habitations exist.

My reading of this circumstance is that the Germans have found that they had over-calculated as to their "aerial menace," and that they have subsequently panicked more or less. Nothing worth mention can possibly be achieved against non-combatants. The more that German aircraft attack these the greater we can put down their failure at.

For the rest, British aeroplanes continue to make German aeroplane enterprise undesirable. The "shortage of petrol" story is being repeated with variations of a quite realistic nature, but every indication is to the effect that we have secured the command of the air and that "petrol shortage" is merely a convenient excuse.

There is a fair amount of evidence that we have taken on the air as part of our heritage. For example, the official report of the replacement of a propeller blade in mid-air by some of the crew of one of our dirigibles—name not disclosed. It does not mean anything very special, but it does spell efficiency.

Germany's great air effort is yet to come. But to misquote an old Armada statement of Drake's, "We have singed the Kaiser's moustache," and if and when the German aerial Armada does appear we can rest fairly confident that Wilhelm II. of Germany will fare little better than Philip II. of Spain did in 1588.

It is interesting to note that exactly the same elements are present. On the German side we have the same vague threats, the same vague stories of invincibility; the same vague appeal to the Deity. On our side we have the same casual confidence, the same individual confidence, the same conviction that we are mostly faced with bluff.

Personally, I think that there will be the same sequel. But, sooner or later, I do think that the air invasion will come, and we will be very ill-advised to treat it as an empty threat. Football has replaced bowls as a popular sport. Let us go on playing football à la Drake at bowls. But let us take Germany's contemplated aerial Armada as seriously as our Elizabethan ancestors took the Great Armada of Philip of Spain.

This Armada will not sail till it is very numerous and till certainty of success seems clear on paper. To put the fear of God into the civil population will, of course, be the principal objective; no very real damage is likely to be achieved. Moral effect will be everything.

The trial before us is probably no light one. London may well have to suffer several chapters of the "Book of the Revelation." We have no airships to meet a determined German airship attack. On our aeroplanes and on our aeroplanes only will victory depend. It is of the utmost importance that all concerned are ready to meet this German aerial Armada in the same spirit as our Elizabethan ancestors faced a similar crisis.

After we have faced it and beaten it will be quite time enough to make songs about it.

Perhaps the most interesting aerial exploit of the week is the circumstance that an Italian aeroplane has succeeded in locating several Austrian mines. No similar success has been recorded in our own latitudes, nor can we hope too much that it will be. Our home waters are far more turbid and far less smooth than the placid Adriatic.

All the same, however, this matter is of the greatest significance. Once aeroplanes can be tangibly employed to detect things under water, a great step will have been made towards defeating submarine warfare whether fixed or mobile.

For the rest, it would appear that our aeroplanes employed in the land warfare are using bombs more freely than at first, and that they are well in advance of the Germans in this particular phase of aerial warfare.

Loss and damage from the air is likely enough to befall us sooner or later, but all the indications are that we hold the upper hand.

Given that isolated hostile successes count for nothing whatever. So far as can be gauged, serious aerial warfare is bound to mean heavy losses on either side, with victory only to the side which aggregates best, possibly only to the side which has anything left over after a definite clash.

The air is still a quite novel battlefield. But in so far as the results of the present war can teach us anything, they teach that the human element is the determining factor even more in the air than on the water or under the water.

In the past we have been told *ad nauseam* that war to-day is a "matter of machinery." Everything seems to indicate that with the very latest appliances the human element counts for more and more.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

AUGUST 3RD.—Sir Edward Grey stated British policy and revealed Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting our obligations to France. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany. German and French Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin.

AUGUST 4TH.—Germany rejected England's ultimatum. English Government took over control of railways. War declared between England and Germany.

AUGUST 5TH.—Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for War. H.M.S. *Amphion* struck a mine and foundered.

AUGUST 6TH.—House of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by 500,000 men. State control of food prices.

AUGUST 8TH.—Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000 men.

AUGUST 9TH.—The enemy's submarine, U15, was sunk by H.M.S. *Birmingham*.

AUGUST 10TH.—France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans advanced on Namur. The new Press Bureau established by the Government for the issue of official war news.

AUGUST 11TH.—England declared war against Austria.

AUGUST 15TH.—The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and the use of the Polish language.

AUGUST 16TH.—Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.

AUGUST 17TH.—The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in France.

The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.

AUGUST 18TH.—General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appointed to command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in succession to the late General Grierson.

AUGUST 20TH.—The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near Shabatz.

AUGUST 21ST.—The German forces entered Brussels.

AUGUST 22ND.—Serbia announces that their army had won a great victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

AUGUST 23RD.—Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian army gained an important victory near Gumbinnen against a force of 160,000 Germans.

AUGUST 24TH.—It was announced that Namur had fallen.

The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was occupied by the Germans.

AUGUST 27TH.—Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German armed merchantman *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on the West Africa Coast.

AUGUST 28TH.—A concerted operation was attempted against the Germans in the Heligoland light.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the *Mainz*. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, *Köln* class, and another cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking condition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that "The Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India."

SEPTEMBER 1ST.—The Russians met with a check in East Prussia, but were successful in minor engagements in Galicia.

SEPTEMBER 2ND.—Continuous fighting was in progress along almost the whole line of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinction, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten guns. The French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. The Russian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.

SEPTEMBER 3RD.—The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

SEPTEMBER 4TH.—The Russian Army under General Ruzsky, captured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

SEPTEMBER 5TH.—The formal alliance of England, France, and Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

SEPTEMBER 6TH.—It was announced that the scout-cruiser *Pathfinder* foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.

SEPTEMBER 7TH.—General Joffre's plans were being steadily carried out. The Allied forces acted on the offensive and were successful in checking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the German forces opposed to them.

SEPTEMBER 8TH.—The Allies gained ground on the left wing along the line of the Ourcq and the Petit Morin river. Here the British troops drove the enemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from Vitry-le-François to Sermaise-les-Bains the enemy was pressed back in the direction of Rheims.

SEPTEMBER 9TH.—The English Army crossed the Marne, and the enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

SEPTEMBER 11TH.—Our 1st Army Corps captured twelve Maxim guns and some prisoners, and our 2nd Army Corps took 350 prisoners and a battery.

SEPTEMBER 13TH.—On the left wing the enemy continued his retreating movement. The Belgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive to the south of Liège.

SEPTEMBER 14TH.—All day the enemy stubbornly disputed the passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the crossings were secured by sunset. On our right and left the French troops were confronted with a similar task, in which they were successful.

SEPTEMBER 15TH.—The Allied troops occupied Rheims. Six hundred prisoners and twelve guns were captured by the Corps on the right of the British.

SEPTEMBER 16TH.—Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed the German cruiser *Uela*, six miles south of Heligoland.

SEPTEMBER 19TH.—The Russian army seized the fortified positions of Sieniawa and Sambor.

SEPTEMBER 20TH.—Rheims Cathedral was wantonly bombarded, and nothing is left but the four bare walls.

The British auxiliary cruiser *Carmania*, Captain Noel Grant, Royal Navy, sank the *Cap Trafalgar* off the east coast of South America. The action lasted one hour and forty-five minutes, when the German ship capsized and sunk, her survivors being rescued by an empty collier.

SEPTEMBER 22ND.—H.M. ships *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* were sunk by submarines in the North Sea. The *Aboukir* was torpedoed, and whilst the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* had closed and were standing by to save the crew, they were also torpedoed.

SEPTEMBER 23RD.—British aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered an attack on the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf and Flight Lieutenant Collet dropped three bombs on a Zeppelin shed, approaching within 400 feet.

SEPTEMBER 25TH.—The German right wing was strengthened by the transfer of Army Corps both from the centre of their line and from their left in Lorraine and the Vosges. Along the line of the Aisne there was little change in the general position.

SEPTEMBER 26TH.—There was much activity on the part of the enemy all along the line. Some heavy counter-attacks were repulsed, and considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy.

SEPTEMBER 27TH.—Between the Oise and the Somme and to the north of the Somme, the battle continued along a very extensive front with perceptible progress on our part. By the evening our troops regained the ground they had lost. Between the Argonne and the Meuse there was nothing new to report. In the south of the Woevre the Germans occupied a line which passed through St. Mihiel and the north-west of Pont-a-Mousson.

SEPTEMBER 28TH.—At certain points, notably between the Aisne and the Argonne, the enemy made further violent attacks, which were repulsed.

SEPTEMBER 29TH.—There was practically no change in the situation. The Allied left had some very heavy fighting, but they well held their own.

DAY BY DAY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1st.

The Allied line moved forward to the north of the Somme and in the Southern Woevre, the district to the east of Verdun. The arrival of the Indian Expeditionary Force at Marseilles was announced.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 2nd.

On the left wing the battle continued very fiercely, particularly in the neighbourhood of Roye. On the Meuse the Germans attempted to throw a bridge across the river near St. Mihiel, but it was destroyed. On the remainder of the front everything was quiet. The Secretary of the Admiralty communicated the following: "The German policy of mine-laying combined with their submarine activities, makes it necessary on military grounds for the Admiralty to adopt counter-measures. His Majesty's Government have, therefore, authorised a mine-laying policy in certain areas and a system of mine-fields has been established and is being developed upon a considerable scale."

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 4th.

On our left wing the battle was in full progress in the Arras region. Progress was made in the Soissons region, where the enemy's trenches were taken. On almost all the remainder of the front the lull continued. A German army, four corps strong, established between the frontier of East Prussia and the Niemen, has had its left wing thrown back on Mariampol and Suwalki.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 5th.

On our left wing to the north of the Oise the battle continued with great violence. At certain points we had to yield ground. On the remainder of the front there was no change. In Russia, after a battle which lasted ten days, the German army which was operating between the front of East Prussia and the Nieman was beaten all along the line and retreated, abandoning a considerable quantity of material.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6th.

The situation remains "in statu quo."

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7th.

It was reported that a German destroyer had been sunk by a British submarine off the German coast. The authorities at Antwerp announced the probability of bombardment of the city.

CORRESPONDENCE.

BUCKINGHAM PALACE,
October 5th, 1914.

On August 6th I appealed to the nation to assist me in founding a National Fund to prevent and alleviate military and civil distress arising in consequence of the War. To-day, after the lapse of exactly two months, I am happy to say that the Fund has reached the splendid total of £3,000,000. I wish to take this opportunity of thanking once more the many thousands of generous subscribers who have helped me to achieve this grand result.

I have delegated the responsibility of administering the Fund to the Executive Committee, which I have appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, and I count upon the Committee to see that assistance in emergency cases is adequate and given with as little delay as circumstances permit. I trust that the portion of the Fund which is to be applied in relief of civil distress may, as far as possible, flow into productive channels, such as assisting schemes for male and female employment and perhaps industrial training, for it is as repugnant to me as it must be to the recipients that assistance should be distributed only in the form of doles. What men most want is work, and what the young people need is training.

The sum which has already been raised is magnificent, and I am confident that the generous British public will continue to do their utmost to alleviate the distress which war inevitably brings in its train.

EDWARD.

COLONIAL INFANTRY.

We are requested to state that the High Commissioners of Canada, Australia, and South Africa view with favour the formation of the Colonial Infantry Battalion which has been authorised by the War Office, and is now proceeding at the White City, Shepherd's Bush entrance.

The High Commissioners will co-operate as far as possible, and advise all those men who have at present, or have had, association with the Overseas Dominions and Colonies, and who have not already enlisted elsewhere, to apply for enrolment in this Battalion of Colonial Infantry.

Applications in person or by writing should be made to Colonel Arthur du Cros, M.P.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

The *Sporting Times* maintains its reputation for "liveness," and forms a welcome relief from eternal disquisitions on the fate of Von Klock and the situation on the Niemen. The cartoon of the week is especially clever, and at the present time the "Pink 'Un" forms an admirably witty addition to the smoking-room table list, combining genuine smartness with a thorough review of racing matters.

The *Tatler* has organised a Games Bureau to supply indoor games of every description to the various institutions where our soldiers and sailors are being restored to health. All games should be addressed to Mrs Hugh Spottiswoods (Hon. Superintendent), *Tatler* Games Bureau, Great New-street, London, E.C., who will distribute them on a regular plan to the various hospitals and other places where the wounded are lying. All packages sent should have the name and address of the donor clearly written on the outside of each package.

The current number of the *Asiatic Review*, devoted especially to features connected with the war, gives particular prominence to our Eastern Allies, special articles by Lieut.-Col. Yate on "The British Army in Europe" and "The Mighty Voice of India" being well worthy of attention, while Marmaduke Pickthall also contributes a survey of "Turkey in Europe," and D. N. Singh deals with "The Indian Press and the War." The situation in the eastern area of conflict is reviewed by E. Charles Vivian in an article entitled "The

Opening of the Eastern Campaign," and altogether the number is one of great interest from a topical as well as an Asiatic point of view.

One of the latest additions to the ranks of British publications, *Colour*, is showing what can be done in the way of capturing German trade by adopting the method of production long pursued in the case of *Jugend*, the famous Munich paper, and other continental publications. The third number of *Colour*, recently to hand, contains reproductions in colour of the work of famous British and other artists; Brangwyn and Augustus John have been well represented in its pages, and Orpen's name is another that may be mentioned in connection with this excellent production, while the style of story and article in the paper is on a level with its illustrations. Up to the present *Colour* is the best thing that has been done in the way of chilling monthly production.

The issue of *The Academy* for the current week is especially interesting. Its principal feature is an "Open Letter" to Lord Roberts, in which the lessons of the present campaign are neatly enforced, and the work of the veteran soldier is emphasised in its connection with our present specially-recruited army. A good article entitled "The Amateur Strategist," by E. Charles Vivian, points out the pitfalls that await criticism of military affairs without the necessary knowledge, and "The Belgian Refugees" throws much light on the organisation of the relief of our influx of visitors. Two of the reviews are of excellent topical value, "Britain's Sure Shield" treating of the work of the Navy, and "Armies and their Secrets" dealing with the German and Russian forces. It must be admitted that *The Academy* gives us this week a remarkably fine number.

Army Drill Made Easy, a sixpenny manual issued by the Temple Press, has been written and illustrated by the staff of *The Regiment*, the well-known "soldier's paper"; unlike any other publication, official or unofficial, this has been specially written to meet the present need for concentrated active service training. Every word matters to the officers and men now in the ranks. The drill explained is only the drill necessary in war training. Mere parade "frillings" have been cut out under the practical supervision of the editorial staff, who know from actual experience the specialised kind of training needed to fit a man for active service as quickly as possible. *Army Drill Made Easy* should be of the greatest assistance both to recruits and to the ex-N.C.O., who, rejoining the forces, finds his knowledge a trifle rusty. A useful addition to the book is the *Army A.B.C.*, in which a great number of Army terms are explained.

Of particular interest at the present time is the official history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, issued by Messrs George Allen and Unwin in one large volume at a guinea. The various campaigns of the war are described by military officers who actually took part, and the book counts as an authoritative record of the strategy and tactics in every field of the operations. Of especial interest is the account of Bourbaki's ill-fated operations, and the section devoted to the study of the campaign conducted over the present field of action. Most of the work is written from an extremely German point of view, but although the successes of German arms are emphasised, and the unfitness of Napoleon's armies in the field is brought well to the front, this bias is not permitted to obtrude to an extent which interferes with the correctness of the narrative. Though we may resent the pro-German attitude, we must also bear in mind that France of 1870 was a very different country from Republican France of to-day, and the strictures passed in this volume were fully justified by the events of the time. The book is historical and authoritative, and must be counted as a work of permanent value.

The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries recommend any farmer who is experiencing difficulty in obtaining farm hands to apply to the local Labour Exchange, the address of which can be obtained at any post office. The labour exchanges are making special efforts to furnish farmers with the names of suitable men and women who have had previous experience in farm work, and all applicants will be interviewed and passed by a farmer of standing before they are put into communication with those who are in need of them.

H.M. QUEEN MARY'S Royal Naval Hospital at Southend will be opened shortly for the reception of wounded seamen and marines from the Navy. One of its chief needs will be an efficient supply of sweaters and jerseys for the use of the men returning to duty after having been restored to health. Cricketers, football players, and rowing men do not need to be told of the inestimable value of a sweater for warding off chill. To these patients such a gift would be a veritable godsend, seeing that the winter is approaching and the cold in the North Sea will be intense for men on destroyers and other craft doing patrol duty.

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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

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SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND PROSPECTS AT THIS MOMENT.

THIS week is the critical week in the first phase of the European War.

Contact is established upon the Vistula, the lines in France have reached their maximum of extension, the Germanic powers (not their opponents) have put the last recruits and the last reserves into the field. From this week we must expect—from this week onward—some decision.

It is the moment for taking stock not only of the strategical position in which the opposing forces now find themselves throughout Europe, but also of the main movements which have led to these positions, and of the main strategical results which may or should proceed from those positions. And in connection with this task of "taking stock" we will do well to note in passing certain novel conditions of warfare—such as the weakness of the fortress—emerging from the two months of struggle. For, it is upon our appreciation of these novel conditions that the soundness of our judgment for the future will largely depend.

In appreciating the situation as a whole, we have two things to consider which appear everywhere in human effort. They are the material and the moral elements in that effort.

To take first the material:—Here is an outline map showing in the roughest possible fashion the two great material factors in the present situation. These are:

(2) The opportunities of supply and of communication open to either party.

Opportunities of supply for petrol, for horses, for copper, and the rest, and, what is less important to the Germanic Powers, for food, I have marked with arrows; and the numerous arrows which I have indicated for England, for France, and for Russia signify, of course, the perfectly open field of supply in such things which these three Allies have behind them. Russia has behind her an indefinitely large supply coming over her Plains from the East, whether of horses or of petrol, of copper, of nitrates, or of almost any other necessary. France and England have an equally immeasurable field behind them for the provision of such supply afforded them by the ocean, so long as the ocean is kept open by the superiority of the British Fleet.

The opportunities for this external supply which is partially afforded through neutral countries to the Germanic central Powers I have marked by broken arrows. I have marked it thus differently because the supply is doubtful, and with increasing difficulty obtained. For instance, there may be some limited and difficult supply of petrol to be obtained in this fashion by the Germanic Powers, through occasional cargoes coming by Norway; but the only direct supply (so long as that is continued) would be from Roumania.

In the same way the main communications by which each body of Allies moves or can move its men and material I have indicated by lines of dots, but these, of course are, in the case of the sea, almost



(1) The position of the opposing lines (of which the Germanic are in thick black and the Allies in open white).

as numerous as the ports are, while a whole gridiron of railways behind the Western field of war supplies the Western front of the Allies in France. These

main lines, therefore, are only to be taken as a very incomplete and elementary indication of the full opportunities of communication which the Allies enjoy. The corresponding main communications of the German Powers I have marked in full lines.

Even from such an elementary sketch certain main features emerge. In the first place the Germanic Powers are seen to possess one prime advantage coupled with one prime disadvantage.

The prime advantage is that they stand united in place and time, as also, largely, in spirit. They are each well served, moreover, by railway communications permitting them to pass troops and guns from west to east and east to west continually.

Now the prime material disadvantage which the Germanic Powers, our enemies, suffer is not remotely connected with this advantage of theirs. This disadvantage is a more or less complete *blockade*.

The Germanic Powers can pass troops and guns from frontier to frontier speedily. Why? Because they are inland powers holding the centre of Europe, the one the Baltic Plain, the other the Valley of the Danube. And both the Baltic Plain and the Valley of the Danube run east and west. For the mountain ranges which might interfere with communication do not run across these main lines, but parallel to them. But this same fact that our enemies are in the midst of Europe makes possible their more or less complete blockade by sea, which in its turn is due to the superiority of the British Fleet.

When we say that it is to the advantage of the Germanic powers to be thus packed together, with main communications running east and west, we mean something like what is meant in smaller fields of strategy by the term "interior lines."

For instance, supposing Russia, with her great numbers, could send troops and guns to Belgium in three or four days, it would be obviously of immense advantage to the Allies in the Western field of war. But Russia cannot do this. Such an expedition would mean thousands upon thousands of miles of steam, weeks upon weeks of time, and an impossible calculation of organised detail. Germany, on the other hand, can send a large body of troops from the Russian field of operations to the Belgian field of operations in a less number of days than the number of months that would be required for bringing a Russian body to the West. And this power of acting upon interior lines of communication has a further important advantage: you can use your knowledge of the two combined fields, Eastern and Western, *immediately*. A big Russian success or failure upon the Vistula is felt and acted upon *immediately* in the shape of reinforcements or withdrawal of Germanic troops to or from the Eastern and from or to the Western field. A double campaign is "felt" more faithfully and acutely by the people sitting in the middle than it can be by the people pounding at the two outside edges. The knowledge of what is going on at a circumference can be more thoroughly co-ordinated from a centre than from a periphery. The Allies have indeed to-day the telegraph, which eliminates what would have been an almost insuperable difficulty a hundred years ago; but co-ordination by telegram with people whom you cannot meet and see at every few days' interval is another thing from co-ordination by personal interview between commanders or their envoys none of whom are twenty-hours from your centre.

Serious, however, as these material advantages are to the central Powers, they are certainly outweighed especially in the later phase of the general campaign,

by the corresponding disadvantages; for the blockade of certain prime materials, even where it is not absolute, is a most serious thing for a modern belligerent and a particularly serious thing for that belligerent if he is a Prussian.

All war connotes a lavish expenditure of most things usually husbanded, from human life to horse flesh. But Prussian war *particularly* depends upon the power of this lavish expenditure. The whole spirit of Prussian warfare is to win at once, and the whole weakness for Prussia lies in the inability of the Prussian commander, text-book or professor, to tell you what is to be done in case of a progressive defeat. The successes of Prussia in this war have been successes due to immediate and expensive attack, of heavy artillery against fortification, of close formation in overwhelming numbers in the field, and of forced rapid marching. I do not belittle this spirit. It is one of the two only ways of winning. What I am pointing out is that it involves a lavish, a spendthrift, expenditure of *everything* in the sweep forward to succeed once and for all.

So there we have two important things pointing to the necessity of very rapid immediate supply if Prussia and her Ally are to win. First, that all war involves this enormous consumption as in a matter of life and death. Secondly, that in particular Prussian war demands it.

But there is a third element favouring blockade to-day. *Modern* war demands such expenditure in a peculiar degree, because modern war deals with the maximum numbers of men, horses, material, fuel, and all the rest of it: it mobilises a whole nation.

There is yet a fourth factor advantaging the blockaders and disadvantaging the blockaded in modern war, and that is the peculiar nature of certain indispensable materials for modern war.

It so happens that modern war requires for its conduct a whole category of materials such as petrol, copper and certain of the chemicals necessary to the production of high explosives, which materials are not universally discovered, are mostly extra-European in origin, and depend for their introduction to Central Europe mainly upon sea-borne commerce.

Consider, for instance, the position of the Germanic Powers in the matter of petrol. Without petrol you cannot fly, and without petrol your transport—at least in Western Europe—is grievously hampered. Well, the main supplies of petrol come from Asia, from America, from the Russian Caucasian region, from Roumania, and from Galicia. Of all these fields the Roumanian alone is, in theory at least (of what is actually happening I say nothing), open readily to supply the Germanic Powers. And even if this field were as open practically as it is in the theory of international law, a Russian advance southward over the Hungarian Plain would intercept it, and has already partially intercepted it.

Imagine the positions reversed, and the importance of this factor of disadvantage will appear. Supposing the main sources of petrol in the world lay within Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, see what an advantage our enemies would then possess! As it is that advantage is exactly, or nearly exactly transferred to the British and their Allies.

Having said so much on the material advantages and disadvantages of the position occupied at this moment by the Germanic Powers in the centre of Europe, let us turn to the moral account and strike a balance. It is important to do so, because upon the moral factor everything ultimately depends—

though this factor is much more difficult to appreciate than is the material, and can never be appreciated so exactly.

First of all we have the factor of homogeneity: *which of the two bodies of opponents is morally the most united, the Allies or the Hapsburg-Hohenzollerns?*

There is here a very subtle problem.

The Allies consist in three great national groups, to which must be added the two smaller nations of Belgium and Servia. Now as regards each of these groups, the national feeling is absolute and unanimous. Every single Frenchman, every single Belgian, every single Russian, every single Servian is determined upon the French, the Russian, the Servian, and what is now the Belgian object of the war. One may even justly say that (with the exception of certain German populations in the Russian Baltic) those populations which are not in sympathy with the central governments of Russia and England, but which are subject to them, are far more in sympathy with the anti-German policy of Russia and England than with any other part of Russian or British policy. For instance, the chief doubtful element of all, the Poles, are, as a nation, far more inclined to-day to support Russian than Prussian arms. The Allies have then that essential moral element in strategy: a common purpose really inspiring them.

On the other hand, the Germanic Powers are handicapped by the fact that only the German speaking core, and not quite all of that, is enthusiastic for their cause. The Magyars are certainly in sympathy, but they are disparate. They are occupied (or have been until the present war) in the government and even the oppression of aliens. Millions of Roumanians, and millions of Catholic Slavs who are not of the Magyar temper and who do not desire any Austro-Hungarian success, are subject to them. The Austrian-German is somewhat at issue with the Catholic Slav of Bohemia, violently at issue with the small Italian-speaking population in the south on the Adriatic. That brave, intelligent, and intensely vital Italian body is a highly important factor for disruption and peril to the Hapsburgs at the present moment.

There is a sufficient measure of orthodox Serbs in the south-east to be another source of peril; and though the Austrian-Pole is not averse from Austria, Polish feeling must be taken as a whole, and it has been permanently alienated from the Germanic claim by the political incapacity of Prussia. For Prussia cannot govern.

Belgium, which Germany proposes to administer (we may look at any moment for a policy of annexation, that is—even without formal decree—for the establishment of German Courts, as of German currency, and for the official German re-naming of

Belgian topography), is less reducible to the German claims than any area in Europe, great or small. Alsace-Lorraine is enemy's country to the Germans, though it talks the German tongue; and all Prussian Poland—that is, everything more than one hundred miles east of Berlin, and everything more than thirty miles from the Baltic Sea—is still more bitterly anti-German.

If, upon the immediately preceding map, you mark with a thick black line the frontier of the area occupied by our enemies at this moment and mark off with hatching the area occupied by populations disaffected to those who occupy their territory with arms, you will find no such areas among the Allies and a very large proportion of such areas within the territory for the moment administered by our enemies.

Yet another modification must, however, be allowed before we have any complete view of the spiritual factors the strategist must consider.

Though the German powers are thus handicapped by whole regions which are either actively hostile or doubtful in their allegiance, they have this advantage—that where they are united they are completely united. What the war may bring forth in the long run we can none of us tell, but we may make quite certain that at the present moment, and for a long time to come, that which is German in the Germanic effort stands as one man. The Allies—Russia, England, and France—may be equally determined upon one *object*; but the German resistance is one *thing*.

The Russians coming over the boundary of East Prussia, the threat of a French advance upon, say, Treves, each violently affect and almost in the same degree a man of education living in Leipsic. But to hear that the Germans were recently occupying the government of Suwalki makes no Englishman's blood boil. Few Russians would feel it intolerable that the Germans should have been in Arras. The stay of some hours which the Germans made in Arras (where, by the way, they failed to burn the MSS., upon which the Life of St. Patrick is based, but seem to have destroyed St. Waast) means to a Frenchman something very different from what it can mean to any Englishman. Thirty shells dropped upon Westminster Abbey and leaving it a ruin would mean to an Englishman something quite different from the burning of Rheims. To most Frenchmen it would mean nothing at all.

That is the moral strategical disadvantage in all alliances, that every alliance is "weak at the seams," but this alliance suffers from the weakness less perhaps than any alliance in the past has suffered from similar divergences.

I cannot complete this brief survey of the general situation (so far as material and moral forces are concerned) without recalling (1) on the *material* side the factor of *numbers*; (2) on the *moral* side the factor of *claim*.

(1) In the material factor of *numbers* there is a very simple formula, which anyone may use like a rule of thumb, to remember what the situation is. Of trained men in the first line (that is, the young armies with their full complements of all arms and nothing improvised) you may put down the Germanic Powers at 110; the French at 40; the British—in the first phase at 3; the Russians at, say, 25, growing rapidly through 30 to 50.

In the phase immediately succeeding, allowing for similar losses on all sides, you get, with the Germanic Powers still at 110, the new British forces swelling from three up to anything you like—say twenty or even twenty-five. If the war were very



much prolonged that figure might be increased indefinitely. The Russian thirty or fifty increases to 100, to 150, and, at a pinch, to 250. The French forty cannot increase. It was, at the beginning of the war, at its maximum.

(2) As to the moral factor of *claim*, no one, even a student considering mere strategies, can neglect it. The Prussians claim rule, the Allies freedom. It is true that the Germanic Powers, and particularly the modern German Empire, are fighting for their life; but then so is everybody else—except, possibly, Russia; and even Russia would cease to be Russia without her family of kindred states. But there is this indisputable difference between the fight for life of the Allies and the fight for life of their enemy: that the enemy is claiming as part of his fight for life something which no European will ever accept. No Western European, at least, has ever accepted contentedly, or ever will accept without ceaseless revolt, an alien government. The conception that he would do so is the great strategic miscalculation modern Prussia made a generation ago. She is too stupid to learn.

It is, in truth, a strategic miscalculation and one has a right to allude to it in a strategic commentary, for there is one great principle underlying all strategies, which is this: "*The success of a campaign can only be measured in terms of its political object.*"

For instance; Napoleon succeeded in 1796-97 because his object was to clear the Austrians out of the Lombard Plain. If his object had been to turn the men of the Lombard Plain into Mahomedans the campaign would have been an infinitely more difficult task and he would have failed.

Here is an important concrete note upon what I mean. Germany by her action in Belgium has not, as a plain matter of fact, saved any appreciable number of men upon her communications. Those communications are not 100 miles in length. She thought by one miscalculation that they would run through Belgium, as they do through Luxemburg, in territory free from peril. She has produced a state of affairs in which those few miles require a larger garrison than they would have required had she done no more than civilised Europeans in the past have done, to wit, executed those who broke the laws of war and spared the rest. My judgment in this will be disputed. I believe it to be sound.

THE "BLOCK" OR DEADLOCK.

There is the foundation, moral and material, upon which the situation now rests. Let us next turn to the present strategical position and what led up to it.

The first characteristic of that strategical position is a "block" or deadlock upon the East as upon the West; which block has lasted, roughly speaking, for a month.

The second characteristic of the position is that the block is maintained well exterior to anything vital in the Germanic powers.

Upon the west it is almost entirely external to their boundaries; only Upper Alsace, and a fraction of that, is in the hands of the French.

Upon the east it is largely so; only Eastern Galicia and a few miles of East Prussia is in the hands of the Russians; all West Poland is in the hands of the Germans.

To perceive how true both these propositions are, look at the following diagram.

Here is the front of the positions occupied by the German armies in the west to-day (Tuesday, October 13th)—represented by a full line. Compare



DOTTED LINES REPRESENT POSITIONS ON SEPTEMBER 13TH.
FULL LINES REPRESENT POSITIONS ON OCTOBER 13TH.

it with the similar position occupied a calendar month ago, upon September 13th—represented by a dotted line—and see how slight has been the change. There has, it is true, been an extension northward, due to the successive attempts of France and Germany to outflank each other, but, so far as the advance of the one party or of the other is concerned, hardly any such advance has taken place.

Turn to the same question in the east, and though the deadlock is not there so striking, it is remarkable enough. Here you have the Austro-German front a



DOTTED LINES REPRESENT POSITIONS ON SEPTEMBER 13TH.
FULL LINES REPRESENT POSITIONS ON OCTOBER 13TH.

month ago in dotted lines, and in a full line what appears to be the Austro-German front to-day.

As to the way in which these blocked fronts keep the Allies at arm's length to the east and the west of Germanic territory, the reader can understand it best by looking at the following rough diagram.

In this sketch, the German-speaking area (1), in so far as it corresponds with the feeling in favour of our enemies, is marked with deep hatching. The area in favour of our enemies (3), but not German-speaking as a whole, is marked with another hatching; the boundaries of territory occupied by the German and the Austrian Empires in arms is marked with a broad black line. Finally, the hatching (2) represents



1. GERMAN SPEAKING AND MORALLY ATTACHED.
2. GERMAN SPEAKING OUT OF SYMPATHY.
3. NON-GERMAN SPEAKING BUT IN SYMPATHY.
4. THE WHITE PORTION WITHIN BLACK BOUNDARIES REPRESENTS RACES NEITHER GERMAN SPEAKING NOR IN SYMPATHY. BLACK LINES REPRESENT BOUNDARIES OF TERRITORY NOW OCCUPIED BY GERMANIC FORCES.

the areas within this broad black line which are German-speaking but opposed to the war and not morally attached to the German-speaking core. All the rest—not German either in speech or sympathy—a larger area, is left white. It is apparent at a glance how the war is still being pushed well back from what is, for our enemies, their own soil. We shall not be bringing pressure upon that soil, we shall not have turned them from invaders into beleaguered men,—nationally speaking, they are still far from it—until we have got them back somewhere *on to the deeply hatched central area.*

Now, what are the conditions, both expected and unexpected, which have led to this “block” or deadlock of opposing lines, east and west, external to the Germanic core we are fighting; and what are the prospects of the future, or rather, what *alternative* prospects do those conditions promise?

The “block” to east and to west, in so far as it represents a failure in the general German plan, is a failure due to the breakdown of what may be vulgarly called “the strategy of rush.”

In a minor degree this “strategy of rush” failed also on the side of the Allies when the French had to give up their premature attempt upon Alsace-Lorraine, and suffered a heavy defeat (in the last third of August) south of Metz. In the eastern field it failed still more conspicuously when the quite unexpectedly rapid Russian advance into East Prussia broke so disastrously at the same time before Tannenberg.

But these failures in the “rush strategy” of the Allies were but of slight effect upon the general conduct of the war compared with the failure in the “rush strategy” of the Germanic powers.

For the Allies never intended to “rush” the campaign as a whole. The French preliminary work in Alsace-Lorraine was that of an advance guard. The Russian work in East Prussia was equally detached from the general aggregation of later Russian forces ten times as numerous. The French, when they failed in their preliminary clutch at Lorraine, had an army corps cut up and lost the strength of perhaps a division, as well as over fifty guns. The Russians, in their preliminary clutch at East Prussia, had a couple of army corps cut up and lost perhaps 30,000 men, perhaps 50,000, perhaps more, to the enemy. But as regards the vast national armies and the general national plan, neither of the two Allies came out perceptibly the weaker from these mischances.

On the other hand, the failure of the German “rush strategy” determined the whole first phase of the war, and for this reason—that, in the German case, the “rush strategy” was not experimental initial work with heavy reserves behind it. It was something fundamental in the whole German scheme upon which this war was designed, and involved all the German power.

There are in any form of contested human efforts—a speculative adventuring in commerce, a prize fight, a race, or a war—two alternative avenues to success. By the first you concentrate effort upon immediate mastery over your enemy. You keep little reserve. You risk all. *If* you win you win not only thoroughly, but at an expense less probably in material and certainly less in time than in the alternative method—which is this:—To maintain an ample reserve, to expect your enemy, to hold him and to master him at last, and slowly, by your power of perpetually bringing up fresh strength.

In a race, for instance, it is the contrast between a man who sprints and a man who starts slow but counts on his staying power; in a wrestling match it is the contrast between a man who lavishly spends his energy in the first bout as against a man who merely resists until the third or fourth. And in modern war it is the prime contrast between the two great schools of strategy that dominate modern war. Not that each school is not attached to a vigorous offensive, but that the one risks initial weakness for the advantage of a strong reserve, the other risks the upsetting of all its plans for the advantage of immediate success to be achieved by all its force available in the field.

It need hardly be added that neither in war nor in any other form of contest is the one method demonstrably superior to the other. History is as full of success in either case as of disaster, and the whole choice in a modern war in Europe depends upon the calculation of modern European conditions.

Germany deliberately decided for the *first* of these two methods. She was to bring her all into the field at once. So was Austria. Her best armies were to advance upon the west, to overwhelm the numerically inferior French forces before the full weight of Russia could come into play. Upon the east her Austrian Ally was to march immediately and boldly into Russian Poland, strike across the Vistula by the Krasnik road for Lublin (as along the arrow) and get right on the main Russian railway and communications in the valley of the Bug.



Russia would return. But meanwhile she had been held by this rapid Austrian advance—this up-

setting of her communications—while France was being settled.

In the case of the western half of this plan Germany had two first-rate pieces of right judgment upon her side. She claimed that modern howitzer fire would dominate modern fortification, and she proved right. She claimed, in other words, that the French reliance upon strongholds would betray them in the field of time. She claimed that the fortresses of the Meuse would impose no appreciable delay. Further, she calculated that she could put (by the excellence of her organisation, and considering that the strain would be but a momentary one) the vast majority of her forces north of the Meuse in Belgium and maintain them supplied through the narrow gap of Liège for the few days necessary to an invasion of France. Once they should have broken through thus they



would have other communications open to them through Luxembourg and Treves, and the pressure would be relieved.

Here again they were perfectly right. They had brought against the Allied army on the Sambre forces far larger than any commander or critic outside Germany had thought possible.

Again, the advance on Paris was as rapid as human physical effort and human intelligence combined could make it. Few finer things have been done in the history of war than that amazing advance.

Up to the last days of August and to the first days of September the "rush" strategy Berlin had planned was triumphant. Then (about the anniversary of Sedan) in the first week of September came the failure in both theatres of war.

In the eastern theatre the Austro-Hungarian ally had pushed his main army right up into Russian Poland, had carried everything before him, had quite defeated the troops he had found at Krasnik and had pursued the road to Lublin. But the Russian mobilisation had proved more rapid and smooth than German calculations admitted. The forces Russia brought into the field at the end of August destroyed the fighting power of the Austrian flanking army round Lemberg, taking from it perhaps 400 guns and certainly 60,000 to 70,000 prisoners. The victors poured over and occupied all eastern Galicia. The chief Austro-Hungarian force which had been so successfully moving upon Lublin was compelled to

retire beyond the San and up the Upper Vistula Valley.

Meanwhile in France the policy of a large reserve had vindicated itself, and the fresh masses deliberately kept out of the field during the great retreat from Mons and Charleroi appeared from behind the screen of Paris and compelled Von Kluck's retreat.

From that moment in either theatre of war, eastern or western, the strategy of "rush" failed.

But precisely at that moment of failure came in another element to produce the "block" or deadlock which marked the rest of the month of September and the first days of October. Another modern element (which the British service could, perhaps, after the experience of South Africa, expect better than any other in Europe) modified what at first looked like the progressive defeat of the Germanic allies. This element was the formidable resisting power of entrenched infantry, backed by heavy guns. It was in the western field of war that this new element was particularly observable. Upon one of the best long defensive positions discoverable in Europe from the Argonne to Noyon the German army held its own day after day.

Yet another new element appeared. Your turning movement, the essence of which is that it should be unexpected (in the absence of heavy numerical superiority) proved no longer possible in modern war. To bring up great forces by railway was a matter not of hours but of days; and the movement could be observed almost sufficiently by old-fashioned methods of intelligence—cavalry, spies, prisoners—its discovery could be made even more certain by the use of air-craft. Finally, the only roads by which the work could be done, the railroads, limited to precise and known lines the methods of its advance.

Under all these conditions the attempt to turn the German line by its right north of Noyon failed. Every new French body brought up to extend that turning movement was met and checked by the arrival of a corresponding German body, drawn, as the Allied body had them drawn, from the centre and the east. Until after the extension of the line northward to the Belgian frontier at the end of September the turning movement as such may be said to have definitely failed. It had proved to be nothing but an extension of the block already established.

Something of the same sort appears to have gone on in the eastern field of war, though there certain modifications appeared. Germany lent aid to the Austro-Hungarian forces; between them the resistance to the Russian advance proved stronger and stronger, and the progress of the Russian hosts through Galicia grew less and less pronounced, until with the first days of October things were at a standstill in southern Poland. Meanwhile in northern Poland the very same phenomenon was repeated on a small scale as had taken place in France upon a gigantic one.

A rapid German advance to the Niemen failed, turned back, was pressed to a certain line of defence partly behind and partly in front of the frontier of the German Empire, and there, for the moment, at least, established a stalemate.

With this close and stationary grip so unexpectedly prolonged in either theatre of the great war ends its first phase.

Under what conditions does the second phase open, and what promises to be its leading characteristic? What kind of fighting are we to expect in the immediate future?

To forecast a single development in war is impossible, but to state necessary alternatives is possible enough.

Now, among all the theoretical possibilities of the situation, among all the ways in which the block may break up to our advantage or disadvantage, two are very much the most likely—(a) in the west the alternatives lie with far greater probability between the Allies *breaking* the German main communications and the Germans *turning* the main Allied line; (b) in the east—that is, in the Vistula—the alternatives obviously lie between an action, however prolonged, which will ultimately release German troops for the west or will ultimately call for German reinforcement from the west eastward. No great action upon the Vistula—with wet weather coming on and cold, with very poor roads, and hardly any railways—can be a draw. It may be prolonged but it will not be a draw. You will certainly have the initiative passing to the one side or to the other of the hosts that face each other to-day in southern Poland.

Observe the consequences. If the pressure upon Germany here ceases, or is relieved, German brought back forces returning to the west may pass through the gate on the Meuse that is still open at St. Mihiel and may so force back the whole right of the Allied line and open those shorter communications with Germany which I have alluded to so often in these columns. If, on the contrary, pressure on Germany and south Poland increases, Silesia is in danger and a withdrawal of troops from the western field, the maintenance of a mere defensive in that field, will be imperative to our enemies even if they have gained successes hitherto against the Allies in France.

The whole position may simply be put thus:—

The Germans having failed to *break* the Allied line in their attacks in the western front in France at Arras, at Albert, and at Roye, have a better chance of *turning* it by bringing down their reinforcements (following on the fall of Antwerp) upon the flank of the Allies, that is, between Lille and the sea. Already their cavalry are threatening such a move. Already they are in Lille.

The Allies, on their side, have no opportunity of *turning* a German line, which now extends right up to the Dutch frontier, and may, at any moment it chooses, touch the sea. But they may *break* it; and an obvious place for their efforts is in the neighbourhood of the Franco-Belgian frontier.

Meanwhile, whichever of the forces in north-eastern France now in movement has the better of the other, what happens in southern Poland will be the final and decisive thing. For if there is here an action which releases existing and victorious German forces, those forces can in a few days appear where they will in the western field, and particularly through the gate of St. Mihiel, which is being kept open at a great effort. But if the *Russians* are victorious in south Poland, then, no matter what happens in France, the menace overhanging Silesia will be of such weight that the Germans will certainly turn to a defensive in the west, and will use every man they can spare for the defence of the valley of the Oder.

Upon the upper part of that valley lie the wealth, the mines, half the industrial life of modern Germany. To threaten this with destruction is like threatening the destruction of Lancashire and the West Riding.

In the lower part of that valley lie the properties of the very class, the Prussian military caste, which is at the heart of this war, and whose claims to over-ride the public law of Europe, and to destroy the

lesser nations, is the spiritual motive maintaining the whole of this disastrous business.

The elements of the problem are, therefore:—

(1) The effect of the fall of Antwerp, the number and quality of the troops thus released;

(2) The appearance of these and other reinforcements upon the Western-German front between the Belgian frontier and Noyon;

(3) The way in which the gate at St. Mihiel is being kept open by the Germans; and

(4) The positions in south Poland, with their chances of victory and defeat, upon which, more than upon any other factor, the future would appear to turn.

Each of these four main elements has, in the last few days, developed with great rapidity, and I propose, in conclusion, to examine each.

I.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL OF ANTWERP.

When the German effort was first opened against Antwerp it was certain that the fortress must fall, nor was it very difficult to set limits within which that fall must come.

One of the three or four very great conclusions, hitherto disputed, now established by this war, is the conclusion that modern howitzer fire dominates modern permanent works—at least, the modern permanent works of the type which all the great ring fortresses had. After the fall of the fort Camp des Romains and the consequent German occupation of St. Mihiel just below, it was no longer possible for anyone to believe that Liège, Namur, Maubeuge, and the rest had each suffered on account of some peculiar local circumstance.

We can even give a time-table. Manonvilliers, a very strong isolated work, fell (seven or eight weeks ago) after not less than seven and not more than eleven days' bombardment; the last of the Liège forts after seven; the last of the Namur forts after two or three; the last of the Maubeuge defences after eight. Troyon successfully resisted for five days, and was then relieved. Camp des Romains appears to have succumbed to two or three days of the same form of attack.

The weapon, therefore, by which Antwerp was accounted for was simply the 8-inch and perhaps also the 11-inch howitzer.

The forts of the south-eastern section (Waelhem, Wavre St. Catherine, Lierre) were silenced in more than forty-eight and less than sixty hours. A short chance of resistance lay in the mobile defence of the garrison, especially along the line of the Nethe. But the numerical superiority of the enemy over the remaining garrison enabled him to cross after a three days' resistance. Then the howitzers were further brought up to bombard the city itself, and there was no particular military reason why it should continue to hold out. The value of a garrison numerically inferior to an investing enemy lies in the fact that behind fortifications it can employ and divert from other fields the more numerous forces opposed to it. When the fortification has gone, and it can no longer serve this purpose, its only proper place is the open field. The garrison of Antwerp withdrew somewhat late, but more than half seem to have re-established contact by the western road with their fellows and with the Allies near the sea coast.

Now there are two points in connection with these events. The first is only of academic interest

to-day. It is whether the garrison remained too long within the walls of Antwerp, and whether, therefore, the small drafts of the Allies sent in to counsel and aid such prolonged resistance were justified in their arrival and in that prolongation. There is no doubt of the object: the object was to see whether the German forces in front of Antwerp could not be held until the Allies had done the trick further south and had pierced into the German lines east of Lille. At any rate Antwerp fell before that success was achieved (for it is not even yet achieved), and the delay therefore proved not an advantage but a hurt. Instead of the garrison getting away in good condition, for use in the field, when the first breach had been made in the fortifications, only a portion got away; another smaller portion—but over 20,000 men—are prisoners of war; not, indeed, in the hands of the enemy, but interned in Holland. These include a certain number of Englishmen. It is evident that every hour's delay, as the Germans advanced northward towards the city, narrowed the belt between the German lines and the Dutch frontier. For Antwerp lies squeezed up along that frontier. And along that belt the retreat had to be conducted. That belt was narrowed so much when Antwerp fell that part of the evacuating garrison, including 2,000 British, would not or could not risk the defile and took refuge in Holland.

But the second point is not of academic interest, but is still of poignant and practical interest, and that second point concerns the immediate value of this act to the Germans. This is threefold.

(a) What number of troops has the fall of Antwerp released for the use of the enemy.

(b) Of what quality are these troops.

(c) In what direction will they probably be used.

(a) As to the numbers actually released by the fall of Antwerp.

We have first of all the two guesses and the biassed statement.

The biassed statement talks of 200,000 men. Now we may dismiss that immediately. The carefully organised Prussian system of influencing opinion includes fantastic stories spread through Copenhagen and Rome, as well as the reasonable stuff from Amsterdam and the really sober and accurate official communiqués. This German talk of 200,000 men released by the fall of Antwerp belongs to the first and worst category. The two guesses are the French estimate of 60,000, and a local estimate (on the sources of which I need not dwell) of 45,000.

I conceive the French estimate to be the nearest to the truth. More than 45,000, of whatever kind of troops, the Germans must have had in the face of the resistance they had to meet upon the Nethe, and of the probable (though, as it turned out, not the actual) task before them in the occupation of a city which, with its suburbs, counts nearer three-quarters of a million than half-a-million in numbers. But since we may be absolutely certain that in an action where their artillery was sure to succeed and under such active menace to their communications through northern France, the Germans would not waste a single man before Antwerp, we need not put the numbers at over 60,000.

Nor are all those 60,000 released. A certain number—not large—will be required to police Antwerp itself and to occupy the neighbourhood. A much larger number are accounted for by the necessity of facing the line of troops parallel with the sea-coast,

Belgian, English, and French, from north and south of Ostend onwards. Say that 40,000 men are released from directly in front of Antwerp and you have probably an exaggerated statement. Moreover, the same act releases for the field a much larger number of Belgian troops, who can give and have given a very good account of themselves against an equal number of the German reserves.

We may sum up and say that the direct result, the full amount of extra troops free for German work from before Antwerp, is not the significant point in the matter. Call it a division and not two divisions and you will not be far out. *What is far more important is the effect of the fall of Antwerp in releasing men now used along the communications between Liège and the French frontier, and the timing of the fall of Antwerp for the arrival in France of new German troops.*

So long as the Belgian Army lay within Antwerp it potentially threatened the main line of German communications through Belgium. Readers of these columns will remember the raid upon the railway between Louvain and Brussels some three or four weeks ago. Now the getting rid of this threat means (1) the release of men kept, on account of the threat, on the main line, Liège—Namur—Hirson; (2) the power of moving forward into France new troops.

Let us take these points in order. What release of men will be effected from the main line through Belgium by the withdrawal of the Antwerp menace? Nothing very great.

Of two things, one. Either this astonishing new Prussian doctrine (that murder and fire are tolerable to the European conscience for the purpose of securing communications through hostile country) has been successful, or it has not. Either the railway line from Liège to Hirson wanted its regular complement of men a mile (and a division could have held it anyhow), or it did not. *In either case the fall of Antwerp only releases the force that was previously masking Antwerp.* It does not release any considerable force kept upon the main line of communications to the south. There is no more mere terror than before.

But here comes in the second point. The Germans quite certainly attacked Antwerp at this late moment in order to be free to move through Belgium on to the Allied flank new troops which, till this moment, they had not ready. What are those troops?

It is certain that Germany is about to bring through Belgium against the Allies in France very considerable new forces. Of what they will consist we can only guess. They cannot come in *great* force until there has been some decision in the east; they may be the better trained of the new conscripts; they may be yet further bodies tentatively and perilously withdrawn from the left and the centre of the long German line in France. But though the bringing of those forces upon the flank of the Allied line, that is upon the Franco-Belgian frontier at Lille, and to the west thereof, is the most probable event of the near future, and though the fall of Antwerp will facilitate the movement, I do not see whence the enemy can very seriously increase his *value* (not his numbers) in this field. The German Government has undoubtedly called up all its boys and old men. Unlike the French, it will keep no reserves, but stakes *all* on *now*. Equally undoubtedly it is now ready to put into the field in France some new trained and probably mixed force: it would not attack Antwerp till that was ready. But of what value will that force be?

As to the troops that will be actually released from before Antwerp we have definite evidence. They are not troops of the first line. They are reserves, and for the most part reserves of the second class. Upon this all evidence agrees. German witnesses are silent; and Belgian, English, and French witnesses who have been able to test the matter in action are in no doubt. As to what *new* troops may be coming over common sense can guide us. The fall of Antwerp does not send against the flank of the Allied line young, new and fully trained troops. It can send new troops; it can send young troops; it can send old reservists. But it will not and cannot send first-class material. It will send men of the latest hardly trained levies and of the oldest and worse reserves—many of them also but partially trained. It cannot do what it did two weeks ago at Roye and at Arras.

The fall of Antwerp will release, it must be remembered, a large siege train; but that large siege train has been in existence all these weeks since the fall of Maubeuge; and the immediate work before the German army is not a new siege, but the release of its main communications between Noyon and Belgium from peril.

Now there are two ways in which this release may be effected. The Allied line which runs up opposed to the west front of the enemy from the corner where the Aisne joins the Oise up to and beyond the Belgian frontier, may be *pierced* or it may be *turned*. And the last question we have to ask about this new body of men which the fall of Antwerp will, directly and indirectly, let loose upon our flank from the Franco-Belgian frontier around Lille, is the direction in which this body will be launched. If the Germans still think they can break the Allied line they will send these reinforcing bodies of theirs east of Lille, and down to the Arras district, where they have already tried to break the line and failed, or to the Roye district further south, where they have also tried to break it and failed. If, as is more probable, they propose to outflank and to turn the Allied line, then they will launch their new forces upon the district westward of Lille, that is, between Lille and the sea. We shall see which they do, but it seems probable at this moment of writing, the afternoon of Tuesday, Oct. 13th, that they should attempt the latter adventure.

In order to see why this should be, let us briefly consider what the fortunes of this West front have been during the last month and are to-day.

II.


THE WEST FRONT, ROYE—ARRAS.

Briefly, the situation upon the west front, which makes one believe that the new German reinforcement will rather attempt to outflank us by Lille than to cut us further south is as follows:

The line held by the enemy east and west, right across Champagne, from Noyon east to the Argonne, was, as we have seen, capable of envelopment. Its right, or western flank up north of Noyon towards the Belgian frontier, was exposed. But since the numbers were nearly equal on both sides, and since a modern turning movement involves the use of great numbers and of railways, and can be watched from the air as well as in older fashion, the attempt of the French to creep northward and outflank was continually met by further German reinforcement, which crept northward and tried in its turn to outflank the French, until the line went clawing up northward with each attempt of the one party to get round the other, so that within three weeks it had stretched about seventy miles and was touching on

the Belgian frontier. Neither party being able to outflank the other, an attempt was made upon either side to outflank the opponent's line on this west front. The progressive extension of the two antagonists passed up through Roye, through Albert, through Arras, and at last to a point about ten miles south of Lille.

It must be particularly noted that in this attempt the Germans had a numerical superiority. They outnumbered and still outnumber the Allies. They brought up great masses from their centre and their left. They made three attempts to break the French line, each of which had a considerable measure of success, and each of which failed. One was the attempt round the town of Roye, the other to the north again round the town of Albert, the third and last round about the town of Arras to the north again.



THE ALTERNATIVE USE OF GERMAN REINFORCEMENTS EITHER TO CUT OR TO OUTFLANK THE ALLIED LINE.


In this diagram I have roughly suggested these three "bulges" which the Germans pushed out without succeeding in breaking the French line.

Every one of these bulges (or "salients") has been thrown back again. Roye is reoccupied by the French, who are now also either attacking or occupying Lassigny. They have long ago got back Albert. They are far to the east of Arras, which they retook last week.

III.

THE GATE AT ST. MIHIEL.


There is no need, in connection with the third element in this week's critical situation, to reproduce at length the description given on the past of the "open door" at St. Mihiel on the Upper Meuse. Two diagrams will suffice to recall it to the reader's recollection. The first diagram shows why the



opening of this door at St. Mihiel (upon the Upper Meuse) while it has not *yet* become important, might at any moment become important.

Here you have the German line A—B from the Belgian frontier of France to Noyon, B—C from Noyon to the neighbourhood of Verdun, faced by the Allied line. Verdun and Toul are two strong fortresses with a wall or barrier of forts between them. On the wrong side of that wall, to the east of that wall, is a German force M: on the right side of that wall, to the west, is a French force N: at S. half way between Verdun and Toul, is St. Mihiel—a town right on the barrier of forts, protected by two of these forts, and standing on the River Meuse, which is the obstacle those forts protect. A couple of weeks ago the Germans quite unexpectedly attacked and reduced the two forts (Paroches and Camp des Romaines) commanding St. Mihiel town, and in an attempt to cross the river (which now turns out to have been a feint) they were thrown back by the French force opposite them at N.

But here comes in the important point: *Though the attempted crossing at St. Mihiel was but a feint and did not succeed (for the Allies withdrew none of their troops and weakened no part of their line under that menace) the gap in the line of forts, the occupation of the town of St. Mihiel, and the power that occupation gives of crossing the river whenever sufficient forces come up, is still jealously retained by the Germans.*



Now this is surely of capital importance. Here in Diagram XIV. you may see the importance which Germany attaches to the crossing. Her forces occupy, and have occupied for now so many days, a position apparently perilous and quite abnormal in war. She has thrust a wedge in between the radius of action of the fortress of Toul and the radius of action of the fortress of Verdun. She keeps that gap open as a sort of roadway, very narrow, but just wide enough for her purpose. All the efforts of the French to advance from Toul on to the valley where the railway leads from Metz to Thiaucourt—which valley is called the Rupt du Mad—she concentrates forces to repel and succeeds in repelling. She similarly repels all efforts on the part of the garrison of Verdun to get south and to close the issue from the northern side. She anxiously and successfully maintains her railhead at Thiaucourt, which is the end of rapid communication from Metz, and which, through Metz, communicates with all central Germany behind Metz and with all the great depots of the middle Rhine. Though she makes no further effort *to-day* to cross the Meuse at St. Mihiel, she yet holds tenaciously to St. Mihiel town and bridge, and is not driven from it.

I suggest that Germany is here keeping open a door; and that in the expectation of victories in the east of Europe and of consequent reinforcements she means to hold that door open until she can, through

success in Poland, pour troops through the gap and take the Allied line in reverse—supposing she has not up to that moment been able to relieve the pressure upon the west or right flank of the German armies in France. If she is not acting with some such object, ultimately involving the investment of Verdun or of Toul, the re-establishment of communications through Alsace-Lorraine, and the pouring of great masses through which shall force back or take in reverse the eastern end of the Allied line, then her action is meaningless. And meaningless action is not the Prussian way in war.

But such action as the bringing up of large new hordes through the St. Mihiel "door" presupposes the release of great numbers from the eastern theatre of war. It is upon the result of the fighting in Poland that all ultimately turns.

IV. THE MAIN ISSUE IN POLAND.



Let us turn, then, to what we may justly conceive to be the most important theatre of all, the basin of the Middle and Upper Vistula.

It is necessary in time of modern war that news officially permitted to the public should be cut down to very simple and terse expression. But an inevitable consequence attaching to this necessity is a misapprehension of the enemy's strength in any particular field. Until things begin to go ill we tend to underestimate his strength; and when things go ill, to over-estimate it. And this simply because in the lack of sufficient bases for judgment the emotions of hope or fear take the place of calculation.

If a full story of what has happened in southern Poland during the last ten days were permitted, the public would be alarmed; but they would be unduly alarmed.

Briefly, there has been a very considerable set-back of the tide, if we are merely considering the ebb and flow of the line. The Russian forces, which had been advancing almost uninterruptedly through Galicia, first discovered that very considerable German reinforcements had come up to strengthen the Austrian armies, and next that they could effect no proper concentration upon their own side if the Galician army were to continue its western march. The *advanced parties* (only) of the Russian forces therefore have fallen back from just in front of the line Piotrkow-Kielce-Stopnitza-Tarnow—upon which line

much the largest number of their effectives were upon the left, between Tarnow up to and just across the Vistula—to the line of the Vistula itself, and that retirement is one of about sixty miles. It has been a duly organised retreat, made for the purpose of concentration, and averaging about ten miles a day.

Lest there should be a misapprehension as to the nature of this retirement and as to its gravity, it is most important to appreciate that we are dealing with the concentration of at least two Russian armies. The Russian army which I have marked in dots upon this sketch map as A—the same which had been going forward so successfully through Galicia and towards Cracow—was well ahead of the Russian army which I have marked B, and which was concentrating east of the Vistula at the same moment that the army A was advancing through Galicia in front of it. The Russian forces which less than a fortnight ago faced the advancing Germans along the line Stopnitzka-Kielce-Pietrokow were advanced forces thrown forward in front of the main Russian body upon and beyond the Vistula. In other words, while the advanced Russian bodies on the north of the line were falling back towards the Vistula, other bodies from the east were coming up to reinforce them.

But note that this necessity for a concentration upon the Vistula south of Warsaw, in face of the unexpectedly strong German advance, compelled the body A to fall back very much further east. It had to get behind the River San if it was to be in line with the main body to the north, and in getting behind the River San, A had also to give up the investment of Przemyśl.

At the moment of writing, Tuesday evening, what you seem to have in this all important theatre of the war is a situation made up of the following elements:—

(a) Russian forces of unknown amount but very large—certainly over 1,500,000 men—hold the line of the River Vistula from Ivangorod to Sandomir, and thence southwards, holding the line of the River San up to the neighbourhood of Jaroslav. There are further Russian forces to the south, but I am concerned with the immediate battle line alone.

(b) An Austro-German force of unknown amount, but presumably approximately equal or a little less, has advanced in the last ten days from the line Petrokow—Tarnow to this same line of the Vistula and the San. The German reinforcements are on the north, or left; the concentrated Austrian forces, both those intact and those formed from the remnants of the army defeated at Lemberg, form the south or right of the allied line.

(c) The Russian retirement behind the Vistula and the San has not been the result of any check in the field, still less of any defeat. It is quite evidently due to the fact that the most rapid concentration of the Russian forces now in southern Poland with the reinforcements coming from the east, is best effected by a retirement of the first to meet the advance of the second. It is equally evident that the Russian commanders have deliberately taken up the defensive behind or upon the Vistula and the San.

(d) In connection with the retirement of the one army and the advance of the other, there have happened a number of those incidents which always mark a retirement before the enemy. The advancing enemy picks up stragglers, bogged guns, and so forth; and the retiring army loses them. All that is quite unimportant to the ultimate issue, except in the case of a disorganised movement. The chief point (no doubt exaggerated) which the Germans can make in this connection is the picking up of 2,000 men, wounded and otherwise, in the neighbourhood of Grojec.

(e) This concentration upon the Vistula and the San has partly relieved Przemyśl. At least, it has apparently disengaged the western section of the investment.

It is probable that at the moment of writing full contact has already been taken from north to south and that the struggle is engaged. And upon that struggle, as I have pointed out several times in these comments, much more will depend than the fate of Polish territory and of the eastern campaign. For if or when the Russian forces behind the Vistula and the San pass from the defensive to the offensive, and if or when the allied Germanic forces before them begin to retire, the threat upon Silesia is at hand. In proportion to the completeness of such a victory the "pressure" upon the allied powers, and particularly upon the German empire, would be severe. Silesia would be in peril, and the western march of the Russians would be resumed.

If, upon the contrary, the Russian forces are in part disorganised by a German victory, or even held, then will come the opportunity for Germany to bring both German and Austrian troops westward and to attempt a final decision of the campaign in France. For among other things that the war has shown is the organisation whereby the Prussians can with unexpected rapidity transfer troops from west to east along their parallel lines of communication.

I sum up and say that upon these operations which have the Middle and Upper Vistula for their theatre depends, more than upon any other, the immediate future of the campaign.

V.

THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH POLAND.

The great importance of the coming action in south Poland belittles what has happened in the north of that country. But in view of the rather violent denouncing by Berlin of the Russian official communiqués, it is as well that we should be clear as to what has happened. To be thus clear will serve the double purpose of making us understand one important detail of the war, and also (what is perhaps of more value) it will enable us to test the value of the German official communiqué under defeat. It may well be that this piece of psychology will be really useful to us in the near future. Hitherto, the German official communiqués have been models of exactitude. They have suppressed unpleasant truths, but they have not as a rule told direct untruths, nor have they shown any sign of "nerves." But, as I think I can show, the German official communiqué dealing with the most recent operations in North Poland is both disingenuous and full of "nerves."

That official communiqué tells us that the Russian victories before Suwalki and Augustowo are "inventions"; that no attempt was made to besiege the fortress of Osowiec; that the Germans never intended anyhow to occupy the province of Suwalki; and that the Russians do not tell the truth because they did not in their earlier official communiqués describe the defeat of Tannenberg.

It is well to pay particular attention to this German message, because it is the first of all the German official messages to adopt this tone of falsehood, exaggeration, and complaint. The plain facts about the campaign between the East Prussian frontier and the River Niemen I told last week. They are known to all students of this war throughout Europe by this time, and they are simple and decisive.

Briefly, four or five German army corps advanced across the German frontier upon a front of anything between eighty and one hundred miles. An attempt was made to cross the Niemen at Drusskiniki, while at the same time a siege train was brought up to bombard the forts of Osowiec. The German attempt to cross the Niemen was beaten back, the mass of the German

and incidentally some of the big German howitzers were abandoned. The Russians coming through the Forests of Augustowo occupied that town, and, along the railway to the south, they advanced from Osowiec right over the Prussian frontier. The Prussians in their retreat left in Russian hands about 10,000 prisoners and about 40 guns. Nearly all their forces are now back over the Prussian frontier, while Russian forces are occupying Lyck and Margrabowa, where the German Emperor has an establishment. Further, it is a matter of history that the German forces while they occupied the Government of Suwalki exercised administrative authority and treated it as their own.

The whole thing is nothing very enormous. It is not upon the scale of the fighting in France or the fighting upon the Vistula in southern Poland. But to say that it does not represent a Russian victory is nonsense. To say that no attempt was made to take Osowiec is even worse nonsense. A commander who should have tried to cross the Niemen without dealing with Osowiec would have been even more incompetent than Napoleon's own brother in the same field of war a hundred years ago—and that is saying a good deal. While as for the Russians not mentioning in their official communiqués in any detail the defeat of Tannenberg, the simple reply is that in none of the official communiqués of this war does the defeated party give details or the earliest information. Both the Austrian and the German official communiqués left us in complete ignorance of the overwhelming Russian victory at Lemberg.

I repeat, the point is important because we shall perhaps have need in the near future to understand the psychology of official German news under circumstances adverse to Germany.

Here we must leave the eastern field, and with it this week's examination of the war. The event in that eastern field is still undecided. Until it is decided the very critical moment through which the war is again passing—its third crisis—cannot be further analysed.



force retired upon Mariampol-Suwalki-Augustowo. In doing this the pressure upon Osowiec was relieved,

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

THE current issue of the *Academy* is one of exceptional interest, containing as it does a translation of matter by that great theoriser, Bernhardt, which has not been previously published in English. Bernhardt has more or less deservedly come in for very adverse criticism of late, but as an exponent of the Prussian theory as to the method of waging war he stands alone. Nietzsche and the rest pointed the way of blood and iron, outlined the ideals of the Germanic races, but it remained for Bernhardt to detail the means by which these ideals were to be translated into practical terms. It may be remembered that the *Academy* secured the British rights of Admiral Mahan's article on seapower a few weeks ago; the present securing of fresh Bernhardt matter is yet another instance of the enterprise characterising the present management of our contemporary.

A SERIES of very clever drawings is comprised in the recently published booklet, *Kultur and the German Blunderbuss*, with verses by H. Robertson Murray, and Charles Grave as the artist. The dream of the superman, as interpreted in Germany, is pictured with ruthless irony, and there is in the last two pages of the booklet a very good forecast of German awakening.

THE list of works on the period and personality of Napoleon is probably one of the longest lists in literature. A recent addition is *Napoleon at Work*, translated from the French of Colonel Vachée, and comprising a minute study of Napoleon's methods in his various campaigns, more especially the campaign of 1806. The author, one of the foremost French strategists and tacticians of the present day, sets out with the idea that by careful examination of the Napoleonic methods of warfare, and those of the German staff in 1870, it is possible to formulate rules of war for use at the present day. Events in the present campaign have proved that the advance of science has not materially altered the basic principles of warfare, and Colonel Vachée's theory is much more tenable than it appears at first sight. The book certainly ranks among the most noteworthy contributions to serious modern military literature, and at the same time it contains a mass of little-known information concerning one of the world's greatest men and his work.

Punch issues a double number this week containing a supplement entitled "Punch and the Prussian Bully." Some two dozen cartoons

are reproduced, amongst them being some fine examples of the work of Sir John Tenniel, John Leech, and Linley Sambourne, as well as the well-known present-day *Punch* cartoonists. In the opening cartoon, which is to-day of special interest in view of recent events, "King Punch presenteth Prussia with the Order of 'St. Gibbet,'" for tearing up the "scrap of paper" in which Prussia pledged herself to respect the integrity of Denmark.

IN this time that is surely the forging of a new age in the history of humanity, such a book as J. Comyns Carr's *Coasting Bohemia* is matter for congratulation to the author and to Messrs Macmillan and Co., the publishers. For the writer tells intimately and well of the great ones of the Victorian age; he writes of the true Bohemia, of Burne-Jones, Rossetti, Forde Madox Browne, and all the pre-Raphaelites, while other of his pages concern such names as those of Du Maurier, Dickens, and Meredith. Yet again he talks of "Sex in Tragedy," "the English School of Painting," Henry Irving, and other themes pertaining to the time before mediocrity and a peace that was apparently permanent had cramped the arts. It is a book of great names and great subjects, and, as for its construction, it may be said that there is dignity as well as interest for the reader—the book is literature, in the best sense of the word.

IN another part of the paper we draw attention to the necessity for thoroughly reliable waterproof garments and accessories in the ideal service kit. It is worthy of note, in this connection, that Messrs. Anderson, Anderson, and Anderson are makers of the sealed regulation pattern waterproof, and that the name of the firm is a guarantee of the highest quality.

In the event of readers experiencing difficulty or delay in obtaining copies of *LAND AND WATER* from their newsagents, the proprietors will be glad to be advised of same. Copies can be immediately obtained on application to the offices of the County Gentleman Publishing Company, Ltd., Central House, Kingsway, W.C. (see subscription form on page 16*).

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

THE NORTH SEA.

THE principal event of last week was the sinking, off Schiermonnikvog, of the German destroyer *S 126* by the British submarine *E 9*, the same boat which sank the *Hela*.

The Germans now appear to have raised some query about the incident having happened inside Dutch territorial waters. This is absurd, as no submarine could act inside territorial waters owing to the depth being too little.

So far as can be gathered *S 126*—which was a boat of 487 tons and 28 knot speed, laid down ten years ago—was patrolling across the mouth of the Ems. She was torpedoed forward and sank in three minutes.

The significance of the incident is two-fold. In the first place—as the map indicates—*S 126* was torpedoed virtually inside “the front door” and the moral effect of this following on the loss of the *Hela* cannot but be considerable. At the present time the importance of any successful submarine attack lies rather with the locality in which it takes place than with the actual value of the bag. For example, suppose a German battle cruiser to be submarined while attempting to enter Harwich harbour, the loss would be heavy but it would not come under the head of “unexpected.” Therefore, it would have no particular moral effect on the enemy. On the other hand, an unexpected loss is bound to influence nerves.

In the second place—and the moral effect of this on the Germans is bound to be great—a destroyer is in the ordinary way immune from torpedo attack as a torpedo will pass underneath her. Consequently, the torpedo which sank *S 126* was clearly deliberately “set” for a depth suitable to hit a destroyer. This means that all patrol work by destroyers will be nervy work in future; they will at once realise that we have marked them down for destruction, and draw their own conclusions as to the why and wherefore.

Out of which the pressure on the German Fleet will become greater than it already is.

ANTWERP.

The Germans state that Antwerp will be valuable to them for the attack on England, but unless this means that they intend to ignore the neutrality of Holland it is an idle proposition. The Scheldt is a neutral river.

Supposing the neutrality of Holland to be violated by them, there will still be the circumstance that all shipping at Antwerp has been destroyed, and such as can be got there by canal or by land transit is inconsiderable. Old torpedo boats and the lesser-sized submarines could possibly be transported as the Russians transported them across Siberia ten years ago; but a naval base cannot be improvised, and the Dutch Fleet, which is specially designed for inshore work, would probably soon make short work of any German naval force in the Scheldt.

Consequently, it is unlikely that, for the present at any rate, the Germans intend to violate Dutch neutrality, and we may take it that statements about what they mean to do from Antwerp are merely bluff intended to produce a “moral effect” on us.

THE LOST CRUISERS.

The *New York Herald* “through the kindness of the German Admiralty” has been permitted to publish the personal narrative of Kapitan Lieut. Weddigen of *U 9*, and how he sank the three *Cressies* single-handed. It is an interesting story, made all the more realistic by its compliments to our sailors. But, technically, it is absurd. The *U 9* does not carry any spare torpedoes, and she has only three tubes. Four is less than the six known to have been fired; but the four specifically mentioned

as fired is still one too many. We may, I think, safely take it that at least one German submarine went under.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

There are (at the moment of writing) no fresh developments, nor do any seem likely, in the Adriatic just at present.

In the black Sea, on the other hand, quite another state of affairs prevails.

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is reported to have put to sea, presumably in an effort to make certain that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* do not become German again in the Black Sea.

The *Goeben* is individually more than twice as powerful and a very great deal faster than any battleship in the Russian Euxine Fleet. Should she emerge nothing but blockading a fleet very close to Constantinople could effect anything against her. Her possibilities are as serious as they are enormous.

Of the Russian battleships only three—pre-Dreadnoughts all—possess any modern fighting value, and it is probable that the *Goeben* could outrange all of them easily, since all are mounted with big guns of a now antique model.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there

+ Approximate spot where *S 126* was submarined.



CHART TO ILLUSTRATE THE SUBMARINING OF GERMAN T. B. D. S 126 BY BRITISH SUBMARINE E 9.

is understood to be a secret treaty between Turkey and Roumania, so that should the *Goeben* emerge as a belligerent Turk she could look to find a possible base in a Roumanian harbour. The attitude of Turkey is, therefore, of international importance; and the flight of the *Goeben* may yet turn out to have been a clever piece of high strategy.

THE BALTIC.

Here, again, nothing of much moment is taking place. Presumably the Germans have established a blockade, but since this must accord with Russian plans and anticipations it can hardly be considered as a German advantage. The Russian official reports deny that a single Russian ship has been lost, and there is every reason to deem this correct.

Incidentally, the Russian Admiral is that Von Essen, who—as captain of the *Novik*—was one of the two or three Russian officers who earned glory in the Russo-Japanese War debacle.

The other, once Captain Wiren of the *Bayan*, is now Commander-in-Chief at Kronstadt. As for the still one other—Admiral Grigorovitch—what he has done for the Russian Navy is too well-known to need comment. The Germans have nothing to put against this trio of men who have been through the mill. It is unfortunate for our national pride (though it is really a

compliment to us) that Germany will, as I read things, seek her Trafalgar in the Baltic rather than the North Sea. From what I know of the re-organised Russian Navy, the part of the German admiral will be Villeneuve, not Nelson.

THE FAR EAST.

The advance upon Kiao-Chau continues. There is reason to believe that all the German warships in the harbour will presently fall victims to land attacks from the Japanese, who have the valuable experience of two previous wars to bring on results of this nature.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

At the moment of writing the German predatory cruisers are taking a rest. This, presumably, means that by easy stages they are proceeding to fresh hunting grounds, whence a recrudescence of attack may be expected. To the number of known corsairs the light cruiser *Leipzig* (twenty-three knots)



MAP SHOWING THE LOCALITY OF THE RIVER SCHELDT.

must now be added. Her original port was Kiao-Chau, but her last heard of "stamping ground" was off the west coast of South America, where she has made two captures—one of these worth about £120,000.

Vigilance on the part of British consuls all over the world in detecting suspicious supply craft and warning our cruisers is the surest method of capturing German corsairs. Unfortunately

in a great many minor places our consular service is represented by any handy foreign resident. In peace time this system (common to all countries) is economical; but war is indicating its disadvantages. A neutral cannot possibly be expected to throw the same energy into the business as a Britisher. I am inclined to fancy that one immediate result of this war will be a very considerable change in our consular service, unless "Britain for the British" is to remain a mere empty chat-word.

The Admiralty has just issued an official statement in connection with the duel between the *Carmania*, and the *Cap Trafalgar*. The outstanding feature of the report is that we appear to have aimed steadily at the waterline of the enemy, whereas the enemy aimed at the *Carmania's* upperworks. This is a reproduction of what used to take place in the Great War of a hundred years ago.

Unfortunately, we are still without data as to whether the high aim of the Germans was merely bad gunnery or whether it was of deliberate intent. Probably it was the former.

THE WAR IN THE AIR.

IN the bombardment of Antwerp the Germans are reported to have employed six Zeppelins. As explained in previous articles anything German which is lighter than air is for public purposes a "Zeppelin," so for "Zeppelin" we had better read "dirigible airship."

Now the Germans started this war with sixteen big rigid airships built or completing and six others in course of construction. At the very outside they had nine Parsevals or inferior non-rigid imitations. This gives a maximum total of twenty-five all told. Of these we know that three have been destroyed for certain, probably double that number. We shall not be far wrong if we put the total of available and effective airships at somewhere about eighteen to twenty. Secret Zeppelins are as impossible as secret Dreadnoughts—they are too big to try to hide.

At least as many dirigibles will be required on the Russian frontier as on the western side. From which we can calculate that the number of dirigibles of all kinds available for service against Antwerp would have been between six and nine.

We had better assume the latter number; because fragile craft like dirigibles are never likely to be able to materialise in full strength at any selected moment.

Two more raids have been made by our aeroplanes on the German airship sheds at Cologne and Dusseldorf. No success seems to have attended the Cologne attempt, but the flame seen issuing from the Dusseldorf shed is clear proof that there is certainly one Zeppelin which will never fly again, also probably one shed that will no longer be of any use.

FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS AND THEIR DEFENCE.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

SPEAKING with an experience of many years, there is nothing so difficult to teach in peace time as the construction and "siting" of field entrenchments. Men very soon get tired of lifting earth, with unaccustomed back muscles and blistered hands, on some disused patch of uninteresting land—all that can be spared them for the purpose. The whole idea of digging a pit and squatting in it to shoot seems so childish simple that in a very short time the interest slackens, and unless you are lucky enough to have the assistance of war-experienced sergeants and subalterns, the whole business becomes tedious and subversive of discipline in the highest degree.

This last remark may require elucidation for civilian readers, as the connection is not at first obvious; but, in reality, it is very simple. Men come back from trenchwork thoroughly stiff and sore, with an appalling thirst on them. The canteen is a comfortable resort, and though drunkenness is now almost extinct, yet the couple of extra glasses of beer and the next morning's muscular stiffness, not to mention the blistered hands, bring them back to work in just that condition of nervous irritability which renders friction with authority nearly inevitable. Someone or other loses his temper, a couple of men are marched back to the guardroom, and a settled gloom descends on the trenches. Every little shift or evasion is

practised to save the sore hands and aching muscles, unless you have with you some of the above-mentioned assistants, to cheer the men up and interest them with bits of practical experience.


Fortunately, during the last few years there have been many such men in the regular army, and nothing struck me so much when watching the Infantry Pioneer classes at Chatham as the greatly increased interest in their work which all ranks showed, as compared with my experience as instructor in earlier years, and reports from the front show how much we are profiting from this altered state of things almost daily. If instruction in fieldworks had not become a living reality, had it remained in the "before the war" condition, matters on the Marne might have taken a very different course.

The real difficulty of this class of instruction, and I write for the benefit of the very many officers fresh to the work in the New Armies, lies in the absolute simplicity of the fundamental ideas and the extreme difficulty of reconciling all the conflicting tendencies contained in these ideas. The bedrock principle all through the practice of warfare is "to kill your man first before he can kill you"; clearly, when he is dead he can do you no further damage. But, to begin with, you do not always know where he is, or how he intends to attack you; so you dig a hole to get cover from both sight and bullets, and wait for him to commence operations or, at the best, to give himself away.

Now we get to the first difficulty. The closer you can get your eye to the ground level, the safer and more invisible you become.

The ideal trench, which is only a hole laterally extended, would, therefore, be something like this. The earth dug out

Fig. I.



being thrown away behind down a convenient slope or otherwise distributed so as to be quite invisible, a very difficult condition to satisfy. Still, heaped up bracken or heather, transplanted turnip tops, etc., will suffice to hide the firer's head almost completely, and his body has the whole thickness of the hill as protection against the bullets.

But now you have practically sacrificed your best chance of killing the enemy first—admittedly the best defence in principle—for ground is seldom absolutely level, and any bush, stone, or even a homely cabbage may intervene to break your line of sight, and even in a trench you cannot move sideways to clear it, for there are other men alongside of you who want a clear field of view just as badly, and they will not give way. So from the very first your personal interest begins to clash with your neighbours, and you are up against the first lesson of co-ordinated action, viz., the necessity of self sacrifice for the good of the community which runs through all warlike action from start to finish, and invariably, in the long run, brings Victory to the Race in which this instinct of self-sacrifice rules higher than the instinct of self-preservation.

Again, even if no obstacles of the above nature intervene, one seldom, in Northern Europe, finds ground sloping uniformly towards the enemy. Generally, the section of the hill-sides on which we are now fighting, and shall continue to fight for a long time to come has this section, viz.: Convex towards the enemy,





Fig. II.

and clearly, if you bring your eyes down to ground level at A, an enemy at B, perhaps only twenty yards away, will be quite invisible, and if he rushes forward you have no second chance to stop him. Again and again positions have been lost because this elementary fact has been forgotten by men trying to solve other problems to which I shall hereafter allude.


The common-sense solution of the difficulty will obviously be to use a profile shewn in Fig. III. This, at least, extends the field of fire very considerably. But it introduces at once new complications for it is practically impossible to hide the fresh earth of this higher breastwork, it takes, generally, longer to make and does not give equal protection.

Fig. III.



Now it happens that the prevailing section of the ground in South Africa was almost invariably concave towards the enemy: Hence a man in a trench at the top of a slope could see indefinitely out to his front, a fact of which the Boers at once took every advantage, and we, as usual in South Africa, quite rightly at once copied their example. But when we came back to England and began teaching the deep Boer trench as applicable to the very different circumstances, we blundered into a very bad hole indeed. Fifty years ago we had gone to the other extreme. Our teaching staff for the Army when I joined had all learnt their work practically before Sebastopol, where the rock cropped up close to the surface, the slopes generally convex, and as a consequence they had taught us to rely more on the type of trench in Fig. IV., precisely as their successors after South Africa taught Fig. I., and what we now have to do is to avoid both extremes, except where suitable conditions prevail, and generally to choose the best working compromise between them on each occasion, probably something like Fig. III. above, fitted out, of course, with head cover and so forth as I shall explain hereafter. For the moment all I want to make clear is the essential compromise between fire power and cover which has to be made in every case, and to suggest to the many men under training or waiting for appointment how much they can facilitate their own progress in the future by bearing this simple "duality" in mind and going out into the country and training their eyes to appreciate the points involved in obtaining a workable compromise between the two.

Fig. IV.



To dwellers in London, I recommend a walk over Wimbledon Common, dipping down towards Kingston and across Richmond Park. For those who can spare time to go farther, I suggest a walk over the North Downs, or any chalk country in the neighbourhood. Our troops are fighting principally in chalk districts now, and as I continue these letters I shall call attention to the different characteristics in the countries we shall have to traverse. I will only now add that, whereas in the chalk downs, one is constantly driven to the use of the type in Fig. IV.; in the Eifel—a volcanic district I expect many of our troops will traverse—the concave type of ground prevails, and Fig. I. will find its application.

A DIARY OF THE WAR.

SYNOPSIS.

JULY 23RD.—Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.

JULY 25TH.—King Peter of Serbia's appeal to Russia.

JULY 27TH.—Sir Edward Grey proposed a London Conference between French, German, Italian, and Great Britain's Ambassadors.

JULY 28TH.—Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.

JULY 29TH.—A partial Russian mobilisation was signed on receipt of the news of the bombardment of Belgrade. English Stock Exchange closed. English Bank Rate, 8 per cent.

AUGUST 1ST.—General Russian mobilisation ordered. German mobilisation ordered by Emperor. Germany declared war on Russia and followed up this declaration by invading the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

AUGUST 2ND.—Germany's ultimatum to Belgium.

AUGUST 3RD.—Sir Edward Grey stated British policy and revealed Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting our obligations to France. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany. German and French Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin.

AUGUST 4TH.—Germany rejected England's ultimatum. English Government took over control of railways. War declared between England and Germany.

AUGUST 5TH.—Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for War. H.M.S. *Amphion* struck a mine and foundered.

AUGUST 6TH.—House of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by 500,000 men. State control of food prices.

AUGUST 8TH.—Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000 men.

AUGUST 9TH.—The enemy's submarine, U15, was sunk by H.M.S. *Birmingham*.

AUGUST 10TH.—France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans advanced on Namur. The new Press Bureau established by the Government for the issue of official war news.

AUGUST 11TH.—England declared war against Austria.

AUGUST 15TH.—The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and the use of the Polish language.

AUGUST 16TH.—Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.

AUGUST 17TH.—The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in France.

The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.

AUGUST 18TH.—General Sir H. Smith Dorrien appointed to command of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in succession to the late General Grierson.

AUGUST 20TH.—The Servians gained a decisive victory over the Austrians near Shabatz.

AUGUST 21ST.—The German forces entered Brussels.

AUGUST 22ND.—Serbia announces that their army had won a great victory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.

AUGUST 23RD.—Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian army gained an important victory near Gumbinnen against a force of 162,000 Germans.

AUGUST 24TH.—It was announced that Namur had fallen.

AUGUST 27TH.—Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the German armed merchantman *Keiser Wilhelm der Grosse* had been sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on the West Africa Coast.

AUGUST 28TH.—A concerted operation was attempted against the Germans in the Heligoland Bight.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the *Mainz*. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, *Köln* class, and another cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking condition.

Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total British casualties amounted to sixty-nine killed and wounded.

Lord Kitchener announced that "The Government have decided that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a cavalry division, besides other troops from India."

SEPTEMBER 2ND.—The British Cavalry engaged, with distinction, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten guns. The Russian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.

SEPTEMBER 3RD.—The French Government moved to Bordeaux.

SEPTEMBER 4TH.—The Russian Army under General Ruzsky, captured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.

SEPTEMBER 5TH.—The formal alliance of England, France, and Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.

SEPTEMBER 6TH.—It was announced that the scout-cruiser *Pathfinder* foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.

SEPTEMBER 9TH.—The English Army crossed the Marne, and the enemy retired about twenty-five miles.

SEPTEMBER 11TH.—Our 1st Army Corps captured twelve Maxim guns and some prisoners, and our 2nd Army Corps took 350 prisoners and a battery.

SEPTEMBER 13TH.—On the left wing the enemy continued his retreating movement. The Belgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive to the south of Lierre.

SEPTEMBER 14TH.—All day the enemy stubbornly disputed the passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the crossings were secured by sunset.

SEPTEMBER 15TH.—The Allied troops occupied Rheims. Six hundred prisoners and twelve guns were captured by the Corps on the right of the British.

SEPTEMBER 16TH.—Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed the German cruiser *Hela*, six miles south of Heligoland.

SEPTEMBER 20TH.—Rheims Cathedral was bombarded.

The British auxiliary cruiser *Carmania*, Captain Noel Grant, Royal Navy, sank the *Cap Trafalgar* off the east coast of South America.

SEPTEMBER 22ND.—H.M. ships *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy* were sunk by submarines in the North Sea.

SEPTEMBER 23RD.—British aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered an attack on the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf.

SEPTEMBER 26TH.—There was much activity on the part of the enemy all along the line. Some heavy counter-attacks were repulsed, and considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy.

SEPTEMBER 28TH.—At certain points, notably between the Aisne and the Argonne, the enemy made further violent attacks, which were repulsed.

SEPTEMBER 29TH.—There was practically no change in the situation. The Allied left had some very heavy fighting, but they well held their own.

OCTOBER 1ST.—The arrival of the Indian Expeditionary Force at Marseilles was announced.

OCTOBER 2ND.—His Majesty's Government have authorised a mine-laying policy in certain areas and a system of mine-fields has been established and is being developed upon a considerable scale.

OCTOBER 5TH.—In Russia, after a battle which lasted ten days, the German army which was operating between the front of East Prussia and the Niemen was beaten all along the line and retreated, abandoning a considerable quantity of material.

OCTOBER 7TH.—Submarine E 9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton) returned safely after having torpedoed and sunk a German torpedo-boat destroyer off the Ems river.

DAY BY DAY.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8th.

In the Northern region of our left wing the enemy made no progress anywhere. They fell back in several places, particularly to the north of Arras. The operations of the two cavalry forces developed almost to the North Sea.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9th.

On our left wing the opposing cavalry forces still operated to the north of Lille and of La Bassée, and the battle proceeded along a line passing through the districts of Lens, Arras, Bray-sur-Somme, Chaulnes, Roye, and Lassigny. Sharp fighting took place in the Roye region, where during the last two days 1,600 prisoners were taken. The British naval airmen carried out another successful raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Düsseldorf. They destroyed a Zeppelin. The bombardment of Antwerp continued.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10th.

The War Office announced that Antwerp was evacuated yesterday.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11th.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announced that in the retreat westward of the Anglo-Belgian forces, some 2,000 British Naval Marines and 3,000 Belgians were cut off by the Germans and compelled to retire into Dutch territory, where they had to lay down their arms. The German cavalry, which had seized certain crossing points on the Lys to the east of Aire, were driven off and retired into the neighbourhood of Armentières. Two German aeroplanes flew over Paris and dropped twenty bombs in various places. It was announced that King Carol of Roumania died yesterday.

MONDAY, OCTOBER 12th.

Six bombs were dropped on Paris by a German airman. The Russian cruiser *Pallada* was sunk in the Baltic on Sunday by a German submarine.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13th.

The town of Lille was occupied by a German army corps. Between Arras and Albert we made marked progress. In the centre we also made progress in the neighbourhood of Berry-au-Bac.

The Austrian army corps which were beaten in Galicia tried to reform twenty-five miles west of Przemyśl.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14th.

It was announced that the Belgian Government had removed from Ostend to Havre.

The Belgian field army, with King Albert still at its head, was also in Northern France.

It was officially announced from Petrograd that two German submarines were sunk in the attack in the Baltic, by which the Russians lost the cruiser *Palladia*.

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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

THE MAIN ACTION ON THE VISTULA.

THE Allies, as we shall see in a later part of these notes, have in the last week pushed forward a strong wedge into Belgium, threatening and, perhaps, rendering hopeless a German advance along the sea coast to the Straits of Dover. They have gained ground to the south of Lille and of Arras, and have advanced further towards their goal, the main line of German communications into France. A fresh and violent German counter-

still turns upon the results of that yet greater action engaged at this moment upon the Vistula River. If it go against the Germans, no temporary success can save them in the west. If it go against the Russians, nothing the Allies do in the west can prevent the arrival there of strong reinforcements for their German enemies.

It will be important for our judgment of this vast action on the Vistula and for following the future chances of the war in this field to appreciate the elements of the ground over which it is being fought.



attack near Chaulnes has been thrown back. Everything in the west points to some considerable modification in the near future of the deadlock there. But it remains true that the campaign as a whole

The River Vistula, rising in the Carpathians, runs in a great bend eastward, then northward, till it falls into the Baltic near Dantzic. On its very mid-course stands the modern Polish capital of Warsaw.

The battle is joined upon all its central reaches from Warsaw southward and on along the San to the Carpathians.

The Vistula first tumbles as a mountain torrent through the foothills of the Carpathians, then flowing east and west past the great fortress and ancient Polish capital of Cracow it begins to trend north, and reaches, in about two hundred miles, the little town of Sandomir. In all the lower part of this first division it forms the artificial frontier between Austria and the Russian Empire, though, of course, both banks are really Polish, and the whole territory of Warsaw and Cracow is but the ancient sacred south, the later centre and heart of an undying Poland.

The province lying to the south of this artificial Austro-Russian frontier and stretching up to the crest of the Carpathians is called Galicia. To the north of this frontier and to the east of the equally artificial frontier between the Russian and the German Empires lies the western part of Russian Poland with its five main Governments of Kielce, Radom, Petrokow, Warsaw, and Kalisch.

About four and a half miles below the isolated castle-hill of Sandomir comes in from the south and east the main tributary called the San, upon the upper waters of which, also in the foothills of the Carpathians, stands the great fortress of Przemyśl.

After the two rivers have joined, the Vistula runs north through a trench commanded upon either side by hills, first fairly high, then gradually falling. It turns a rather sharp bend after the issue from these hills at the place now called "New Alexandria" and there enters the plains which run almost uninterruptedly to the Baltic. Twenty miles further it passes the fortified point now called Ivangorod, which town (it will be important to remember this in the development of the battle) lies on the eastern or right bank of the stream. Thence another sixty miles of course now trending westward brings it to Warsaw upon the *left* bank, and somewhat lower down to the fortress of New Georgievsk, beyond which it does not concern us in the matter of this battle.

In all this stretch of the river between Sandomir and Warsaw the Vistula, everywhere broad and fairly deep, is of course increasing in depth and breadth. It is already a large river below Ivangorod, three to four hundred yards across at Sandomir, quite six hundred at Warsaw. It is navigable even in dry seasons all the way, and all the way there is no ford. At this moment the water is high and the current considerable. Note, for further consideration in the action, the tributary known as the Pilica, having the town of Warka upon its north or left bank; it is, as we shall see, of high strategical importance. Note further the town of Grojec, the junction of seven roads and a point which gives to whoever holds it, a choice in his avenues of approach from the west and from Germany to Warsaw and to the Lower River.

After a continuous German advance through Western Poland and as continuous a Russian retirement before it, the invaders reached the neighbourhood of Warsaw upon the north and touched the Vistula itself in all its middle course from Ivangorod to southward; while southward again, the Austrians, after their long retreat, turned and advanced abreast of their Allies through Western Galicia till they reached the San.

At the end of all this—about a week ago—the whole Russian force had concentrated (meeting its continual reinforcement from the east) upon positions which ran from near Warsaw upon the north, all along

the east bank of the middle Vistula, then along and up the east bank of the San to the batteries emplaced before Przemyśl and so to the Carpathian Mountains.

This great position—the Russian retention of, retreat beyond, or advance from, which history will probably call the *Battle of the Vistula*—is fully as long as the corresponding great position in the west, that is more than 250 but less than 300 miles. As in the west, two nearly equal forces, each in the neighbourhood of two million men, are struggling each to break or turn the opposing line. Again, as in the west, that line has been thrust back by the Germanic powers upon the territory of Germany's enemies. As in the west, the main direction of the fronts runs from north-west to south-east. There is a remarkable parallelism between the two great conflicts, 800 miles apart, upon whose co-relative fates the future of Europe should depend. But when this parallelism of certain main elements—some of them accidental—has been noted, the comparison fails.

In the first place, the line of battle along the Vistula is one of extreme topographical simplicity—as contrasted with that in the west, which depends now upon a range of mountains like the Vosges, now upon a forest like the Argonne, now upon a small river like the lower Aisne, now again upon an entrenched but open plain like the Champagne. The Polish position is simply the line of the Middle Vistula between Warsaw and Sandomir, or, more accurately, between Warsaw and the mouth of the San; it is then continued up the San nearly to its source in front of Przemyśl, and so across the foot hills to the Carpathian Mountains.

No more elementary strategic thesis could be conceived. The Russians are holding the line of the San and the middle Vistula; it is the business of the Austrians and Germans to pierce them upon that line, or at the least to hold them there in check and to forbid their further advance. It is the business of the Russians to hold the continuous line of the two rivers and by turning or breaking the Germanic forces facing them to compel them to retire.

There is another contrast in the nature of the line. All the western rivers concerned in the present actions in France and Belgium are comparatively narrow and slow; everywhere bridged, and when the bridges are destroyed easily to be bridged again by the engineers of either army. Often they are fordable. But the Vistula is everywhere deep and broad and swift and, *save at two points—Warsaw and Ivangorod*, unbridged. The San, save in quite its upper part, is an equally simple and absolute obstacle though better bridged.

Again there is a great contrast between the eastern and the western fields in the matter of railway and road communications.

There is here of course the main point that whereas in the west the railways are very numerous and hard macadamised roads universal and serving every four or five miles of country, such roads are rare in Poland and railways rarer still. But there is more.


The Vistula, the one main artery of the country, is not even served as are all the great rivers of Western Europe by a railway line parallel to itself. There is, indeed, such a railway line from Warsaw past Ivangorod to New Alexandria, but beyond that point the railway trends off eastward to Lublin, and between that point and Sandomir there is no railway following either bank of the river. There is no direct and continuous facility for the supply of ammunition and food by rail to the millions lined up on the opposing sides of the stream.

Such facilities are only to be found in two very simple groups.

There is from the east and to supply the Russians that line which comes from Kieff up to Lublin. There is from the west and to supply the Germans the branch line with its rail head at Ostroviecs—a good deal nearer the river than Lublin.

In the last section of the line, along the San, the Austrians have excellent railway supply up from the main line at Jaroslav, and through Debitza junction, with the railway exactly serving all their bank of the San. While the Russians have nothing north of the main line from Kieff and Lemberg, which serves their positions in front of Przemyśl.

We see, therefore, that the Austro-German line



west of the Vistula and the San has its best railway supply just opposite the points where the Russian railway supply on the other bank is lacking. The Germans are better served on the Middle Vistula from Ostroviecs than the Russians can be from Lublin. They are admirably served all along the lower San where the Russians are not served at all. On the other hand, between the Radom—Ivangorod line and Warsaw, there is nothing along the west bank to supply the Germans while the Russians have an excellent line parallel to the river along their eastern bank between Warsaw and Ivangorod fed by lateral lines from the East. The point is of great importance because the heavy artillery upon which, as we now know, the Germans principally depend, is useless without a sufficient railway supply, and the general scheme of the railways leads one to believe that the principal effort of the Germans will be made at the points where this railway system serves them, that is in the middle of the line, while the Russians should be strongest—for advance, at least—to the north, their right. The difference of gauge should not hamper the Germans very much, for they have provided for it by preparing axles measured to the Russian gauge and convertible. A worse handicap is the attitude of the Polish population, which will do everything to interfere with German supply along the extended lines of communication between the German frontier and the Vistula. Those lines of communication are nowhere less than 150 miles long, and the method of terror which has been introduced into Western Europe by the Prussians in densely populated and wealthy regions, and has there in the main failed, will be of even less service in the open country of Western Poland with

its dispersed population and its few and not valuable buildings. When the history of the war comes to be written, it will probably be found that one important element working against German victory has been the hatred every Pole has come to feel for the Prussian name, a hatred due to the incapacity of the Prussian to govern and to his crude persecution of such Poles as have the misfortune to suffer German rule.

In the paucity of railways, the next important factors of communication are the weather and the roads.

The weather we can only estimate by the averages of many years; but it is worthy of remark that the rainfall in Southern Poland is by no means at its heaviest in the autumn. The heaviest rainfall in this region is in the summer: and this is particularly true of the southern part of the field near the Carpathian mountains. June will have from three to four inches of rain, while October sometimes has as little as half an inch. It happens to have been raining heavily during the last week over the northern part at least of the field of battle, but the weather would be altogether exceptional in this region if it were to remain wet for a long time on end in the early autumn. If then the roads were numerous and good, the factor of the weather would be inconsiderable as against an advance. But the roads north of Galicia for the most part are—in Western and Russian Poland—impassable to heavy traffic after a little rain at this season; and the sort of traffic involved by the passage of an army, particularly the movement of heavy field guns and field howitzers, cuts them up altogether. The soil in all the middle part is heavy, the roads, though possessed of culverts and bridges over streams, are rarely macadamised and, in general, an attempt to advance with the sort of train necessary to what we now know to be the German methods will be very heavily handicapped indeed; for though the normal rainfall is slight the soil does not dry as it did earlier in the year.

The advent of winter is capricious, the coming of hard frost differs by more than a month from year to year, and it would be quite an exceptional year if this facility for transport, such as it is, was felt before the middle of November. It is true, of course, that all this tells just as much in theory against a Russian counter-offensive as against the German advance. But there is this difference between the two.

- (a) That the Germans depend much more for their power to hold a position upon their heavy artillery, and that the direct contact which this arm keeps off tells against the German as compared with the Russian soldier: using the term "direct contact" for all short-range field operations from the field-gun to the bayonet.
- (b) When an advance is difficult the hostility of a population makes much more difference than when you have good roads and plenty of railways, and the population in Russian Poland at least, and especially immediately beyond the present German advance, is, for the most part, exceedingly hostile.

Further, there can be no doubt that the Russians have the advantage in horses, at any rate in the quality of endurance in their horses, and that is one of the prime factors in transport everywhere, but particularly in a country only partly developed, especially when the roads are heavy.

The Battle of the Vistula is marked then (in contrast to the struggle in France, whose issue is so

largely dependent on it) by a much simpler scheme, by the paucity of the communications, the natural strength of the defensive line, and the simple (and inadequate) distribution of its railway system.

But there is this one last contrast between the Western and the Eastern positions, more important than all the rest: the Eastern position—the struggle in Poland—lends itself to a decision much more obviously than does the Western conflict in France. In other words, though a deadlock is a possibility (and has, indeed, obviously been envisaged by the German General Staff as a conclusion not wholly unfavourable to their cause), yet it is far more probable that one or other of the two opponents will establish a decisive superiority after the first few days of fighting.

This probability (it is no more) is a capital aid to our judgment of the campaign. It means that the thesis which has been always maintained in these comments—that the result in Poland would be the prime factor in the general result of the whole campaign throughout Europe—still holds.

But why does one say that the Eastern position lends itself to a rapid decision more than does the Western?

Because (a) there is room for outflanking; (b) one party at least can count upon a continual arrival of reserves; (c) either line, if broken or turned, lacks for a long distance to the rear any prepared defensive positions: either party, if compelled to retirement, would be compelled to a long and disastrous retirement.

(a) That the first point is true—as to room for outflanking—is evident from the very nature of the position upon the map. It ends near Warsaw; that is, only at the beginning of the vast plain which stretches thence to the Baltic. True, that plain is cut by a whole belt of marsh and lake on the boundaries of East Prussia, the northern boundary of Russian Poland. But there is ample room between for a turning movement round Warsaw to be undertaken by whichever party shall have so decided a numerical superiority as to permit of such an action.

Of any considerable turning movement upon the other flank, the southern, which is the extreme right of the Austro-German line and the extreme left of the Russian, there can be no question; for here the extremity of either line reposes upon the "tangle of the Carpathians."

(b) The knowledge that Russia can, at not too remote a date, count upon the arrival of increasing numbers must urge the Germanic Powers to attempt a decision before those reinforcements arrive. At any rate, even if a full result cannot be hoped for, the advent of these new bodies (though they should not have the value of the first line) must prompt the enemies of Russia to strike a heavy blow at the Russian army before it is further strengthened.

(c) There is not afforded by nature any good defensive position parallel to the line of the Vistula and the San for a long way on either side. If the Russians be compelled to fall back, the rivers behind them provide doubtful positions. If it is the Germans who fall back, they have indeed prepared a line within the immediate proximity of their own frontier, but, as yet, nothing very

serious in between. We shall see, if they have to go back to the line of Kielce-Petrokow whether they have sufficiently entrenched *that*; but even if they have, it will be as open to outflanking upon the part of the Russians, as is the present German line along the rivers. Further, the difficulties of communication would prevent rapidity in retirement, and though that handicaps the pursuer as well, it handicaps him less, for it does not gravely affect his cavalry and light artillery.

We may sum up and say, first, that a decision is to be expected upon this field probably before there is any final result in the west, and that, according to the nature of this decision (according to whether it is adverse to the German cause or not) we shall either (1) see the western German line in France retreating in despair of receiving reinforcements from the east; or (2) see such reinforcements arrive in great numbers, and the campaign in France enter upon a new and very different phase.

This is by no means certain, it is only conjecture. It is always possible that a decision might be reached in France and Belgium before the first undecided actions upon the Vistula and the San had begun to show which way the tide was flowing. But it is far the more probable event that an appreciable result in Poland will in a short time release men for the west, or, in the absence of such reinforcements, compel the German line in the west to retire. That is why it is the business of all of us to keep our eyes fixed upon this unfamiliar eastern field.

So much being said, it is further evident that for the Germans to achieve a decision in their favour they must *pierce* the line before them. Conversely it is evident that the Russians must attempt to *turn* by the northern flank (the only available one) the position of their enemies upon the further bank of the two streams. The Germans do indeed attach a great importance to the possession of Warsaw upon their extreme northern flank. It would give them a bridge across the Vistula (there is but one other—at Ivan-gorod), and it would give them depots, a great accession of that moral position to which they attach so great a political value (even at this advanced stage of the campaign) and last, and most important, the great town with its fortifications at Memlin (New Georgievsk) just below Warsaw, which would cover and protect the German left from Russian assault and from Russian turning movements even for some time after the perpetually growing additions to Russian strength begin to be felt.

While, then, the Germans must naturally attempt to take and hold Warsaw they could not themselves attempt a turning movement there, and to get behind the Russian line in the Vistula, because, *first*, they are not in sufficient numbers even now to do so, and *secondly* because those numbers of theirs are diminishing, *in proportion to the enemy's*, with every day that passes. The principal Austro-German effort must, therefore, be to cross the rivers Vistula or San at certain points, there to break the Russian line, destroy its cohesion and its unity of command, and leave it for a long time to come permanently inferior to its opponents. Such a result would leave Germany free to transfer numbers of troops to the Western theatre of war, even though she would still be condemned to preserving a very large force in Southern Poland.

On the side of the Russians it is equally obvious that their attempt must be a turning movement round by the north—by Warsaw. They know that

this is largely a campaign of exhaustion. They know that the enemy has rendered his own communications insecure by a false policy of cruelty with the peasants. They know that he has in his retirement but few roads and railways to depend upon—roads and railways which would be hopelessly clogged in any pressed retirement.

The Germans have massed (they themselves say it) not less than five army corps in front of Warsaw—a third of all they have upon the Vistula. They advanced at first to within half a day's march of the city. But the Russians gradually affirmed their superiority at this point, at any rate in the first days of the struggle. The furthest point of German advance before the Russian counter-offensive was here reached, perhaps, last Wednesday night. Thursday things lay doubtful. By Saturday and Sunday, if we are to trust the official Russian communiqué, the superiority of the Russians upon this wing had definitely established itself, and the Austro-German line was already in some peril of being turned from the north.

Meanwhile, very strong and at first partially successful, attempts to force the line of the rivers and thus to break the Russian cohesion were continuing in the middle of the vast field and to the south of it. How far these have been or will be repelled we cannot yet say, but apparently they have not to this date made any considerable progress, though some foothold may have been obtained upon the right bank.

How difficult such a crossing must be and how strong the position is as a defensive one a more particular examination of the line will prove.

The whole position from the Carpathians to the neighbourhood of Warsaw falls into three rather clearly marked divisions, unless, indeed, we add a fourth for the hilly country round Przemysl and the mountains at the back of it. At any rate, immediately to the north of this first short mountain sector you have the course of the River San up to the point where it falls into the Vistula; one may give to this line, say, from the main Galician railway northward, a distance of over sixty miles. The upper part of the San River is fordable. The fords naturally get less frequent as one goes down stream; all the lower part is even navigable. Further, a main railway line leads up to and feeds this southern wing of the enemy, and a branch line, leading northward along the left bank of the San from Jaroslav, acts as a main avenue of supply, an opportunity for concentration of troops upon any chosen point of it. If the best troops, the strictest organisation, and, above all, the strongest artillery were to be discovered in this region, one might predict an attempted forcing of the line here rather than further north. The obstacle is less formidable, the communications are much more perfect. But it is precisely here that you have no more than the recomposed fragments of the defeated or second Austrian army and the first, which though not hitherto defeated has suffered from weeks of retreat under considerable loss and at some expense to its organisation.

It must further be remembered that a crossing of the water and a breaking of the line so far south as even the middle San, if the *principal* operation were here undertaken, would not be decisive, as a breach effected nearer the centre would be. It is a universal truth in every form of attack, strategical or tactical, by land or by sea, that, other things being equal, a line is more effectively broken in proportion as the stroke comes nearer its middle; for thus is the largest of the two fragments at least still small. But the

doctrine particularly holds in this case, because the main Russian communications lie far to the north of any threatened point upon the San. There will be attempts to cross the San; one vigorous one has already been made near Nikso—just below the first bridge upon the junction of the San with the Vistula. Some measure of success was claimed by Austria (but unofficially, I think) for this attempt.

The main effort, however, to break the Russian line will hardly be undertaken in this section upon the San; it will fall in the middle section between the town which the Russians now call Ivangorod (a site known in Polish history as Demblin) and the little, ancient, and once strong borough of Sandomir, which lies but a few miles above the junction of the Vistula and the San.

There are several reasons why the main attack should be delivered in this central of the three sections. Here, to begin with, you come immediately upon the main communications of the Russians after piercing their line: or at least their main communications as a united army. Get through *there*, and you throw the northern half of their line back on to the main road and railway Warsaw-Brest, and the southern half of their line back upon the other railway Lemberg-Kief. Further you bring to bear (upon whichever of the separated halves you choose) the whole weight of the invading advance through Poland upon the breach so made.

Again, this section is tackled by the most efficient portion of the Allied Germanic Powers, the German troops; it is presumably better supplied with heavy artillery, under the action of which alone could the crossing of a deep, broad, and rapid stream be attempted.

These reasons alone should be sufficient for expecting the main attack to be delivered in the section Ivangorod-Sandomir, the second or central section of the line. But there are further reasons.

This is the portion of the Russian line which is least well backed by railway communication. There is here no railway along the eastern bank. But on the western bank, where the Germans lie, the main line through Radom up to Warsaw throws out an extension towards the Vistula, the railhead of which is at Ostrowiecs, a depot central to any attempt upon this portion of the stream. There is no other railhead equally well situated for a concentration anywhere between Sandomir and Warsaw. (See Map II.)

To the north of Ivangorod crossing is more difficult; apart from its being too far from the centre, you have considerable belts of marsh along the stream, a crumbling bank, and this usually steep and a matter of from 50-100 feet in places above the normal water level. It is true that the country through which this central section (Sandomir-Ivangorod) passes is hilly, the hills becoming bolder (especially upon the left bank) the more one goes southward and upstream. The Great Plain does not begin until after New Alexandria (which is the Russian name for the site more congenially known in Polish history as the Palace of Palawy). But this hilly country is not so confused or broken as seriously to intercept an advance, and there is firmer opportunity for landing upon the right or eastern bank, and less opportunity for the concentration of the enemy.

What is more, two considerable obstacles separate any effort undertaken against the line Vistula-San below Ivangorod or above Sandomir from any effort undertaken in the central portion between the two towns. The first and least of these obstacles is the great belt of forest 50 miles by at


least 20, which lies roughly triangular a couple of days' march south of Radom. This, though traversable of course by two or three good roads, may be regarded as the southern boundary of the belt over which the Germans must advance towards the crossing of the central Vistula. It cuts off for an advancing body the columns working north of Sandomir from those working south. To the north is the very serious obstacle of the Palica. Should a Russian turning movement by the north be even partially successful, then the obstacle of the Palica would afford delay for the withdrawal westward of such German troops as might have already passed successfully to the further bank of the Vistula between New Alexandria and Sandomir. But an attempt to put the main German force over the river north of that obstacle would spell disaster if the German left in the neighbourhood of Warsaw were seriously menaced; still more if it were turned. The Palica with its marshes would hem in the retreating army. There would hardly be time to withdraw the advanced bodies that might have approached or even crossed the Vistula; and there is no natural obstacle between Warsaw and the Palica to fend off the Russians approaching from the north to cut the communications of the bodies that had just crossed or were just crossing.

It is evident that the Germans, while their numbers may not be sufficient so much as to threaten a turning movement here against the Russians, would, by only holding Warsaw, make their advance across the central Vistula (should they succeed in crossing the stream) secure. They must of course not only hold Warsaw: they must also mask, attack, or in a paradoxical way *repose* upon the enemy's fortress of Novo Georgievsk (the true name of which is the old Polish name of Memlin). They must mask also the secondary fortress of Ivangorod. But containing the garrisons of these two, without further advance east and west there, if they cross the Vistula further south at some central point between Ivangorod and Sandomir, and if they there break the Russian line, such a breach, while Warsaw was held, would decide the action as a whole. All this means that an attack upon and an occupation of Warsaw and with it the holding of the line Warsaw-Ivangorod while a crossing is effected somewhere further up above Ivangorod is the obvious German plan.

When we look then at the three sections (1) the San, (2) the Vistula between Sandomir and Ivangorod and (3) the Vistula from Ivangorod down to Warsaw, we see, as I have said, that the central one of these is the most favourable for the chief attempt of the Austro-German allies at crossing the river; and we know that, as a fact, the attempt has been made (with what final success or ill-success we do not yet know) at one particular point especially chosen therein, the point near Jozefów.

In order to understand why this particular spot was chosen the following sketch map may be of interest. The Vistula happens at this point to be narrower than it is at any place either above or below. It is even narrower than at Sandomir. Above, there are marshes; below, islands and the entry of a tributary which balks an advance.

That the Vistula is here correspondingly deeper does not affect the problem, because it is not, in any case, fordable. That it runs more swiftly is an adverse consideration for the Germans attempting to cross it; but this extra current is not sufficient to outweigh the great advantages of a passage which can be gained



more rapidly (if it is gained at all) than at any other point for many days march above and below.

Nor is this the only advantage of the crossing place of Jozefów. It is the nearest point (by road) upon the Vistula from the railhead at Osowiec. Further, there are two roads leading from that railhead to the head of the river bank opposite Jozefów. The one goes north of a belt of wood at this point, the other south of it; and the total distance from the railhead to the right bank is but twenty miles as the crow flies—less than thirty by either road.

The Russians upon the opposing bank have no such advantage. Their railway is fully half as much again, even as the crow flies, behind them; and they have but one road to it—though a longer road down the river leads to New Alexandria and a more distant point upon the same railway.

If, as is reported, the German attempt at crossing the Vistula opposite Jozefów has failed, the check to the invaders, though not decisive, is heavy. No equally good opportunity is to be found for breaking the middle of the Russian line.

Upon the San, of course, there are numerous opportunities of crossing. That river is not more than 150 yards broad in its lower courses, it narrows rapidly as one approaches the mountains, the bridges across it and roads leading to these bridges are numerous, the opportunities for gun positions to defend the crossings are, in such hilly country, also numerous. But it must not be forgotten that the effect upon the Russian line here would be but partial. It would be a blow delivered too near the end of the line, which can hardly be turned, as it reposes upon the mountains; and the nearer one is to this extreme end of the line the better are the Russians supplied by the great railway from Lemberg and Kieff.

Again, below New Alexandria and between Ivangorod and Warsaw, the opportunities for crossing grow rarer and rarer as one goes downstream. The river broadens out, is marshy upon one bank or the other (sometimes upon both), and is not served, upon the German or western side, by the railway.

There is one last point of considerable strategic importance to be watched, and that is the junction of the two rivers, Vistula and San. This point is not of great importance to the attackers at the present moment, for there is no particular reason why the Austro-Germans should try to cross near here more than at any other place. But if the tide of the battle turns, and a Russian pursuit of a German retirement begins; if the main Austro-German line is turned round its Warsaw flank and has to retreat from the rivers, then this river junction will become of the very greatest importance to the Russians.



SKETCH OF JUNCTION OF SAN AND VISTULA RIVERS.

Why? Because if they cross here in any force they will be driving a wedge between the Germans in the north and the Austrians in the south; they will be, to use a metaphor, "enfilading" the line of the Upper Vistula; they will be upon the north side of an obstacle which separates the main Austrian armies in Galicia (to the south of that obstacle) from their allies in Western Poland; they will have but to defend the northern banks of the Upper Vistula to separate the two allies. And we may confidently expect, if a Russian advance begins, a particularly strong effort to seize this junction of the two streams and to obtain a bridgehead at that point. Of course there is no existing bridge; the "tête de pont" the Russians would fight for here would mean the possession and defence of a point upon the left or western bank to which soldiers could be ferried over, or to which they might cross by a pontoon bridge.

So much for the attempts of the Austro-Germans to force the Russian defensive line behind the Vistula and the San (probably somewhere in its centre), and for the Russian counter-offensive if such an attempt fails.

But the main Russian effort will not consist in merely awaiting the Austro-Germans. It will consist in attempting to turn their north flank near Warsaw. The Germans know this, and to reach Warsaw, hold it, and prevent such a turning movement is essential to their success.

To hold New Georgievsk is essential to the German plan, for it is the northern fortress, the extremity of the line. Nor should we be blind to the undoubted fact that political considerations (perhaps to an undue extent but not always unwisely) weigh upon the German commanders. The capture, or rather the occupation, of Warsaw would have a great effect throughout all Eastern Europe, and a corresponding effect in Germany and Austria. It is for this reason that the greatest mass of the German troops is not concentrated for the moment—was not concentrated a week ago—opposite any one crossing place of the Vistula, such as Josefów, but was concentrated for an advance upon Warsaw. Grojec, commanding the junction of so many roads, as we have seen, and the very ante-chamber of Warsaw, was seized more than a fortnight ago in the German advance. A week later the advanced

cavalry bodies of the Prussians were almost within sight of the city—not a day's march away.

But the same considerations which have made the occupation of Warsaw a prime object in the German advance, have made the repulse of the Germans in this part of the field essential to Russian success. The political importance of saving Warsaw from even a temporary German occupation must have had its weight with the Russians; but much more than that, with any sane commander, must be the all-importance of turning the German left in this region. If no effort were ultimately to be undertaken against one of the two wings, of what purpose would be the occupation of this immensely long and purely defensive position along the Vistula and the San? And if no flanking action were to be attempted upon either of the two wings, what use would it be to the Russians to count, perhaps immediately, certainly with every week of the future, upon increasing numbers superior to their foes?

We may take it as certain that the Russian plan has for its principal business the turning of this German flank in the north. Of a corresponding movement in the Carpathians there can as yet be no question. And it is true to say that all the chance of a decision in favour of our Allies turns upon the success of this pushing back of the Germans from before Warsaw, eastward and southward. With every mile that the Germans are compelled to "refuse their left," to bend back their line, before Warsaw, their chance of a successful offensive across the Vistula further south—and indeed their chance of deciding the whole action in their favour at all—gets less and less.

By the Russian account, up to the news which had reached London at the time of writing this, the Germans had in their advance on Warsaw succeeded up to about the morning of last Thursday, October 15th. With the 16th the tide turned, and on the 17th and 18th, Saturday and Sunday last, according to the Russian version, the German left, strong as it was, was here pushed back right to the line Grojec-Skienewice—a matter of twenty miles at one end of the bend and thirty at the other.

The whole battle at this stage stood somewhat as this sketch map shows, with the attempted German



crossing of the Vistula at Josefow, on arrow (1), and the attempted Russian turning of the German lines before Warsaw on arrow (2). Neither effort is yet decided, and there we must leave it.

II.

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

In the Western Theatre of War the week has seen (up to the moment of writing) one fresh and one belated piece of news.

Nothing noteworthy save in the extreme north and on the extreme south—near the North Sea and in the Vosges.

Upon the old main front between the Oise and the Argonne there have been but slight movements. It is obvious that the forces on both sides must have been very largely depleted for the sake of reinforcing the great effort the Allies have been making upon the west up to the Belgian frontier, and the violent counter-offensive attacks which the Germans have directed against that line. None the less, in some points there has been a rather noticeable flexion of the line. Thus, all the advanced trenches of the Germans above the Aisne has been taken; half of the crest of the plateau north of Soissons is already reached by the Allies, but not Craonne nor the Noyon end of it.

Below Craonne, again, between that high promontory hill and Rheims, and in the neighbourhood of Berry-au-Bac, there has been some advance, and a part at least of the Nogent Hills to the east of Rheims are held; but whether the whole lump has been occupied by the French or not neither French nor German communiqués indicated.

But on the Belgian frontier near the North Sea and down in the Vosges there are two points of interest: One belated piece of news, as I have said, and one notable change.

The notable change concerns the situation in the Franco-Belgian frontier. The belated news concerns the recapture by the French of the Southern Vosges overlooking Upper Alsace. I will take these in their order.

A.—THE BELGIAN FRONTIER.

It is important, if we are to understand the French and English official communiqués which deal with the all-important left wing or northern extreme of the Allied line, and with the assault that is presumably to be delivered upon it by the enemy, that we should grasp the nature of the ground. The Allied line ran originally nearly north and south from the district just east of Arras to the sea near Ostend. We may note that the entire stretch of these two fronts, from the Arras district to the North Sea, is not far from eighty miles. Nearly the whole of this line traverses a plain, most of which is dead level. The exception is in a range of slight heights running in a dwindling crescent south of Ypres. From Lens northward to above Armentières you are in the coal district—a mass of dirty lanes and a gridiron of railways and canals. But from the north of this to the sea the complexity of such country ceases, and is replaced, especially as the sea-coast is approached, by numerous very slow watercourses, both canalised and natural. Almost every field has its wet ditch. Of communications it is not worth speaking, for both good, hard roads and railways are so numerous that transport is possible for almost any numbers that might be concentrated for the shock in this region. It is worth noting, however, that neither side has one long natural defensive line upon which to fall back in case it is pressed by the other. On the side of the Allies there is, if they were, unfortunately, compelled to pivot far round eastward, the line of heights all the way down south from Cape Gris-nez. That is three days' march behind their present positions in the

middle, and a week's march behind their extreme positions on the seacoast. There is no defensive position immediately behind the Allied line as it is now held. With the Germans this defect is still more strikingly apparent. There are no heights whatsoever behind them, and nearly all the watercourses run across their line, and not parallel with it. Entrenchment, modern entrenchment, is apparently an artificial line anywhere producible: we have yet to see whether it can "hold" an advance where no natural aid is given it and where time has been lacking. If it is against the Germans that the balance of pressure is felt this next week they must fall back thoroughly, uncovering Lille, and depending at the best upon the line of the Scheldt, continued perhaps by the canal which runs from the Scheldt to the neighbourhood of Eecloo; but the prospect of any long stand across that line of country is not favourable. A retreat, if it were imposed upon them, would be a retreat which would uncover not only Lille but Douai, and would come perilously near to their main line of communications behind Valenciennes.

This is as much as to say that the Germans count upon certain advance. It is not an exaggeration to affirm that such a line as Lille-Ostend would not be held by any force that did not count upon an immediate advance. Difficult and cut up as the country is, there is no very great extent of wood. There is a group of detached woods both east and west of Ypres and one considerable forest north of Ypres and in front of Roulers, and there are numerous scattered woods south of Bruges for over a belt twenty miles by seven or eight miles. But there is nowhere continuous wood in such quantity as to check an advance upon either side, or to screen any large movements—so far as these can be screened from aeroplanes. The only defiles—that is the only places where troops would be compelled to narrow issues during a retreat and where congestion of transport and all similar difficulties might happen, are, of course, in a country of this sort, through bridges. But these bridges are so numerous, and the streams to be crossed so sluggish, for the most part so narrow, and all so easily dealt with by pontoons or trestle work, that a retirement would not be anywhere subject upon either side to difficulties from this cause.

As has necessarily been the case throughout the whole of this western campaign, taking place as it has over territory where the Germans and the French have in various aspects struggled against each other for two thousand years, this last extreme northern field which has been reached by the extension of the Allied line, and which bids fair to be the principal scene of the next heavy work, is filled with the historical memories of former actions. The British force stands right in the country traversed by the Duke of York on his march to the siege of Dunkirk in 1793. The Germans at Werwicq used and commanded the bridge by which the Austrians, crossing too late, lost the Battle of Tourcoing in the next year. Fontenoy is but a few miles behind their positions at Lille; Oudenarde but a few miles behind their positions at Courtrai. Immediately behind the Allied line Hondschoote marks the first considerable victory of the French Revolution in its life-and-death struggle of the Terror.

It is clearly evident (and this is of first-rate importance) that the Germans are here upon the Franco-Belgian frontier attempting a divided thing.


I say that our knowledge of this diversion in their aims—which knowledge is now certainly acquired—is of capital importance. And for this reason.

That no more important test of possessing the initiative—of “pinning” your enemy and providing against unexpected action upon his part—can be looked for than the discovery of his trying to do two things at once.

When the Germans had the initiative—during that amazingly rapid and well-ordered march of theirs upon Paris—no subsidiary thing was attempted. All was on one idea. But to-day, after they have been held in the western field for six weeks, a plain diversity of object, already slightly apparent on more than one point of the long line of battle, has now quite clearly presented itself in the north.

The German commanders have been tempted (1) to break the Allied line anywhere between Lille and Noyon: that was not only a principal and legitimate object, but one in which they have often nearly succeeded, and one consonant with their general scheme; (2) to move along the sea-coast and occupy successively Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne: to command the Straits of Dover.

Now such a double scheme would have a plain strategical meaning in the case of an enemy strong enough by his advance to push back the *whole* of the Allied forces in this quarter. If he had so great a superiority of numbers that he could be certain of advancing from the line Lille-Valenciennes on to Arras, and at the same time of advancing from the line Lille-Ostend to the line St. Omer-Boulogne, then



the double operation would really be a single operation; and an Allied force attempting to hang on for a short time to, say, Menin, would at the very beginning of such an advance occupy a dangerous salient from which it would have to retire. It would be swept back *en masse*.

But it is fairly evident that Prussia commands no such overwhelming force either in quality or in quantity in this region. It is the Allies who have gone forward. It is they who have taken successively Estaires, Armentières, Frelinghien. It is they who have made progress in front of Arras. It is they who have pushed even as far as Roulers. And it is self-evident that not *both* of the plans thus undertaken by the German commanders can now be achieved.

I am not saying that they have not unexpected reserves which may yet make good some advance of theirs south of Lille, as along the arrow (1). I am not saying that they have not the power—though it seems very doubtful—to advance if they choose to undertake that dangerous enterprise along the arrow (2) along the sea-coast. But, I do say that they cannot undertake both objects, and that their objects are here clearly divided.

Now, to divide your force is to put both parts in peril. And in this case the two parts in no way co-operate. They cannot bring down south from arrow (2) any aid in flank of arrow (1)—unless they have an overwhelming number. The country between is solidly, successfully and progressively occupied by the Allies. Still less can they bring up to the north aid to arrow (2) from arrow (1). That would be suicide; for it would be the exposure of their main communications with France behind Valenciennes.

There is no doubt at all that the two efforts are separated. Difficult and usually rash as it is to say: “This known situation necessarily produces that known future result,” it is a fair estimate of the present position upon the Franco-Belgian frontier that not both of these two separate efforts can succeed; and the chances are more than even that neither of them will succeed.

If this is so, it may well be asked for what reason this effort along the sea-coast was undertaken by the Germans at all? One might begin the series of questions by asking of what strategical use was the occupation of Antwerp? Here there is one reply quite satisfactory: “Antwerp was occupied in order to remove any considerable threat against the main communications through Belgium, because the moment had come for moving certain German reinforcements—perhaps not very large nor of very good quality—through Belgium into France.” Even so the answer does not cover the field. Antwerp could perfectly well have been masked, and was fairly efficiently masked for more than a month. But anyhow, let it go at that. You get something of an answer to the strategical question “Why did the enemy occupy Antwerp?” It cost the Germans very little in men, and we must also remember that it raised the spirits of the civilians behind, which spirit, though an indeterminate factor, is not one entirely to be despised—especially in a country which has been taught to expect continuous victory and which can boast that the great war has been hitherto conducted beyond its own frontiers.

But when one proceeds to ask the further strategical question “Why was Ghent occupied?” one gets an answer less satisfactory. Some reply: “It was occupied in order to cut off the retreat of the Belgian forces from Antwerp along the sea-coast.” I say this answer is still less satisfactory than the answer to the occupation of Antwerp, because the German commanders must have known that the Belgian army would escape them. They cannot even have thought it a very close thing.

It is not, by the way, one of the least achievements of the last few days in a strategical sense, that this considerable force should have been safely withdrawn. Nor is it, paradoxical though it sounds, a discouragement to know that the 20,000 of them who were lost by crossing the Dutch frontier, were only lost through a blunder and not by the German pressure from the south.

Even let it be admitted that the occupation of Ghent had some strategical meaning, when we come to the last question, “Why were Bruges and Ostend occupied?” no good strategical answer is available at all. The thing was political. While the great sweep on Paris was taking place the coast could have been occupied by small German forces at any moment. It was not then thought worth while. Now that that sweep has failed, the occupation of the coast in the hope of some moral effect upon England has been undertaken. The answer is not strategically sufficient.




PLAN SHOWING DANGER OF GERMAN ADVANCE ALONG THE COAST TO THEIR MAIN LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

Nothing but a similar answer can be given to the proposal to go on westward along the coast to the Straits of Dover in the face of such large forces of the Allies pushed forward eastward and below as far as Menin and Roulers. To pursue the advance by the level road along the sands to Dunkirk, to Calais, and ultimately across the Grisez hills to Boulogne with this big enemy-force on their left flank is impossible to the Germans. It is a march which simply cannot be undertaken until the Allies are pushed back from that flank. And to attempt it at all can only mean that the occupation of the coast immediately opposite Great Britain has in the eyes of the German Government (not of the German General Staff) some particular *political* value. Of strategical value it has none.

The occupation of Lille, and the vigorous defence of the German positions south of Lille and in front of Douai (where the French have already reached the trenches), has a very real strategical meaning, as have had all the German efforts upon this line from between Douai and Arras right down south to the corner of the old line of the Aisne near Compiègne. The strategical meaning of it is the defence of the main German line of communications, and even a pushing back of the Allies from these, until the Germans shall feel perfectly secure. But the isolated German thrust along the maritime belt is a waste of effort until or unless very much larger forces than anything hitherto brought to bear by the enemy should appear. Meanwhile, the advance of the wedge thrust by the Allies between these two German efforts, east and west of Lille, continues.

It may be of service here to give in some detail a sketch map of the district in which this double effort is being made by the enemy, and to describe the fortunes of the fight during the last few days in detail; for quite probably in this field something

decisive will be achieved by the one opponent or the other in the next few days.



The change of dispositions as we have learnt them from the official communiqués of the French, the English, and the Germans upon this decisive area, the Franco-Belgian frontier, during the last few days, are as follows:—

Following upon the fall of Antwerp it was generally expected that there would come a German

advance—in what numbers, of course, we could not discover. The Allied forces were prepared to meet that advance wherever the stroke might fall, and, if necessary, to take the counter-offensive. The Belgian Army which had evacuated Antwerp marched round in proximity to the frontier, until it had effected its junction with the French forces along the sea-coast, the advanced guard remaining at Nieuport and the mass extended westward towards Dunkirk, through Furnes. South of this came the Allied forces holding all the country southward down to the neighbourhood of Arras.

Up to this moment, the furthest point to which the German cavalry had penetrated in its great advance as a screen, rather less than a fortnight ago, was the front Hazebrouck-Cassel; Hazebrouck in the plain, Cassel on its splendid single, Roman, hill. From this Hazebrouck-Cassel line the German cavalry had been pushed back in the first encounters. The main German advance (in what full numbers we do not yet know—and we shall never be able to do more than guess, though its *composition* will gradually appear through prisoners and other sources of information) appeared last Thursday in the almost simultaneous occupation of Ostend and Lille. The momentum, so to speak, of this German push was not exhausted by the seizure of these points. The ultimate front—the extreme westward and east of the enemy here—was a line occupied a week ago from in front of Arras, through or near Lens, in front of La Bassée, by Merville, to the heights (base, confused and insignificant) known to the inhabitants as the Hills of the Cat (the *Monts du Chat*); whence, by the way, a valiant body of volunteers marched just too late to be of any use at the Battle of Tourcoing a hundred years ago. In the local patois, which is Flemish, men call it “The Catsberg.”

From these heights the German line bent back slightly, but well west of the Ypres Canal, through Dixmude, to the sea. Ostend lay behind this line, and was occupied as a matter of course.

At this moment it was not certain whether the Germans would attempt to attack along the sea-coast or to renew their violent efforts between Lille and Douai against Arras; or even whether they would not attempt both things together.

Meanwhile, against so long a line which might for all we knew be insufficiently held (from in front of and below Arras to the sea-coast near Ostend is, as I have said, a round 80 miles), the Allies pushed vigorously forward, and the effect of that advance was to strike a great wedge in between the northern coastal forces of the Germans and their forces in and to the south of Lille. As this advance proceeded it looked more and more as though the big German cavalry movement of the week before had been not so much a screen in front of a really large advance of German reinforcements, as a blind—perhaps an effort to get the Allies to put too many men up north along the sea and so to weaken the front by Arras: perhaps the other way round: to make more progress along the coast by threatening Lille and the country south thereof.

At any rate the Allied forces, depending largely upon the excellence of cavalry work, pushed eastward. On Friday last the French, who had already taken Estaires, were at Laventie, and the Allies had seized the isolated group of these hills named after the Cat. They had not yet reached Ypres or Armentières. But by Saturday they were right up against Armentières, in Ypres, and already making a bend in the German line. On the Monday

after the capture of Fromelles, there was a general advance in this region from Laventie, on to Armentières, which was captured and occupied; advanced guards also captured the town of Frelinghen. Twenty-four hours later more advanced bodies of the Allies had reached Menin, and a spear-head of the Allied forces (how composed we do not know) was in Roulers.

Now if the Germans on the sea-coast had fallen back before this steady and rapid push of the Allies north of Lille, we should have less to record. But the interesting thing is that in spite of this big wedge driven in between the coast and the manufacturing region south of the River Lys, the Germans have clung to the coast and were still attempting, as late as last Monday, to force a way eastward along it. They were checked by a mixed force in which the Belgians had the good fortune to take some revenge. This force was posted along the only strong north-and-south defensive position in this flat and sandy district—the canalised course of the Yser, which waterway is also known as the “Canal of Ypres to the Sea.” This watercourse comes out at Nieuport, running by Dixmude, and appears hitherto to have checked any further German advance along the coast towards Dunkirk.

Meanwhile, any such advance would now, as I have said, be very much in peril from the occupation by the Allies of all the country to the south of it; and until or if that country is cleared by the Germans and the Allies pushed back from it (of which there is as yet no sign), it is not credible that the offensive undertaken by the enemy along the coast of the North Sea towards the Straits of Dover can be continued.

It is equally true that if the advance from Menin should reach Courtrai the German position at Lille will no longer be possible.

The whole story of these days is one of a fairly rapid and distinctly successful pressure exercised upon the enemy, pushing him back across a belt 10 or 12 miles wide in the neighbourhood of Arras, 30 miles wide in the broadest part of the wedge between Hazebrouck and Roulers. But much more important than the mere advance is the fact that, if it can be continued, it will mean a gradual envelopment of what lies to the *south* of it, and must surely already mean the retirement of the hazardous German advance to the *north* of it along the sea coast.

B.—THE NEWS FROM ALSACE.

The second item, the belated piece of French official news as regards Alsace, is interesting chiefly in this: That it is the first indication we have had for many weeks of any improvement in the situation there. It was generally taken for granted that, with the exception of Belfort and its garrison (and perhaps a few miles of the plain east of Belfort) all Alsace had been abandoned to the enemy since the French disaster at the end of August in front of Metz. Indeed, we had heard no more than occasional accounts of a German offensive in front of St. Dié, which offensive had been time and again repulsed. But it was generally believed that during the whole of this period the crests of the Vosges and their passes, from that mountain in the south called the Ballon d'Alsace right up to the northern height of the Donon, had been occupied by the enemy, who had also seized the French, or western, slope of those mountains. It now appears that all the southern passes have—after what struggles we are not told—come again into French hands, and that the eastern



or Alsatian slope of the Vosges is held up to a point abreast of Colmar.

The forces hitherto engaged on this extreme right of the great line of positions through France have been (comparatively) so small during the last few weeks that the strategic value of an advance or retirement in this district is not great. But the news does at least mean this—that if a big turning movement is attempted on this right wing of the French at any time—as by the release of troops from the East after some German success upon the Vistula—that turning movement will not immediately approach, or without warning, the gap of Belfort. It means that the attack, should it come, is more likely to come through Lorraine and upon that “open door” of which I have spoken so often in these notes upon the Meuse at St. Mihiel. But it is no longer certain that this open door

is as open as it was three weeks ago. St. Mihiel, indeed, is still occupied, but such slight change as there has been in the situation has been to the advantage of the French. They may now hold Camp des Romains. They are back over the Meuse, quite near St. Mihiel. The news is very scanty, but a little startling. It speaks of the destruction of a battery of heavy German guns and of a recrossing of the river—of action close to the St. Mihiel point. But of a cutting off of the German advanced post patiently waiting there, it says nothing. Had the French occupied the whole of the Rupt du Mad, had the advances northward from Toul and southward from Verdun met, the German door into France at St. Mihiel would have been shut again. It has not been shut; but the corridor leading to it has been maintained narrow, and has, perhaps, been made a little narrower. We must wait for more news.

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THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

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THE BALTIC AREA OF CONFLICT SHOWING THE MOST IMPORTANT FORTIFIED POINTS.

THE SUBMARINE MENACE.

At the moment of writing the German week's bag—by submarines—is one Russian armoured cruiser and one old British protected cruiser. It works out at two of something for nothing! And it is idle to deny that a species of submarine panic is spreading.

The actual asset remains small. To date no German submarine has achieved anything whatever likely in the remotest degree to affect final issues. But—the Germans have secured enough "moral effect" to make everything else seem possible. Many of us envisage them, out of the way, lying in harbour till such time as they have sunk by submarines enough of our Navy to make a fleet action a "toss up," or else odds in Germany's favour.

So far they have—except in the case of the *Pallada*—merely submarined ships which "don't matter." But we may take it that they will pursue this policy steadily until they have sunk various capital ships of ours which *do* matter very much.

And it is just about here that German calculations seem likely to go astray.

Supposing that they attain their object; supposing that they sink some of our Dreadnoughts until battle fleet equality or an advantage therein is obtained? The German fleet may then come out at the "selected moment." But—and it is a very big "but" indeed—it chanches that we have more than twice as many submarines as they have, and, as I described in a recent article, submarines manned on those democratic lines which alone can be relied on for ultimate success in this kind of warfare. Whatever risks we may have run, *their* risks will be twice as great.

That, however, is overlooked. German agents in this country have made a strong but so far only partially successful effort to raise a submarine panic. It cannot be too clearly understood that it is not the loss of ships and men on which the enemy relies so much as "the panic." It is in the chapter of accidents that not long before the war Admiral Sir Percy Scott, in a letter, and Sir A. Conan Doyle, in a story, should have invested the submarine with a very high potentiality. Of these entirely extraneous circumstances capital is already being made.

Presently more capital will be made, because it is reasonably certain that, sooner or later, the German submarines will secure some of our Dreadnoughts. The first Dreadnought secured we may be certain of seeing the "panic" sequel worked to the uttermost.

Now, this is one of those few troubles which are best met half way. As I suggested some weeks ago, the loss of a dozen Dreadnoughts by submarines is among the things that are *possible*. We should meet it by thinking of it as a *probable* event. The more we anticipate it the better, for by so doing we shall keep our heads.

To date, the losses due to submarines have been proportionately far less than people imagine. For example, here is a list of all losses which have taken place in what may be called "submarinable waters":—

	ALLIES.	GERMANS AND AUSTRIANS.
Submarines.....	Pathfinder Cressy Hogue Aboukir Hawke Pallada	Hela S 126
Mines	Amphion Speedy	t.b. 19 (Austrian, Accidental)
Gunfire		K. Luise (minelayer) Zenta U 15 V 187 Magdeburg Köln Mainz Ariadne S 115 S 117 S 118 S 119

Now, if we examine the list, we find that, at the time of writing, there have only been six successful submarine attacks in seventy-seven days of warfare. Of these six successful attacks two were delivered by us. Consequently our loss works out at approximately one successful attack against us every nineteen days. There have been six gunnery affairs in the same period, resulting in the loss of twice as many units, so to date the submarine (counting in units) has been only half as effective as the gun. As yet, therefore, there is no occasion for alarm, the more so as there is reason to believe that the Russians sank some of their submarine attackers.

In any case, the submarine is neither invulnerable nor invincible. The difficulty with it is mainly that it is a new arm—this is the first time that it has been effectively tried in warfare. Means of defence have therefore to be invented, for only in actual warfare can the necessary experience be gained.

Of itself a submarine is a species of intelligent floating mine, its speed and visual ability both of a low order. The real danger lies in the German habit of using a trawler mother ship flying a neutral flag. Each German success has been thus secured—the trawler acting as the brain.

Obviously, then, the first thing necessary is to devise ways and means of dealing with the brain.

That is to be done either by restricting the liberty of trawlers to fish or cruise in submarinable waters, or else by utilising trawlers for the examination service. Further, it is probably not beyond the wit of man to devise some means of transforming small steamers into some kind of submarine destroyer. Take the harpooning of Nature's submarine—the whale—for example. And, finally, we should be well within our rights if we gave it clearly to be understood that the crews of all vessels assisting enemy submarines under the neutral flag would be hanged as pirates. The percentage of men who will face in cold blood the chance of being hanged is small.

THE NORTH SEA.

The process of destroying the British Fleet by "attrition" has decidedly failed in its object during the last week. On the German side the bag is one old cruiser, the *Hawke*; on our side four German destroyers, old, but still useful.

None of these losses affect the main issue, save in so far as the principle explained by Bernhardt is concerned. Our numerical superiority in the various classes of ships varies, but it can be roughly generalised at from 33 per cent. to 50 per cent.

This makes no allowance for ships on foreign service, or for what the Germans have to detach to operate against the

Generalised broadly, the situation is approximately as follows:—

Type.	British.	German.	British Surplus.
"Dreadnoughts"	34	22	12
Pre-Dreadnoughts	40	30	10
Cruisers	49	15	34
Light Cruisers	72	36	36
Torpedo Craft	260	209	51
Submarines	84	30	54

In every case the ships concerned are of widely varying fighting value in each class. But where numbers are at stake the fighting values of units are apt to coalesce in the general total. Taking an arbitrary 100 against seventy, it is obvious that if the lesser Power destroys ten of the enemy with a loss to itself of seven, it has made no progress whatever. The situation remains unaffected; the superiority of three has no meaning. And since the Germans are actually up against a proposition which is nearer 100 to forty (even at a moderate computation), it is easy to see that even an apparent gain would represent an actual loss.

The following is a list of losses in the North Sea and Baltic to date. These two areas cannot act in combination so far as the Allies are concerned; but so far as the Germans are concerned they are more or less one and the same thing:—

Class.	Lost by Allies.	Lost by Germans.
Cruisers	4	0
Light Cruisers	2	5
Gunboats	1	1
Torpedo Craft	0	6
Submarines	5	1 to 4
Total of all sorts	7	13 to 16

Now, working in units this means that it has cost the Germans about double value for every unit which they have destroyed. Translated into terms of ability to afford it in units this works out at something like sixpence expended for every penny gained. Translated into terms of fighting value it only works out at something like it costing twopence to make a penny against adversaries which have a shilling available for every German sixpence. "Attrition" is hardly to be achieved on these lines.

Turning to the two latest actions; little of much moment is to be extracted from either. The *Hawke* was an old cruiser launched in 1891, in the days when the torpedo counted for very little. She displaced 7,350 tons. She was armed with two ancient 9'2's, and ten equally ancient 6 inch. Her palmiest speed was 19½ knots.

The destroyer action is in a different category. It must be left to others to decide whether Mr. Churchill was quite "happy" in his rat-destroying simile. But whether he were or whether he were not, this particular action comes under that head.

So far as can be ascertained, the four old German destroyers, S 115, 117, 118, and 119, sunk by the light cruiser *Undaunted*, and the t.b.d. *Lance*, *Lennox*, *Legion*, and *Loyal*, were patrolling off Borkum. They were boats designed for the destruction of battle-ships by torpedoes, without the least regard to conflict with others of their kind. To continue the Churchill simile, they were rats which crept out of their hole and found a man with a shot gun waiting for them.

Directly they saw the *Undaunted* they must have known that the game was up. To my mind, the disquieting feature of the matter is that they did not surrender right off, but instead put up a fight with their popguns against overwhelming odds.

The *Undaunted*, in common with the rest of her class, carries a couple of 6-inch guns. These guns mean death and destruction on the first hit, whereas an old German destroyer might fire at an *Undaunted* for a whole day without damaging her anything to speak of.



PLAN SHOWING BORKUM, OFF WHICH THE GERMAN DESTROYERS WERE SUNK.

Russians in the Baltic. Nor does it take into account the considerable force of small craft which the French maintain in the Channel. In calculations of this kind, it is always better to allow a margin. The surplus given is therefore our minimum superiority, and the German total, correspondingly represents a maximum.

Space does not permit of giving the whole sum in exact percentages—nor would there be any particular advantage in giving it. In matters of this sort broad generalities are the things that count.

I may be wrong, but I am of opinion that we should take very careful note of this affair off the Dutch coast. It indicates that the Germans have a tenacity fully equal to our own. They are playing for the Empire of the Seas, and they are playing to win. The odds against them are stupendous, but they do not recognise these odds.

The guns available on either side were as follows:—

BRITISH.
Two 6-in. (100-pdrs.)
Five 4-in. (31-pdrs.)

GERMANS.
Twelve 4-pdrs.

Little wonder that our losses only amounted to five wounded!

A curious feature of the action is that it is stated to have occupied over an hour altogether. This probably included from the first shot fired in the chase to the sinking of the last enemy destroyer. Shooting from a destroyer at high speed is, however, always very difficult.

Sufficient data are not available to form a connected story of what happened. We cannot rely much on the Dutch eye-witness who "knew the ships were destroyers because they had four funnels." None of the British boats engaged have more than three funnels, while all the Germans had but two. His other observations were probably equally at fault.

The precise tactics, however, matter little. Of far more moment is the circumstance that the enemy was annihilated without appreciable loss. He had not a dog's chance—and that is the correct strategy of war. On each occasion that we have met the enemy this has happened.

THE BALTIC.

News from the Baltic is still somewhat vague—for some reason or other no coherent official German report is available.

The Kiel Canal has been closed to merchant shipping; this probably to curtail information as to where the High Sea Fleet is.

There are rumours of a German Fleet cruising near the Aland Islands, but it may possibly turn out that they are Russians.

The incident of most moment is the official Russian statement that on October 10th the *Admiral Makaroff*, while searching a suspicious fishing vessel flying the Dutch flag, was unsuccessfully attacked by submarines. On the following day her sister cruisers, the *Bayan* and *Pallada*, were again attacked, the latter being hit and sunk with all her crew. The *Pallada*

was a modern armoured cruiser of 7,775 tons, armed with two 8-inch, eight 6-inch, and a 7-inch belt. Her speed was about 21 knots. She is the first modern ship (save the little *Amphion*) to be lost in the present war. A feature of the design of this type is a very complete series of unpierced bulkheads of great solidity. Theoretically, she was unsinkable by one torpedo. Either, therefore, she was hit by two or more, or she happened to be struck in a magazine.

In this connection German torpedoes appear to be more violent in their action than do ours. A special new secret explosive has consequently been suspected, but evidence as to this is yet inconclusive—there is a great element of luck in where a torpedo happens to hit.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

There is no change to record. The bombardment of Cattaro continues. Photographs which have been published suggest that only old ships are actively engaged—which is also both reasonable and probable. It seems improbable that anything on a par with the German "17-inch howitzers" on land is being attempted by the ships; there is no reason why it should be.

The usual Austrian destroyer is reported unofficially as "sunk," also an Austrian submarine. Stories of this kind are best accepted with caution. Indications generally are that the Austrians are remaining in harbour.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

At the moment of writing all German corsairs have disappeared. One or two vessels supposed to be their auxiliary colliers have been captured or detained, and this may partly account for the recent lack of activity. More probably, however, it is part of the general plan of campaign designed to lull us into a temporary security. Possibly, however, our cruisers are too active to make commerce warfare alluring.

In any case, nothing has so far happened to render necessary any consideration of the adoption of convoy, with its attendant inconvenience and expense.

THE FAR EAST.

The old Japanese cruiser *Takachiho* has been sunk by a mine. As a fighting unit she was quite obsolete. Operations otherwise continue much as usual.

FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS AND THEIR DEFENCE.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

IN my previous article I gave rough illustrations of very simple sections of trenches, leaving out all dimensions, and I did this for a reason I shall now explain. Nothing in my experience disheartens the would-be student of these matters more than the diagrams in text books, marked minutely 4 feet 3 inches, 5 feet 6 inches, and so forth, many dozens of them, all of which he is told he must commit to memory for examination purposes.

The whole thing seems so unpractical to him. If a man wants breast-high cover when bullets are flying, or are likely to fly, he will dig till he gets it, without bothering at all about inches. But even in war bullets are not always flying; in peace, naturally, they never are, and it is essentially in peace that all instructional work has to be done. There will be lots of it in the new armies for the next six months. Hence these dimensions have to be fixed, because in peace what the whole squad wants is to get back early to their dinners, and unless you lay down distinct and definite dimensions of depth, width and task required from each man (which must be adhered to) the instructor has no irrefutable argument at hand with which to check shirkers. As many of my readers will probably be instructors in a very short time, I recommend these hints particularly to their attention.

Moreover, where places have to be entrenched against time it is absolutely necessary to have some clear idea as to the amount of earth a man can throw out in a given time, before any reliable scheme for a whole position can be evolved. If the general gives his subordinates eight, twelve, or forty-eight hours to prepare a position, he must at least be able to judge how much work he can reasonably expect to find done upon it

in the time, since his whole plan and distribution of troops must depend the duration of the defence which an allotted number of men can make in it.

Generally, after a long peace, the tendency is to underrate very materially the amount of work that can be done, with the result that works are not attempted at all for fear they should not be finished in time, or far more men than would suffice are allotted to their defence whose services, as a mobile reserve, may be badly needed elsewhere.

I remember an old Crimean instructor telling us that the best guide as to what a man could dig out under fire was to back the champion man of one company against the champion of another to get out 100 cubic feet for drinks, and then note the result. I remember also one such competition in which the two men almost tied in one quarter of the time which the book allowed for the job. These are hints not to be found in official textbooks, but they will be exceedingly useful none the less.


The next point is of importance to all ranks alike, whether they have to dig trenches, or defend them, or both. It has been brought out very clearly in "Eye-witness's" last letter from Headquarters in France. The writer is himself an engineer officer, and the point raised is one around which a great conflict has raged for many years.

Generally, everybody at first thinks that the greater the range at which he can see his enemy the better the chance of shooting him down before he is reached by the enemy. It seems such plain commonsense that if a man must spend thirty minutes under fire in trying to get at you, you will have thirty times more chances of hitting him than if the distance is so short that he can cover it in only one.

Curiously, however, the exact converse is the case, as Plan I. will show.

Let the distance be 3000 yards, taking thirty minutes roughly to cover. Now, at 3000 yards long-range infantry fire has never yet stopped a decent battery from unlimbering and opening fire, and never will.

The enemy's infantry comes over the brow of the hill in successive lines, and your men begin shooting, thus disclosing their position by the graze of their bullets.




PLAN I.

Batteries promptly appear near the top of the hill, not necessarily on it, and in three minutes or so a rain of shrapnel begins to burst over your heads, smoke, dust, and bullets fill the air, and it ceases to be possible for men to see the approaching enemy, much less aim at him, for the bullets come so thick that every square foot of vulnerable surface, men's heads, and shoulders, must be hit three or four times a minute. At last, when the enemy's infantry is about 300 to 500 yards off, according to the slope of the ground, his

It was argued by many of us long before the war began that to place trenches on the top of a long slope was simply to court destruction at the hands of the gunners, who can always outrange infantry. We argued that a man could always shoot straighter from a rest than when standing up from the shoulder. Therefore, the essence of a good defence lay in so tracing the trenches that the guns could not get at them from a distance, thus compelling the infantry to attack without their support. Thus, as shown in Plan II., B's guns

now cannot come forward down the slope towards A. without being crushed by A's artillery, which can shell the wood full of B's infantry as it pleases, and if B's infantry try to break out of the wood down the hill, A's unshaken infantry can pump out magazine fire enough in a minute to wipe out every living thing among them. This is exactly what we have now learnt to do in practice on the Aisne.

Of course, the enemy's aeroplanes may locate A's trenches, but unless the gunners can see where the acro-



PLAN II.

guns have to cease their fire in order to avoid hitting their own men in the back, an experience no men will stand. But by that time the defenders have been so reduced in numbers and so harassed by shells generally, that they fire high and wild, and can no longer stop the enemy's final rush. That is, and always has been, the mechanism of every successful attack, but hitherto, in actual practice, no army has seen that in the modern breech-loader they possess the one weapon which can defeat this design.

plane's signal bomb drops their fire is not likely to be very accurate, and, after all, you must take some chances in war.

When, therefore, in the near future any of my readers may find themselves in a trench halfway up a slope, or close to a wood, at first sight the worst kind of place he can imagine, let him take heart, for the choice of such a position only shows that his leaders know their work and have full confidence in his shooting.

THE WAR AND THE FILM.

Latest pictures at the Scala Theatre.

Those who have not yet seen the beautiful colour pictures of the war at the Scala Theatre will do well to take an early opportunity of doing so, for there is certainly no entertainment of equal interest to be seen in London at the present time. The latest additions to the colour films, comprising scenes of interest round the Belgian coast, and an admirable series of views of Paris and Parisian life, are full of animation, and are alone well worthy of a visit, while the first part of the programme, which shows in varied detail the different units of the military and naval fighting forces of Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Serbia, Denmark, Switzerland, the United States, and Japan, constitutes a feast of gorgeous colouring and of dramatic incident which can never fade from the recollection of the spectator, and which may, indeed, be enjoyed again and again with undiminished zest. Among so much that is noteworthy, it is difficult to particularise, but the strikingly beautiful aspect of the foaming sunlit waters in some of the naval pictures is a veritable triumph for the kinemacolour process. Another remarkable effect is that produced by the firing of the field guns, the flashes from which appear at times like an actual blaze of real fire upon the screen. Quite a feature of the entertainment is the orchestra, which is excellently handled throughout, and adds much to the general enjoyment, the various items being skilfully chosen to enhance the effect of the pictures. A word of praise is also due to the lecturer, whose lucid explanation of the films is often characterised by touches of humour.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

Messrs Hodder and Stoughton have just published two topical books, *The British Army from Within*, by E. Charles Vivian, and *The French Army from Within*, by ex-Trooper, at 2s. each. The former will make very instructive reading, not only to those who have enlisted or are about to enlist, but to all those interested—and at the present moment who is not?—in the welfare of the British Army. All the various units that go to make up the com-

plete army are carefully dealt with. The chapter on the "New Army" will be read with considerable appreciation.

Although not specifically stated, it is not difficult to imagine that both these books are from the pen of the same author, and the *French Army from Within* explains the various branches in detail. The chapter dealing with the great garrison towns of France is of particular interest.

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THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

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THE FIELD IN FLANDERS.

Tuesday afternoon, October 27th, 1914.

I WISH this week to concentrate upon that large business—largest as it serves the Allies though large it serves the enemy—which is acting in Flanders as I write.

Perpetually in the course of this great campaign, and especially during its course in the West, we have had a situation which looked like a decision; and yet that situation has not matured.

We have had movements that not only might have resulted in very definite success to one side or the other, but which seemed necessarily to point to such immediate results.


I do not mean that we have had situations which could make one certain of victory or defeat for one party; I mean that we have had situations which promised as *alternatives* some considerable success on one side or the other—just as you may say of a big speculation that either the man will make a fortune or will lose one. From what you know of the state of the market he will be made or broken. But at any rate he will not come out with a *small* loss or gain.

Now the principal characteristic of the campaign up to the present moment—that which seems to differentiate it from every other great campaign of the past, and a characteristic probably proceeding from the wholly novel conditions of modern universal conscript armies and modern machines—is that these critical situations have never developed beyond a certain limit. They have never matured. They have never led to a decision.

Upon the analogy of the immediate past of the war it would therefore be unwise to say that the present situation in Flanders points to an approaching decision. Nevertheless one is tempted to say that, what with (1) the violence of the struggle, (2) the large reinforcements involved (especially upon the German side), (3) the concentration of all main interest on to this one point—the state of affairs does look more like a decision than anything we have had before.

It does look as though a continuation of stalemate on this end of the Franco-Belgian frontier was hardly possible. There is no doubt that the enemy has here concentrated new forces which, though they certainly do not exhaust his reserves, prove him to be making a gambling effort. Prisoners are captured, troops are noted upon the march, which make this certain. He has masses of first-rate material in Flanders. But he is, among other better troops, using boys much younger and men much older than the Allies choose to put into the field at this stage; and the whole of his action during the last ten days, both in the northern part, the neighbourhood of the sea-coast, and in the southern between Lille and La Bassée, proves that he is depending upon superior *numbers* in this region acquired at some expense of *quality*. He is, therefore, fighting, not in expectation

of falling back on a defensive position, but to win or lose.



We may make perfectly certain that, both across the canal between Ypres and the sea and in the region of La Bassée west of Lille, far to the south, where the enemy is making his greatest efforts, he has for the moment got a numerical superiority, and we may make equally certain that he has acquired that superiority at a quite extraordinarily heavy expense of men. Only the event can show whether he is wise or unwise in making this extraordinary effort, but, at any rate, if he proves unwise (that is, if the effort fails) *he cannot, after it has failed, fall back with the same security with which the first-class troops of Kluck fell back in their admirable retreat from Paris.*

Now let us estimate the elements which may lead us to expect in this field success or failure upon either side.

The first of these elements is one which I have insisted upon before now in connection with this fighting, and which is particularly evident in the crisis of the last few days. It is the *separation of objectives* which, I do not say the German commanders, but certainly the German Government, has imposed upon the German forces. Someone, clearly, has presented an advance along the coast from Ostend towards Calais as *one* of the objects to be obtained by the German army. As clearly some other person has proposed another effort (and very vigorously maintained it) south and west of the town of Lille. The two may be co-ordinated by some agreement; they do not come from one head.

Now see what this duplication of objective means.

From the little town of La Bassée to the sea at Nieuport (which line is the general frontier of the

Allied resistance) is a distance, as the crow flies, of not less than 45 miles; following the sinuosities of the line, as it actually is, the front must mean something a good deal over 50 miles.

Very large forces striking an expectant, defending, but inferior body deployed along such a front might attack everywhere in the general effort to roll back that defensive, or, rather, to push it back. Such lines fully deployed one against the other, without special points of concentration, we had at the beginning of the war. But even such a shock, fully developed along a whole week's march of country, will almost certainly have to turn at last into an attempt to outflank.

In a struggle of a line of ten against a line of ten there is not likely to be a decision unless two of the ten rush at one point to get through, or turn round by one side to catch the opponent in flank.

You do not tear a hole in your opponent's line by striking it everywhere with equal force. To tear a hole you must concentrate upon some supposedly weak link in the chain. If you do not choose to attack in this method, in other words, if you do not choose to try to tear a hole through his line, the only other thing you can do is to get round him—to hold him on his line while you claw round him with unexpected men to the right or the left.

Now, in this case, there can be no question of "clawing round," that is, of outflanking, because the effort is being made at the end of a long and tenacious line which reposes on the sea, and then stretches away indefinitely southwards. So there is no question of the Germans outflanking by the German *left*, that is to the south of Lille. The other end of the line—the far northern end on the German *right*—reposing on the sea, there is no outflanking there; for through the sea no troops can march.


In other words, what the Germans *must* do if they are to succeed, and the only thing they can *possibly* do, is to tear a hole.

But when you want to tear a hole through a line you naturally put all the strength you have upon one supposedly weak spot. You must of course have troops all along the line to "hold" your enemy, but you mass a "bolt" of men on some one comparatively narrow front, and you launch it at that point where you think the opposing line, from the pressure of bad or few forces on difficult ground, can be broken. Napoleon, for instance, at Waterloo, in each of his great efforts to break the Allied line tried first one place and then another. He tore at Wellington's left centre with his great battery; at that left centre he launched Erlon. At the end of the day he launched the Guard at the right centre. But what would historians have said of him if he had launched part of the Guard at the right centre and another part at the left centre at the same time?

Napoleon being what he was, historians would have had to try to find some explanation other than mere folly or confusion. And the German Army being what it is, possessing the tradition, doctrine, and efficiency in practice which we know, we are equally bound to find some explanation for this divergence of objective: this attack of the enemy, not along the coast alone or in front of Lille alone (four days off), but at *both* these distant points. If the Germans massed all the men they could spare for their "bolt" in front of Lille and hurled them against the point of La Bassée, and if by so doing they tore a hole through the Allied line there, they would achieve a result large in proportion to their success. If their success was overwhelming, and they

poured through in great numbers and very rapidly, they would probably cut off that great body of their enemies which fills up the remaining fifty mile line between Lille and the sea. But even if they failed to cut off that northern group, with its hundreds of thousands of men, even if they failed to take them prisoners and destroy them as a military force, they would, even in case of that incomplete success, compel this advanced northern portion to fall back very quickly. They would "uncover," as the phrase goes, all the sea-coast well past Dunkirk to the neighbourhood of Calais. To win in the Lille region by using there, at the La Bassée point, all the men they have free, would be, in itself, to win Calais.

The thing is elementary. If I have here a line A—B reposing upon the sea, and C—D my opponent breaks me by massing superior numbers in a "bolt" at E, then the portion E—B will have to



fall back as fast as it can into some such position as F—B, and poor A—E can only escape the extreme probability of capture by pelting away backwards towards some such line as H—G. The chances are, indeed, of course heavily against A—E being able to get away at all after the whole line A—B is broken at E. When a line is broken it usually suffers disaster in one of its two halves and sometimes in both. But at the very best, and in any case, the only chance of safety for this northern half would be to fall back and "uncover" all that district H—A along the sea-coast which the line A—E had hitherto protected. Even if the enemy with his "bolt" had not broken the line A—B at E, but had pushed it in, the same would be true. An ugly push into a line, which only *nearly* breaks it, compels the retreat of one half or the other above or below the bulge; because, if the line should break, one half or the other would certainly be in peril of disaster.

Now all this is as much as to say that, while we must seek some strategic object in the Germans thus dividing their forces, that object is hard to find.

A is Nieuport, H is Calais, E is the neighbourhood of Lille and the point of La Bassée.

One would have thought that the heaviest "bolt" the Germans could afford to gather would have been shot at E only, because success there would, as a

necessary consequence, involve the abandonment of the sea-coast between Nieuport and Calais. Why, then, has this diversion of forces taken place? Why have the Germans struck, not only west of Lille against La Bassée—where success would automatically have uncovered the sea-coast—but *also* along that sea-coast itself?

The answer must be political. There is no other answer. Someone in control of German affairs has said: "If we can occupy the sea-coast *quickly* we shall have a certain political effect which we much desire, and which an ultimate success further south will not subserve." Someone else, more military, has said: "I regret this waste of men upon a political object. Our only chance of breaking the enemy's line is to go for the main point west of Lille. I insist upon having, at any rate, great masses of men for that main point (the neighbourhood of Lille). Use what you think you can spare to the north." Whereupon a compromise has been effected between the politician and the soldier. The former first took large reinforcements for his attempt along the coast; the latter had reinforcements, also large, not as large as he could have wished, for his effort in front of Lille. But as the politician is master, the attack along the sea-coast has used up most of the men, and is attracting to itself, by its very lack of success, more and more forces from the south.

The effect of this division of power has been to leave a large body of the Allies well advanced between both attacks, threatening at Ypres and to the east of Ypres, the flank of each German push. All those strong bodies in the neighbourhood of Ypres and to the east of that town, occupying country nearly up to Roulers, threaten the southern German advance by Lille somewhat and threaten the sea-coast advance very gravely indeed.

For instance, the French have been pushing eastward from Armentières for three days consecutively. They certainly would not have been able to do that if the whole of the German attack had fallen upon La Bassée. But the mass of that attack had been deflected, by divided counsels, to the north and along the sea.

Now what was the German political object in this march along the sea-coast? To that a simple and true answer can be given. The object was to frighten England; to advance, as some German political authority believed, another step in the process of weakening the Alliance. Such political objects are not without military value where one is certain of one's psychology. The great siege of Paris in '70-'71 was almost entirely political, and the Germans rightly judged that the fall of Paris would be the end of the war. They therefore risked a great deal with that one political object in view, and they were right. But it is an extraordinary misconception of the moral condition in this country to think that the occupation of the French coast up to Cape Grisnez would appreciably affect either the Alliance or the domestic balance of the English people.

This political move had, indeed, also some strategic value: though quite out of proportion to the strategic loss it involved.

But first let us note another political object which may have been held in view by the enemy, and that is the complete holding of Belgian soil.

The power to say that they were technically the masters of *all* that had once been Belgium may have attracted some German statesman or Prince. At any rate neither this nor any larger object was worth the diversion of such masses of men from the critical point by Lille. It is that diversion which puzzles

every critic and student of the campaign in its present phase. It only puzzles him if he forgets how often the most urgent military considerations have been sacrificed in the clash between the politician and the soldier.

But let us consider in detail how a man possessed of political power might, if he had power to force this false plan on the staff, bring forward military arguments for thus dividing the German army and attempting the Calais march.

THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEM OF THE STRAITS.

I have said that it is clear that someone in authority over the Germans has suggested as an imperative necessity of the moment an advance by Dunkirk to Calais, and the occupation of the French shore of the Straits of Dover. I have further said that a soldier, not a politician, would have urged the massing of all forces for a blow that should *break* the Allied line—not turn it on the coast.

For it is the business of soldiers to decide campaigns, while it is the business of politicians to estimate the psychology of those whom they happen to govern as subjects, or as foreigners to oppose.

But the advance along the sea-coast to, let us say, some point north of Boulogne, the occupation of the maritime end of that range of hills which bounds the Artois country, and runs into the sea at Cape Grisnez, at the narrowest point of the Straits, the possession of Dunkirk and of Calais, and of the cliffs that look at England from the west of Calais (whence is the shortest artillery trajectory across the narrow seas toward Britain), has certain strategical objects. The politician who shall have ordered this move did not act, and could not only have acted, with a vague intention of disturbing the English temper. There are already between Ypres and the mouth of the Yser perhaps 10,000 German dead, perhaps 60,000 German casualties; and the purely military value of such a move must have been weighed—even though it were undertaken against the highest military advice—before it was begun.

What is that military value?

I will summarise what is to be said for and against the march upon Calais; or, to be more accurate, the march upon the heights of Grisnez—for these are the true strategical objective.

1. Of the Allies in the west Great Britain alone is, theoretically at least, inexhaustible. Slow as the training of new levies must be; difficult as is the finding of officers and even of instructors for them; untried as must be their *cadres* or framework (the officers and non-commissioned officers which hold an army together, as the honeycomb of solid metal holds the paste of an accumulator plate); diverse as the elements of British recruitment necessarily are (Colonial, Asiatic, and the rest): it remains true that in a prolonged war the power of Great Britain to provide mere numbers should be, in comparison with the Germanic peoples, inexhaustible.

Now, to create such a state of mind among the British, and particularly in their politicians, as would detain upon these shores reinforcements otherwise destined for France and Belgium would have an obvious strategic value.

This I think the principal, and certainly the most legitimate, of the conclusions drawn by whatever minds conceived this quite novel move of the German march upon the Straits of Dover. It is believed that operations of a certain kind (to be described in a moment), undertaken upon the French

shore of the Straits, would incline the judgment of Englishmen and their political directors to keep great bodies at home and thus to check the supply of reinforcements from Britain to France. That supply would be interfered with, or would cease. The naval aid afforded by Britain to France would also be impaired.

2. It is believed by no inconsiderable body of German critics, that an invasion of this country could be arranged from the coast of Flanders and Ponthieu (that is from the ports of Dunkirk and Calais, and so round the heights of Grisnez Cape to Boulogne) in a fashion more direct and secure than from further north. The arguments in favour of this theory must be summarised in a separate category of their own as follows:—

- (a) Heavy artillery could command the major part of the width of the Straits of Dover, perhaps three-quarters. Once let it be known that shells could be accurately dropped at a given range (and the range of a ship in fine weather can be found from secure positions on land to a few yards) over the most part of the Straits, and the traffic through them, the communications between the North Sea and the Channel, the main traffic from the world to the Port of London would be half strangled.
- (b) Under protection of such heavy artillery mines could be laid, and this mine-field, with passages through it known only to the enemy, would approach very near to the shores of this island. The mine-field could be pushed forward under cover of any difficult weather or of darkness. Once it was laid the last dash to be made over the very few miles beyond what could be mined would perhaps be negligible.
- (c) The element of distance is exceedingly important in connection with transports. Whether you are going to be a day at sea or an hour may make in the tonnage required by you a difference of doubling or halving it. So much tonnage which will take horses and guns and men for a sea journey of a day or two would take certainly twice as many men and horses and guns and perhaps three times as many for a journey of only an hour or two. Therefore, to secure the short passage is to double or treble your capacity to carry.
- (d) The short passage once secured could be (it is argued, not proved), at least intermittently maintained for the further passage over to England of supply. An expedition which had fought off and partially crippled an opposing fleet through the wide northern part of the North Sea would still have to take with it all its munitions and all its provisions for a raid. But one which had secured the passage of the narrow seas at their narrowest point might depend upon at least intermittent replenishment from the further shore. The invading force would not be burdened with the necessity of having to bring with it the supply for many weeks.
- (e) That guardianship of the German shore by a British blockading fleet which is possible in the Bight of Heligoland (where the re-entrant angle of the coast confines an enemy and gives to the blockader the shortest segment to watch outside the gulf)

is, in the case of the narrow seas, reversed. Here the bend is the other way; it goes outward. Outside the Bight of Heligoland the British sailors watch the mouth of a purse. On the bulging and shallow lines of the shore from the Scheldt to Boulogne they would be like men dodging round outside an enclosure: a park wall. To watch what was going on all the way from Boulogne to the Scheldt would, like any other similar task, be a task heavy in proportion to the thickness of the weather or the darkness of the night, but it would also be a task *dividing the existing British naval force*; weakening it in the north. Upon this truth depends the last and perhaps the most important point.

- (f) The possession of the Straits of Dover on the French side would give the enemy *the choice of departure*.

It is an elementary point in all strategies that if you are about to take the offensive, your prime factor towards success is a doubt in the mind of the enemy as to the point from which you will attack. Now, so long as the transports lined up in the Ems River, and their convoy in the shape of German ships both in that river and in and beyond the Kiel Canal and in the harbours adjacent thereto, represented the certain, known, and *only* opportunity for a raid upon this country, this "choice of departure" did not exist for the Germans nor has this doubt dwelt in the mind of our commanders.

The sole point of departure was known. The great disturbing factor which is imperative for the strategist to introduce into his opponent's mind, perplexity as to the next move, was absent. But let it be conjectural from which of several possible points (the Scheldt, the ports of Flanders, Calais) the attack may come, and from which of two distinct fields (the Bight of Heligoland and the shore of the Netherlands) the attack may come, and that all-important element of *doubt* has at last been presented to Great Britain by the Germans just as it was presented by them to the French before they hurled themselves on to the Sambre. I think that this consideration weighed as heavily as any other with those German rulers who determined upon the Calais march.

But now let us briefly consider what there is to be said against that march as a strategical proposition.

- (a) In the first place, the command of the Straits by heavy artillery is *not* complete. If the Straits were 10 miles instead of 20 across, it would be a very different matter. But it so happens that at this juncture of the world's affairs the erosion of the centuries has produced a gap of 20 miles between Britain and the Continent, while the progress of artillery has produced an effective range of much less than 20 miles.
- (b) Next, let it be noted that there is not sufficient transport on the French and Netherland shores for a raid. They may have enough in Antwerp—but I doubt it. They have not a tenth enough, even if all the shipping were left undamaged in Calais and Dunkirk; and they cannot get transports down from the German ports to these new ports should they occupy them: whether the Calais march should succeed or not I shall discuss later.

Anyhow this lack of transport would seem to me to settle the matter, and to determine what I have

maintained in these columns before, and am particularly maintaining this week—that the Calais march is not well thought out: that the desire in undertaking it with such violence was rather to frighten than to hurt. But the German rulers should have remembered that we have arrived at a stage in the war in which men calculate their risks closely and can not be disturbed in their objects by any rhetoric or by any wandering desire or apprehension. It is to be hoped that there has been some such vanity in expectation upon the German side. Such things have happened often to men disappointed of victory.

- (c) The next point is a little more doubtful, for national action in this country is not—even in war-time—subordinate to military necessities. It is rather dependent upon the orders of a few rich men. But I will make my point for what it is worth.

Even supposing that the narrow seas were occupied upon the French shore by the enemy, the chances for and against invasion would still in a military sense depend, not upon what we did in this country, but upon what we did on the Continent. Though England herself were threatened, the defence of England would still be centred—if *military considerations alone had weight*—in a vigorous effort to push back the enemy into Belgium and through Belgium into Germany.

Now England would be physically able, if morally her head were kept, and the mere military problem alone were considered, to send reinforcements as easily as ever; even after the French shore were in the enemy's hands. The very few more hours required to pass men across lower down the Channel would be the only strictly strategic disadvantage imposed on Great Britain and her Allies by a German occupation of Calais and the heights of Grisnez. It is true that submarines could come down the coast and make of Calais or of Dunkirk a new base, but not a base appreciably advantageous over Ostend or the mouth of the Scheldt. The same watch which is kept for submarines in the Channel now could be kept then, and would, probably, be as successful then as, upon the whole, it is now.

But when I say that the true defence of Great Britain should the French coast near Calais be occupied is still the sending of reinforcements to France, that involves some consideration of the strategical problem from the Continental point of view.

How does this sea-coast march, the advance on Calais, look from the point of view of strategies upon the Continent?

From that point of view it is wholly unfavourable to the Germans, and that is why I do not believe that any soldier, undeterred by civilian (or, as we call them, political) considerations, ever proposed it. Note the disadvantages of this march as a military movement, quite apart from its supposed psychological effect upon the temper of the British and of their Government.

- (a) It is no way to outflank the French line.


To be more accurate, you cannot outflank the French line, for it reposes upon the sea; and to waste masses of troops in merely pushing back the end of a line when you ought to be using them to tear a hole somewhere in the line, is exactly like trying to get rid of a young tree by bending back the top of it instead of cutting its stem.

- (b) The march is exposed in its most essential line to fire from the sea. It is not only harassed by that fire, it is subject to enormous losses by that fire; and, what is still more important, the one great road—the coast road—by which it *must* move its heaviest transport (for there is no other) is particularly open to this form of attack.

- (c) The ground is abominable. It is a mass of small brackish watercourses, hedged fields, dykes, brick walls. And the nearer you get to the coast the more you get treacherous sand as well. Further (and this is not to be despised), there is *trouble about the supply of good water*.

- (d) But more important by far than any other consideration is this: the march along the sea-coast is undertaken—every mile of it as it goes forward—with a greater and a greater peril to communications.

Here I must, with the reader's leave, introduce yet another diagram dealing with this very familiar



ground. You have upon the coast going from west to east the points Calais, Dunkirk, Nieuport, Ostend, representing a line of about fifty miles; and you have stretching down southward from Nieuport, also some fifty miles, the front which is marked upon this sketch by a shading to the east of it, which shading gives you roughly the territory now occupied by the German forces.

Next, note that the whole weight of the German attack is centred upon two lines of advance—A, the line along the sea-coast, and B, the line (at least four or five days' march away) south of Lille. Further note that, as things have turned out, much the bigger effort is being made along A. Supposing the attack at A does succeed in getting as far as Calais, and that to their occupation of the hatched area the Germans add the dotted area. They will then (I am putting the matter purely hypothetically, for such a strategic position would in its ultimate form be impossible) have their communications—their columns of convoy and provisions, their evacuation of wounded, and all the rest of it—along some such line as C—D, a line threatened along its whole flank. That, I say, is an impossible position. It is true that a very great force coming like this round the bulk of enemy forces to the south of it, coming north of the compact mass of the Allied troops who now are so far eastward as to be well beyond the line Armentières—Ypres, can in their turn threaten those Allied advanced positions and cause the troops in them to retire. But the


There is the strategic argument for and against the German march on Calais, put as simply as the present writer can put it; and I repeat what I said at the beginning of this passage; it is not a soldier's move, it is a politician's move. There are, without doubt, at the German Headquarters to-day, men still protesting against its being attempted at all, and still asking for reinforcements to be sent south of Lille, where a real decision is still conceivably possible. Moreover, it seems true at this moment of writing (Tuesday evening) that the German push along the sea coast has been too expensive; that exhaustion is already upon it, and its opponents may at any moment advance and reverse the whole movement.

From the town Ypres to the sea at Nieuport is nearly twenty-one miles. It is almost exactly twenty miles from the Cloth Hall at Ypres to the railway station at Nieuport. But the town of Nieuport itself lies somewhat inland and the mouth of the canal is more than a mile beyond the town to the north. All the way from Ypres to the sea runs this canal, artificial and often straight, so far as Dixmude, and

It is nowhere very deep; there are even places where it is just fordable. It will be seen that about four miles north of Dixmude and about six miles south-east of Nieupoort the canal makes a big bend



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
the Germans upon the western bank. Thirty-six hours passed, and the advantage produced no fruit. It is more probable that the effect was exhaustive and that the defensive holds it own in spite of this crossing, expecting to take the counter-offensive at any moment. Still it is wise, in judging any strategical problem in action, to consider all possible developments.

Supposing that the line of the canal is forced, and that the Allies evacuate Dixmude and Nieupoort, will the next defensible line be one that covers Calais? What does the nature of the ground offer for defence between the Yser and that line? What chance of retardation in a successful enemy's advance?

As to the first question, what line beyond the Yser Canal defends Calais? There is between this frontier country and Calais one first rate line, and only one. It is the line of the River Aa carried on by the Canal to St. Omer (and from St. Omer, south-east again, out of the map, towards Béthune). This line between St. Omer and the sea is strong not only in one straight line of water running without re-entrants and fairly broad for the whole 20 miles between St. Omer and the coast, but it is further strong in being covered, through all the lower or sea coast and Calais part of it, by a network half dried marshes and draining ditches, which make a belt miles wide upon either side; while immediately in its centre, where the River Aa leaves a gap before the line of the St. Omer canal begins, where the wet country is therefore at its narrowest, you have a conspicuous group of heights which afford excellent defensive positions all round the village of Watten. This position is far stronger than anything which the Germans have had in force in Flanders. It thoroughly covers Calais; but there is no corresponding position covering Dunkirk.

south of St. Peter's by night and succeeded in getting across the re-entrant angle or loop of the canal we have just been discussing.

The estimate of the Germans who got over at various places, and particularly inside the bend of the loop, in the darkness of Saturday, is not more than 5,000 men; of those 5,000 hardly any got back. They were either killed or taken wounded and unwounded. But on the next day, the Sunday—at what hour we have not yet been told—the water was forced again, and a permanent footing established by



The real strength of all that country between the Yser canal and Dunkirk is the mass of small waterways and the nature of the soil. The Duke of York failed before Dunkirk in 1793 principally from these two obstacles. The great marsh south of Dunkirk called the Two "Moers," great and little, is indeed nearly drained by this time; but great parts of it can be flooded. Further, if it were intended (which I doubt) that troops should in the event of retreat stand along the small canal that runs from Loo to Furnes, they would have, between them and the Yser, seven or eight miles of extremely difficult country which is cut up by a perfect labyrinth of waterways.

I think one may sum up and say that an advance along the sea coast, even if the Germans should be able to make it by bringing up unexpectedly large numbers, would be a painfully slow business. It is not country the full difficulty of which you grasp by the map, though the map tells you something; nor is it country, which, surveying it under conditions of peace, you can report on easily for conditions of war; and time and again under the conditions of war it has disappointed those who would occupy it. Most of it is as "blind" as any country in the world. The more eastward you get the more difficult your advance becomes with the increase of small waterways in all directions, and, though it is a soil too light to impede an advance after rain, it is one in which, especially towards the coast, transport sticks through the peculiarly treacherous nature of the sand. There is only one really good road, that along the sea coast behind the sand hills, called "dunes," and this road is commanded from the sea.

But all this is only a supposition in a more or less abstract strategical problem. Before any step of

droops, the offensive will pass to the Allies: with the offensive the initiative: the counter-stroke.


No more can be said. But on this battle very much depends the immediate future of the war, and it has all the marks of a violent effort which, when it is exhausted, does not fail stubbornly, but suddenly and all together.

THE NEWS FROM THE ARGONNE.

The obscure fights which take place all along the old line from the Meuse and Moselle to the Oise, right across north-eastern France, merit more attention than they receive from the public. It is natural that the vast struggle upon the line to the west of all this between the Oise and the sea, and particularly the conflict (perhaps decisive) going on in Flanders at this moment, should absorb the gaze of Europe. But all that old series of positions, 100 miles long, in which Germans looking south face Frenchmen looking north, have this interest, that they show in what fashion the German line is being "held"—that is, *pinned*.

When the history of the war comes to be written, not the least of its lessons will prove to be the power of resistance which modern small arms and entrenchment give—even to a short service conscript army, with its masses of nearly civilian reserves.

As an example of this power, consider the state of affairs in the Argonne. We have evidence of what happened there, fragmentary indeed, but stretching over almost every day of the last six weeks; and in all those six weeks there has been no retirement upon either side *for more than four miles!*



the Calais march can be undertaken the initiative must be assumed by the Germans—their huge offensive between Ypres and the sea must succeed. It has not yet succeeded; it seems, at the moment of writing, to be drooping, and as it droops, or if it

Here you have a sketch of the very small district where one may study in detail the kind of thing that is going on along all this chain of entrenched positions.

The main Argonne Forest—a clay ridge about

300 ft. above the plain, and densely wooded—is cut into three sections: that south of the Grand Pré Pass, with its road and railway; that south of the Vienne-Varennnes road; and that south of the Ste. Ménehould-Clermont road.

Now when the whole German line was forced back (by numbers smaller than its own) in what is called "The Battle of the Marne," the Crown Prince, who had had his headquarters at Ste. Ménehould, moved them rapidly back to Montfaucon. The line which the Germans held, after September 14, in front of these new headquarters ran north of Forges (where it reposed upon the Meuse just out of range of the Charny forts, that are part of the fortifications of Verdun, and there run along the Ridge of Charny). From this point north of Forges, the line passed in front of Malancourt; then in front of Varennes; then in front of the road from Varennes to Vienne, and so proceeded across Champagne to the hills and gun positions in front of Rheims and to the lower Aisne and Soissons.


That was more than six weeks ago; and all the efforts on both sides during those six weeks, though there has been constant fighting and ceaseless watching for an opportunity to gain any yard that could be gained, has not, I say, altered that line by four miles either way.

The first move was a French attack, which carried Varennes and the town of Vienne. The next move was a German counter attack which attempted to seize Vienne, failed in doing so, but succeeded in

Varennes-Vienne road; they were beaten back from the western part of it, but kept the eastern. Last week they advanced from the eastern part of this line in front of Varennes into the woods called the Bois de Chalade—which are the woods through which Dreuet rode to intercept the flight of Louis XVth and Marie Antoinette. The Germans blundered in this attack and lost very heavily, but the French could not force their way north into Varennes. Meanwhile Vauquois close by was held by the French, though the German line was still in front of Malancourt. All the southern part of the woods between that village and Varennes was held by the French. Finally this week, four days ago, a French advance captured Sézon-Melzicourt.

From this brief summary may be judged the extraordinarily close grip of two modern entrenched lines. For a month and a half you have two opposing army corps (that is supposed to be about the strength of either party just to the west of Verdun) doing no more than hold the one the other, and each counting it a success if at any point he can advance by less than the range of a field piece.

Meanwhile, in that more interesting because more critical point, the gate the Germans have opened and kept open at St. Mihiel, this very slow shifting of the line has greater significance, for the corridor held by the Germans here is so narrow that the least restriction of it puts their positions on the Meuse in St. Mihiel in peril. One may see in this sketch map how the thing lies. The valley of the little river



capturing Varennes. Later again, in about the fourth week of the operations, the Germans made a sharp move to recover if they could the whole of the

Mad—a tributary of the Moselle just above Metz—is that up which the railway comes from Metz as far as Thiaucourt. This valley is almost a ravine with its

steep banks, and bears the name which all such clefts have in western Lorraine—the word “Rupt,” which means the “breach” or “break” of the Mad. It is continued above the rail-head to the high plateau country just underneath the extraordinarily regular line of further covering heights called “The Hills of the Meuse.”

Beyond this again going westward is the deep trench of the Meuse in which St. Mihiel lies. From Thiaucourt the shortest road to St. Mihiel is up along the north edge of the valley, then through Woinville and so straight through the Hills of the Meuse to St. Mihiel. There is an alternative, lower, longer and on the whole better road, from Thiaucourt to the main Commercy-Pont-à-Mousson road, between Flirey and Rambucourt, whence a branch road goes through Apremont to St. Mihiel.

To appreciate how narrow the German “corridor” has here become, it is enough to point out that Apremont—in the south road—was taken and held by the French weeks ago, lost, retaken again, and is now held. One may take the line of the road all the way from Pont-à-Mousson to St. Mihiel and say that all except the last three or four miles of it between Apremont and St. Mihiel marks what the French hold *from the south*; that is, what is held by the garrison of Toul and by the forces that are operating northward from that fortress. On the north the corresponding garrison of Verdun and the forces operating from it southwards have got within long range of the other road from St. Mihiel through Nonsard and Woinville to Thiaucourt. The French official communiqué (of Tuesday) proves that even taking that long range of heavy guns at an extreme the Germans hardly hold eight miles at the mouth of the funnel: not five miles at the extremity of the funnel where they touch the Meuse at St. Mihiel itself. The situation here is extraordinary, cannot be accidental in the German plan, must be *intended* at least for some future move. Meanwhile the whole thing is just like the fighting in the Argonne, an example of the exceedingly close grips that fairly equal forces can maintain nowadays with the rifle, the machine gun, and the spade. Nor can anything unlock such a grip save very considerable reinforcement at some one point.

THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR.

On the Vistula what has happened is this:

(1) First, and much the most important point, the German plan of holding the Russian forces (presumably along the line of the Vistula River itself), of crossing that river, of occupying Warsaw at one end of the line, Przemysl and the upper reaches of the San at the other end, and by the success of such an offensive movement of pushing off the Russian pressure, has failed.

The Russian pressure upon Germany and Austria has not indeed begun or nearly begun. It is a long cry from the checking of the German plan to an invasion of German territory. But at any rate the German plan in its entirety has certainly failed. The occupation of Warsaw was absolutely essential to it, and so far from occupying Warsaw, the strong German force of some five army corps advancing upon that town has been beaten right back, even a point so far west as Lodz is out of German occupation, and pretty well all the country north of the Pilica is now in Russian hands. Our first point is, then, that the holding of the slow Russian advance so that Germany should be free to send large reinforcements to the west has proved impossible.

(2) But the Austro-German line as a whole has not fallen back. The attempt is still maintained to



THE MAIN POSITION IN THE EAST.

push the Russians eastward at the southern end of their position: the attack goes on below Sandomir, along the San, and before Przemysl.

It is a thing worth noting in these great modern actions that the new scale upon which they are fought has put an end to some of the unquestioned rules of older warfare. In an action upon a front even of eight miles or ten, to be outflanked meant that your whole body fell back if it could. But in an action—or, rather, a series of actions—upon a front of over two hundred miles, you have much more time to consider whether it is really necessary for all your forces to fall back or no when you are outflanked.

Here is the Austro-German line all along the Vistula threatening Warsaw and Novo Georgievsk on the north, and vigorously attacking Przemysl upon the south. Its northern extremity is badly beaten in front of Warsaw and the whole of its left outflanked. Between the Pilica River and Warsaw it is turned right back and thrust even beyond Lodz. The attempt of the Germans to cross the Vistula at Ivangorod is also beaten. They make no real footing at the crossing of Jozefów, and the Russians in their turn cross in force at Solec. It is evident that the whole original Austro-German line A—B—C has been bent back on its left, A B, to a position D B. That is an attitude which would have meant, in the older warfare, the retirement of the remainder, B C. Because in the older warfare the people who had outflanked you could be down upon your centre and behind it in an hour or two. But to-day you have days to decide in, and of that retirement from the Vistula—of the German retirement from the Upper Vistula at least between Jozefów and Sandomir—there is as yet no sufficient indication.

Remember that from B to C is a very long week's marching. It is an immense distance: and remember further that an advance on the south whereby the Germanic allies crossing the San or the Upper Vistula near Sandomir should push the Russians well

back in this region, would straighten the line again and compensate in some degree for the bending back of it in the north.

In other words, it is worth while in these very long and extended modern actions for your centre and unthreatened wing to try, even through some days, to retrieve the misfortunes of your defeated wing.

That the Germanic allies have at some points upon the Upper Vistula near Sandomir and upon the river San crossed these two streams, I take to be indubitable. What we do not know is how far they have really established themselves upon the eastern bank. The chances are that though the Austrians and certain of the Germans have crossed the San and the Upper Vistula, the movement here has not been anything like as decisive against the Russians as has the Russian movement against the Germans in the north. And one's evidence for this is that the official communiqués of the Austrians and the Germans do not speak of any real success upon the right of their line (they are of course perfectly silent as to their reverses on the left), while the Russian communiqués, though admitting vigorous attack upon the line of the two rivers, admit no serious reverse south of Jozéfow. Meanwhile there is a somewhat detailed report of Austrians *recrossing* the stream below Sandomir, proving that it *was* crossed a few days ago and also suggesting that now the whole of the Vistula (though not yet the San) is being slowly given up by the Germanic allies.

It is indeed certain that a very heavy effort is being pushed forward by the Austrians near Przemysl. It is not true that this fortress is completely disengaged. It is true that all the western sectors have been disengaged for nearly a fortnight. Further we must note that very great and partially successful efforts have been made by the Austrians to clear the passes of the Carpathians, not only in front of Przemysl, but far to the east of that point.

What is not tenable is the conjecture that any Austrian movement on this south end of the line will really turn the Russians and threaten them. That could only be done by a great numerical superiority. It is not possible that Austria should discover that numerical superiority either now or later.

We may sum up and say that the operations upon the Vistula and upon the San are on the whole in our favour, and that they have (what is all-important to the West) prevented the Germans from releasing any considerable body from the East for operations in Flanders or in Lorraine.

But there are still two questions of great interest to be asked with regard to this field. The first is, with what rapidity can the Russian "pressure" in Germany be applied? The second is, upon what line will the German retirement fall if the present Russian advance is maintained?

As to the first of these questions, the early stages of the war in the east, the known operations of the two opponents, the nature of the country over which these actions are fought, and the type of German advance which the war in the west has already acquainted us with, furnish a sufficient answer. It is the same that has been insisted upon in these notes from the very beginning; a warning not to expect the Russian "pressure" upon the German forces in the east to be rapid—though it may be, before it is ended, overwhelming. The nature of the actions fought and to be fought, the type of communications in Western Poland, the fact that all the armies of the Germanic Allies are in being there

and do not seem to have lost really heavily in recent operations (how many guns, for instance?) the indeterminate climate between the mud of autumn and the frost of winter, the very distances involved—all point to a movement of advance on the part of the Russians which will only be slow during the next few weeks.

As to the second question, where a long German resistance is likely to be offered to such an advance, it would seem that the line of the River Warta affords the best opportunity for this. That river does not, indeed, present a regular and parallel front to the German frontier, but the front it does present is, as the accompanying sketch map will show, a sufficient



THE LINE OF THE WARTA.

protection to the German frontier to make it an obvious line for the Germans to hold. There is a gap of more or less open country between Koto and the fortress of Thorn, a gap about 50 miles wide, which would want particular attention, but which would be defensible with entrenchments. Southward, the hilly country where the three Empires meet, should be a sufficient defence for even a sparse body of troops to continue the line; and it may well be found that if the Russians push back the whole Austro-German line westward, after these first successes of theirs, the line of the Warta, continued through the hills and on in front of Cracow, will be the holding point attempted by the enemy against our eastern Ally.

It must be remembered that the German Government attaches the greatest importance—military as well as political—to keeping operations off Germanic soil. It is probable that every effort will be made, if the German army in the east is really forced back, to hold this line of the Warta and to continue the German administration of the Polish province of Kalisz. This would have the advantage of preventing communications between the Russian Poles and those oppressed by Germany to the west, of keeping the war off German soil, and of producing—though much nearer her own territory than

Germany originally designed—the “deadlock” or “stalemate” to which her policy still looks forward in the east as in the west.

The real argument against Germany's being able to produce that deadlock is *the numbers* that Russia will now in continually increasing volume bring forward. Russia, it must be remembered, is in this field what we should be in the western field if we could (which, alas! we cannot) put forward every month another batch of, say, 200,000.

Germany did for six weeks produce a deadlock in France between the North Sea and the Vosges. She hoped to produce a deadlock upon the Vistula, and to hold that eastern line while she sent reinforcements back west, and broke down the deadlock there in her favour. She has not been able to do that; but we, on our side, have not the extra numbers which would be

so useful at this moment to pour in against the western deadlock, especially in Flanders. Now, Russia has those numbers, and it is perhaps upon those numbers in the next two months, more than upon any other element in the general problem, that we had best rely. In other words, it seems as though the campaign as a whole turned, from the point of view of the Allies, upon their power to hold the Germans in the west, while trusting to Russian numbers to push on, though slowly, in the east.

From the German point of view it seems as though, while awaiting and dreading this increase of Russian numerical strength, a desperate attempt to prevent reinforcement from England, and a threat upon, or even a blow at, England itself, was the immediate necessity. Such a blow, from Calais at least, is not promising.

THE PICCADILLY RIFLE RANGE

Is a happy inspiration in these piping times, not of peace, but of war. Just now London is populated with fighting men, many of them naval and military officers waiting for their marching orders. To the majority of these it will be welcome news that the spare hours can be pleasantly and profitably occupied by keeping up their rifle practice. At 67b, Shaftesbury Avenue, they will find in the spacious basement, some quarter of an acre in extent, a fine rifle range with a dozen targets and all modern fittings. The committee of management are all military men, and all visitors connected with the two services are made honorary members. For the novice there are two sergeant instructors, one of whom is an ex-sergeant of the Royal Fusiliers. A minor diversion is a well-equipped skittle alley, one of the finest in London. Ladies desirous of handling a rifle are also welcome.

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

The November number of *Colour*, the new shilling monthly, fully maintains the standard set by its preceding numbers, both in the quality of the reproductions of artists' work and in the literary contributions. As already noted, *Colour* is the only British publication that attempts the reproduction of the work of modern artists in their original colouring, and it is doing for British, and to a certain extent for foreign art, in England what the *Mercure de France* did for French literature in France. It takes an easy first place among artistic publications in this country, and is of considerable literary value as well.

A new map of N.E. France, Belgium, and the Rhine has just been issued by the Edinburgh Geographical Institute (John Bartholomew and Co.), price 2s. on paper, 3s. on cloth. The map, which is on a specially large scale—16 miles to the inch—shows railways, fortresses, main, secondary, and other roads, with the distances between road junctions marked. Heights are given in metres with their equivalent in English feet.

Mr. H. G. Wells' new book, *The Wife of Sir Isaac Harman*, shows its author in yet another light. It is detailed and intimate, as are all the works of this author, and it is hardly necessary to say that it is interesting, for whatever a “Wells'” book may be, it is always interesting. But in this story is something that not even the most rabid censor of public morals could possibly ban, something that may be read by all, a concession, it appears, to the libraries. To say that the book is worth reading is mere gilding of the lily; as for its plot, there is none, as is the way of a Wells' novel—none, that is, in the conventional sense. As for its interest, we recommend it without fear that the censor will quarrel with us for so doing. Messrs Macmillan and Co. are the publishers.

Very few among the reading public of England and America are ignorant of the existence of *McClure's Magazine*, and the majority of these people will be pleased to make the acquaintance of Mr. S. S. McClure, who, in *My Autobiography*, just published by Mr. John Murray, at 10s. 6d. net, has told a fine story of energy and self-reliance. Peddling for a livelihood, doing housework to provide for his own education, establishing the magazine that bears his name, Mr. McClure is always interesting. His book deals with such men as Stevenson, Henley, Meredith, and others of their kind, the great ones of literature, and will be warmly welcome by all who are interested in the works of great literary men, and the way in which they are produced.

Messrs. George Allen and Unwin have just included in their “Special Campaign” series a concise and lucid history of *The Invasion of France, 1814*, by Captain F. W. O. Maycock, D.S.O. A feature of the book is the way in which it emphasises the offensive strategy of Napoleon, up to the time when offensive action was no longer possible, and the Corsican had to face the final advance of the Allies on Paris. The campaign of Waterloo so far dominates the military history of the second decade of the nineteenth century that, apart from students of military history and strategy, the eventful work of 1814 is often overlooked. Captain Maycock's work, fully technical in its conception

and execution, is yet so clearly written that it is of extreme interest to the normal reader, and forms a valuable addition to existing literature on the Napoleonic period.

Messrs. John Lane have just re-issued, in a shilling edition, *Life in a Garrison Town*, the translation of ex-Lieutenant Bilse's book which caused a national scandal in Germany, and earned for its author a court martial and subsequent imprisonment. In its recital of the defects of the military system, the book is comparable with Beyerling's *Jena or Sedan*, though, of course, the latter was written by a master of literature, while Bilse's book is merely the work of a military officer. Still, Bilse's book bears the impress of reality, and affords a good view of the under-workings of the German military machine.

Modern Pig-Sticking, just published by Messrs. Macmillan, and written by Major A. E. Wardrop, of the R.H.A., is a volume of interest not only to those familiar with this form of sport, but to all interested in mounted sports. Chapters by Colonel J. Vaughan, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Caton-Jones, M. M. Crawford, and Captain H. E. Medlicott are included in the work, which includes the history of the sport, the natural history of pig, the training of horses for the sport, the actual riding and hunting, and details of clubs and cups. It is, on the whole, a veritable encyclopædia of the sport, and is written in good hunting style, so that the pages are as interesting as they are instructive. It is a book to read for its own sake, apart from its value as regards the sport, and deserves a wide circulation among all interested in mounted work as well as among those who by circumstance and locality are able to make quarry of pig.

Mr. MURRAY has just published Dr. Stuart Reid's *Life of the First Duke of Marlborough and of Sarah, his Famous Duchess*. No work of personal or military biography could be more timely than this, which reminds readers of the great achievements of British soldiers on a battleground adjacent to that on which they are now winning new and imperishable honours. The work has an introduction by the present Duke of Marlborough.

A valuable map has just been issued by George Philip and Son, Ltd., and forms an admirable guide to the theatre of the war in the west. The scale is ten miles to one inch, whilst inset round are nine important sections enlarged to the scale of three miles to one inch. Unlike so many war maps, it has been specially drawn from foreign ordnance sheets and Continental staff maps under the supervision of a military expert. An index accompanies the map, which contains 5,500 names. The price (on paper) is 2s. 6d., but we strongly recommend it, both for appearance and permanency, mounted on cloth—either to fold, or with a roller to hang—at 6s.

THE NEW NOTE.

The new £1 note will shortly be in the hands of the public, and is a great improvement on the first issue. The notes have been produced on specially prepared paper of special watermark design, and of the strength and thickness of the Bank of England notes. The introduction into the watermark of the Rose, Crown, Thistle, and Daffodil (the Emblem of Wales) will be observed.

The notes (size 6 inches by 3½ inches) are being printed in black by Thomas De La Rue and Co., Limited, from plates engraved by the same firm from a design supplied by Mr. Eves.

The outstanding features of the design are the King's Head encircled in a garter, around which the inscription as appearing on the gold coinage is reproduced, the whole being surmounted by a crown. On the top right-hand side of the note the emblem of the lesser George and Dragon appears, encircled by a similar garter, on which the Royal motto is engraved, the latter also surmounted by a crown.

Altogether, the note is both from a utilitarian and an artistic point of view an immense improvement on the previous issue.


On Wednesdays Mr. Charles Frohman will present “The Little Minister” at *matinées*, commencing at 2.30, whilst the evening performance on that date will be discontinued. *Matinées* Thursdays and Saturdays as usual.

For those who find it necessary in this war time to seek an economical food there is the new production, Plasmon oat cocoa, put on the market by International Plasmon, Ltd. Both the company and the goods are British. It is claimed that Plasmon oat cocoa provides the most nourishment at least cost. The flavour is like that of the finest drinking chocolate.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF AND ATTACKS ON INSHORE SQUADRON OFF OSTEND. THE SHADED PORTION SHOWS THE TWO-FATHOM AREA AND THE DOTTED LINES THE FIVE-FATHOM.

IN THE affair known as "The Battle of the Coast" the German Army has clearly had an uncommonly bad time at the hands of our inshore gunboats. In this connection it is curious that these boats were built originally for Brazil for use in the Amazon, but for some obscure reason the Brazilians tried to get out of taking them over. They were hesitating when this war came along, else the boats had left for Brazil. The boats have now shown themselves of incalculable worth to us and incidentally proved how correct Lord Charles Beresford was, when, some years ago, he agitated for an "inshore squadron." There is every reason to believe that the entire military situation at the sea-end of the land campaign was entirely governed by the fire of the inshore squadron which, owing to its light draught, was able to creep into waters normally inaccessible to warships.

These three boats—renamed *Humber*, *Mersey*, and *Severn*—displace about 1,200 tons with a draught of 8½ feet. Their principal armament is two 6-inch forward and a couple of 4.7 inch Howitzers aft. It is these howitzers which rendered the German positions untenable, and incidentally proved that—whatever may happen inland—no Power which does not command the sea can accomplish anything on the sea coast. Hence the persistent efforts of the German submarines to attack. At the time of writing no success has attended these efforts, nor is much success to be expected.

In the first place to torpedo a vessel drawing only 8½ feet needs considerable skill, in the second place, no submarine can manoeuvre in a couple of fathoms or less. Submerged and in fighting trim a submarine needs nearly as much water as a Dreadnought. If operating within the five fathom line she runs grave risks of running into the mud and remaining there; or else she must work more or less awash and chance the fate which has already befallen one German in these operations—being rammed by a destroyer.

This destruction of a submarine by our torpedo-boat destroyer *Badger*, following closely upon the loss of our *E3* under more or less similar conditions would seem to indicate that on both sides the "menace of the submarine" is no longer what it was. As I indicated last week, "every bane has its antidote," and there is now very fair reason to believe that this war will see the submarine relegated to a position of less importance than it occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. The difficulty of combating the submarine has lain in the fact that it is a new weapon, equal—shall we say—to the introduction of some equivalent to the card "joker" on to the chess board.

As yet, of course, matters are merely in the transition stage, but detailed information which has become available during the past week, seems to demonstrate very clearly that both against swift moving big ships and against light draught inshore squadrons the submarine is, relatively speaking, rather impotent. This, curiously enough, was the conclusion theoretically arrived at by the Germans some years ago, when they refused to build submarines at all, and on account of which they have comparatively few to-day.

INVASION PROJECTS.

Neutral reports continue to arrive as to the German "pontoon" for invasion. They are now represented as very large submarines designed to carry invading soldiers.

I am inclined to attach the fullest credence to this latest story of the pontoons—absurd though the idea may at first sight appear. It is an absolute bringing to date of Napoleon's "flat-bottomed boats." There is nothing at all impracticable in an unarmed submarine capable of carrying a hundred men or so for a short trip.

To build enough sufficient to carry an invading army or even a big raiding force is impracticable. But it is practicable to land by submarine a hundred men—motor bicyclists probably—

here and there, or anywhere, with orders to do as much destruction and *butcher* as possible.

I should not care to bet on the ultimate prospects of their success other than psychologically; but I do think that there is every possibility either of the attempt being made, or of the submarine transports being used as a menace just as Napoleon used those "flat bottoms," designed to row across in a calm when the British warships were helpless.

In the old days this policy led us into a vast expenditure on Martello towers and the retaining in England of thousands of troops which else had been sent to the Continent. The German General Staff has studied history.

THE BALTIC.

There is no news whatever from the Baltic, in which a species of stalemate seems to obtain. The Russians appear to be employing against the Germans exactly the same tactics as the Germans are using against us, and the Germans are at a loose end accordingly.

This Russian action (or rather, inaction) is probably of far more value to us than we yet realise. So long as the Russians adhere to their present policy so long will it be impossible for the Germans to attempt an attack on us—or on some of us—in full force.

To attack with less than full force would be suicide pure and simple. One way and another it still looks as though the Russian main fleet lying inside the harbour at Libau is the real controlling agency. It is probably no exaggeration (wild as it may seem to-day) to say that the key of the whole situation lies in the Baltic and with the Russian fleet. It sounds like incoherent prophecy; but if anyone considers the question carefully, it must be obvious that if Germany concentrates against us she must leave the bulk of her sea coast (mostly Baltic) undefended against an unbeaten Russian force.

Her coastline in our direction is small and heavily defended. In the Baltic it is large and very lightly defended.

In the present state of affairs it is no more safe for Germany to abandon the Baltic than it would be for us to desert the North Sea. Unless Germany is prepared to take abnormal risks she dare not attack us in force so long as the Russians are a "fleet in being" in the Baltic. Hence the presence of German warships in the Aaland Islands.

It is dangerous to prophecy where Germany is concerned, but strategically she must defeat the Russian main fleet in the Baltic before attempting anything serious in the North Sea.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The Adriatic continues to be the theatre of vague rumour and little fact to go on. So far as can be gathered, recent events have been very slightly in Austria's favour to date of writing (October 26th). We hear of submarines which have moved against the Franco-British force off Cattaro; the retreat of that force and the sinking of two or more submarines. Little or nothing is officially confirmed, and I am inclined to fancy that in the matter of the sunk submarines it is a case of "the wish being the father to the thought." A submarine stands very little chance of injury by gunfire from a big ship.

The retirement is probable. It is certainly logical. There is no hurry about Cattaro; no object in risking anything. The Austrians have but eleven submarines all told, and some of these are not really effective. Six is nearer the number in the fighting line. The Allies can easily afford to delay matters for a month if necessary till these six are destroyed, as they are bound to be if they have to continue an unsupported campaign. Once more I would insist that as the weapon of the weaker power the submarine is merely a temporary weapon. It is really the weapon of the stronger power, and no matter what losses we may suffer, I, for one, am absolutely convinced that long before the war is over this fact will be demonstrated. The stronger power has always a numerical superiority in every kind of arm; and the real or problematical advantage of any given weapon is discounted accordingly. Austrian submarines may delay the fate of Cattaro, but that is the utmost which they can effect.


THE NORTH SEA.

Related official reports of the Heligoland affair of August 28th have now been issued. They add little to what we already knew, or had surmised. That little, however, is very important.

At the time of the affair I stated in these notes that in "Act II" we believed that we were getting the worst of it. This is very apparent from Admiral Beatty's report.

For the rest, the feature of prime importance is the persistent reference to a "large four funnelled cruiser." This ship was subsequently reported sunk and what not; but none of the ships *officially reported by either side as sunk had four funnels*. From which we must assume that either the *Roon* or *Yorck* was out—in any case that the Germans were out in strength—possibly their battle-cruisers were not far off and their battle fleet no very great distance away.

It now seems absolutely established that the Germans were in stronger force than was to have been anticipated in the ordinary way, and that the entire issue rested upon the fact that Admiral Beatty took risks and chanced everything to support our light division, and that on this and this alone our success rests.




TO ILLUSTRATE VERY APPROXIMATELY THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE EARLIER STAGES OF THE BIGHT OF HELIGOLAND BATTLE.

A brief summary of all the official reports pieced together is as follows:—

About seven a.m. some of our destroyers, led by the *Aretusa*, sighted and chased a German torpedo-boat destroyer. An hour later our division found that it had been led into a trap, and had rather a bad time from German cruisers—the *Aretusa* being the target of a very superior force. Coincident with this, our first flotilla hammered an entirely different German division, and sank one German (V 187).

Subsequently, all our torpedo-boat destroyers and the *Aretusa* seem to have joined up and nothing in particular happened until eleven a.m., when the Germans appeared in superior force—the position being roughly that they had got far the better of the affair. So far as I can read things—their



TO ILLUSTRATE THE APPROXIMATE POSITIONS WHEN, BUT FOR ADMIRAL BEATTY'S ADVANCE THROUGH THE SUBMARINES, THE BRITISH FORCE WOULD HAVE BEEN ANNIHILATED.

armoured cruisers entered into the fray, and absolute defeat was assumed to be our portion.

Our position at that time appears to have been very near "defeat accepted." On the other hand, the Germans having lost V 187 and having been hammered more than we were aware of, were ignorant of the advantage which they had secured, and

consequently they did not press their attack as quickly as they should have.

This enabled us to reinforce; and there followed a *mêlée* in which each side considered itself "vantage out." On the whole, I think that the Germans were really "vantage in." At any rate, that seems to have been Admiral Beatty's reading of the situation.

Be that as it may, at eleven-thirty Admiral Beatty brought in his battle cruisers at 28 knots. He ran great risks from submarines; but he annihilated all that was left of the first German line, and saved the day.

I am inclined to credit this first German line with having taken annihilation in order to cover the retreat of the second, and of possibly the third and perhaps even the fourth (battle fleet) line behind.

In acting as he did Admiral Beatty turned what should have been a British defeat into a British victory, or rather a semi-victory, for it now seems abundantly clear that the Germans were quite ready for us off Heligoland on August 28th.

The situation as I read it is that the Germans were ready for us, that they had prepared an overwhelming reception for the *Arcthusa* and her consorts, that they had won, and that everything was with them when suddenly Admiral Beatty charged out of the mist with his battle cruisers.

The exact German plans we shall probably never know, things of this sort are never unfolded till their interest is merely a matter of "ancient history."

But, in a way, I am afraid that the Germans will—as I suggested at the time—translate the Heligoland affair into a moral victory for themselves. It is like this: Their presence was such that our battle cruisers had to come in earlier than was intended. As a result of this their battle cruisers went back to the Kiel Canal and so did not get annihilated as we had probably arranged, and hoped for.

If we desire to keep our perspective clear we must view things always from the enemy's standpoint as well as from our own. Well, we sank four units of the enemy's light stuff, but we got no "heavy stuff." And where psychology is concerned psychology is all that really matters.

To describe the Heligoland affair as a German victory—their loss four units, our loss none—sounds very ridiculous. But psychologically I am afraid that it is nearer the truth. The "rats" that matter evaded the trap.

Our popular Press feeds us on apparent results. Such results are admirable for the music hall stage. But from the naval war standard, the fact remains that if Admiral Beatty had not taken abnormal risks, we should have been badly beaten in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28th last.

My reading of the matter is: We tried a very smart thing. We were trapped and failed. Admiral Beatty came to the

rescue and transformed defeat into victory by taking atrocious risks. And he saved us by the skin of the teeth.

The task before us is no light one. Not only are we faced against men able to fight quite as well as we can; but we are also faced by an admiral who has his side of the business very much in hand. The British Navy is up against the biggest proposition that it ever has had to face. I hope and I think that it will win through. But the fight is going to be a very hard one; and the bombast of the daily Press about the "skulking fleet" etc., etc., is very ill-timed.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

During the period since these notes last appeared the *Emden* and *Karlsruhe* have both been heard of once more—the latter having succeeded in capturing several colliers, and so rendered herself independent of German Admiralty arrangements for her coal supply.

As the *Karlsruhe* has sunk some of the captured colliers, we know that she has enough at disposal to last her for a practically indefinite period. With armed guards on board, these colliers are by now probably distributed all over the ocean outside the trade routes, their recapture being a matter of blind chance of several thousand to one against, for now there are no clues whatever.

In connection with clues, it seems to have escaped notice that German corsairs seldom, if ever, interfere with merchant ships fitted with wireless.

Although we have had stories of the crews of ships captured being allowed only a quarter of an hour to get off, what with overhauling and what not, it is very doubtful whether from first to last—that is to say, from the beginning of the chase to getting clear away—the operation of capturing can take much less than six hours.

A defending cruiser does not and cannot steam about at full speed all the time, but we can safely allow her to be able to cover from 100 to 125 miles in six hours, so that attacks on any wireless fitted ship would be attended with some considerable risk, seeing that about seventy cruisers are engaged in the corsair hunt, and necessarily mostly along the trade routes. A conspicuous installation is therefore quite possibly a valuable defence against a form of commerce attack so cleverly conceived that it may well continue for months.

In view of the *Karlsruhe's* captures it may become necessary to make colliers travel in convoy. A recently issued Admiralty statement places our High Seas losses at 1 per cent. This is not high. It is, however, quite high enough; also, unless we can cut off the hostile fuel supply, it is bound to rise.

The corsairs cannot, of course, go on indefinitely. Foul bottoms and machinery defects must sooner or later take effect. But they will not do so for many months. Hence the gravity of the problem and the need of every conceivable "reply."

ACCURATE SHOOTING.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.



It is impossible to pass over the anniversary of Agincourt without drawing a lesson for immediate application from the extraordinary accuracy of shooting attained by our ancestors in those days. Our archers carried about thirty arrows, and never seem to have run out of them, though they often killed and wounded up to ten men a piece in a single action. We carry upwards of 120 rounds and more, but even the best of our recent practice in France falls very far behind the standard of those days. Yet the operation of aiming over sights is really simpler than getting an alignment for an arrow drawn up to the ear—and the range at which the archers practised, 200 to 600 yards, was not so much below

modern individual practice as a layman might suppose. Sir Ralph Payne Gallwey is the chief authority on these subjects,

and, referring to Turkish archery, he gives instances of ranges of over 1,000 yards attained by Turkish archers as late as the eighteenth century—indeed, some of the shots he cites were made before the Royal Toxophilite Society by the Turkish Ambassador here in England some seventy years ago.

Now the reason why the archers shot so much straighter stares one in the face, if one considers the man, bow, and arrow as part of a single mechanical whole, the one bracing up the other, and in turn being braced by it.

The initial sketch explains the idea:—

In order to draw the arrow to the ear, the left arm has to thrust against the bow with all its strength. The tension of the cord acting through the bow compels the arm to become a rigid strut in which no shaking is possible. A man may be excited, or blown with running, it does not matter, for the moment he draws the arrow towards the ear his arm becomes locked into position, and any tendency to shake is mechanically suppressed.

In shooting with a gun no action of this kind arises, we have never looked upon gun and man as an inseparable unit, but always as two distinct parts, exercising no mutually controlling effect upon one another at all.

In the old days, the gun or musket kicked like a young horse, and, unless the firer pressed the butt well into the shoulder he was apt to suffer very severely. But the more you try to press the rifle home to the shoulder the more unsteady as a support does the left forearm become; also after excitement or

violent exertion, it becomes quite impossible to get steady enough to hit anything at even a moderate range. Everyone who has ever stalked game, particularly in mountain countries, will recall days when he has had to lie still for ten minutes or more, till his breathing and pulses had become normal enough to make him sure of his shot. On one such occasion when I had to take running shots, standing, to see over the brushwood, it struck me that the accepted attitude of a sportsman, or soldier,

there appeared to be nothing to choose between the two systems, and as a few days afterwards I was offered the opportunity of organising the army of the new Chinese Republic, where I could have as much active service conditions as I might require, I dropped the subject for the time. Unfortunately, my opportunity in China never materialised, but other matters claimed all my time, and it is only within the last few days, in comparing the extraordinary parallelism which is noticeable in the way our modern tactics in France are evolving with the old practice of our Norman ancestors, that its immediate importance came into my mind.

It is now too late to expect official inquiry and trial, but the matter is so simple and practical, than anyone in the ranks of the new army or any commanding officer can satisfy himself forthwith. He has only to copy the position in the accompanying sketch to apply the practice at once, and once he catches the idea everyone will immediately copy him.

Its importance can hardly be exaggerated, for it is the fact that in war bullets almost invariably fly too high or too low—men generally pick up the line, but the elevation bothers them—and now that our rifles give a practically flat trajectory for 800 yards, or nearly so, if once that tendency to vertical jump, due to the mechanically false support the left arm gives




FIG 1.
SKETCH OF MAN
WITH RIFLE AT
THE PRESENT AS
OFFICIALLY
AUTHORISED.

was about the most unscientific and unmechanical idea in the world, and, moreover, that with modern sporting or military rifles there was no longer the slightest reason for it, for the recoil is perfectly controllable.

So I tried as an experiment grasping the sling of my rifle firmly in the left hand, extending the arm to its full extent and then leaving my trigger finger free, pulling with my right hand against the left as if I was straining a bow. The result was quite startling. The left arm now having become a rigid strut all tendency to wobble vanished, and I found I could pump out lead with an accuracy as regards vertical error that I had not imagined possible.

Subsequently, I tried the experiment with some of my volunteers, and the results astounded us all; in a few rounds they had caught up the trick, and after running and doubling about till their hands were quite jumpy they made shooting which would have won any field-firing cup in the kingdom.

Unfortunately, I failed altogether to get the authorities at Hythe to give the idea a fair trial in my presence. Instead of trying two teams against each other under the closest approximation to battlefield conditions practicable, they insisted on trying a man whom I had not instructed against some of their crack marksmen at deliberate target practice on a dead calm day. As on such a day anybody could make a whole possible score,




FIG 2.
THE POSITION OF
PRESENT WITH
LEFT ARM RIGID,
AS SUGGESTED BY
THE WRITER.

to the rifle, is eliminated, our fire would sweep the ground like a very scythe of death—there could be no escape from it.

In an attack resolutely pushed home, men must fire standing, there is no time to lie down, and, anyhow, men with their blood thoroughly roused and out to kill, don't think of themselves. Even the Boers, the coolest and most skilful takers of cover in the world, almost invariably stood up to receive a rush. Men don't like to die lying down, it is not in the racial strain.

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THE WAR BY LAND.


By HILAIRE BELLOC.

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OPERATIONS IN POLAND.

Tuesday afternoon, November 3rd, 1914.



THE EASTERN FIELD OF WAR.

the first consisting in the defence by the Russians of, and the retreat by the Germans from, the Middle Vistula; the second, the fighting along and across the River San.

Further, we must add in a separate and distant corner of the whole field, in that little Austrian province known as Bukovina, to the eastward of Galicia, a distinct Austrian effort, which includes the approach to and perhaps the occupation of the town of Czernowitz.

The most notable feature is this general line, especially in its present disposition, is the separation between the group acting in the north at D, and the group acting in the south from A to C; and before proceeding to the main actions upon the Vistula and the San, we should do well to note the nature of the fighting upon the frontier of East Prussia, for it conveys an important political lesson upon the nature of this great European war.

(A.)—THE FIGHTING UPON THE EAST PRUSSIAN FRONTIER.

In spite of the need in which, as we shall see later, the Austro-German forces stand in the south of reinforcement, a strong German body is kept isolated upon the frontier between East Prussia and the Russian Empire, just in front of the line Suwalki-Augustowo. It will be remembered that these German armies, after their considerable success at Tannenberg in the early part of September, following upon the Russian invasion of East Prussia, advanced rapidly and in some force towards the line of the River Niemen. It will further be remembered how they tried to cross this river and failed, were pursued to the frontier, beaten by the Russians in the Battle of Augustowo, and compelled to give up the siege of Osowiec, which they had undertaken. There was even for a moment a certain penetration of East Prussia by the Russian columns; and it was not until the German forces had rallied that this Russian counter-advance was checked. Since that moment (now nearly a month ago) the two enemies have faced each other almost exactly upon the frontier itself. How closely the frontier corresponds with this "block" the sketch map on the top of the next page will show. It concerns but a small though the more important southern part of the general line in this region. So far as can be judged from the official descriptions upon both sides, the forces stand very much as they are given in this map. The railway junction at Lyck, which was for a moment threatened by the Russians, is again in German hands; a large Russian force defends the village of Bakalarshewo, holding a strong position upon a bluff between two of the lakes that mark this region. Heavy German efforts to force this position have failed. The line goes down southward in a cordon almost exactly corresponding to the frontier, though the Russian forces are often slightly across it, especially in the neighbourhood of Lake Rayrod. Finally, the Russian forces are astraddle of the main

WITH the great battle line in the East of Europe the readers of these notes are already sufficiently familiar. Its main theatre is the basin of the River Vistula; its extent, though broken, a matter of nearly 400 miles; and the territory over which the struggle is taking place is that of Poland.

That struggle still consists, as it has consisted for now over eight weeks, in two groups of very different importance. The main group, A-B-C, involves something not far short of four millions of men, or at any rate over three and a half millions, and the theatre of their action is the Middle Vistula and the course of the River San. The second group, in which, all told, less than a million and perhaps not more than half a million are as yet engaged, is the group D, which is at issue upon the frontier between East Prussia and the Russian Empire, a week's march west of the River Niemen.

While the whole line thus divides itself into two main bodies of very unequal size, the larger body, A-B-C, should again be divided, for reasons which will presently appear, into two limbs, A-B and B-C,



THE EAST PRUSSIAN FRONTIER AREA.

railway which runs towards Lyck from the fortress of Ostrowiecs, and so into the heart of Prussia.

Why do we find such a disposition so far eastward and to the north of the South Polish field, in which Germany has need of every man she can spare?

The question needs an answer the more from the fact that a full retreat of the Germans in the south from Russian Poland must inevitably, sooner or later, involve the retirement of the smaller German forces from East Prussia. Not only must it inevitably involve their retirement, but as Russia continues to call up its reserves of men (very much larger than those at the disposal of Germany) there is a certitude that this German force, if it remains upon the Russian frontier in front of Lyck and Magrabowa, will be taken in reverse and will be in danger of isolation. It is true that a movement thus coming from the south over the Russian frontier into East Prussia directly is hampered by the long region of lakes which lies along that frontier, and of marshes, the defiles between which are all strongly held and fortified. But long before the Vistula is reached this region ends; the Russians can cross in force into West Prussia, and a German force thus isolated on the eastern frontier would be in grave peril.

This does not mean that we should look to the isolation and destruction of such a force. What it means is that the moment the peril begins to threaten that force will have to retire. Why then does it remain fixed at such a distance from the retirement of its much more numerous brethren? There is no such Russian force in front of it as could join the main Russian forces southward with much effect. It disposes of every facility for getting round to reinforce the main German bodies in the south. Yet it not only remains in force upon this frontier, but in sufficient force to attempt the counter-offensive. It has indeed made that attempt with violence during the last few days.

The answer to that question is a political one, and in that answer we may discover much that will explain the next phases of this war in the West as well as in the East.

It is of solid and serious advantage to the Germans—an advantage which perhaps they exaggerate but which is of very high moral value—that the war has hitherto been fought off German soil. What it means for a war to be fought upon the enemy's soil, France and Belgium well know. And for a few moments Germany knew it, when the Russian irruption into East Prussia, though pursued but for a few miles, involved £20,000,000 worth of material damage, and was sufficient to throw such alarm into Berlin as produced the heavy reinforcements of two months ago, and the German victory at Tannenburg. That the enemy's armies, though only occupying a corner of France, can yet hold and ruin that corner, is something; and the whole tone of the English people at this moment depends upon the fact that English soil is as yet inviolate. The voluntary system depends upon that, and a hundred other things.

But even more important than the effect upon the enemy of fighting upon *his* soil, is the effect upon the German population of the German armies being able to maintain this boast. It is the whole German theory of this war, that it must be fought with every available man and gun and horse in this, its *first* phase; that if victory is not now assured it will never be recovered. To procure that effort—which, as we know by the new levies attacking us in Flanders, is far more than the ordinary effort of a full mobilisation; it is the staking of a whole nation upon the cast—the immunity of German soil is essential. Nor can we yet judge of what a revolution there will be in the moral condition of Germany when it is German towns that burn and are destroyed, German civilians that are shot in batches for spying or for informing the enemy, or even as hostages, and German goods that are sequestered to the advantage of the invader. Meanwhile, *we may be certain that this political consideration will fetter German strategy more and more as the campaign proceeds.*


Now, it is to maintain German soil immune that this "siege-work" is being maintained at the known cost of ultimate peril upon the frontier between East Prussia and Russia. The labyrinth of lakes and marshes helps the effort; but even if it were open country and needing far more troops, that effort would still be maintained. And it is worth prophesying that the retirement from the East Prussian frontier will not come until the very last moment, when its peril of being cut off is extreme, perhaps not even then.

We may prepare to hear, then, of an immovable situation all along this front, until the main German bodies in Southern Poland have retreated much further than they have already done.

B.—THE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN POLAND.

I have said that the operations in Southern Poland should be divided for purposes of analysis into two limbs; A—B, the limb which is concerned with the middle Vistula, and in which the Germans are retreating from that stream, pursued by the Russians, and B—C, the limb along the River San.

Of these two the first is by far the most important. Upon it will ultimately depend, for reasons which I shall proceed to show, the fate of the whole campaign in the East. The Austro-German object in that campaign, so far as the main operations upon the



Vistula and the San were concerned, may be remembered. It was the object of the Germanic allies, the Austrian half of which had already been badly mishandled by the Russians in Galicia and pushed back half-way between Przemyśl and Cracow (see Map 1), to get back again to the line of the San in the south, continued by the middle Vistula to the north, to cross these streams, and to establish themselves firmly in a defensive offensive upon the further bank. The capture of Warsaw, on the extreme north of this effort, the relief of Przemyśl, on the extreme south, would protect the two ends of the advance. Later Lemberg would be retaken, and, though the allies would not propose to penetrate deeply into the Russian plain—with the winter coming on, with its poverty of communications and with the great length of the line of supply from Germany which such further penetration would involve—yet it was essential to their plan that the line of the middle Vistula and the San should be firmly held, and that there the Russians should be indefinitely checked, in spite of their increasing numbers—making of Russian Poland, as it were, a larger Belgium. While the Russians were thus held in the East, a definite victory might be expected in the West, to which further reinforcements could be sent when it was apparent that the defensive line held by the Germans and Austrians beyond the Vistula was secure.

In pursuance of this plan very large reinforcements were provided in aid of the defeated Austrian armies, and these reinforcements came, not into Galicia, but, leaving the reoccupation of that field to the reconstructed Austrian bodies, the Germans, to the number of some 800,000 men or rather more, with Austrian reinforcements upon their right along the


southern frontier of Russian Poland, advanced right across that province towards the line of the Vistula between Sandomir and Warsaw. Before this advance the Russians retreated, concentrating beyond the Vistula upon reinforcements reaching them from the east. No effort was made to prevent this German and Austrian advance up to the Vistula itself, and a corresponding Russian retirement to take place in the south through Galicia up to the line of the San. Przemyśl was still partially invested by the Russians, but only partially. The western sector of its perimeter was open to the Austrian advance. When the shock came, the most important part of this whole line, the part along the middle Vistula, stood very much as the dotted line upon the accompanying map. It had everywhere touched the stream, and was prepared to cross it at the points indicated by the arrows. It was equally prepared to occupy Warsaw, upon which essential northern point of support more than a quarter of the Austro-German line upon the Vistula was marching.

Though the Russians allowed the enemy to reach the Vistula everywhere above Warsaw, and to attempt the crossing, they took the counter-offensive at exactly the right moment in front of Warsaw itself, and began driving this wing of the Germans back westward along the main railroad. Their success in this field we know. From extreme positions within six or seven miles of the Polish capital, the Germans were beaten back at the rate of nearly ten miles a day for three days, until rather more than a week ago they were on the line Skierniewice-Rawa-New Misslo-Radom, and so to the river; the defeat in front of Warsaw involving the abandonment of all attempts to pursue the crossing of the

stream, although such crossings had been actually accomplished in more than one place.

Since this throwing back of the line in the first Russian successes, the Russian pursuit has been methodical and continuous. It is ridiculous to use the word "rout" of the German retreat, which has been orderly, and in which everything essential has been saved, which apparently has lost no very large body in prisoners compared with its size, and which still maintains a perfectly intact formation. But though it is an orderly retreat, it is a retreat none the less, and one which renders more and more certain as it proceeds the fate of the campaign in the East.

It is here that the importance of the fighting upon, and afterwards west of, the middle Vistula appears, and the subordination of the effort further east along the San to this main effort of the Austro-Germans. For, as the Austro-Germans fall back westward and south-westward, it becomes clear that the eastern effort cannot be prolonged. The line is still intact, and beyond Sandomir is continued up the San Valley; but all the north-western portion of it is bending backwards and further back towards the south, and the prolongation of such a strain upon the main forces of the enemy by the Russians must involve the withdrawal of the Austrian forces operating further south to the east. If these were to maintain their positions (they can hardly hope to advance—and even advance would be of no value) the line would ultimately find itself bent into a bow from Cracow, along the Vistula, and then up the San. It would not even be covering Silesia—the keeping of the Russians out of which, much more than the keeping of them out of Galicia, is the prime object of the German Empire in this field. One may put the matter diagrammatically thus:—



If the shaded portion S represents Silesia, then the Russian pressure has already bent back the northern portion of the Austro-German line and is bending it back further still. From W X P (Warsaw, Sandomir—at X—Przemysl), which was occupied nearly three weeks ago, the Austro-German line is bent back to L X P (Lodz, Sandomir, Przemysl). Should it be bent back to C X P (Cracow, Sandomir, Przemysl) Silesia would be uncovered, and any Russian success between X and P (the Russians can throw their perpetually arriving reinforcements where they choose) would be not only the ruin of Silesia but of

the whole Austro-German line. It seems certain therefore that such a line as A B, falling back again to A D, will be the result of the Russian pressure. But in order to maintain such a line the Austrian eastern advances in Galicia, now holding X P, will have to fall back first to B, and then to D.


It is therefore upon this continual advance of the Russians from the middle Vistula south-westward, and the as continual retreat of the Germans and Austrians before them in this region, that the fate of the campaign depends; for it involves with it an ultimate retirement from the San and from East Galicia as well.

How far this retirement has proceeded at the moment of writing (Tuesday evening) the Russian official news informs us. The main German bodies are out of Lodz, though we have no news as yet that this town is occupied by the cavalry of the Russian pursuit. Piotrkow is apparently entirely abandoned by the enemy, and already occupied by the Russian advanced cavalry. So is Opoczno. So is Osowiec, and apparently even Opatow, though here there has been strong resistance. Sandomir is still the pivot of this great retreat.

The whole thing singularly resembles the corresponding German failure in the West, generally called the Battle of the Marne—with Lodz to stand for Soissons and Sandomir for the pivot at Verdun. But there is this difference: that the marching wing or extreme of the retreating enemy's line has had to go more than double the distance it had to go in France, and, much more important, with the inability of the enemy so far to make a stand. For there is this great difference between the German retreat through Russian Poland from in front of Warsaw and the German retreat through north-east France from in front of Paris—that the pursuers greatly outnumber the pursued, and that the numbers of the pursuers are increasing every day. When von Kluck turned back from in front of Paris on the discovery of Joffre's reserves, he carried with him indeed the whole German line as far as Verdun. It all had to fall back. But the troops that pressed it back through Chateau Thierry and Vitry were less in number than the troops they were pursuing. It was possible for the majority that was retreating to spare men for the preparation of a position, to rally there, and to begin a prolonged resistance. A corresponding resistance has not yet taken place in Poland, and it is the whole object of this methodical Russian pursuit, comparatively small as its results in men and material captured have yet been, to prevent such a resistance. Only the future will show whether it has been found possible to prevent it or no.

Meanwhile an exceedingly important point, upon which judgment must be held in suspense, is, *whether in this pursuit the Russians have managed to divide those whom they are pursuing into two separate bodies.* If they have, a very great deal has been accomplished. Certain unofficial telegrams maintain that they have done so; but I cannot, from a study of the map, see that the trick has really been done. What that separation would mean, and how it might be effected, may be grasped from the next diagram.

Here is an army in two portions, A and B, retreating in front of another army, also divided into two portions, E and F. It has right across its retreat an obstacle M N, which separates its two portions A and B. It has further two great avenues of communication along which its retreat is facilitated, (1) and (1a), both leading to C. But from (1) a secondary avenue of communication (2) diverges towards K. A—B is divided by the natural obstacle



M N into two portions, and so for that matter is the victorious pursuer E—F. But this obstacle comes to an end at M. Now, if both portions of A—B—the A portion and the B portion—stick to the two main lines of retreat (1) and (1a) and are able to get back behind M to the level of the dotted line G H L, they will join hands again, and from that point onwards the two avenues of retreat converging towards C will serve them jointly. If, on the other hand, the A portion tends to slip off after reaching H along the secondary avenue of retreat too, towards K, and to take up a position such as that at Q, and to continue its retreat thence toward K, while B pursues its original following of the main avenue of retreat, and stands at P marching towards C, Q will get more and more separated from the southern portion P as the retreat proceeds. The more the retreat proceeds the wider the gap will get, until at last the pursuers E F will be able to step in between through the gap, and the position will be like that in the following




diagram with Q and P finally broken asunder by E F, which can deal with each of them in detail. E F would have done strategically what is done tactically in a battle when you break your enemy's line.

It will be asked why should the A portion of the retreating enemy be so foolish as to go along the secondary line (1a) until it gets to Q and is thus separated from its southern portion B, which has got to P. The answer is that it may either have been shepherded or edged outwards by the superior mobility and cleverness of E pursuing it, and have been got away north before it reached the end of the obstacle: or that a political desire to protect some piece of territory, such as the shaded portion S may have lured A away from his companion B in the middle of the

retreat when both bodies were approaching the end of the obstacle that separated them. Only reasons of this sort, strategic or political, could compel A to be so foolish as to remain out of touch with B one moment longer than the obstacle M N kept him so separate.

Now, apply this diagram to the sketch map No. 3. The two separated retreating bodies A and B are the Germans north and south of the marshy lower course of the River Pilica, which is the obstacle M N. A is the Germans lying to the north of that marshy stream and just beaten back from the line Warsaw—Vistula—mouth of Pilica to the line, Skierniewice—New Misslo. B is the Germans who have retreated from the Vistula to a line passing through Radom south of the Pilica: that is the position of rather more than a week ago. The Pilica ceases to be a serious obstacle at about the point marked M on this same sketch map 3. The two great avenues of retreat (1) and (1a) are the main railway lines from Radom to Cracow and from Warsaw to Cracow. The subsidiary divergent avenue of retreat is the railway line branching off from the first through Lodz to Kalisz. The shaded area S, the defence of which might lure the retreat into dividing into two bodies, is Silesia. Another lure which might tempt the northern part of the German line to go directly westward while the rest went southward, would be the opportunity of defending the line of the River Warta, on which a good deal of labour in entrenching has already been spent. It is therefore quite on the cards that the German retreat might get split into two bodies such as are represented by the dotted bodies X and Y on map 3. These bodies would, of course, *try* to keep in touch with each other; but it would be the object of the Russian pursuit, as the angle between them approached breaking point, to push in and separate them.

Now certain unofficial telegrams from the Russians claim that they, in their pursuit, have virtually done this, and that while one body is inevitably pinned to the two great railway lines that go south-west towards Galicia and Cracow, the other is already depending upon the line going due west to Kalisz and by the shortest road into German Poland, and so to Berlin. There is even in the official Russian communiqué the vague phrase that the retreat of the enemy north and south of the Pilica is "of enormous importance."

But, I repeat, we have not yet any evidence that the separation of the retreating Austro-German body into two has really taken place; and such a separation would be so disastrous, it would be so much the object of the German commanders to prevent it at any expense, that we ought not to believe it has taken place until the very best of proof has been offered us. Of that as yet we have none. What we do know is that the German retreat from the Vistula, following upon the German retreat in front of Warsaw, is quite definite and final, and that the Germans will not retrieve it. They may entrench again and fight a whole defensive position as they have done in the west; but they have lost their first objective, and have been foiled in their original plan of campaign. They can no longer reinforce the West from the East without suffering what they most dread—the presence of the enemy upon their own soil. As that enemy continually increases in numbers, his presence upon their soil may yet be afflicting them before the full winter sets in a month hence.


(C).—THE OPERATIONS UPON THE SAN.



Meanwhile, as I have said, this main defeat of the Germans upon the middle Vistula will ultimately involve the retreat of the Austrians of the southern or second limb upon the San. What these Austrian forces to the south of the main Vistula line have accomplished is not inconsiderable. They have rallied; they have cleared Hungary of the small cavalry forces which had penetrated across the Carpathians; they claim to have partially relieved Przemyśl, and they have certainly come down the eastern slopes of the Carpathians through the foothills to the plain. They are still fighting, however, in those mountains, even as far back as Turka, which is in the heart of the hills; and their detached bodies are not further north at the most than Sambor and Stryj. It is not possible that any large turning movement should take place on this extreme southern flank of the Russian line. The Russian reinforcement there is, compared with the Austrian reinforcement, inexhaustible, and the Russians have Lemberg as their base from which to hold up any such effort. But, until the Vistula was lost, the co-ordinate attempt to force the San while the Vistula itself was being crossed, looked promising, and that would at least have had the effect of completely relieving Przemyśl. The news from the valley of the San is very meagre, but such as it is it is worth noting that it connotes no successful Austrian crossing of the stream. We have one Russian telegram and one Austrian one. The Russian telegram tells us that a successful effort was made by the Russian troops over the river at Nisco—the point, it will be remembered from past notes, about which the first bridges cross the San. The Austrian telegram tells us that the Austrian troops successfully repelled an attack on Leheisk—a town which, like every other in Galicia, has its name spelt in three separate ways—I adopt that of the telegram. Now the significant thing about both these telegrams is that Nisco is on the left or Austrian bank of the San, while Leheisk is not only on the left bank but at some distance in from the stream. In other words, the line of the river is at the moment of writing being firmly held by the Russians and dominated by them, and there has been no crossing of that stream of any moment by the enemy, or, if there has been, such a crossing has been made good again by the Russians.

The general result, then, of the operations in the Eastern field to date are in favour of our Allies, from the "block" that holds up the detached and now dangerously isolated Prussian forces in the north, through the great German retreat from the Vistula, to the hitherto successful holding of the Austrian effort upon the San.

THE BATTLE IN FLANDERS.



Up to the end of last week the main interest of the great battle in Flanders—apart from the stupendous fact that on the issue hung the fates of the German armies in the west—as they do still—was the division of the German effort into a northern and a southern struggle. The southern effort consisted in the attempt to push south-westward of Lille and to break the Allied line in front of La Bassée. The northern one consisted in the attempt to break, or at least to roll back, the extreme of the Allied line where it reposed upon the sea. Of these two efforts the first, that in front of La Bassée, was slowly and partially successful, in so far as a certain indentation was there made in the general line which the Allies were holding from the sea right away south to Compiègne. More than that the German push at this point did not achieve, and chief among the causes of its failure was the division of forces consequent upon that second effort in the north, which has completely failed. For this second effort, which may be called—though somewhat ironically—"The March on Calais" (undoubtedly based upon political rather than strategic considerations) has failed at an incredible cost of human lives, of which loss by far the greater part has fallen, of course, upon the defeated party. The mass of the German reinforcements were brought up against the twelve miles front between Dixmude and the sea. The canalised river Yser between Nieuport and Dixmude was crossed at last by the Germans, but with no greater result than to see the bodies already over the bridge swamped by the opening of the sluices, and unable to advance

beyond the railway which runs from Nieuport through Ramscapele and Pervyse to Dixmude. Even had the violent effort made upon this front succeeded, the German pursuit of the Allies through the wet country eastward to Dunkirk would have been an appallingly difficult business; and behind that again, in front of Calais, the Allies had, as we saw last week, the best defensive position of all that coast, the line of the river Aa, prolonged by the canal to Saint Omer.


At any rate, this effort has certainly and finally failed. That in front of La Bassée is still being vigorously but fruitlessly continued (with no appreciable further advance at this moment of writing, Tuesday evening) towards Béthune. Nor are the Germans yet in possession of Lens, the other railway centre of that neighbourhood, which it is essential for them to occupy if Lille is to be of any value to them.

But the new struggle (which bids fair to be as intense as that, now abandoned, along the sea-coast or "Calais" route) is directed towards the position of Ypres.

To obtain possession of that point is the business the German commanders have set for themselves as an alternative to the possession of that sea route which has proved impossible.

This attack upon Ypres is not an attack upon a junction or "nodal point" of importance to supply. A single line of railway does indeed lead west from Ypres to Hazebrouck, while, of course, lines run from Ypres to the south and Lille, to the east and Brussels, to the north and the sea at Nieuport, but none of these are essential to a German advance westward, as Calais and Boulogne. Ypres is not, as Hazebrouck is, for instance, or even as Béthune, a "nodal" point where a mass of communications essential to the enemy for his project of invasion join. The reason why Ypres is being attacked is not, either, that it is a depot. The reason is that Ypres is the heart of a dangerous "salient" or wedge thrust into the territory occupied by German armies, which salient was neglected during the German attack upon the Yser to the north.

If the reader will glance at this diagram he will



see what that salient meant and still means to the enemy.

When the furious offensive in Flanders succeeded to the furious attacks lower down the line—especially before Arras—which had been successfully beaten off, the country already occupied by the German forces might be represented by the horizontal shading "A."

As the concentration of the superior German numbers, due to exceptional reinforcement, proceeded on this front the Allies retired from Roulers. Lille was occupied by a German army corps, the Allies retired several miles, and the next line to be held by them should logically have been Nieuport-Dixmude-Ypres-Lille-Armentières, which line the Germans would again have proceeded to attack at various places, notably in the Calais march on the front Nieuport-Dixmude and south of Lille.

I say "logically" meaning, supposing for each party the offensive in superior numbers and inferior numbers on the defensive, had acted with reason. But the Germans did not act with reason. They divided their forces. And in this waste of their effort, the too violent, unsuccessful and immensely expensive attack on the front Nieuport-Dixmude they were compelled to take men from their centre. This left an opportunity for the Allies to press forward in front of Ypres, with the result that at the end of a fortnight's incredibly violent attempt of the Germans, with their superior numbers, to seize the strip along the sea-coast, and in face of their failure in that attempt, they found themselves in the presence of a great wedge thrust forward by the Allies in front of Ypres into the country they held. All that they occupied of the new belt was that represented by the diagram shading "B" in the sketch, and it is then apparent what a wedge Ypres commands. Now that the Calais attempt is abandoned, the reduction of this salient or wedge in front of Ypres has been undertaken by the German commanders. Pressure brought there will, it is hoped, relieve the attack below Lille from the resistance in front of it; for if the German line can be pushed forward to Ypres itself, and can include Armentières on the south, there will be no further danger from the north flank to the German effort at La Bassée, and all available forces can be brought forward by the enemy on to that point. To reduce the Ypres salient, therefore, is the chief business of the Germans at this moment, and the action they have developed with that object, regarded as a part of the whole battle of Flanders, may be called "The Battle of Ypres."


It is a singularly belated effort. For in that failure of the last fortnight between Dixmude and Nieuport, Germany has thrown away in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at the very least, the equivalent of a whole army corps.

Should the Germans be successful and reduce the Ypres salient, nothing very enormous will have been done by them, but their line will at least have been straightened out; the dangerous wedge pushed into it in front of Ypres will have been thrust back.

To appreciate the nature of the work round Ypres, the accompanying detailed sketch may be of value. Ypres is the centre of a great half circle of positions, with a radius of, roughly, six miles, all of which positions are, at the moment of writing, in the hands of the Allies, and all of which are, at the moment of writing, or have been immediately before, the subject of very violent attack from the enemy.

When I say within a radius of six miles, I am giving an extreme measurement; some of the points most seriously attacked are barely four miles from the Cloth Hall, which is the centre of Ypres town.

Bixschotte is one such town, and north of it the flooded country forbids German action. Poelcapelle is another such town; Paschendaële is another;



Beccalaere another; Zenwode another; Hollebeke another, and Messines the last of this series. Beyond the ideal north-and-south line which unites Bixschotte, Ypres, and Messines—that is, to the west of such an ideal line—there are no German forces. Of the villages mentioned a little above, Paschendaële is the most eastern point of the salient which it is the German business to reduce and flatten back on to Ypres.

The main German effort in the pursuance of this task (the effort on to which they have put their best troops and no reserves) has come from the south. There lies here a belt of wooded land. The wood is not continuous. It consists in a number of separate plantations and parks, many private houses and gardens, which often join, or nearly join. Special effort has been made by the enemy upon the three points Zenwode, Hollebeke, and Messines which are on the line of these woods and slight rises. These three villages were all at one moment—last Friday or Saturday—in the possession of the enemy, and it was at this moment perhaps that Ypres was most gravely threatened.

Whether Zenwode is recovered or not at the moment of writing we have no information, but Hollebeke was retaken two days ago. The fate of Messines appears to have been this. It was first taken at the bayonet, largely, we are told, through the efforts of a Territorial unit—the London Scottish—who suffered very heavily and very gloriously. It was next partially lost, and appears to have been during the course of Monday a scene of fierce struggle. For the final news on Sunday from both sides—German and French—give us that impression, the French telling us that “part of the village” is occupied by the enemy, the Germans claiming the capture of the village.

It is obvious from the map that the line which the Allies will make for, as the first outpost of an advance from Ypres when the counter-offensive shall be taken against the enemy, is the line of the River Lys. So far that narrow, sluggish and winding stream, between Messines and Lille, is in German hands.

There is, therefore, a double importance attaching to this struggle for Ypres, and for the projection into

the enemy's positions held by the Allies all round the east of Ypres. A German success will pave the way, if it is not achieved at too great an expense of men, for pressing more heavily than ever the attack upon the critical point of La Bassée. But if the Allies maintain a successful advance, the occupation of Lille by the enemy will be near its end, and of course, as a consequence, a retirement of the Germans from all the La Bassée country, and the end of this very critical struggle.

For the issue, we can, at the moment of writing (Tuesday evening) only wait. We shall have in this struggle exactly what we had between Dixmude and Nieuport; the enemy bringing up much larger numbers than the defensive at the moment commands, numbers composed in part of first-rate material, in part of the new levies which are formed of material less and less excellent as the slaughter proceeds. There will be a much larger loss on the side of this determined attack than on the side of the defence, and if the attack be thrust back that factor of final victory upon which the whole French strategy of reserve is counting—the exhaustion of the enemy—will come into the field of Europe as a whole, and bring the campaigns, not only in the west but in the east, into quite another phase.


What this factor of exhaustion may be at the present stage of the war I will attempt to estimate upon a later page; meanwhile there is little more to be said of the campaign in France.

There has been a little progress in the Vosges, and the passes into Alsace are now commanded by the French. In the old line of trenches of the Aisne, where forces very much thinned face each other across the slopes of the chalky hills on the right bank of that river, there has been a sharp little German success carrying a local advance almost down to the stream near Vailly, while the French have got almost abreast of Noyon to the west, and are occupying or standing immediately in front of Trezy-le-Val. Both matters are so far too small to be worthy of special comment or illustration. Neither is the deadlock in the Argonne appreciably advanced upon either side at the moment of writing. It is still through the Wood of the Storks (La Grurie) that the German attack on the French troops takes place north of the Verdun road, and it is still from the Wood of La Chalade, south of it, that corresponding French counter-attacks are made. There is one last point that is worthy of attention and of a brief analysis, and this is the menace to the Egyptian frontier if, as seems now certain, Turkey shall come into the game.

THE EGYPTIAN MARCH.

An attack delivered from Syria against Egypt depends upon two obvious factors—the desert and the Suez Canal. Unless transports are ready to convey troops and munitions across the Mediterranean, unless their troops and munitions have been long prepared and unless the eastern Mediterranean is at the same time empty of French and English men-of-war, there is only the land route. The ability or inability of the enemy to traverse the desert and to overcome the obstacle of the Suez Canal sum up the whole business.

It is perhaps the canal which should be first remarked. It is a continuous obstacle from sea to sea of a minimum breadth comparable to a broad inland river such as the Lower Meuse; everywhere deep, of course, equally of course nowhere bridged and nowhere affected by a strong current. The problem of crossing



it, therefore, is the commonplace problem of crossing, under the protection of one's artillery, a broad but sluggish unfordable stream over pontoon bridges. Unless superior artillery is present upon one's own bank to dominate the artillery of the enemy, such a crossing cannot be effected. If it is present the crossing can be effected. The problem is further simplified from the facts that there are no heights or gun positions upon either side. It is simply a question of having the larger guns, better served, and, under their protection, effecting a crossing. If the proposed invasion has not that superiority the obstacle is absolute; if it has, the obstacle is clearly negotiable. Save for one other important and quite exceptional factor.

The Suez Canal—unlike an inland water-way—is accessible to ships carrying heavy guns. That is where it differs from your broad river to which it is the parallel. Similarly it is bridgeable, as an inland river rarely is, from the presence of large ships within it; for ships can be slung across it.

Much more important however, than the obstacle which is the strategic frontier of Egypt is the Desert across which all land approach to that country must be made. This desert is the Isthmus and Peninsula called after the group of mountains which contains, towards the south of the Peninsula, the traditional peak of Sinai. The high mountains, I say, lie in the Peninsular portion of this bit of land, between the Gulf of Akaba and the Gulf of Suez. The northern, or continental portion, though crossed (especially at the north-east) by ranges of hills is not mountainous.

The whole region is however desert. There is hardly any water. Such water as there is confines all travel to two tracks and to two tracks only, and the supply of water is, nowadays, very limited upon each.

These two tracks are the *Sea Road*—which is that taken by all the great historical invaders of Syria from Egypt, and of Egypt from Syria—and the *Hadj or Pilgrim's Road* from Suez to Akaba, which was the road followed by the Mohammedan pilgrims (especially

in the old days before steam traffic came to change the conditions of the pilgrimage) on their way from Egypt to Mecca. The northern or sea road after going down the coast of Palestine through country increasingly dry, crosses the conventional frontier of modern Egypt at Rafa and is already under desert conditions at El Arish. From El Arish to the town of El Kantara or The Bridge, is a matter of over 100 miles. It suffers as a road of invasion towards Egypt from two disabilities. First, the earlier or eastern part of the march is exposed to fire from the sea.

The second difficulty is, of course, the difficulty attaching to all this district—the difficulty of water. It is much more than a day's march, it is over 30 miles, from El Arish to the next supply of water—by which distance all danger from the sea has disappeared, as the road is by this time protected by wide shoal lagoons which stretch between it and the Mediterranean. This water (found in a single well with no great depth of water) is at the point of El Maza; another equally long stretch—far more than a day's marching—takes one to a much better supply of water at Bir-el-Abd. A long day's march further west again is Katieh; and from this point the chief difficulties of the desert march are overcome. There is a sufficient supply of water at Katieh not only in existing wells, but obtainable by digging. The remaining march to El Kantara is indeed much more than a day's going: but the supply of water obtainable at Katieh and the presence, once the Suez Canal is reached, of the fresh water from the Nile Canal alongside of it, disposes of the main difficulty. If a force can reach Katieh it can reach the Canal. The fresh water supply at El Kantara, however, is controllable by those who possess the further bank of the Canal. And indeed in all this problem of the march through desert on to Egypt one has to consider the fact that the obstacle, when one reaches it, is still passing through desert land. A force not too large might supply itself with water at the various points (Napoleon did so with a force indeed much smaller than should be required for any operation against Egypt to-day, but he was going the other way into Syria, and in his time the obstacle of the Canal did not exist). But such a force, though it had managed to cross the desert, if it should fail at the obstacle for any appreciable time would find the difficulty of continued water supply insuperable.

The march on Egypt by this route is, therefore, if feasible at all, a matter for a comparatively small force, especially so long as that force finds the sea under the control of its enemies.

The southern route from Akaba to Suez, though everywhere perfectly good going, is very much worse provided with water. Opposite Akaba, from the palm grove of Tabah, after a sharp climb for some 2,000 feet, you are on a flat hard plateau running directly in the direction of Suez between low hills, and the Pilgrim's Road is marked fairly clearly upon this hard plateau.

At what is very nearly the central point between Akaba and Suez you get the first reserve of water. A modern force upon the march would not reach that reserve until the end of the third day at the very earliest. There are cisterns to hold a great provision of water; whether these are, or now can be, kept filled I can find no authority to tell me. The remainder of the way to Suez there is but one point of water, the Well of Moses, "Ayun Mousa," a short march before Suez. It is evident that this second marching route is much harder than the first, and I believe that

historically no great force has ever taken it, though there may have been Arab movements of which I am ignorant; but the Roman, the Egyptian of Pagan times, the Assyrian, the Greek, and the Frenchman have all chosen the sea route.

In all this analysis of the difficulty in approaching Egypt from Syria (and the Akaba route has become the more difficult as I write from the now reported destruction of the Akaba stores and fort by a British man-of-war), it must be remembered that rapid modern transport would, for small numbers, have no such problems to face such as I have mentioned. On either route right up to the neighbourhood of the canal petrol traffic could move at will, and carry such armament as petrol will carry within

a day for light vehicles, within forty-eight hours for heavy ones. But petrol vehicles, save in very great numbers, though they may seize important points ahead of an army, will not convey an army.

I will conclude my notes this week by a thorough examination of a subject on which I have not yet touched, or touched but superficially, and which is yet of prime importance to the judgment of the campaign. I mean, the factor of *wastage*. At what rate is the enemy losing men? The reply to such a question is of vital consequence to the future—for other things being equal, numbers are the deciding factor in war, and to disarm your opponent—no matter how—in greater numbers than he disarms you is the ultimate end of strategy.

ESTIMATE OF WASTAGE.

This factor of wastage has three important bearings upon one's judgment of a military situation.

First, a comparison between the wastage of one side and the other gives us a record of relative strength at various moments in the campaign. It is the only way of establishing such a record. We know at the beginning of a campaign how the numbers stand. We can only judge by some estimate of comparative wastage how they continue to stand as the campaign progresses.

Secondly, the rate of wastage of both parties combined give one some power to judge the approach of exhaustion. Such figures are, though but a vague indication, yet *some* indication as to the maximum possible length of a campaign, or at any rate its maximum possible length on the scale to which it was planned and begun. After a certain proportion of waste upon both sides, though the campaign may drift on, it will not be what it was in its first fury.

Thirdly, the proportion of wastage (and this is the most important point) is also an indication of success or failure *according to the type of campaign or action which is being fought*. For instance, any one taking the losses by wounds, death, and capture of Napoleon's advance into Russia in 1812, and contrasting it with the corresponding wastage upon the Russian side, would have had little in the mere figures to guide him as to the probable result of the whole movement. But when those figures were made alive by a consideration of the nature of the campaign, when one remembered the steadily increasing numerical strength of the Russians, the immense and as steadily increasing length of communications upon which the French depended, the bad roads, the lateness of the season, &c., *then* one could compare. One could say that if the wastage had been nearly equal upon both sides, that was for the French a very bad omen indeed.

Take a converse case: The immense wastage of the German armies in 1870-71. No one marking those figures with any judgment would have thought the case of Germany any the worse, at any rate up to November, 1870. She was attacking to win at once. She was undergoing a very heavy strain with that direct purpose. She had undertaken many very severe marches. She was fighting late in the year. She had, after the first few weeks, no regulars against her. While she was fighting regulars she had sacrificed men without counting because she thought or knew that the blow could be driven home at once. But if the French had succeeded, as they so nearly

did, in pinning the German effort in the late winter, *then* the later figures of German wastage would have been very significant indeed.

Bearing these three points in mind as to the way in which wastage is an indication as to the trend of a campaign, let us try to get at approximate figures.

Our basis for such a calculation is very crude and insufficient. We have to guide us nothing but the official Prussian lists of killed, wounded, and missing, the official German statements of the prisoners they hold, a rough—and now old—unofficial estimate of the German prisoners in France, British official and unofficial statements of loss in the British contingent, some knowledge of the type of fighting upon each side—and, for the rest, nothing but the application of common-sense to all these fragments. Nevertheless such an application will lead to appreciable results.

Let us begin with the German account of their own wastage. The lists of which we have hitherto had notice in this country (1) apply to Prussian losses alone and (2) carry us no further than the middle of September.

These lists give 36,000 killed, 160,000 wounded, and 55,000 missing.

To correct these official figures with regard to Prussia we have no counter check save the unofficial French estimate of 65,000 German prisoners in France somewhat earlier in September. This one check, however, is not without its value, for it corroborates, roughly, the Prussian figures of missing. For the difference may well be German reticence in counting as certainly missing many who may yet (it is hoped) appear, and captives not notified at the moment their lists were made. But though we have no counter statistics with which to check these Prussian lists, we can apply to them a general criticism which should enable us to arrive at tolerably accurate inferior and superior limits.

For the principles of this criticism let us first remember that it is the characteristic of German *official* statements in this war at once to suppress news which the German Government happens to think weakening to its cause, and to be singularly accurate in the news it *does* publish.

It is very important, in this connection, that we should not confuse the various types of information furnished by German agency to the world. There is plenty of German falsehood, some of it fantastic. But the falsehood is calculated and organised. There are, as it were, zones of information. The German

Government permits and encourages the publication, in German provincial newspapers, of childish stories against the Allies, and of equally childish prophecies of inevitable German victories. It presents for the consumption of neutral countries something quite different, not fantastic stories but special pleading. America is full of this, so is Scandinavia. Finally, it issues, for the effect it may have upon minute and careful criticism in Europe (such, for instance, as that of the General Staffs of the Allies) figures the known reliability of which will earn respect.

The calculated truth-telling and lying of the Prussian Government may be compared at this moment to that of a man who is rigidly accurate with his bank book, keeps a quantity of his transactions from passing through the bank, puts forward through hired lawyers a totally false view of his fortune in some law case in which he is involved, and finally permits and even fosters ridiculous popular legends which make him out ten times as rich as he is. If one were dealing with the evidence of such a man's wealth one would respect the accuracy of the counterfoils in his cheque book, though one would doubt the rest of his reports for various reasons and in various degrees.

The official *communiqués* of statistics are of the exact category. One may take it, therefore, as accurate that the Prussian Government was (*for the Prussian forces alone*) able to note 36,000 dead by the middle of September.

But the Prussian male population is only just over sixty per cent. of the total male population of the German Empire. It contains, with the capital, a slightly larger proportion of men for various reasons exempted. Call it but sixty per cent. for military purposes and you are within the truth. So to get statistics for the German armies as a whole we must add to any Prussian statistics two-thirds as much again—forty to every sixty or sixty-six per cent. Therefore we must add to this 36,000 dead another 24,000 and say that official information up to the middle of September accounted for 60,000 German dead. There is our first item in the process of calculation.

160,000 Prussian wounded would, in the same proportions, give us just on 267,000 for the total number known upon that date as being wounded in the whole German Army. But here we must make our first reservation as to the accuracy of the Prussian figures. The proportion of wounded to killed is altogether too low. 60,000 dead is to 267,000 would give one man killed out of less than $5\frac{1}{2}$ hit, to be accurate, one out of 5.45. We know from numerous accounts, as well as from accurate statistics (though these apply only to portions or samples of the whole), that the proportion of dead upon the side of the Allies is in heavy lists more like one in eight, and in light lists one in fifteen in this war. It is indeed but rare that a particular list brings it up to as high as one in eight; and indeed, judging upon the analogy of other modern war, one in ten is quite high enough a proportion, taking a campaign as a whole. The proportion of dead to all casualties by wounds and deaths included in the Prussian lists therefore, at 1 in 5.45, a great deal too low. There are, of course, many particular cases of desperate attack in which you—very rarely—reach such proportions. It is further true that the Prussian method of attack lends itself to a high proportion. But allowing for all this, the proportion is altogether out of reason. In other words, there must have been, at the date mentioned, the middle of September, knowledge of a great many more than 267,000 wounded in the German armies.

We should probably be still within the mark if we doubled that figure: we are quite safe if we add just over 50 per cent. to it and make it *one in eight*.

This does not mean that the Prussian statistics are fantastic or even false. It simply means that they have only chosen to count as wounded those who were very seriously wounded, those, for instance, who had no prospect at all of ever appearing again in the field and that they did not choose to swell their lists with any less serious cases. Such a method of presenting casualties is arguable. But we who are trying to get at a just estimate of the *total* wastage at *this one moment*, and who are not handicapped by any desire to keep the enemy in good heart, must consider *all* casualties, and, I repeat, the adding of just over half to the admitted proportion of wounded, the allowing of at least eight men hit more or less grievously for one of the eight to be killed is an estimate well within the probable truth. Such a low estimate gives us 60,000 killed and just less than half a million Germans killed and wounded—480,000—mentioned to date at the middle of September.

In the case of the third category, that of the missing, we are on surer ground. The numbers there are more nearly accurate. They have but one doubtful factor in them and that is due to the reluctance of those responsible for soldiers to admit the units are really lost until there is no further doubt. But against this must be set the military habit of estimating the number of one's missing men immediately after an action, although stragglers coming in, wounded picked up, &c., may later reduce that number.

To be well within the mark let us add no more than ten per cent. to the lists of missing, that is, let us suppose that the reluctance of subordinates to admit losses of this sort in their commands would have made no greater difference than adding 5,000 to the Prussian figures of 55,000. That would give us 60,000 missing Prussians, or 100,000 missing men for the whole German Army. And such an estimate is very fairly corroborated by comparing it with the French unofficial statements, *somewhat earlier in date*, of 65,000 unwounded German prisoners; for, in the first place, among the Germans merely marked missing there must have been a number of wounded abandoned wherever a Prussian force fell back, and, in the second place, men marked as missing in the campaign often fail to appear in the statistics of either army. They are lost for good. They represent desertions, people killed but not marked as killed, &c. For instance, behind the Prussian lines after the great retreat in the early part of September, Picardy and the edges of Normandy were full of half-starved little groups of Germans that had lost their units—especially cavalry—and that often took to brigandage as a desperate resource, and very many of whom were summarily shot by the French. Next we must admit a certain number—not yet large—of captures by the Russians.

Put all this together—your 100,000 missing, your close on 500,000 wounded and dead—and you get in round figures more than 600,000 men for the killed, wounded, and missing of all the German forces by the middle of September.

But before we leave that particular patch of figures we may note yet another consideration which is of great value to our estimate. The figures of loss given by an army, however accurate, are always for a particular date below the real total losses. For to the list of a given day there are always additions to come in, and this is particularly seen when you are dealing with millions over two widely

separated theatres of wars, each many thousand square miles in extent. It takes some time for the reports of units to come to the Staffs and be first roughly co-ordinated. The further news which reaches subordinate commanders extends the first lists. If a man is asked for his losses twenty-four hours after an action, he will invariably send in a smaller amount than the total amount turns out to be after lengthy and complete examination. It is true that these Prussian lists are not issued until long after the dates to which they refer, so that there is plenty of time for adding further figures, but it is still true that supplementary lists continue to be issued throughout a campaign, and that the 600,000 which we have here got are therefore certainly less than a quite complete account of losses to the exact middle of September would come to. They are less, that is, than the total number of men killed, wounded, taken prisoners, or lost up to the date of the 15th of September. The last few days before that date are sure to represent incomplete returns. But to this consideration must be added another fact—that the date happens to be of peculiar significance.

Those few days just before the 15th of September, the last days of the account in which most omissions are necessarily made, happen precisely to correspond with the great German Retreat called the Battle of the Marne. Some of the worst punishment which the German army ever received on East or West falls upon those very days with regard to which the official statistics are likely to be in any case below the mark. What difference this may make we cannot tell. But let us again put a very small estimate for the sake of safety and say no more than ten per cent. Even that brings us up to 660,000.

We may sum up and say that in the case of the official German statistics coupled with what is certainly known of modern war and of normal proportion of death to wounds, you have by the middle of September more than 660,000 but less than 800,000 men hit or taken prisoners upon the German side.

Next let us turn to the losses to be presumed since that date; after that to the presumption of losses by sickness in various forms. Only when some such full calculation is completed shall we be in a position to draw a general conclusion as to the position of the German forces and their chance, so far as numerical strength alone is concerned, for the future.

We have seen that more than 660,000 and presumably less than 800,000 men are to be counted as wastage from the German forces in killed, wounded and missing up to the end of the retreat from Paris to the Aisne in the West, and up to the victorious advance of the four or five German Army Corps from East Prussia over the Russian frontier at the same moment.

What proportion to these losses do subsequent losses bear?

We are now in the first week of November. Seven weeks have elapsed since the totals just computed were arrived at. But these totals account for less than four weeks of active warfare. There was no heavy and serious fighting in the field until the third week in August, when the big losses began with the Battle of Metz (August 19-21) and the Battle of the Sambre (August 22-24).

If, therefore, the fighting had been of the same character all through, we should have to multiply these first estimates—our 660,000 to 800,000—by nearly three to get the total of the present time; since

the first estimates refer to little more than three full weeks of the heavy fighting, and we are ending the eleventh week of active warfare now.

It is common knowledge, however, that the fighting has not been of a piece throughout. To the very heavy work of the rapid German advance on Paris, with sharp losses in infantry and no losses in prisoners, followed by the equally heavy work of the retreat to the Aisne, with its considerable losses in prisoners and large losses in dead and wounded of all arms (a higher proportion, perhaps, in the Artillery), there succeeded, after this middle of September, a long deadlock in which the only fields subject to heavy loss were those fought in defence of the German communications to the west of the River Oise, and north and south of the Upper Somme.

There was loss, of course, the whole time along the line of trenches from Noyon to the Argonne; and there was rather greater loss beyond the Argonne and in the open country where the garrisons of Verdun and Toul were in contact with the army of Metz. There was also a good deal of sharp work in the Vosges. But all this kind of fighting meant losses on a different scale from those which had been incurred during the advance on Paris and the few days of the main retreat, while even the heavier fighting up along the west front in defence of the German communications was upon another scale from the original conflicts.

It is exceedingly difficult to estimate, even in the roughest manner, what proportion we should allow for the German losses between the middle of September and the end of the first third of October when the great battle of Flanders opened. It is a period almost as long as the first period. We should be safe enough, considering the repeated and dense German attacks, if we put it down at about 50 per cent., but we are at any rate perfectly safe and well within the mark if we put it down at rather more than a third, say 250,000 on 660,000 or 300,000 on 800,000. When we consider that this same period saw the retreat of the Germans from the line of the Niemen and their very considerable losses in the battle of Augustowo as well as their bad quarter of an hour on the causeway of Suwalki, the loss of their heavy guns by Osowiec and their failure in an attempt to cross the Niemen at Drusskiniki (the attempt and failure to cross a broad stream under fire is always an extremely expensive operation) we may be perfectly certain that this estimate of just over an extra third is well below the mark, although of course the German forces in East Prussia were not a quarter of those in the Western field.

Let us add then for the period between September 15 and October 10 from 250,000 to 300,000 to the total losses already computed, and you already have at the opening of the battle of Flanders a total of certainly not less than 910,000, nor probably more than 1,100,000.

Now the battle of Flanders has by every account been altogether more prodigal of German fighting men than anything that has gone before. It has already lasted three weeks. We are just at the beginning of the fourth week from its opening, from the opening that is of the severe phase which distinguishes the struggle on the Franco-Belgian frontier from the prolonged flanking movements which have preceded it. The full despatches from the General Officer in command of the British contingent, the official French communiqués, the Belgian private letters received at home, and the public correspondence in the newspapers, all are unanimous

in the conclusion that the losses on the German side have been on a scale far greater and the effort correspondingly more intense than anything that has been seen before in this war. It is true that the front upon which the fighting has occurred is little more than fifty miles, but the main forces massed there must account for nearly half the whole German forces immediately deployed for action along the Western Front. Of the total number of prisoners taken we know nothing, save one French estimate of one week, and even that estimate only refers to the internment within France of unwounded prisoners taken some days before. If we multiply that estimate by three we get 25,000 prisoners taken upon this front. Scale that down to 20,000. Estimate the killed and wounded in such a struggle by the known results in the Belgian contingent opposed to it, and by the partly known and partly presumed rate of loss in certain British and French contingents opposed to it. Remember that the fight consisted in a perpetual and reckless offensive on the part of the enemy—and you will not get a total of less than 150,000 men hit and missing in this field alone. History (if it can ever get accurate information of such things—which is doubtful) will probably find that 200,000 was nearer. Meanwhile the regular wastage has been going on at the old rate along the rest of the line. Diminish that rate because the line has been thinned to bring up masses for fighting in Flanders and you must still allow 100,000 casualties at least, counting every form of such for more than three weeks over nearly 200 miles front and with continual fighting.

Here again I think that estimate would be too low by far, but at any rate you have upon the whole Western line during the battle in Flanders at the very least another quarter of a million.

Meanwhile, you are having your regular wastage in East Prussia, and in the German defeat upon the Vistula, with its rapid though orderly retreat, its necessary loss in stragglers and parties cut off, as well as its loss in killed and wounded, certainly not less than 150,000 men. Prisoners will be a small part of that total in Poland as yet. They are almost certainly not a third of it, and probably not a quarter of it, but the German reinforcements sent into Poland to help Austria were not far short of a million men, and another third of a million had been fighting continuously on the borders of East Prussia. I am allowing, remember, for over three weeks of action, of which a fortnight upon the middle Vistula has been one of defeat and retreat, *only 12 per cent.* of losses, and I think it will be conceded that such an estimate is quite certainly below the truth. Add then, your 150,000 here to the quarter of a million in the West: that makes 350,000; add this to the totals of 910,000 minimum to 1,100,000 maximum previously obtained, and you get *at the very least*, and on the most favourable calculation, over a million and a quarter of Germans hit or caught in the progress of the whole campaign to date. Much more probably the true figures go well above a million and a half, but that they are more than a million and a quarter we can affirm with absolute certitude.

I know that the figure looks startlingly large, but the various steps by which it is arrived at are not, I think, open to criticism. It would be easy by a little manipulation of figures to make out very much larger totals. I have attempted, on the contrary, to fix the lowest conceivable minimum, and I arrive at something certainly larger than a million and a quarter for the strict German losses in the field.

But to the losses of men caught or hit you have always to add losses from sickness, which term in military history signifies not only actual illness but the results of fatigue, accidents which prevent a man's marching, and even the proportion, such as it may be, of men foot-sore at any one moment and unable to keep up with their units.

The estimate of an enemy's losses under this heading are exceedingly difficult to arrive at, for three reasons. First, the factors of such loss are quite indeterminate (they range from a few stragglers to the myriad victims of an epidemic); secondly, that a proportion of sick are always coming back on to the strength; and, thirdly, that the curve of such losses varies in the most surprising manner with (a) the length of a campaign; (b) the climatic conditions under which it is fought; (c) the quality of troops upon which you have to fall back; (d) management.

One sometimes hears it laid down as a sort of rough rule that for one man hit or caught you must count another man off the strength from sickness. But that rule of thumb would never do in an estimate of a particular campaign such as we are now trying to arrive at. It may work in all campaigns on the average. It would be wildly exaggerated of, say, the Sadowa Campaign, and as wildly an underestimate, for, say, 1812. The campaign began in the very best of weather (in the West at least). That weather was prolonged to a quite exceptional date. We have had no rumours of any serious epidemic in the enemy's ranks, and such an accident is still quite unlikely. Losses from fatigue, from over-marching, and the rest of it would vary very much with the different phases of the campaign. There must have been a great deal of it during the rapid advance on Paris. Hardly any of it during the deadlock; little in the German service, at least, upon the Eastern front of the war. Again, a considerable amount of transport, even of men, nowadays is mechanical. There must have been towards the end of the work on the trenches a good deal of loss from ordinary causes of sickness and fatigue; but with a few exceptional crises to interrupt its general excellence the supply of food and clothing to the enemy at the front has been constant and regular. I propose—it is purely empirical, but it has the advantage of being an underestimate—to cut severely the old rule of thumb and to add only 35 per cent. for these causes instead of 100 per cent.; and that although the active part of the war has already been going on for nearly three months. Remember, that to add only 35 per cent. is to pursue the method that has been pursued throughout these notes; it has been well within the mark. Even so, you get little less than one million and three-quarters of men in wastage to the enemy at this moment. It is quite certainly much more, but it is even more certainly no less.

To that figure, just over one million and three-quarters, then, let us pin our first conclusion, *These losses have almost up to the present day—up to within the last two weeks or so—fallen in the main upon the trained troops of the enemy, and with particular severity upon his body of officers.*

The German Empire had, counting lunatics, bed-ridden men, cripples, old men over 80, and boys between 17 and 20, 17,000,000 males available in four categories. A quarter were the trained men of useful fighting age, 21 to 45—four-and-a-quarter million; a quarter—another four-and-a-quarter million—the men of the same age left untrained or but partially trained, never having formed part of the regular army or having done their full two years—most of them

because it is not the German system to take every available man, but rather to pick and choose and to leave a large untrained or half-trained reserve to be digested into the army in the course of a war, *but very many because they were physically unfit for service.* The remaining two quarters—or eight and a half million—stand for the boys who are not really fit to bear arms, but who can at a pinch be called upon, even from the age of 16 (as Napoleon called upon such classes in his last desperation), and for elderly, old, and very old men. Nor should it be forgotten that to keep a nation going at all in wartime, you cannot reckon less than a number varying with varying circumstances, but in the case of Germany at least one million men—neither boys nor too old.

Well, this loss of nearly one-and-three-quarter millions (at the very least) which has already fallen for the most part upon the two first quarters, the trained army, and the equal untrained mass behind it—has fallen most heavily on the first and best. It comes to more than a fifth of all the two possible categories combined: more than a fifth of those who can ever make real soldiers, and of these more than a quarter of the first line.

There is the chief military feature of the struggle at the present moment. In a service peculiarly dependent upon *cadres* certainly a third of the officers have by this time disappeared. It sounds like a violent statement, but the lists are there to prove it.

It will probably be found when fuller records are available that much more than a third have already gone. Of the best troops called up for the first effort one-fourth have certainly gone and probably more. Of all troops, trained and untrained, so far incorporated by Germany one-fourth have gone, for she has quite certainly not yet summoned in any shape more than seven million men since the beginning of the war—it is doubtful if she has summoned six. Of all available material for anything approaching a true army a quarter has already gone.

At this point my calculation ceases. It must as yet be enough to suggest that upon analogy drawn from known cases of loss in particular actions, every man can, by such methods as I have used above, come to his estimate of the corresponding wastage upon our side, and, for the whole of both fields, he will find that estimate a reassuring contrast.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

THE NORTH SEA.

THE discovery of a German mine field of unknown extent twenty miles north of Tory Island (Donegal, Ireland) is a serious matter. The mines must have been placed there quite recently or something would have been sunk by them long ago.

Now, it is impossible that any German mine-layer can have reached the spot under its own colours. Therefore, a neutral flag and probably a neutral vessel was employed. Now *where* did that vessel sail from?

Mines are not things that are easily shipped without observation, and they occupy quite a lot of space. Of course, they can be hidden under a screen of harmless cargo, but none the less there must be some very carefully organised scheme.

The question certainly arises as to whether these mines have not been stored in harmless looking cases somewhere in *our own* territory in anticipation of *Der Tag*, and the question is how many more are lying "in bond" awaiting use? It would be quite consonant with German thoroughness.

Some years ago—though for obvious reasons the fact did not appear in the Press—a *cache* of arms was discovered on the East Coast, and a systematic search unearthed others at various unexpected places. If arms and explosives were imported well beforehand, why not mines?

Another point in connection with the Tory Island mine field is that it is very improbable that the mines are anchored. Anchored or not, they will presently break adrift and so are liable to be met with anywhere around those parts, a danger to friend and foe alike.

The net result of all this is that sooner or later—probably sooner—considerable restrictions will have to be placed on all neutral shipping in or near British waters.* There are certain objections to imposing a systematic search, but the formation of regular convoys could hardly be resented by any innocent neutral, for any delay would be more than compensated for by the risk avoided.

As for our warships, the risks which they run from this kind of warfare is immense, and it also comes under the head of things which cannot be provided for, except by the institution

of a very strict convoy system for all neutrals using waters anywhere contiguous to our coasts.

Next in importance to the discovery of the Tory Island mine field is that on October 31st the old cruiser *Hermes* was submarined in the Straits of Dover.

It has been known for some time that one or more German submarines have been hanging about in the Channel, and every effort has been made against our squadron off Ostend.

The disquieting part of the affair is how and in what way the German submarines manage to maintain themselves without visible means of support.

In "the Battle of the Coast" matters generally remain as heretofore. We learn from an official statement that the old battleship *Venerable* is engaged in the bombardment. She carries 12-inch guns, and the effect of these on the German trenches must be something very terrible. One of the famous German howitzers is said to have been destroyed by well-aimed fire from the 6-inch in one of our gunboats. Now that 12-inch guns have been imported, the German situation anywhere near the coast must be distinctly unpleasant.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

TURKEY'S entry into the war has been no surprise—the *Goeben* and *Breslau* subterfuge prepared us for it long ago. A fortnight ago I suggested that the flight of the *Goeben* before our little *Gloucester* might turn out, after all, to be an item of high strategy. In the Mediterranean itself the *Goeben* had no chance; in the Black Sea, if properly handled, she will neutralise or destroy the whole Russian Black Sea Fleet.

From the German point of view, immediate assets—beyond the bombardment of unfortified towns are not likely to be very great. Whatever the Turco-German Fleet may accomplish in the Black Sea it is abundantly clear that in some way or other Russia will reach Constantinople and hold it.

When the world war is over, it is well on the cards that Russia and Greece may dispute as to who shall hold Byzantium, and Prussia may already be reckoning on some Phoenix resurrection of the German Empire over that event. But, so far as Turkey is concerned, it is the end of the Turks in Europe.

This, however, is neither here nor there at present. The central point is that thus early in the naval game the enemy

*Since these lines were written the Admiralty have imposed certain restrictions.—Ed.

should have been compelled to play his trump card. It is the first real confession of defeat that we have had.

It will probably be many a "Louvain" for many undefended villages on the shores of the Black Sea. Only submarines, destroyers and luck, especially luck, can avail the Russians here. For a while at least, thanks to the *Goeben*, Turkey will pull chestnuts out of the fire for Germany in the Euxine. But it is certainly going to be at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, as the Turks will presently learn. They have given Constantinople to their hereditary foes; and every island in the Levant will presently be Greek.

And in dragging Turkey into the fray Germany has probably hit herself the hardest blow.

These things will not be apparent at first. We may probably look for a rising in Egypt ere long—followed by a corresponding rising in Tripoli against the Italians. The net result will be a forcing of Italy into the camp of the Allies. But these are land and side issues. The main point is that up till now the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been "out of the war," because it was confined to the Black Sea by treaty. Now all is changed.

As a fighting machine the Turkish Navy is quite worthless. The Black Sea issue entirely depends upon the *Goeben*, which is probably equal in actual fighting value to the entire Russian Euxine Fleet, unless it first disables her by torpedo attack. But if the *Goeben* sank every Russian ship in the Black Sea it would not affect main naval operations in the least, and its effects on the military situation would be more inconclusive still. The *Goeben* cannot get out through the Dardanelles without facing a fighting force of the Allies more than able to cope with her. Her utmost capacity is a certain amount of wanton destruction in the Black Sea, for which ultimately Germany will have to pay heavily. And, further, there will arise the question as to whether both she and the *Breslau* are not now of pirate status, and outside all that International Law which they have so flagrantly ignored.

The bombardment of Cattaro continues, and, so far as can be gathered from the meagre reports which come in, it is being slowly destroyed. On sea as on land it looks as though all old ideas about fixed defences must be modified; before this war is over even Heligoland itself may be bombarded into insignificance. At any rate, it is within the region of possibilities.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

Last week's recrudescence of corsairs is marked by the temporary retirement of the *Karlsruhe* and the reappearance of the *Emden*, which on October 28th suddenly appeared at Penang with a dummy fourth funnel and flying (according to Russian accounts) the Japanese flag (according to the French report) a Russian flag. This divergence of opinion is instructive, since by no possibility can the Russian and Japanese flags be mistaken for each other.

We can, therefore, reconstruct with some accuracy what probably happened. The *Emden* approached the Russian cruiser *Jemichug* under the Japanese flag and possibly actually torpedoed the cruiser under it. Being in some way possessed of the information that the French destroyer *Mousqueton* was also at Penang, she then hoisted the Russian ensign, probably hoping to escape in the confusion, or at any rate to obtain advantage out of the *Mousqueton's* expected hesitation.

The whole affair is mysterious, because it is a fixed canon of corsair warfare never to fight if fight can possibly be avoided, as a very little damage may materially impair any future work.

The *Jemichug* was not a powerful ship, but she had a broadside of four 4.7 against the *Emden's* five 4 inch. She was hampered by being at anchor and also by being surprised, but, even so, the *Emden* took enormous risks for no apparent object, since one pursuer more or less could make no difference.

Consequently, we are forced to one of two conclusions. Either Kapitan von Muller has got swelled head and is bent on being in the limelight at all costs, or else, as seems more probable, he is nearing the end of his tether, and now only intent on damaging as many warships as possible before going under. We know that the *Emden* has had to sacrifice two of her colliers—the *Markomania* and the Greek steamer *Pontoporus*—recently, in order to save herself, and from this we may presume that her "communications" have very possibly been cut altogether. It is well within the bounds of probability that she will be next heard of as interned in some neutral port—by preference Siamese.

Another thing which must hamper the *Emden* is that her ammunition must be growing short, and her favourite trick of using the British or other Allied flag is becoming well known. The quarry is therefore a great deal more shy than heretofore.

The *Emden* has now twenty-one merchant ships and two warships to her credit, but the indications are that her days are numbered. In any case, it is clear that the great German scheme of commerce warfare has signally failed and that one way and another the cost of it all to Germany has probably

been greater than the loss inflicted on us. In one way especially has it been a signal failure—it has completely failed to create a British commercial panic. Theoretically ere this we should all have been on short commons with food at famine prices.

It is ironical that this German failure must be in great part due to Prince Louis of Battenberg having urged the early mobilisation of the British Fleet and so prevented many corsairs from materialising. It is curious that the *Emden's* abandonment of the corsair game should coincide with the retirement of "L.B." (as the Navy has always called him) from his post of First Sea Lord on account of a public agitation directed on the fact that as a baby he was a German!

THE FAR EAST.

So far as can be gathered the clouds are closing round Kiao Chau. The sea bombardment appears to be conducted mainly by British warships, while the Japanese land batteries are doing much damage. The German gunboats inside appear to get sunk by slow degrees, but whether they do or do not it is unlikely to affect the main issue, Kiao Chau is doomed to extinction.

MATTERS GENERALLY.

DURING the last week or so the destroyer has receded considerably from her pre-war status. The affair off the Dutch Coast, the sinking of the *Mousqueton* at Penang, all go to indicate that 6-inch and even 4-inch guns are far more deadly against destroyers than was anticipated. Like the submarine, the destroyer also seems doomed to illustrate the old saying about the impotence of the lightweight boxer before the heavyweight.

All of which is still in the embryo stage. We cannot yet say for certain that the "Dreadnought policy" is proved correct. But, whatever happens, it has so far shown itself not to be wrong, despite things done by submarines.

AN IMPORTANT WAR MAP.

One of the most useful of war maps yet published is the large relief map of the central European area issued by Messrs. George Philip at six guineas. It forms a faithful representation of the configuration of Europe—western and central Europe, that is—and gives a clearer idea than can be obtained in any other way of the difficulties that face the Allies in the Rhine Valley, the region of the Argonne, and the Ardennes country—these as instances. The nature of the country over which the Russian troops are also advancing is clearly shown, and altogether the map is an education as regards the difficulties attendant on the conduct of this war. It is a publication that should be found in every club, at every war lecture, and in every country house in which an interest is taken in the progress of the war.

WAR KIT.

Inspection of the materials and methods of Messrs. White, tailors, of 10, Blenheim Street, W., demonstrates that the firm has made special study of the needs of officers proceeding to the war area, and is prepared to give the ultimate of value in conjunction with detailed personal attention to each customer. The prices are extremely reasonable, for a cash system obviates bad debts and gives opportunity for smaller profits than are required in the case of credit firms. There is an overcoat of rainproof frieze which merits special attention, and another thing worthy of note is the "British warm" coat of military pattern—an ideal garment for winter campaigning. These are but instances; the firm is making a speciality of military kit, but equally good value is given in the matter of civilian attire, and the work of the firm as a whole is well worthy of recommendation.

Charing Cross Hospital appeals for funds to equip five wards for the wounded soldiers. The sum required is £3,000. The five newly renovated wards were reopened at the end of last year, and their use by our soldiers and sailors will in no way interfere with the rights of the civil population. Cheques crossed should be made payable to the Appeal Secretary, Charing Cross Hospital.

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THE ENEMY'S TRENCHES.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.


FROM the course the war is taking, it seems most probable that our attention during the next few months will be directed to getting the Germans out of their trenches rather than to digging ourselves in. Now, the best way of getting them out—to use an Irishism—is never to give them a chance of making any trenches to get into.

This seems a counsel of perfection, but it is an idea that has lain at the base of all offensive strategy ever since the days of Napoleon. His immediate predecessors knew all about field entrenchments and used them on what, in proportion to their numbers, was an even greater scale than their descendants in the present war. Even in Marlborough's time the French and Austrians faced one another in fortified lines stretching right across from the marshes in Flanders to the Rhine at a point a little east of the town of Weissenburg, and the lines in those days were far more difficult to assault than now, because they were of much bigger sections, more deliberately traced, and there was then no artillery in existence capable of blowing their parapets and breastworks to pieces.

But Napoleon sacrificed everything to speed of manœuvre—marching his men so much farther and faster than his enemy, that the latter found his lines taken up on one day, completely out-flanked by the next morning, and in sheer desperation dropped the game of entrenching altogether, and tried to meet his enemy by counter-manceuvring. Incidentally, I may add, both sides practically dropped spying altogether as a game hardly worth the candle.

It seems to me that if the Germans had followed Napoleon's ideal and spent all the money they had on increasing the mobility of their troops by all modern appliances, instead of squandering their resources on "black marias," spies, concrete foundations, and so forth, they would have come much nearer to success than they have been throughout this campaign, and presently when we have begun to shift them out of their trenches, the skill of our men in repairing roads, devising means even to do without them, may prove of the utmost value in bringing the campaign to a more speedy conclusion.

I would suggest to intending inventors that they might well concentrate on some sort of steel barge or scow which could reduce its own weight by blowing out compressed air on exactly the same principle as an ordinary rocket.



Something of this description, the whole resting on rollers, the axles of which could be raised and lowered by an ordinary eccentric axle, such as is still in use on the old garrison gun carriage for running the gun back by hand. Our fish torpedoes carry compressed air at 1,000 lb. to the square inch, and it is astonishing what a lifting power air at this pressure will develop.


Meanwhile, we have got to shift the enemy out of his trenches first; and for the moment, thanks to the extraordinary manner in which we have learnt to utilise the ground, as described in my last article but one, we seem to have got back into the old difficulty which beset our ancestors in the old days when "they swore terribly in Flanders." They, as I have said above, had no artillery power adequate to shift their enemy's breastworks. We have learnt to get so close up to our enemy that neither he nor we can utilise our artillery power either to cover or to attack each other's works, for you cannot drop high explosive shells when the trenches are only a couple of hundred of yards apart without endangering both defenders and assailants alike. It is now a frontal duel between rifles and machine guns on either side, and neither is adapted for dropping bullets into trenches at such short ranges.

For the moment we have no accepted means of achieving this end, and must make out by shifts and expedients improvised on the spot.

It is in these circumstances that intelligent men of any rank can make their mark. People are only too eager to jump at a cunning device in such predicaments.


It seems to me that it would be well within the scope of any man with a workshop training to recreate the old-fashioned catapult for throwing packets or bombs of high explosives out of improvised material to be found at almost any railway station, garage, or even a wheelwright's.

Here is the idea:




A stout carriage spring with a cup attachment, fixed at A, is bent down by a wheel and ratchet, and held by a trigger of the simplest design. Such a contraption would easily throw a twenty pound weight three or four hundred yards, or for any distance that might be needed, using more or less compression, and a shower of such bombs, before a rush with the bayonet, would make all the difference in its chances of success.

Or an adaptation of the old "sap roller" might be improvised out of one of the big bobbins or reels used for electric piping, so often seen about the street, and certain to be found in any of the manufacturing towns about the frontier.



You place the explosives inside with an electric fuse and field cable. Wind enough wire or chain around it to make it bullet proof, then taking the wire from the fuse, wind it outside, but between the chains, so as to minimise the risk of getting it cut by a bullet, and let the whole thing roll down hill upon the enemy, paying out the electric cable as it goes, and firing it with the service dynamo exploder just as it lobs into the enemy's trenches. One hundred pound charge fired in this way would create a most disconcerting explosion.

If the ground is level or slopes gently upward, another rope wound round it from above, down, and round thus, would make it run up hill when pulled upon, as in the well-known experiment of making a bobbin of cotton run away from you by pulling the thread towards you.



THE DIRECTION OF MOTION OF THE BOBBIN.

I merely throw out these suggestions to induce the young men joining the New Armies to think, for these things must be done on the spot. There is no time for Headquarters to go into them, and settle on sealed patterns. The whole essence of this kind of warfare is to "get there" without asking questions or waiting for formal authority. If a man makes a blunder, of course he must take the consequences, as in any other walk of life, but "initiative" is nowadays treasured as a most precious possession, and in siege work it has always found its best chance.

THE WAR BY LAND.

By HILAIRE BELLOC.

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I.

"PRESSURE."

WHEN nations conflict in war they bring armies one against the other, and the first object of strategy for each army is to disarm, in as high a degree as possible, the other.

But there is a second, subsidiary object always present in warfare between civilised nations, which indirectly leads to the same result, and that object is the putting of a political and economic "pressure" upon the enemy.

For instance: The German attack in 1870 was directed upon Paris, and rightly: not because Paris was an army, but because with Paris taken French resistance was almost bound to cease.

Now there is in modern Germany no centre corresponding to Paris, and therefore no corresponding political objective.

But look for a moment at the accompanying sketch.



Germany is a nation which has chosen in our own generation to *industrialise* itself; that is, to convert the main part of its energies from agriculture to capitalistic modern manufacture by machinery, notably of metal goods.

There has accompanied this phenomenon what always accompanies it: the nation's reposing upon an urban population of lower physique than of old; its dependence for all information upon a centralised Press in the hands of a few capitalists; a vast proletarian mass, impotent to organise itself or to act with civic initiative—and an absolute physical necessity of *keeping the machinery going*.

If an industrialised country be suddenly condemned to use its agricultural resources alone, it is wounded to death.

In an extreme case, like that of England, it will not even be able to feed itself with the first and most necessary forms of food. It will not have enough *bread* to keep alive. Germany is not yet in this case; yet it suffers in the second degree, which is, that a blow at its industrial districts deprives the mass of its population of their common habit of life and cuts all the channels whereby, within their experience, livelihood can be maintained. You may feed the towns, if industry decays, so long as you still have (as Germany has) a remaining sufficient agricultural population. But even the mere feeding of them would require suddenly organised, vastly competent, entirely centralised control—and the destruction, of course, of all the old bonds of property and credit. Food would have to be taken by force and distributed by officials—to perform the task fully would certainly be too hard, even for the most humanly perfect organisation. The striking at the industrial districts would hamstring the whole nation in the matter of food distribution alone: *e.g.*, Belgium (in spite of vast emigration and small size) to-day.

But there is more than this. The industrial districts collect the currency (and its control) in great depots. Outside them, only the capital and the main seaports have great depots of controlled currency.

Again, the industrial districts provide the opinion, spontaneous or manufactured, upon which the government of such countries reposes.

Again, the industrial districts make a mass of things which the nation has learnt to regard as necessities, and which, in some cases, *are* necessities—especially to the conduct of a campaign. They make the rails and the locomotives and the wagons, the internal-combustion engines, the electrical apparatus, the corn mills, the spinning and weaving machinery, and at certain few spots in them you find concentrated the only available plant for making the guns and explosives.

Now it so happens that the German Empire has its two main industrial districts precisely in those regions which the first shock of an invasion will strike. Roughly speaking, you have (1) the Westphalian and Western group—extending into Lorraine—and (2) the Silesian Eastern group. There is much intermediary; but those two districts are the two nerve-centres, the dual poles, of modern industrial Germany.

Defending Westphalia you have, when the tide shall turn against the Germans in the West and the deadlock there shall break, successive lines of defence, natural and artificial. It may be suggested that a first obvious line, for instance, is through and defending Antwerp, then Brussels, to Namur, and so up the Meuse. Another and shorter could run through and in front of Liège along the Belgian Aisne and

across the Luxembourg highlands down to the Upper Moselle. Another, but longer one, would be the Rhine. Before this last one is reached one outlier of the western industrial field, that in Lorraine, would be lost. But at any rate, from the very beginning of the setback, something upon which modern Germany immediately depends for existence, moral and physical, is in peril. The ruin of Westphalia would mean a hundred times more in this war than the occupation of Berlin; and it is possible that the near future will see Berlin occupied and yet the war not at its conclusion.

But if this "pressure" threatens already upon the West, far more does it threaten upon the East. Silesia is actually adjacent to, coterminous with, the enemy's frontier. The thickest knot of manufactories lies just on that point where the three Empires meet; not a day's march from, nor half a day's march from, the frontier of Russian Poland, but actually on that frontier. And behind this most vulnerable belt lies belt after belt back on to the mountains, making up the whole industrial region of the Upper Oder valley.

It is true that a blow at Silesia would not be the same thing as a blow at Westphalia. To take but one point; armament is manufactured wholly in the western field. There only is found the plant required. Krupp is in the West, and so is Erhard and Sehmer (who, by the way, make not only for Germany, but for Austria, and forge gun-barrels for Krupp as well). The German output of heavy guns, the plant for which is about equal to that of France and England combined, proceeds from, *and can only proceed from*, this vulnerable centre in the West. The French centres of such production are very far removed from the advance of armies: The English ones are defended by the sea and by the Fleet.

To sum up: defeating the German armies in the field, disarming them, is indeed the principal business of the Allied strategy; but a secondary and allied object is the destruction of the manufacturing provinces. And these centres are not in the heart of Germany, but on its borders, so far as this war is concerned. The two German battle-lines in East and West are drawn up to cover as long as may be—and are already perilously close to!—the vital parts.

This, coupled with the importance to the German Government of keeping the war off German soil, gives all its meaning in particular to the present Russian advance and to the Eastern campaign.

As the Russian advance, right up to the Silesian frontiers, has been the feature of the past week, and as the Eastern field of war is still (as I have constantly insisted in these notes) the determining field of the war, I will deal first again this week with the operations in Poland.

II.

THE OPERATIONS IN POLAND.

Three things are required for an appreciation of the operations in Poland during the last week. First, some clear conception of the rate and positions of the Russian advance. Secondly, the nature and extent of the Austro-German reverse. Thirdly, some estimate of the chances the Germans have of entrenching and standing upon this side of their frontier.

As to the first of these points, we have accurate information, and that information concerns, as throughout this Eastern campaign, two main fields of war: A, the East Prussian frontier, and B, the basin of the Vistula; while the latter is naturally subdivided into the Russian effort in front of Warsaw and on the middle Vistula (B-1) where it has principally to



THE BATTLE FRONT IN THE EASTERN AREA.

meet German troops; and (B-2) the Russian effort in front of Sandomir and on the River San, where it has principally to meet Austrian troops.

THE OPERATIONS IN EAST PRUSSIA.



As to the first of these, the East Prussian frontier:


The struggle between the comparatively small bodies engaged (comparatively small in relation to such a war as this: they are larger than anything that Napoleon met in any one field before 1812) is still almost coincident with the frontier between the two nations, and the reason of this coincidence I explained last week. It lies in the all-important political necessity under which the Prussians are of keeping the war as long as possible off German soil. Both the Russian communiqués, though they only give one side of the story, and the map (which is more impartial), show some slight retrocession in the German defensive line. When Bakalarshewo was

taken by the Russians at the beginning of last week, that point, still in Russian soil, marked but a slight advance. But since then the frontier has been crossed in front of the frontier station of Wirballen, and the Russian advance guards have reached Stallupönen. It is quite a short distance—less than a day's march—and we have yet to see how far it can be followed up. But it is significant for two reasons. First, because the German communiqués have for some weeks past insisted upon the Russian attempt to take Wirballen with its entrenched positions, and upon the Russian failure in this attempt on the German left flank. Secondly, because the advance is along that main line of railway which also marked the first abortive Russian invasion at the beginning of the war. Another two days' march on is Gumbinnen on the same line, about 25 miles from the frontier. Yet another two days' march forward is Insterburg—and all that country is *not* Polish, but distinctively German. We have yet to see how far the advance along this main line of railway can continue, but every mile of it turns the general German line on this frontier, and goes through the more open country north of the lakes, avoiding that danger of marsh and fortified defiles in which the Russians suffered their great defeat of the end of August and early September. All along the rest of this frontier there appear to be but little changes. There is the usual pressure and counter-pressure in front of Lyck, but no indication of any permanent foothold here upon German soil. The same is true of the neighbourhood of Bialla, and of the cavalry movement to the north of Mława along the second of the two railway lines which cut the south frontier of East Prussia.

As to the short phrase about the forest of Rominten contained in the Russian communiqué of last Monday, it does indicate cavalry raids, perhaps, into the hunting grounds of the German Emperor, but as yet no occupation. In general, one may say that all along the horseshoe of this frontier there is now such pressure on the Germans that they are slowly receding—but very slowly.

B

THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAIN AUSTRO-GERMAN FORCES IN THE BASIN OF THE VISTULA AND THE SAN.



Upon the main operations on a much larger scale in South Poland we have equally detailed information. The Russian advance has throughout the week been consistent and rapid; the cavalry following

up the German retirement closely, and the prolonged Austrian resistance upon the San having now definitely broken down. There seems even a probability that a wedge may have been driven not, indeed, into the two halves of the main Austro-German force A—A (as at D), retiring upon the Vistula westward through Russian Poland—a breach which was thought possible last week (I said at the time we had no real evidence of it), but at C between these forces, as a whole, and the purely Austrian group in Galicia. For while the mass of the retreating invaders is pressed along the lines marked A—A on the above map, the Austrian bodies, which have hung on rather too long to the line of the San, are evidently behind or Eastward of the line of that retreat, in a position more like B—B, and advance bodies of the Russian pursuit have already reached C. Whether the Austrian bodies at B—B, which are falling back from the San, will be cut off—or any part of them—we cannot yet tell. They have the Carpathians behind them with roads and railways for crossing those mountains; but they have only a few such opportunities for crossing through what will be, for such considerable forces, narrow and congested defiles. If they attempt to pursue the course which plain strategy demands, to retire upon Cracow, and try to keep in line with the main Austro-German body A—A north of the Vistula, then their extreme Eastern contingents will have a very hard task set them to fall back with sufficient rapidity. The main Galician railway from Lemberg to Cracow is not available for this Eastern part of the Austrian host, and it is difficult to see how it can escape being cut off if it now, so late, attempts a Westward retirement upon Cracow. It looks as though the chances were for the following situation to develop:—

For one extreme of the line B—B (the Western and Northern extreme) to fall back Westward, in touch with A—A, stand at Cracow and take part in the coming general battle which the Germans must deliver if they are to save Silesia; while the other extreme, the Eastern and Southern one, will get back as best it can Southward across the Carpathians. In war never prophesy; but that seems the more likely of the various developments open to the situation; the division (at last!) of one of the enemy's lines and a full breach therein driven through Western Galicia.

Having said so much let us consider in rather more detail the operations against, and the retirement of, the main Austro-German body through Russian Poland towards the German frontier.

B (1)

THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS THE FRONTIER BETWEEN RUSSIAN-POLAND AND SILESIA.

When the German invaders were defeated in front of Warsaw three weeks ago, their line, which was attempting to cross the middle Vistula at the points marked A A A A on the following map, was obviously turned, and they had to begin to fall back. The Austro-German forces thus falling back pivoted at first upon Sandomir. Their colleagues, indeed, beyond the Vistula and along the River San, hung on to that line of offence, but they retreated (to the number of at least 800,000 and perhaps a million) in a great sweep towards the West. The marching wing of this swinging line successively abandoned Skieniewice and Lodz, and the country to the North of Lodz. A week ago the middle of that wing was still falling back from and evacuating Sdunskowola, relying everywhere for its retreat upon the main railway which passes through Kalisz and



so enters German territory. The extreme north of this line touched the Warta near Kolo. The south of it passed through Czestochowa, and was thence continued to the neighbourhood of Cracow.

The southern part of the whole line thus falling back similarly relied upon a line of railway, that running from Ivangorod through Radom and Kielce to the place where the three Empires meet. The extreme south-eastern end of it still hung on to Sandomir. Apparently the order for the Austrian and German forces to retire as a whole from the Vistula and the San together was either not suggested, or not given, or if given, not obeyed; and the enemy was still clinging to Sandomir at the junction of the two rivers on the same day (November 3rd) which saw his expulsion from Kielce (at which place he lost a certain number of prisoners and machine guns).

It was precisely because he had hung on to Sandomir so long that the capture of this place by the Russians became of such great importance.

It is evident from the sketch map above that after Sandomir was taken last Tuesday week the southernmost bodies of the Austro-German forces in the neighbourhood of Sandomir had all to cross the Vistula southward in the direction of the arrows C C C, with the exception of some small portion that may have been able to retire directly south-westward in the direction of the arrow B; while the main part of this southern group near Kielce used the railway for their retirement. The Russian cavalry pushed forward and, on November 6th, last Friday, had crossed the River Nida, and the next day, Saturday, the River Nidzica, 10 miles further on. On that day the Austro-German line north of the Vistula

had been pushed back to some such front as is indicated upon the map by the line of dashes, stretching from the neighbourhood of Ploeschen to the positions in front of Cracow, and was presumably continued somewhat south of the Vistula in the direction I have indicated by an interrogation mark. The whole Austro-German retreat was now back upon an average more than a hundred miles from the line of the Vistula, which it had attempted to force three weeks before.

But it had left, dangerously far to the eastward, along the River San, the remainder of the Austrian forces which should have kept in line with this retreat. With the effect of that too prolonged delay upon the San I will deal in a moment. But before leaving this main subject of the German retreat from the Vistula we have to ask ourselves, first, how far the Austro-German force has suffered in this retreat, and, secondly, where this retreat is likely to end and a German stand to be made against the Russian tide, with the chances of success that stand may have.

As to the first of these questions: The answer must be that the German retreat has been orderly and apparently inexpensive. What losses it has involved in killed and wounded we do not know, but there is no Russian account of any considerable capture here of prisoners or of guns. It is, as might be expected, the southern part of the general retirement—where the Austrian were the principal contingents—that has suffered most heavily. But even there the losses of the enemy, chiefly in front of Kielce—which was defended apparently too long—were insignificant compared with their total forces.

We may sum up and say that the German retreat through Russian Poland, from the middle Vistula—Warsaw—Sandomir, has been conducted by the enemy in perfect order and with success.

When we ask ourselves the second question, where the stand will we make—and a stand must be made if industrial Silesia is not to be immediately invaded—we are, of course, on more doubtful ground, and we can only put the matter hypothetically and in the shape of alternatives.

At first it was taken for granted that the Germans would stand, where they had entrenched, on the line of the River Warta, carrying the entrenchments from Kolo northward to the Vistula at the fortress of Thorn by a series of ditches across country. We know from our experience in the West that it is the German habit in this war to send back forces behind a retirement to prepare a position, and there at the end of the retirement to stand. This is what they did upon the Aisne after their retreat had fallen back from the line Paris-Verdun to its present line. But there are certain factors in this case which might modify such a scheme.

In the first place there is no series of heights dominating the Warta (in its middle part at least) as there is a series dominating the course of the Aisne. In the second place the conditions of soil and of season are not so favourable as they were in northern France two months ago. The trenches along the Aisne and across Champagne were made through chalky soil. A great part of western Poland is marshy. In the third place—and this is much the most important point—the Germans have before them in western Poland an enemy already superior in numbers and growing more numerous with every week.

That last is really the capital difference of all. What the Germans could do in Champagne against numbers which were still inferior to their own, they cannot hope to do in Poland against superior forces. To stand on the Warta—which they still may do, but which seems increasingly unlikely—would mean the holding of a very long line any part of which (and particularly the part north of Kolo) might be pierced by determined Russian effort.

Next let us note that there is no railway facility just behind the Warta. There is only one transverse line leading to Kalisch, whereas there is a strategic railway running all along behind and parallel to the frontier from the fortress of Posen, to the point where the three Empires meet. This line could feed all the frontier position. Now heavy artillery needs a railway for its constant and prolonged supply. Further, this frontier is from the point marked D upon the map to the point marked E, a river (the River Prosna). What opportunities it offers for defence I do not know, for I have neither seen it nor read any work upon it, but it is at any rate a continuous water-course suggesting a line of defence. And I now cannot but believe that the most likely place for the Germans to make a stand will rather be near, or upon, their own political frontier than along the River Warta.

There is further evidence of this in the fact that though the Germans tell us that the Russian cavalry attempting to cross the Warta at Kolo was thrown back across the stream, yet *two days later* the Russian official communiqué tells us that a body of their cavalry was another forty miles on raiding across the German frontier as far as the railway station of Ploeschen, which is situated upon that very strategic railway, just behind and along the frontier, to which reference has been made.

That a stand will be made somewhere in this neighbourhood—if not along the Warta, then at any rate somewhere near the frontier—is, as I have repeated, a certainty; because it is absolutely essential to the Prussian scheme to save Silesia.

I have already pointed out how Prussian strategy will inevitably be fettered in the later phases of this campaign by the political necessity of keeping the war, if possible, off German soil. The moment you interfere with the purely strategic elements of a problem by any political consideration, to that extent you weaken yourself. But the German Government has here no choice. After the behaviour of the German armies in the West the reprisals that would inevitably begin upon an occupation of German soil by an enemy would have a quite incalculable effect upon the temper of the nation, and the rich industrial district of Silesia would offer opportunities as great for the exercising of this "pressure" as any part of the Empire.

There would be less anxiety at first for the non-German districts to the north. Posen and all its province are Polish; and it is almost certain that, what with the strength of the fortress of Posen itself and with the all-importance of keeping the Russians out of Silesia, a great battle must be fought to cover that district even at the risk of abandoning the provinces of Posen to the north.

It is on this account that we should be very chary of accepting stories about the immediate intention of the Germans to despatch men to the Western field of war from the East. If they weaken their Eastern frontier and if Silesia is invaded nothing that happens in the West can compensate them for the effects that will immediately follow. Let it be further remembered that if Silesia is once invaded, the line of the Oder (a shallow stream in any case) is turned, and the Oder runs so far westward that in its lower reaches it is but four days' march from Berlin. It is true to say that the German defensive plan has never allowed for the turning from the South of the Eastern defensive river lines of Germany, and it is now precisely from the South that these lines are in danger of being turned.

B (2)

THE OPERATIONS UPON THE SAN.



Meanwhile, as we have seen, the remaining Austrian operations in the valley of the San have great importance because it seems certain that the enemy here has hung on too long.

In the above sketch map the position will be apparent. The Austrians made a very vigorous effort to carry the line of the San, to relieve Przemysl, and to advance upon Lemberg. It was their counter-

offensive following upon their defeats in the beginning of September; and that counter-offensive was made possible by the withdrawal of Russian forces northward to meet the great main German attack upon the middle Vistula. At first it looked as though this effort upon the San was going to be successful. It had (supposing the German plan had come off, supposing Warsaw had been taken and the middle Vistula held) a high strategic value. The forcing of the line of the San, the relief of Przemyśl, and the threatening of Lemberg would obviously have turned the Russian south end or left; and this Russian left was at first weak from the withdrawal northward of the forces I have named.

But Russian reinforcements were perpetually coming up upon the San from the interior, and at the same time the German effort upon the Vistula broke down. The moment it broke down it was strategically necessary for the Austrian forces that had been trying to cross the San (and had in some places succeeded), and had also successfully pushed forward across the Carpathians along the arrows A—A towards Lemberg, to fall back at once into line with the Austro-German retreat to the north. For some reason or other this retirement was not effected; at any rate it was not effected with sufficient rapidity. There were Austrians still at Jaroslav and roughly along the line B—B at a moment when the Russian advance beyond the Vistula had already reached the line C—C, which is that of the River Nidzica. It is here that the capital importance of the capture of Sandomir by the Russians last Tuesday week is apparent. It gave them a chance of cutting off a portion at least of the Austrian forces. The now largely increased Russian bodies on the San made good their crossings at Nisko and Rudnik and before Leheisk. By last Sunday they had got into Jaroslav, and it is fairly certain that they have already completely reinvaded Przemyśl. Their main line in Galicia was on Monday last less than 100 miles from Cracow and their cavalry in Russian Poland less than 30 miles from that fortress.

Further, there has been on this front a real success in the way of harrying the Austrian retreat. The official communiqué gives 12,000 prisoners taken along the San and, though apparently no guns, a certain number of maxims.

I should here perhaps explain to the reader why I have not counted either, in describing the retreat of the Austro-Germans from the Vistula as orderly, Reuter's report of nearly 19,000 men taken prisoners by the Russians, with forty guns, or the report from Rome of 200 guns taken on the San with 25,000 prisoners.

My reason is, not that these accounts may not be true or based upon truth, but simply that they are no part of the official communiqués. News received from any other source than the official communiqués must, for the purposes of an accurate judgment, be closely checked. Sometimes it vividly illustrates some hypothesis upon which there are other converging lines of proof; sometimes, by some accident, it betrays a useful and unexpected bit of knowledge. But mere rumours of losses like these should always be looked at with reserve and compared with the declarations of the General Staff. And all that we have from the Russian General Staff at the moment of writing is the announcement of 12,000 Austrian prisoners upon the San, with no mention of field pieces or howitzers.

German forces there are strictly on the defensive; the Russian forces are evidently increasing, and the frontier has been just crossed at the point where the main international line cuts it.

(B) The main operations in the South have gone steadily in favour of the Russians, and while there has been, apparently, no cutting of the chief German line north of the Vistula, it is possible that certain of the Austrian forces in Galicia will be cut off from that chief line.

Meanwhile [B (1)] the main Austro-German force, which has been retreating through Russian-Poland, will be compelled immediately to give battle, probably well behind the line of the Warta and nearer the line of the frontier, on peril of losing Silesia. This main enemy force in Poland is still intact and has retreated with success, though with rapidity.

But [B (2)] the corresponding Austrian effort along the San, which was the prolongation of the line through Russian-Poland, has also failed, with less order in its retreat. Many prisoners have been lost; and there seems a probability of this body being cut off from the main body in Russian-Poland beyond the Vistula, or at the least of the eastern portion being cut off unless it can escape across the Carpathians, in which case it will still be divided from the main body.

So much for the campaign in the Eastern field, which is still the decisive one in the campaign. The Western operations, though more vitally near to ourselves, have, for the moment, less interest, and may be more briefly told.

III.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST.



We may sum up and say that so far as the operations in the Eastern field of war are concerned:—

(A) The East Prussian frontier is still held; the

The campaign in the West has proved throughout all the last few days so complete a deadlock that there is very little more that can be usefully said upon it at the moment of writing this, Tuesday evening. But it may be of service to recall the general features of the Allied line between Arras and the North Sea, and to show where the main effort is now falling.


In the foregoing map that line is approximately given. It runs from in front of Nieuport, cuts the Yser Canal, recrosses it again in front of Dixmude, makes a bulge round Ypres, with another bulge round Armentières, and then suffers a considerable and significant sag between La Bassée and Béthune.

It has sufficiently been explained in these notes that to capture the whole north coast of France, to uncover Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and to be the master of the Straits opposite Dover, a successful "bolt" driven through the point C at La Bassée would have had all the effect required. The Allied forces to the north of that point would hardly have escaped if the Germans had broken the line between La Bassée and Béthune. Such a success would further have put immediately into German hands the two junctions of Hazebrouck and Béthune (X—X) from which no fewer than four

lines of railway were available for the advance upon the sea-coast to Dunkirk, to Calais, and to Boulogne itself. We have further seen in these notes how, instead of concentrating all their strength upon this "bolt" at La Bassée, a furious attempt, lasting for nearly a fortnight, inviting defeat and finally suffering such defeat, was made by the Germans upon the front between Dixmude and Nieuport at A. The line of the Yser Canal was ultimately forced by the Germans, at an expense in killed and wounded of the equivalent at least of an army corps; but they could do nothing upon the further side, and were flooded out. This attempt has now been abandoned.

But even so, the enemy has not concentrated, as one would think he should have, upon La Bassée. He has again divided his forces, and maintaining very considerable strength at La Bassée, he has poured masses of men against the Ypres salient at B.

He has somewhat pushed in this salient, but he has not quite flattened it out. By last advices received, he was not in Ypres, though he was shelling it, and the Allied forces still successfully contained the attack.



The nearest point which the enemy seems to have seized in this converging attack upon Ypres is the little village in the belt of woods marked upon the accompanying map of the neighbourhood of Ypres, Klein Zillebeke. But from this village he has been driven out again. The line, roughly speaking, is now one with a radius of about 4 miles from Ypres, and the battle still presents the successive features with which we are so familiar upon this front—of a violent attack by the enemy in numbers greatly superior to the local defences, of his initial success over a belt of from 5 to 3 miles, and then of the pinning of him—after losses anything between two and three times our own. Not that the Allied losses in this field have not been exceedingly heavy—all the official communiqués insist upon that. But, from the nature of the attack and from the vast accumulation of force which the enemy made for it, we can be quite certain that his loss was far superior to ours.

Beyond the approximate trace of the allied line contained in these notes, there is nothing to be said upon the Western field of war at the moment of writing—save that the great concentration of men which the enemy were reported to be making for a further attack in Flanders has apparently been halted by news from the eastern field of war.

There has been so much wild talk about the movement of men from east to west and from west to east by the Germans that one hesitates to believe any of it; but in this case, not only is the evidence fairly good, or at any rate voluminous, but there is for once a probability in favour of what is alleged.

It is perfectly possible and even probable that, when the Russian pressure was found to be more severe than had been anticipated, and when, apparently, it was no longer thought possible to hold the line of the Warta, the Germans felt a real danger in that field menacing the two cardinal points of their military policy—the keeping of the war off German soil and the saving of the industrial districts. And it is, therefore, credible that a movement of troops from west to east, a change in the plan of bringing overwhelming forces to the west (a plan made only a week ago), has taken place; in which case we have yet another confirmation of the general truth that the deciding factor of the whole European campaign is still to be found in Poland.

I would conclude with two notes on subjects equally important to a just estimate of the campaign. The first is the question of German supply and of the effect on it of British sea-power, the second the German statement of *our* losses by capture.

THE QUESTION OF GERMAN SUPPLY.

It is obvious that the chief effect of British sea-power in this war and its chief advantage to the Allies has been the virtual blockade it has established against the enemy. That blockade is not absolute, because there are neutral countries through which, though with difficulty, the enemy can receive supplies. But when the amount of these supplies becomes abnormal—that is when the neutral country is importing obviously far more than it can possibly want for itself—suspicion on the part of the blockaders is sufficiently strong to warrant very strict search, and even to interfere with such supply. It is this conclusion, for instance, which has led to the closing of the North Sea.

On the other hand, no sea blockade is of effect in preventing the export of military necessities from adjacent neutral countries into the enemy's territory,

when these products are to be discovered in the neutral countries themselves.

Let us consider what it is that Germany most needs in the way of foreign supply, and discover how far the blockade affects her.

There are obviously two great categories into which supply from abroad will fall: (1) material directly required for war, (2) material only indirectly necessary for a nation at war.

I.—Under (1) we have:—

- (a) Copper.
- (b) Petrol.
- (c) Rubber.
- (d) Certain chemicals necessary for the manufacture of high explosives—notably nitrates.
- (e) A certain proportion of food and of fabrics for the feeding and clothing of the troops.
- (f) Horses.

Now of these six, only three, (b) (c) and (f), are appreciably affected by the blockade. The chemicals (d), which the enemy needs for his high explosives, the nitrates, he can obtain from the great works in Norway (German owned), and from his own works. Nitrogen is universal.

And here by the way it is worth remarking that the talk about the Germans having some special new explosive, more powerful than that of the French, is great nonsense. If anything the French explosives have a superiority, and this is worth remembering when we consider that most of the work done against permanent fortifications by the Germans has not been done with howitzers over 5 in. calibre, and the largest of those which have done any prolonged and effective work have been the 11 in. But to return to supply.

The small amount of copper (a) required for shells can probably continue to be smuggled in. It is true that the total amount available from ore in the enemy's own territory and in adjacent neutral countries (such as Sweden) is not 15 per cent. of the normal supply necessary to German industry, but it is ample for the mere manufacture of those bands which are a necessity to projectiles used in modern rifled cannon.

Food and fabric Germany can certainly discover—or rather, Germany and Austria combined—*so long as German territory itself is intact*. That last phrase is of course essential.

But with (b) petrol, (f) horses, and (c) rubber, the case is different. Let us take them separately.

The supply of *horses* for German armament depended to some extent upon perpetual purchase in France and the British Isles—notably Ireland. Nothing is wasted more lavishly in war than horseflesh. Nothing can replace horseflesh for traction, however much competent critics may quarrel as to the rôle of cavalry. Petrol will replace traction upon good roads, but you cannot handle an army, and especially its lighter artillery, without a constant supply of horses. Nor will the most convinced critic of modern cavalry deny its rôle altogether, especially in the later stages of the war. Now it is true that, of the two Allies, Austria can provide some reserve of horses, but not enough. Germany certainly cannot. Russia will not; France and England will not; nor will they be imported. The Germans happen to have been particularly lavish in their expenditure of horseflesh in the first months of the war; and it is as certain as anything can be that the shortage in horses is already felt, and will very soon be severely felt, by the enemy.

The question of (b) *petrol* is much more complicated. In the first place, large stocks have already been accumulated through import by way of neutral countries. In the second place, there is a supply within the enemy's territory, from the middle Carpathians—what are called the Galician oil-fields. It is probable that at the moment of writing, a part of these are already occupied by the Russian invasion; but they are not yet all occupied. Further, there is a supply from Roumania, the firms importing the petrol from this district being in German hands; and as the supply lies in the southern part of the frontier between Hungary and Roumania, it should be long before Russian action could cut it off. Of the political accidents which may restrict this supply in the future, or may already have restricted it, I say nothing. I take the thing at its worst and conclude that the enemy still has a supply from the Galician field (though now restricted) and a full supply from the Roumanian field. But even so, the shortage of petrol is already felt by the enemy. There are various indications of this; some public, such as the sudden and rather desperate expedients used for foreign import; some private, not to be published, and in my opinion even more conclusive. It must be remembered that, especially in the western field of war, the Germans have been utterly spendthrift of this necessity. To use it regardless of the future was all of a piece with that original claim or plan which envisaged an overwhelming, successful and immediate blow against France before autumn had arrived.

But there is a material, benzol, a by-product of coke and of the smelting work in Germany which, though not always with the same type of engine, could in part replace petrol. The inexhaustible mining industry of Germany would provide it. Unless, however, coal is to be used for this purpose alone, there is a restriction in the supply through the shutting down of so much of the metal industry. In August only 30 per cent. of the normal smelting was going on in the German Empire. To-day it must be very much less.

One may sum up and say that of petrol, and even of a substitute for petrol, there is already a shortage, and that before next April, at the very latest—on condition that the blockade can be maintained strictly to that date—the shortage will be so severely felt as to affect the whole operation of the war.

Now as to (c) *rubber*. Here there is necessarily a shortage of a peculiarly dangerous sort. Rubber does not keep. The wastage is enormous, especially (1) through the climatic conditions of winter (2) through the increasing badness of the roads as the campaign proceeds; and the shortage is already very severely felt. No rubber will reach the enemy territory so long as the British blockade is maintained. There is, of course, a large supply in the control of the Dutch, from their colonies (as there is of oil), but the normal imports and exports of a neutral are easily measured. Of all necessities in modern war this one of rubber is that which will perhaps be first and most seriously curtailed, and it is that lack which the enemy will first severely feel.

2.—Now for the second category, the materials which only indirectly subserve an army. They fall into two categories: (a) the material which directly supports a population—its food, clothing, building material, &c.; (b) the material which is necessary to the continued industry of an industrial country and lacking which you create a great strain of unemployment. As to the first:—

(a) The enemy's population can feed itself: of that there is little doubt. The existing stocks are sufficient for a year's supply, and, though the areas of supply could be occupied by the enemy, the population, even urban, inhabiting those areas, will still be fed.

The same is not quite so true of fabrics, for fabrics are confined to the industrial regions of the West and of the East, and it is precisely these that will feel the first shock of invasion, as we have seen in discussing the threat to Silesia. But we may fairly say that economic pressure will hardly come upon the enemy in the form of any severe restriction of his food or clothing, and his material for housing is of course ample.

(b) But when we come to materials necessary to his industry it is another matter. Here you have a whole host of things besides those which are directly useful as material to an armed force. And of those which are also useful to an armed force, many are necessary to industry as well. Take, for example, copper. For an ounce of this that you may need in the army, you want a great deal more than a pound for the vast electrical industry of Germany. Further note that this electrical industry is largely centred in the capital, Berlin, upon the temper of which so very much depends. It is true that Germany has within her own territory vast stores of iron and of coal: but, for the rest, the mass of her industry is supported, as is that of all industrialised Europe, on imports of material from over sea; and when those imports fail Germany, her manufactories shut down. Note that this factor of "unemployment" is modified first by the fact that the great bulk of those employed will be used as soldiers, and secondly by the fact that it is not in any absolute economic sense *necessary*, even to an industrial nation at war, that it should continue to be industrially producing, unless, indeed, it can only get its food (as we do) by exporting the manufactured material. Germany can live, though hardly, without exporting manufactured material to pay for food.

But though there is no absolute necessity in pure economic theory for Germany to fail through unemployment, there is something pretty well amounting to a necessity. When the older men and the lads and the women are thrown out of employment, it is, as has been seen, a tremendous piece of staff-work in an industrial country to organise their food and clothing and housing during a campaign. It is too big a piece of work to be practicable. And the pressure which the blockade will produce in this fashion is perhaps an even more important thing than the pressure it will produce upon the supply of the armies.

THE GERMAN STATISTICS OF OUR LOSSES IN PRISONERS.

I gave last week an analysis estimating the minimum of what seemed to be the total losses to date of the Germanic Powers. I said at the same time that an estimate of the corresponding losses upon the Allied side was not advisable in public interest, but that anyone who chose to use similar methods for making a comparison of his own in private would not be discouraged by the result.

As the Germans have since then given official lists of the total number of *prisoners* whom they claim to be present in Germany, taken from the Allied forces, one element in the problem is public property, and I will, with my readers' leave, closely analyse these figures. They have for us a two-fold importance. First, they enable us to gauge something of the state of mind of official Germany; secondly, they will be useful to us (especially a little later on) in the contrast

that may have to be finally established between our losses and those of the enemy.

Here I would again emphasize what I emphasized last week—the character of official German news. The giving of such news is not more controlled by common morals than is any other part of Prussian effort in this war. It is based upon a calculation of the effect to be produced upon the enemy. It is part of such a calculation that exact figures in matters which the General Staffs of the foreign army can check for themselves will have great moral effect. It is thought, with justice, that if a certain type of official German news, communicated by the German Government, corresponds to what the General Staffs opposing Germany already know, then such other statements as the German Government may choose to make later for purposes of deception will probably be credited also by the General Staffs of the Allies. It is a perfectly simple method and a very good one; and according to this idea we might expect the official lists of prisoners taken from the Allies to correspond fairly accurately to the estimate the Allies are themselves able to make of their own “missing.”

But there are two certain considerations which tempt the Germans to exaggerate in this particular. The total number of missing, with which any General Staff is supplied with regard to its own side, is always *more* than the real number of mere prisoners. There are whole categories of missing that do not correspond to prisoners at all; undiscovered wounded and dead; stragglers who rejoin, and, in some cases, of troops upon the frontiers, desertion. This last category is, however, a very small one indeed on the Allied side, because the Allied troops do not include unwilling recruits as the German troops do. Further, it is of great importance to the German Government to be able to emphasize and if need be to exaggerate the number of the prisoners whom it holds. Everything must be done in these critical weeks to maintain the belief of the German population at home that victory can yet be achieved. This population is able to watch the great numbers coming into the prisoners' camps; it is not able to distinguish between true prisoners of war and others, and therefore an exaggeration of those numbers is both possible, and upon the whole worth the while of the German Staff. To some extent they weaken their moral lever of accuracy in the eyes of the enemy, but they more than gain that loss by their raising of civilian spirits in Germany itself.

All this is as much as to say that unlike the statistics of German dead (but like the statistics of German wounded), the official German statistics of prisoners are likely to be not so much fantastic as manipulated.

Now to put more precisely what I mean let me begin the analysis of these figures.

We are told that on November 1st, the French prisoners in German hands amounted to 191,756; the Russian prisoners to 191,900; the Belgian prisoners to 35,444; and the British prisoners to 16,147.

The first thing we note about these figures is a very large increase indeed over the numbers given not much more than three weeks ago. The Belgian increase, indeed, is not remarkable. But the French figures are increased by thirty per cent.; the Russian figures by about twenty per cent.; the British figures are nearly doubled.

This increase should be carefully noted. Something corresponding to it happened after the German victory at Tannenberg over the Russians. At first a

certain figure was given. Then news reached the West of the great Russian victory at Lemberg and the Austrian prisoners captured (to the total number of about 60,000) in that disaster. Immediately afterwards the German figures for the prisoners at Tannenberg were reissued at more than double their original amount.

I do not suggest that the German authorities simply said, “We must publish a larger number of prisoners; just set down double the original amount.” Nothing so enthusiastically simple would occur to the careful calculators, who are considering not only the figures before them, but the effect those figures will have upon Europe and the power the enemy has of checking them. What I suggest is rather that someone in authority says:

“How many prisoners did you take at Tannenberg?”

He is answered: “About thirty thousand, sir.”

The person in authority then says: “Surely there is likely to be a considerable number picked up during the pursuit of which we have not yet heard?”

And then he is answered: “Certainly.”

Whereupon, in the most honest way in the world, it is arrived at that one may fairly add another twenty thousand without fear of facts ultimately belying one. The Russians have probably far more than that number missing, &c., &c.

Then the person in authority says: “You have, of course, counted all the wounded?”

And he is answered: “No, sir, we did not count all the wounded and none of those who have since died of wounds.”

But the person in authority says that these figures have their importance because the enemy can hardly distinguish, save in a few individual cases, between the dead and wounded whom he has left behind and the unwounded prisoners. So in all fairness one can clap on *another* twenty thousand, and at the end of the process a figure is made out much more satisfactory than the first figure.

In exactly the same way the estimate of total prisoners—not after a particular action the effect of which it is desired to emphasise, but in the whole course of the campaign—can be swelled by every conceivable method which the captor regards as legitimate for the purpose of affecting his foes adversely and raising the spirits of his friends. He will include every kind of enemy he has laid his hands upon; the grievously wounded with the unwounded; civilians taken away into captivity, according to the remarkable method developed by the Germans since the first battles in Belgium; enemy civilians detained under suspicion, and so forth. In other words, the totals will be swelled, not to figures which manifestly war against the truth, but to the highest possible limits which any meaning of the word “prisoner” will admit.

Now in order to discover how far this method has been pursued we have certain tests which can be applied. Let us take the number of French prisoners and deal with that as a particular case. The Germans announce 191,756; that is, not quite double, but more than seventy per cent. over, the number of German prisoners said to be held in France. To this comparison I will return later, but for the moment I beg the reader to fix his attention upon that figure, 191,756. They have suddenly increased their holding of French prisoners by a third since their declaration of some weeks ago.

But in the interval they have been careful to give us accounts of prisoners picked up in actions where

they can legitimately claim small local successes, as for instance at Vailly the other day. Now the total of these small captures, though all wounded are certainly included and probably a good many civilians as well, does not amount to anything like the difference between the old figures and the new. It does not amount to a quarter of the difference. It is true that the perpetual swaying back and forth over a few hundred yards of the long line from the Vosges to the sea gives perpetual opportunities for the picking up of wounded whenever there is an advance by the Germans, and before their next corresponding and inevitable retirement. The same opportunities, of course, occur to the French, who bag certain numbers of the enemy, wounded and unwounded, in a similar fashion when *they* on *their* side manage to make a short advance followed later by a corresponding retirement.

But these dribblets do not, at the most, coupled with the larger captures already mentioned, account in the last three or four weeks for half the total of this sudden German increase.

It is manifest, therefore, that some great effort has been made to swell the figures to the greatest possible amount credible by the opposing General Staff. It is no good asking the French General Staff to believe in miracles; to give in a fantastic figure would be merely to defeat the object the Germans have in view. But it is exactly what the German authorities would do to give the very largest number which the most credulous Frenchman with any available figures before him could be got to believe; and it is my first point that the numbers conceivably taken in the field during the interval between the date of the first statistics issued and that of these last statistics come to much less than the increase in the German figures of French prisoners between the two.

We have a second criterion by which to test the validity of their figures. Of these 191,756 nominal French prisoners *only* 3,138 are officers. That is to say, of every sixty men taken prisoner (according to this definition of the word "prisoner") only one man is of commissioned rank.

Now I admit that the proportion of officers killed is always rather higher than the proportion of men killed, and that therefore in picking up the enemy's wounded after an advance you will probably find more men wounded than officers wounded lying on the ground. And this is particularly true of the French and English services where the officer leads in a fashion which makes him very conspicuous. But still, so enormous a disproportion as one out of sixty is exceedingly suspicious.

Let us contrast it with the figures given of British prisoners. The British officer is not more inclined to surrender than the French, nor is his position during a sharp advance less conspicuous. Yet, of a total of British prisoners given as 16,147, 417 are officers. That makes not one in sixty, but one in 38. And one in 38, by the way, is just about a reasonable proportion. One would expect that there would be rather more than thirty private soldiers and non-commissioned officers taken, wounded and unwounded, for each commissioned officer, but rather less than forty. If the proportion fell to below thirty one would conclude that the men were not being properly led; but above forty it gets very suspicious and begins to look as though men were being counted as prisoners who were not soldiers at all.

Remember that it is more difficult to manipulate figures about officers than about men; their social

position is conspicuous; the number of them that are missing is very carefully noted upon the enemy's side; any considerable exaggeration would at once betray itself.

We have already, then, the following facts:—

- (1) The French prisoners claimed by Germany show a proportion of one officer to about sixty men.
- (2) The English prisoners claimed by Germany show about one officer to thirty-eight men.

We know perfectly well, as I have said, that the British officer does not surrender with greater facility than the French, and, what is more, the British have not lost, as the French have, whole garrisons and whole bodies of men in fortified positions where the loss of officers taken prisoners is strictly in proportion to their numbers on the establishment.

We begin to see at once that the numbers of private French prisoners claimed by Germany has something ill-proportioned and exaggerated about it. As we cannot easily believe, knowing the Prussian temperament and the object of these figures, that they are merely fantastic, we must conclude some category is included among the French prisoners which could not be included among the English prisoners. What such category is there? Obviously the civilian population. There is no British civilian population available on the Continent to swell the German statistics save perhaps a handful of Englishmen of military age present in Germany, but there is a very large French population which can be pressed into the service of these remarkable figures. In other words there is a considerable body of Frenchmen unfit for service or use on railways, etc., which the Germans may carry into Germany and count as prisoners although they are not and have not been soldiers.

In order to test the value of such a hypothesis let us take a third criterion, the figure of Belgian prisoners.

Here we have no less than 35,444 in prisoners claimed by the Germans, but of these only 417 are officers!

This is frankly monstrous. It is one officer to more than 84 men. We are asked to believe that the Belgian army is quite different from all other forces in the world; that its officers belong to some fanatical caste that will always prefer death to surrender, even after capitulation, while its rank and file surrender eagerly and upon every possible occasion. That is tomfoolery. The facts are perfectly well known, and are sufficient to account for this extraordinary disproportion. Belgium, even more than Northern France, has been the prey of that singular system whereby the Prussian commanders seize as prisoners those whom they will of the male civilian population. I do not say that in so doing the Germans are not playing to win. I do not say that their action is, in a military sense, useless. When they mop up the men who are necessary in a country, even during the hardest strain of war, to keep the machine going—the miners, the men in arms factories, the railway men, etc.—they are doing what certainly subserves the cause of their victory. But to call these men "prisoners of war" in any ordinary sense is nonsense. And by the fact that they are called prisoners of war we must test the figures before us.

I sum up, therefore, and I say that:—

(1) Admitting that the German authorities do not publish in this type of communicated official statistic merely fantastic figures, but rather strain the meaning of words, and,

(2) Admitting that the British officer does not, as the whole world knows he does not, surrender with facility, and,

(3) Giving the British standard as the highest to be accepted (and it is surely a very high one), we may proceed to estimate the true prisoners of war, that is, the soldiers wounded and unwounded now in German hands from the Western field.

A multiple by which we find from the number of officers the total number of prisoners is, in the case of the British, 38. For the sake of round numbers, and in order not to make our conclusion more cheerful than we can help, let us say for the French not 38 but 40, and see what we get. There are, of French officers wounded and unwounded in German hands, 3,138. Multiply that by 40 and you get 125,520 French prisoners in Germany, wounded and unwounded. If you think that figure too low, add a margin to save all possible contingencies, and call it 150,000. It certainly is *not* 150,000, but we will call it that. Contrast with that figure about 100,000 German prisoners captured in the Western field, none of whom are in hospital (for the hospital figures are not included by the French or the English), and you will perceive that the balance of prisoners upon the two sides is something very different from that which the first German figures might lead one to suppose and were intended to lead one to suppose.

Remember, further, that the taking of prisoners from the Allies in the Western field was particularly a feature of the earlier part of the war when Belgium was broken, and when the French suffered their heavy defeat in front of Metz; when Maubeuge with from 25,000 to 40,000 troops, mainly territorials,

was taken, and when the British contingent and the French Fifth Army suffered the terrible retreat from Mons and the Sambre. Remember that since the retreat of Von Kluck, though the invader has still been in superior numbers, his counter-offensive perpetually engaged, has as perpetually been repulsed—and you will come to the conclusion that the supposed balance against us very nearly cancels out.

Of the numbers of Russian prisoners and of the corresponding German and German-Austrian prisoners in Russian hands I say nothing, because the elements on which to form a judgment are lacking. We know that the Russians suffered heavily at Tannenberg. We know that since the date of that battle the advantage has steadily been with our Allies. But they have given us no statistics of their captures, save in the Austrian field of war, nor have they told us the number of the wounded picked up in the course of a general advance, not even the numbers wounded and unwounded which have fallen into their hands since their great success before Warsaw of now three weeks ago. But if we may judge on the analogy of the Western field, if we remember that civilians from Russian-Poland will have been seized and sent into Germany and counted just as they have been commandeered and counted from Belgium and Northern France, we may perhaps come to the same conclusion about the figures in the Eastern field of war as we have with regard to the figures in the Western field of war. And we may justly conclude that so far, in matters of mere numbers of armed and whole prisoners to be deducted from either force, the balance strikes fairly even. The least advance into German territory will make it strike heavily, and increasingly heavily, against the enemy.

THE WAR BY WATER.

By FRED T. JANE.

NOTE.—THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE PRESS BUREAU, WHICH DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PUBLICATION AS CENSORED AND TAKES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF THE STATEMENTS.

THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.

TOWARDS the end of last week a German Squadron from the China Station—consisting of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, and *Nurnberg*—arrived off the coast of Chile and was reported from Valparaiso.

I mentioned last week that the taking of the offensive by the *Emden* in sinking the *Jemtchug* and *Mousqueton* indicated that our strategy of intercepting their supplies and “stopping earths” was apparently having effect. The circumstance that the *Scharnhorst* group saw fit to keep together suggests the same thing again. For corsair work four ships together are no more effective than one; and anything in the nature of battle—except as a last extremity—is madness, because very little damage may render the corsair useless for her own particular work, even though the battle in which she engages ends in her success.

Therefore, we are reasonably entitled to assume that our pressure was such that the *Scharnhorst* group was compelled to abandon its original function.

The rest is mystery pure and simple. The German Admiral Spee reported that he had met and engaged off Coronel on Sunday, November 1st, Admiral Cradock, that he had sunk the *Monmouth*, set the *Good Hope* on fire, while the *Glasgow* and *Otranto* (armed liner) managed to escape. All that he actually claimed as sunk was the *Monmouth*, and that his own injuries were slight.

The British Admiralty first of all issued a statement to the effect that it was unable to accept the German report as accurate, because the *Canopus*, which had been sent to reinforce Admiral

Cradock, was not mentioned; also that only three German ships came into Valparaiso after the action.

So far, so good. But then the British Admiralty issued a further report to the effect that it had now received “trustworthy information” that the *Good Hope* (flagship) had been sunk: plus a very clear intimation that the *Monmouth* also had gone under. Both accounts agreed that the *Glasgow* was little damaged, and it was definitely stated by our authorities that neither the *Otranto* nor *Canopus* was engaged. Also for the *Nurnberg* the *Dresden* was substituted. Furthermore, there were reports of a warship ashore. This was looked for by a Chilean vessel, which found nothing. Also the Chileans failed to find any wreckage or signs of any battle other than that the three Germans which put into Valparaiso appeared to have been in action.

The next stage of the mystery is that telegrams were widely reported in Portsmouth to have been received from the *Good Hope*—all of them to the effect that she was “unhurt.”

Beyond that absolute silence so far as official reports from either side are concerned. We have, however, fairly full non-official details collected by American correspondents from the crews of the German ships which put into Valparaiso.

The substance of these various narratives pieced together is—as I read it—somewhat as follows:—

The *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto* were met with off the Chilean coast by the German squadron, in a gale. They were presumably waiting for the *Good Hope*; as about then she arrived, and succeeded in joining up with them at the cost of the Germans securing the inshore position—themselves more or less invisible

against the coast, while the British ships were silhouetted against the sunset. Both squadrons then steamed south, gradually approaching each other. The Germans fired at long range and missed. The *Good Hope* did not reply till the range was about 6,000 yards (roughly $3\frac{1}{2}$ land miles).

The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* (incidentally the *Scharnhorst* has for years held the German gunnery record) concentrated first on the *Good Hope*, and then having disabled her, on the *Monmouth*.

Both the range and the weather conditions were such that the affair was necessarily one of big guns.

The forces engaged were as follows:—

BRITISH.		GERMAN.	
<i>Good Hope</i>	2 9.2, 16 6-in.	<i>Scharnhorst</i>	8 8.2, 6 6-in.
<i>Monmouth</i>	14 6-in.	<i>Gneisenau</i>	8 8.2, 6 6-in.
<i>Glasgow</i>	2 6-in, 10 4-in.	<i>Leipzig</i>	10 4.1-in.
		<i>Nurnberg</i>	10 4.1-in.

The respective broadsides work out as follows:—

BRITISH.	GERMAN.
2 9.2	12 8.2
19 6-in.	6 6-in.
5 4-in.	10 4-in.

Which makes twenty-six British against twenty-eight German guns. Translated into approximate terms of relative value, whereby (very roughly) each 4 in. = 1, each 6 in. = 2, each 8.2 = 4, and each 9.2 = 5, we get a paper value of about fifty-three British to seventy German.

But this paper value is absolutely worthless for comparative purposes, because owing to the weather conditions only upper deck guns could be fought.

Consequently the *effective* broadsides work out as follows:—

BRITISH.	GERMAN.
Big 2 9.2-in.	12 8.2-in.
Medium 9 6-in.	None.
Small 5 4-in.	10 4-in.

Six inch guns, however, are practically useless over 4,000 yards, and 4,500 is understood to have been the smallest range. So, only the big guns really counted. The *Monmouth* probably merely represented a target. Whether she did or did not, the relative real fighting values were approximately forty-eight German to ten British, or if we take it in weight of metal per broadside, really effective at the range, 2,904 lb. German to 760 lb. British—say, 4 to 1 instead of about 5 to 1.

Therefore, even assuming equal skill at gunnery, the result was a foregone conclusion. As things were, however, it was the crack gunnery squadron of the German Navy against British ships manned mostly by reservists. The odds against Admiral Cradock can, therefore, in a perfectly sober estimate, be put at 10 to 1 at least; and for once in a way the headlines of the half-penny press about "fearful odds" are literally true!

Pending further information it is undesirable to inquire as to why Admiral Cradock "asked for trouble." My own surmise is that he did not ask; that the Germans caught him, not he the Germans, and that questions as to "Why was the *Canopus* absent?" are ill-timed.

The Germans have obtained a very *material* victory—it is folly to deny it. They have obtained it by precisely the same means which we employed in the Bight of Heligoland—by irresistible odds. Elsewhere in this article I have suggested that just as the *moral* victory of Heligoland was German, so here in this Chilean affair the ultimate *moral* result may be in our favour.

Hitherto we have always had the crushing superiority which long ago Admiral Sir Cloudesley Shovell described as the only real recipe for victory. In the affair off Chile the tables were turned. Our officers and men proved themselves every whit as game—and perhaps a little more so—than did the Germans in the Bight of Heligoland affair.

I do not wish to elaborate my peculiar views unduly, so here for the present I will leave the matter, save to reiterate my opinion that the battle of Coronel will ultimately prove to have been a *result in our favour*.

Modern warfare is essentially a matter of moral effect. It has nothing to do with the sinking of ships, but only with the way in which men fight in those ships. That is the essence of "new conditions."

THE NORTH SEA.

On November the 3rd a German squadron made a raid into the North Sea.

Shots were fired off Yarmouth and Lowestoft, aimed apparently at nothing in particular—at any rate, no damage was done to anything or anybody by this "bombardment of the coast defences."

In the course of these operations the British gunboat *Halcyon* was discovered and a hundred rounds fired at her. Only two hits were registered, and the damage done by these was trivial. From which, seeing that the *Halcyon* was at anchor we can in the first place deduce very bad shooting, and in the second place gather that presumably only small guns were fired at her.

The *Halcyon* was able to call up assistance, but the Germans did not wait for any action. They retreated, dropping mines astern, and our submarine *D5*, striking one, was destroyed.

In Germany this raid has been received with extraordinary enthusiasm, altogether out of importance with the results. As to why the raid was made, there is some obscurity. Considerable risks were run both in coming and returning, and in connection with the return the armoured cruiser *Yorck* was lost.

According to the German official statement the *Yorck* accidentally struck a German mine at the mouth of the Jahde, but there is a suspicion that the mines were laid by us or that she was submarined. Probably, however, the German official statement is correct; they would hardly attribute to their own mismanagement anything which could be put down to the enemy.

Be that all as it may, however, the *Yorck* has been sunk with the loss of about half her crew, and the loss is more serious than the intrinsic value of the ship as a fighting unit. As a unit she was somewhat superior to our *Monmouth*, though of slightly less displacement. Her armament was 4 8.2, 10 6 inch as against the 14 6 inch of the *Monmouth*. The armour in both cases was the same—4 inches. Both were of about equal date, but beyond that differed radically; the *Yorck* being gunned at the expense of speed (she could barely do 21 knots), while the *Monmouth* was given speed (23 to 24 knots) at the expense of guns.

Where the blow falls heaviest on Germany is that she has lost another cruiser out of a fleet already badly depleted by the detaching of several of these vessels for commerce warfare and the losses inflicted by our ships at Heligoland. A fleet without



MAP TO INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE AREA OF THE NORTH SEA NOW PROHIBITED BY THE ADMIRALTY.

sufficient cruisers is more or less blind, and it is also in heavy danger from destroyer attack. Consequently we could well do with many more German "raids"—provided they reproduced the one in question.

Thus, for the German loss. We have now to consider the German gain. The only *material* advantage that I can see is that they have learned something of our defensive arrangements and sunk one of our submarines. But as this was purely a matter of chance, they can no more claim it as a result secured than we can put in a similar claim for the *Yorck*. The damage done to the *Halcyon* is trivial; for that matter, had they sunk her it would have been no advantage worth mention.

Matters, therefore, are reduced to the *moral* advantage. Here the Germans believe that they have scored heavily; but between belief and fact there is occasionally a great gulf fixed. As a matter of fact—except in so far as it may cheer up their own men—this raid appears to me as a bad moral defeat for the Germans, and that quite outside the loss of the *Yorck*.

Their moral loss is three-fold. In the first place, the raid entirely failed to create any panic, which was obviously what it was primarily intended to accomplish.

In the second place, in order to make the demonstration the Germans had to negotiate a mine field of ours. This they did without the least difficulty, conclusive proofs that they knew the exact road through the mine field, knowledge which could only have been arrived at surreptitiously. Forewarned is forearmed! In demonstrating to us that they *do* know, they have struck themselves a far heavier blow than the loss of the *Yorck*.

Thirdly, there are certain important psychological features of the raid which are of the utmost moral importance. The two per cent. of hits against the *Halcyon* was extremely bad gunnery as compared with all the German gunnery, good, bad, or indifferent, which we have so far experienced. Now, *exceptionally bad* gunnery in war time invariably spells one thing—the “rattles.” The gunners in the great raid destined to put terror into the heart of England, were obviously in a good deal of terror themselves.

We must be careful how we take it as a view of the *morale* of the German Navy as a whole. But we can take it that the difference between the enemy we met at Heligoland and the men who “raided” our East Coast is so great that something has probably happened in the interim.

Probably it means that the effect of enforced inaction is making itself felt just as it made itself felt on the enemy confined to harbour in the days of the Great War a hundred odd years ago. We know enough of German gunnery and German averages to be quite certain that a mere two per cent. of hits against a *stationary* target must have a meaning.

There is, of course, the possibility that the bad shooting was deliberately planned, but I cannot imagine this likely. The sinking of any British warship whatever, right off the English coast, would have been an asset of high moral value to Germany. Nor can one conceive of any expected advantage from such pretended bad shooting.

I may seem to have written a great deal about an incident which has generally been passed over as trivial; but when the war is finished, and the books are opened, I am strongly of opinion that this seemingly farcical German raid on the East Coast will turn out to have been of considerable value to us.

I understand from correspondence received that I have achieved a certain amount of unpopularity because I suggested that the Heligoland affair instead of being—as popularly claimed—a “Great British victory” was really a moral victory for Germany. That view I still hold. Along precisely the same lines I think that the German East Coast Raid is a “British victory” of the utmost importance—something beside which Admiral Cradock’s defeat off the Coast of Chile sinks into complete insignificance. We cannot (if we want to know where we *really* are) consider the new naval warfare along the lines of the old. Everything is altered.

For the public to attune itself to the new conditions is naturally bound to take time. For a thousand years we have been trained to think in terms of losses—of ships sunk and men destroyed. The new warfare, however, is something utterly different.

Of course, if the German High Sea Fleet did come out and give battle to our Dreadnoughts—victory would be victory. But even so, there would not necessarily be a moral Trafalgar on either side. The whole matter is too complex to be put into ordinary words. Only in the crudest possible way can I attempt to explain the (to most readers) abnormal view I take of things. So far as I can do so—it is something like this.

In the old days you killed the enemy or else he killed you. Who killed best was the victor. But under the new conditions which have arisen some new condition has been brought into being. The thing done in one place may directly cause a strong reaction elsewhere. For example, Spee’s defeat of Cradock may put a terrible stiffening into a British crew faced with odds in some quite other part of the world. In the old days events in one quarter remained unknown in another—now *nous avons change tout cela*. Every combatant in the naval field knows almost at once everything that happens elsewhere and takes it according to his calibre.

I have, I fear, inadequately expressed my meaning and failed to explain logically my theory that victory may really be defeat, and defeat victory in modern conditions. Words fail. But for myself I am absolutely convinced that, despite all this jubilation in Berlin, the two worst disasters sustained by Germany are the famous raid against our East Coast and the defeat of Admiral Cradock off the coast of Chile.

To assert a thing of this sort is giving hostages to fortune with a vengeance. However, I do assert it.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Accounts from here are at present too chaotic to count for much. It is apparently established that the German-led Turks have sunk the *Prut*, a Russian mine-layer of 5,000 tons odd. They have also probably sunk one Russian destroyer (the Turkish story runs to four), and since November 3rd one of the Dardanelles

forts has been persistently bombarded with the usual result—*i.e.*, the absolute uselessness of fixed defences under modern conditions.

For the rest, Turkey’s action appears to have relieved the pressure on Cattaro, but only to a temporary degree. It will not save Cattaro.

The temporary result is that the Austrians were enabled to reoccupy Lissa and re-erect the wireless there. This has now been destroyed once more by the Allies.

Meanwhile, the British cruiser *Minerva* has made her presence felt at Akaba on the Syrian Coast. On the importance of Akaba I need not dilate; Mr. Belloc explained it amply in his last week’s notes. Therefrom the assumption is permissible that Sea Power has already negatived the expected Turkish advance on Egypt by the only reasonably feasible route.

It may safely be prophesied that Constantinople will be in the hands of the Allies long before any Turkish soldier reaches the Suez Canal and takes on the problem of crossing it in face of a hostile fleet.

Mr. Belloc has indicated the land difficulties which face a Turkish invasion. But these difficulties are as nothing compared to the naval obstacle. The Turks have not a dog’s chance of crossing the Suez Canal. Half a dozen British ships of no actual fighting value whatever are ample to make it absolutely impossible, unless the Germans manage to scuttle something at a lock or the equivalent thereof. Even so, however, crossing an army in the face of Sea Power seems an impossible proposition. Think it out as one will, it is not possible to envisage Turkish troops passing the Suez Canal.

THE FAR EAST.

The somewhat unexpectedly early capture of Kiao-Chau has an importance altogether outside and beyond the intrinsic value of this ex-German outpost.

In the first place it releases a number of ships, both Japanese and British for the extremely difficult task of finding and destroying the enemy’s supply ships and colliers. This—as I have explained in previous articles—is a task of infinitely greater magnitude than the general public has any conception of. But it is the only way.

Actual search for the corsairs themselves is blind man’s bluff in a twenty acre field: the correct reply (which we are making) is “stopping earths.” For this neither speed nor power matter much—the great thing is *numbers*; and an *efficient consular service*, which unfortunately we do not possess. In this direction, at least, we are paying heavily for our past peace economies, an alien custodian of our interests—no matter how honest—cannot be expected to worry himself unduly as to information about hostile movements.

However, this is the sort of difficulty which can be overcome by numbers, hence the importance of the fall of Kiao-Chau.

The second asset is merely moral and psychological, and due mostly, if not entirely, to one of those inconsidered telegrams which so appeal to the Kaiser. A moment or so of consideration would have convinced him that Kiao-Chau was bound to be captured. Yet he had the folly to make it known broadcast that the loss of Kiao-Chau would be considered as worse than the fall of Berlin. The German Press Censors did, for as long as possible, suppress the news; but it was bound to leak out, and its moral effect will be all the heavier accordingly. The exaggerated and melodramatic value placed on Kiao-Chau will utterly negative the enormous psychological result which might otherwise have been produced by the German naval victory off the coast of Chile. In the ordinary way the two things might have balanced. As things are, the Kaiser by that particular Kiao-Chau telegram, has made our loss intangible, and his own very tangible indeed!

Details are a steady bombardment and ultimate bayonet charges; but things of this sort do not matter. What *does* matter is that the Kaiser was foolish enough to send a certain telegram to the Kiao-Chau Commander.

Earl Roberts has advised us of the result of his appeal for glasses for non-commissioned officers in the field. Up to the present he has received over 14,000 pairs of field and stalking glasses. Field-Marshal Sir John French states that the latter, as well as field glasses, are found to be most useful. Many people who had none forwarded cheques, which were utilised for the purchase of suitable glasses. A large number of these very useful additions to equipment are still wanted, and should be forwarded to the National Service League, 72, Victoria-street, London, S.W. In the absence of glasses, cheques would be much appreciated.

Mr. T. Fisher Unwin has just published *From the Trenches—Louvain to the Aisne*, the first account of an eye-witness of the first phases of the great war in the western area. The work is vivid and realistic; it does not pretend to strategic value or historical detail. The author, Mr. Geoffrey Young, relates the things he saw and the impressions he gathered out of the days that immediately followed the outbreak of hostilities, and his story is a very dramatic and interesting one.

SHIFTING THE ENEMY.

SOME FURTHER EXPEDIENTS FOR MODERN TRENCH WARFARE.

By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.

I SEE from the reports of many Belgian correspondents that our friend the enemy is preparing quite gigantic positions entrenched and hollowed out in a manner quite new in field warfare. They are reported as stretching south from Brussels across the field of Waterloo for miles, and behind them are yet other lines of defence, supported by the reconstructed works of Liège and Namur, and continuing along the courses of several rivers running in deeply eroded channels from the high plateaux of Luxemburg.

In fact, wherever we turn we are bound to encounter months of this new kind of abbreviated siege warfare, in which all kinds of shifts and expedients will have to be tried.


I gave some ideas on this subject in my last article, and will now continue the list, endeavouring to profit by the mistakes of our adversary.

The Germans seem to have gone "big howitzer mad"; setting aside the quite sensible use of weapons of exceptional power to deal with such steel and concrete targets as the Liège and Namur and Antwerp defences, they appear to have imagined that the moral effect of a shell increases quite

nowadays, be done by wireless transmission, but this is hardly as yet within the scope of practical politics. The Congreve rocket was simply the ordinary rocket of Crystal Palace displays especially adapted for war purposes. It answered exceedingly well as far as it went, and in the old days in China and up pirate rivers in the East it was frequently used with great success for setting fire to villages from boats too small and light to carry mortars or guns. But there the idea ended, and it has often struck me that it might, nowadays, be most successfully revived by combining the idea of rocket propulsion with some kind of elementary machine on rollers and steering it by cable from the trenches, at any rate, for relatively short distances.

There would, moreover, be a kind of poetic justice about its revival; for, in fact, without the electric attachments it is about the earliest kind of self-propelling vehicle ever devised, and was the invention of an old German inventor about 1545, who published a weird book on fireworks and fire machines, with illustrations, I think, at Nuremberg. We have the book or a later edition of it in the library of the Royal United Service Institution.

My idea would, therefore, work out something like this:—



enormously in proportion to the "big bang" it makes, and for this end have burdened their field armies with a number of big howitzers which have been many times more powerful than the targets they have recently found have required.

It may be that the "big bang" idea is correct. I feel pretty sure that as against the Germans it would prove so, but I submit that it is sheer foolishness to drop "Black Marias" on the ground with such high velocities that the bang only ensues after the shell has buried itself 10 feet deep, and its man-killing power is thus enormously diminished by the smothering effect of the surrounding earth. It blows out a big hole convenient enough for burying dead horses in, but beyond this its useful effect is comparatively limited.

Our answer should be the propulsion of a shell bigger, much bigger, containing a weight of explosives under conditions which would ensure its bursting on the ground level at the right time and place, and without the disadvantage of requiring twenty-six traction engines to use it. Also, it must be efficient at very short ranges if desirable.

The solution I find in a combination of an old naval device, much tried and tested, some forty years ago, by the experts of H.M.S. *Vernon*—the naval torpedo school at Portsmouth, and a revival of the old Congreve war rocket idea which was abandoned, to my mind very prematurely, about the same date, when all attention was focussed on the development of artillery.

The *Vernon* idea was simple and was intended for blowing up harbour booms, caissons, and so forth; very much the same sort of work as we now require on land.

It consisted of an old steam pinnace heavily freighted with explosives, which was set going with a head of steam sufficient to take it well up to its target, and steered by a light electric cable from a parent ship following some considerable distance behind. Of course, in theory, the steering could,

A heavy iron cylinder with knife-edge bow in front, mounted on broad rollers, and weighing a couple of tons, would contain a rocket in an inside case, packed round with asbestos, in front of which wet gun-cotton would be packed, as much as desired, until the second cylinder was full, and then round the second cylinder the empty space would be filled with bolts and nuts or any other old "langridge" to furnish a sufficient supply of man-killing fragments.

The cylinder would have a sufficient preponderance aft to ensure that a fin keel should bite well into the ground when moving. On second thoughts I would dispense with steering-gear altogether, as the vehicle has only to go straight, but keep the electric firing cable so as to ensure detonation exactly at the right time.

As for the calculations required, they are well within the scope of any youngster from any of our modern universities.

We all know that rocket composition consists of charcoal, sulphur, and saltpetre, mixed together, which when set alight burn at a certain temperature—about 3,000° F. if I remember rightly—and give off so-and-so many cubic feet of gas which expands in proportion to the heat evolved.

Having determined the weight of your machine, say about 2 tons—and the rolling friction to be overcome—any man fresh from the workshops can work out the amount of power required to drive it at a given velocity—about 50 feet a second would suffice.

Imagine this crashing through wire entanglements, etc., and then bursting exactly over one of the modern deep dug-outs the gunners find it so difficult if not impossible to attain. If I know my Germans, and I think I do, I will wager they will be a good deal more disconcerted than ever our lads have been by any "Black Maria" of theirs, and we shall not need twenty-six traction engines to haul our machine either—we can extemporise all the heavy material in the nearest workshop.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SIR,—I am a very interested reader of your paper, and particularly those articles dealing on the military, naval, and aeronautical situation as developed in this great war in which this country is embarked.

We have read a great deal about the Zeppelins that are being built, and that are in existence, and in the pages of your paper we have gathered that the number of these is limited, and that their construction is very slow, while as they are useless without their sheds, the time that is taken in constructing these must also be taken into account.

I think that I am not mistaken in saying that the shortest time in which these sheds could be erected was seven months, and that a Zeppelin could not be turned out in less than nine months. This on the authority of your expert.

In this morning's paper I read that Zeppelins are being turned out "every three weeks, which represents a record time of 500 hours per airship."

The discrepancy is so great that one wonders which statement is correct, for it would seem not impossible to approximately, at any rate, arrive at the probable time involved.

With regard to the sheds, I recently saw at the Pavilion Cinematograph, Marble Arch, sheds in course of erection, in which ready-made girders are erected and covered with sheathing, apparently a very expeditious way of arriving at results.

In Doctor Karl Graves' book entitled, "The Secrets of the German War Office," he has a great deal to say about Zeppelins, that the Germans have discovered a metal much lighter than aluminium for the making of the girders, and a gas very much lighter than hydrogen, so that their buoyancy and lifting capacity is enormously increased, while he speaks of the latest Zeppelins being able to carry a crew of twenty-five men, as well as over 7 tons of explosives if needed. He speaks further of their sphere of action being up to 1,400 kilometres, and that they have been known to stay out ninety-six hours.

There are statements made in the book that tend to discredit him, however, for he speaks of Zeppelins being capable of rising to a height of 10,000 feet, while aeroplanes that are generally supposed to be our arm of defence against these aircraft cannot exceed 6,000 feet.

As we have been told very frequently of heights of over 10,000 feet being attained by aeroplanes, heights indeed up to 25,000 feet at which the record is supposed to stand, and I have never seen a height of over 6,000 feet mentioned in connection with Zeppelins, I am led to wonder whether the other statements quoted in this letter are equally inaccurate.

That we have heard little about Zeppelins in actual warfare thus far leads one to hope that they have not been found as efficient as had been hoped by the enemy, but if your expert could answer the statements made in Doctor Graves' book, as also the length of time taken in the building of these craft, it would be of much interest to the public and might reassure them from a meance which is much dreaded by many.

If you could find time to take up this subject in your valued paper, I feel sure that it would be of interest to many of your readers.

CHARLES I. THOMSON.

GERMAN LOSSES.

To the Editor of LAND AND WATER.

SIR,—It may interest your readers to learn that the losses estimated by Mr. Belloc are fully admitted by some of the German War Office officials. My Dutch correspondent has recently been in Berlin, and has intimate acquaintance with the War Department there. He writes me that up to the last week in

October the German losses were admittedly fully 2,000,000! He estimates the total number of Germans engaged in the war from the beginning at nearly 7,000,000. The Germans claim to be able to provide another 3,000,000 men!

Yours faithfully,

ARTHUR KITSON.

National Liberal Club, November 9th

BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

October 15th, 1914.

For many weeks we have all been greatly concerned for the welfare of the sailors and soldiers who are so gallantly fighting our battles by sea and land. Our first consideration has been to meet their more pressing needs, and I have delayed making known a wish that has long been in my heart for fear of encroaching on other funds, the claims of which have been more urgent.

I want you all now to help me to send a Christmas present from the whole nation to every sailor afloat and every soldier at the front. On Christmas Eve, when, like the shepherds of old, they keep their watch, doubtless their thoughts will turn to home and to the loved ones left behind, and perhaps, too, they will recall the days when, as children themselves, they were wont to hang out their stockings, wondering what the morrow had in store.

I am sure that we should all be the happier to feel that we had helped to send our little token of love and sympathy on Christmas morning, something that would be useful and of permanent value, and the making of which may be the means of providing employment in trades adversely affected by the war. Could there be anything more likely to hearten them in their struggle than a present received straight from home on Christmas Day?

Please, will you help me?

MARY.

To H.R.H. THE PRINCESS MARY,

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, LONDON.

I beg to enclose £ s. d. as a donation to your Royal Highness's Fund.

Name.....

Address.....

WAR PUBLICATIONS.

The manual published by the Temple Press in sixpenny form on *How to use a Rifle and Pistol* has already run through two editions, and a third edition has now been issued in revised and considerably enlarged form. There is a valuable addition of matter on such subjects as trajectory, aiming practice, and common errors of shooting, with the ways of correcting and avoiding them. Written in simple, untechnical language, the manual forms one of the best guides to practical rifle shooting on the market, being written throughout by a military man fully conversant with his subject.

The first translation into English of *Treitschke: His Life and Works* has been published at 7s. 6d. by Messrs. Jarrold and Allen & Unwin. Various extracts from the doctrine preached by Treitschke have made their appearance, but now for the first time it is possible for such as are not conversant with the German language to ascertain the views of the historian-professor-war-advocate. It may be added that the book is a revelation as to the German view point, as evident in one of its most learned and distinguished men, who endorses "blood and iron" as a cardinal necessity to the welfare of his country.

Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton have added to their two-shilling series of war books *The German Spy System from Within*, by "ex-Intelligence Officer," who deals with the practical work of the spy system, and exhibits a commendable avoidance of melodramatic story telling. The book is circumstantial, and is based throughout on provable evidence; the chapter on *agents provocateurs* and the German influence on Syndicalism is especially valuable, and the book as a whole is one well worthy of perusal.

The official German point of view as regards war is admirably, if rather too briefly, stated in *Germany's War Mania*, which condenses the utterances of the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Bulow, Bernhardi, von der Goltz, and others. The object of the book is to show that Germany, as represented by its chief men, is utterly permeated with the doctrine of the necessity of war to the development of a nation, and the argument is well enforced out of German mouths.

LOOKING BACKWARDS.

Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal on "The World's War by Land and Water" will doubtless wish to retain in correct rotation these remarkable series of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE. We have, therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold the first thirteen numbers, at a cost of 1s. 6d. each.

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